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1. SUMMARY: The primary issue is whether named 
plaintiffs, who purport to represent a class for 'tvhich 
certification was denied>and to whom the derendant has 
tendered all the relief they seek, may appeal the denial 
of class certification. 
( 
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2. FACTS: This is a suit by resps as credit card 
holders to recover for violations of state usery statutes 
to the extent provided by the National Bank Act. Resps 
sued as named plaintiffs on behalf of a class vf 90,000. 
The DC denied class certification on numerous grounds: resps -.._.., _ __, 
were unable or unwilling to finance adequate representation; 
the class was unmanageable; individual suits would be less of 
a burden on the courts and less of a threat to the solvency 
of the involved bank; and a class action would undercut state 
substantive law prohibiting the aggregation of usery claims. 
Petr subsequently tendered to resps their monetary demands, 
interest, and court costs. The DC dismissed the action without ___________., 
prejudice to the rights of the unnamed class members. 
On an appeal by resps, theCA first found that the 
case was not moot and resps could appeal. Since in these 
circumstances there was no obligation to notify the class of 
the dismissal, resps and the DC had a duty to ascertain that 
there would be no prejudice to the interests of the class. 
Since an unnamed class member could intervene and appeal in 
these circumstances, and since a named plainttff could appeal 
the denial of class certification even if he had won on the merits 
of his individual claim, there is still a controversy over class 
certification at least be-tween the putative class and the de-
fendant. Thus, the only question is who has standing to appeal. 
Since the named plaintiffs here have a stake in class-wide relief 
and have a sufficient nexus with the class, the appeal is proper. 
( 
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Class actions often involve small individual claims and 
defendants should not be able to cut off every appeal of 
a denial of class certification just by tendering relief 
to the named plaintiffs. On the merits of the certification 
issue, the CA found that the DC had abused its discretion. 
Resps had offered to finance the litigation and provided 
guarantees of their ability to do so. A class action was 
superior because of the numerous identical small claims. The 
DC did not cite any management problems that do not exist in 
every class action. Indeed, management here would be easier 
than in most cases because all the necessary information was 
in the bank's computer. There appear to be no issues that 
were not common to all members of the class. There is no 
indication that· in creating this ground for liability, Congress 
intended that it be limited where the bank has done so much 
wrong that relief would be devastatingo Moreover, "[i]f it be 
assumed • • o that courts should heed hurricane warnings about 
potential disasters to defendants and use them as a reason to 
evacuate class ~ctions, then we consider this to be less than 
catastrophic" because the bank's assets far exceed the po-
tential liability. Finally, the CA found that although 
Mississippi law labels usery claims as penal and aggregation of 
such claims "legal fraud" by borrowers, this is not really ag-
gregation since recovery for each individual class member is 
sought. In any event, the federal claim in federal court must 
be governed by federal procedure. 
( 
- 4 -
Judge Thornberry joined fully in the discussion 
of class certification, and specially joined the other 
holding on the ground that where the named plaintiffs do 
not voluntarily accept the tendered relief there is no 
true settlement; the class action is not terminated by 
"tendering a few dollars to a putative class representative." 
3. CONTENTIONS: (1) Petr argues that its tender 
mooted the case after certification had been denied and that 
the CA has denied defendants their traditional right to buy 
peace. Members of the class have no legal interest in tile 
case after certification is denied. Once the dispute between 
the named plaintiffs and the defendant died, there was no case 
or controversy left for theCA to deal with o Thus, it was 
error for the CA to revive the class and the controversy by 
bootstrapping the named plaintiffs' continuing personal stake 
in litigating the propriety of class treatment on the basis of 
the possibility that class treatment is proper. Winokur v. 
Bell Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 560 F.2d 271 (CA 7 1977), 
cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 1507 (1978), is in direct conflict with 
the decision below, as are Napier v. Gertrude, 542 F.2d 825 
(CA 10 1976), and VunCannon v. Breed, 565 F.2d 1096 (CA 9 
1977). Sec also Las~ Vo ~in1an, 558 F.2d 1133 (CA 2 1977). 
But see also Weathers v. Peters Realty Corp., 499 F.2d 1197 
(CA 6 1974). 
Moreover, says petr, the decision below is inconsistent 
with numerous decisions of this Court. In Sosna v. Iow~, 
- 5 -
419 U.So 393 (1975), the Court indicated that a live 
controversy continued after the named plaintiff's individual 
interest expired because the class had been certified. In 
Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975), 
the Court learned at oral argument that the named plaintiffs 
no longer had an interest in the controversy. The Court ruled 
that "[t]he case is therefore moot unless it was duly certified 
as a class action pursuant to Fedo Rules Civ. P. 23, a contro-
versy still exists between [defendants] and the present members 
of the class, and the issue in controversy is such that it is 
capable of repetition yet evading review o ""'' See also Kremens 
v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 132-33 (1977). ("It is only a 'properly 
certified' class that may succeed to the adversary position of a 
named representative whose claim becomes moot!'). VJeinstein v. 
Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975) ,_says petr, is quite like the case 
at bar. Class action status had been denied, and by the time 
the case got here the named plaintiff no longer had a personal 
interest. The Court vacated with instructions to dismiss the 
complaint. 
Though resps do not discuss this Court's cases cited 
by petr, they distinguish Winokur on the ground that there was 
no indication there, as there is here, that the defendant would 
*The implication that the claims must be capable of repetition 
yet evading review, even though the class was certified, was 
rejected by Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 
(1976). 
.. 
( 
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intercept any attempt to appeal the denial of class 
certification by paying off any intervenor who happened 
to appear. Petr rejected a counter-offer by resps that 
would have preserved review of certification. Moreover, 
resps still have a personal interest in class action status 
since that would allow them to distribute their litigation 
expenses among a far larger number of plaintiffs. They 
. in 
also have the intangible interest/avoiding the situation 
where they hold themselves up as class champions and then 
are bought off without any benefit for the class. 
Resps rely largely on United Airlines, Inc. Vo 
McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977). In that case the Court stated: 
"To be sure, the case was 'stri~ped of 
its character as a class action upon 
denial of certification by the District 
Court. Advisory Committee's Note on 
1966 Amendment to Rule 23, 28 U.S.C. 
App., p. 7767. But 'it does not .•• 
follow that the case must be treated as 
if there never was an action brought on 
behalf of absent class members.'" Id., 
at 393. -
Most crucially, _ though the named plaintiffs there had settled 
their case with the defendant, and though the case consequently 
had been dismissed, the Court found that "[t]he District Court's 
refusal to c-ertify was subject to appellate review after final 
judgment at the behest of the named plaintiffs, as United con-
cedeso" Ibid. The dissent argued that the fact that the action 
ended in a settlement meant that the named plaintiffs could not 
appeal the denial of certification since "[t]he settlement of an 
( 
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individual claim typically moots any issues associated 
with it." Id., at 400. The majority rejected that approach, 
and this case would seem to fall within the rule stated by 
the majority. 
(2) Petr repeats its argument that Mississippi 
state substantive policy would be undercut by allowing this 
class action. It is no answer that this is federal law because 
the federal law was intended to integrate state law on usery 
and the procedural rules were not intended to change substantive 
law. Mississippi state courts have concurrent jurisdiction under 
the Act, and they would never allow this type of action. It is 
anomalous for the federal courts to do so. 
Resps do not discuss this issue. 
(3) Petr finally argues that the CA did not properly 
respect the discretion of the DC in dealing with the certification 
issue. The DC, which should know best, said there were management 
problems, and theCA should not attempt to substitute its judgment 
unless the DC was patently arbitrary. 
Resps do not discuss this either. 
4. DISCUSSION: Issue 3 involves no g~neral question of 
law, appears _correctly decided, and is not certworthy. Issue 2 
initially hinges on whether the CA was correct that this is not 
really prohibited aggreg~tion under Mississippi law. Petr relies 
on Liddell v. Litton Systems, Inc.~ 300 So.2d 455 (Miss. 1974), 
which is contrary to theCA's analysis, but it is still a narrow 
question. If you decide that state law does prohibit this, petr 
- 8 -
cites no conflict on the CA's interpretation of the National 
Bank Act with regard to situations in vlhich state substantive 
law is argued to conflict with a federal procedural rule. 
The first issue is the most interesting oneo Winokur 
and other CA cases are directly in conflict, except that the·re 
is no indication that the plaintiffs in any of them argued an 
interest in spreading litigation costs. Resps' point ·that here 
the defendarit was intent on buying off everyone who could ap-
peal does not seem material. Some of this Court's cases also 
spell trouble for the CA, though there is no indication in any 
of them that the named plaintiffs asserted a personal interest 
in spreading litigation costs. Moreover, in Weinstein, other-
wise the closest case to this one, it appears that the named 
plaintiffs did not appeal the denial of class certification. In 
Jacobs, the class had not been properly certified, and there is 
no indication that the named plaintiffs had attempted to get it 
properly certified. The CA does have rather strong 
support in dictum in McDonald • . Although the lawyers 
involved have not been tremendously informative, I recommend 
granting the "mootness" issue (questions I an9 II). 
There is a responseo 
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Greenville, Texas 
- Grant in full 
- Grant Questions 1 and 2 
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NOT VOTING 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Ellen 
DATE: September 12, 1979 
RE: United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty 
No. 78-572: and Deposit Guaranty National Bank 
v. Roper, No. 78-904 
The principal issue in these straight-lined cases is 
whether a class action is mooted when all of the named plaintiffs' -..-c: 
individual claims become moot after the denial of class 
certification but before the merits of the individual claims are 
finally resolved. This Court's previous decisions are clear 
beyond cavil that the named plaintiff in these circumstances 
cannot appeal the merits of the decision below in the absence of a 
properly certified class. It is less clear that the denial of 
class certification itself is thus insu~ated from review. CA3 
and CAS held below that it is not. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Geraghty. 
The named plaintiff in this action filed his challenge to 
~· 
(~ 
~~ 
2. 
the validity of the United States Paro,le Commission's guidelines 
for determining when prisoners may be released on parole as a 
class action because he was aware that a previous test case filed 
by another prisoner had become moot on appeal. The DC denied 
class certification, relying in part on the mistaken notion that 
~
the action was in the nature of habeas corpus, so that Rule 23 did 
not apply. Applying a "necessary and appropriate" standard 
fashioned by courts in habeas cases, the DC held certification 
"inappropriate" on several grounds. Certain issues were unique to 
resp. Although the validity of the guidelines was an issue common 
to all class members, resp's claims were not typical of the class 
because of conflicts among the class members' interests in the 
guidelines: some would be released earlier and thus prefer the 
new system. Finally, the court did not have habeas jurisdiction 
over all members of the class. In the same opinion, the DC ruled 
against resp on the merits. 
After filing an appeal but before oral argument, resp was 
released on parole. He does not argue that he retains any 
personal interest in the case. Petr argued to CA3 that this made 
the case moot, but CA3 disagreed. ---- v/ Drawing on Gerstein v. Pugh and ~ited Airlines v. McDonald, the court held that the absence of a 
~ ~~ certified class does not inevitably require dismissal when the 
~~r 
t- ~). named plaintiff's claim becomes moot. Instead, the question is 
~LA 3 whether there is a real, concrete controversy in the sense, 
~~apparently , of a hotly disputed issue between defendants and 
_., 1-. ~· certifiable class. Since there was such a controversy in 
Geraghty, Article III was satisfied. Turning to the discretionary 
3. 
elements of the mootness decision, fou,r factors militated against 
dismissal: (1) the action "shares many characteristics with the -
cases denominated 'capable of repetition, yet evading review'": 
(2) the improper denial of certification would otherwise be 
unreviewable: (3) the attorneys retained their vigor and in fact 
represented another plaintiff seeking to intervene: and (4) the 
issues on the merits were not affected by resp's release. 
Accordingly, the mootness of resp's claim did not bar 
adjudication, provided that class certification was appropriate. 
CA~ ~ 
 properly brought for declaratory judgment, not habeas corpus. 
On the certification issue, CA3 noted that the action was 
f>C.. 
~-~ Rule 23 was thus applicable, and the DC applied the wrong 
~ ~dard. Moreover, the trial court's reasons for concluding that 
..).b 
UJ'~ 
-~ 
~~ 
-rrM-J-
a class was "inappropriate" were not well taken, because he should 
have selected out the issues appropriate to adjudication on a 
class basis, and created subclasses to deal with the conflicting .,.. ___ _ 
interests of the members of the proposed class. In particular, 
~~ the court correctly pointed out that the alleged invalidity of the 
,~-~L-~ parole guidelines was an issue common to all class members, and 
t those prisoners whose "cu~ ·release dates" :nder the 
guidelines fall beyond the last day of their sentences would share 
resp's interest in invalidating the guidelines and thus comprise a 
proper subclass. The class was thus certifiable in this limited 
certification, and the case was not moot. 
To prevent the "improvident dissipat[ion of] judicial 
effort", CA3 went on to consider the merits. Although the case 
' < . ' 
.c 
4. 
was remanded for development of a fact,ual record, the only real 
point of contention involves the extent of individualized 
consideration given prisoners . under the guidelines. Assuming the 
application of the guide~ines to be as described by resp, the 
court concluded that they were invalid under the Parole Commission . 
and Reorganization Act because they failed to allow consideration 
of length of sentence. Furthermore, they were impermissible ex 
post facto legislation as applied to prisoners sentenced before 
their adoption. 
~ Unlike Roper, this does not have the appearance of a 
"1411 ' J--' 11 lawyer's case 11 • Respondent was and remains acutely interested. 
~~ He appeared as an amicus in a similar case. Moreover, at least 
~ f~ve oth~ners have sought_t~ interve~e, although it is not 
- clear that any of them retains a live claim at this time (Brief 
for resp, at 37-38 & n.38). What is clear is that there is no one 
who sought to intervene before Geraghty was released and still 
~ ~ maintains a live claim. But this is surely a case like Gerstein ------
~~v. Pugh, in which the constant existence of an interested class is 
JY?VV assured. 
tr1 ~ ff1; ---
~v 
B. Roper. 
This is a consumer class action alleging violations of 
The complaint alleged a rather 
As I understand it petr bank 
~~Mississippi's usury laws. 
technical violation of those laws. 
~
participated in the Bankamericard credit card system, pursuant to 
which a monthly service charge of 1 1/2% was assessed on the 
unpaid balance of each account. The customer was given 30 days 
5. 
from the date of each bill to pay the ~harges billed without 
incurring a service charge. This meant that if merchandise was 
charged one day before the closing date of a bill, the customer 
would only have 31 days "free credit". On the other hand, if it 
was charged one day after the closing date, he would have 59 days. 
( 
This meant the effective rate of interest varied for each customer 
for each month. Those at the higher end of the scale were 
contended to be usurious. 
After 4 years of discovery and other legal maneuvers, the 
DC denied class certification on two grounds: (1) Plaintiffs were 
-----------~ . 
inadequate representatives because they had failed to show that 
they were willing or able to finance the costs of a class action 
(a minimum of $9,000 - now $15,000 - for the costs of the initial 
notice alone, when the individual recovery sought was well under 
$1000); and (2) a class action was not superior to other methods 
of adjudication in that small claims courts were available, the 
defendant would suffer a "horrendous penalty", the law of 
Mississippi bars aggregation of usury claims, and the resolution 
of 90,000 claims would be unmanageable in a single action. Seven 
....... --------.. . 
months after the order denying certification was entered, the 
~ defendant formally offered judgment in the full amount demanded by 
~~e two named plaintiffs, plus legal interest and court costs (for 
total of $889.42 and $423.54), but without an admissio of 
~ ~t__ .~iability. Plaintiffs refused to accept this sum, and made a 
~ counter-offer of judgment (presumably with an admission of 
The court accepted 
6. 
~~M 
1\ defendant's ~fer ~nd entered judgment, in its behalf. The money 
was thereupon paid to the clerk of the court, and for all that 
appears in the record remains there to this day. 
-··-·~-~ 
Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal, not on their 
own behalf but "on behalf of all others similarly situated to 
themselves and on whose behalf the named Plaintiffs sought class 
1U> J.Af. 
ction treatment". Nothing in the record gives a clue as to the 
~ 
:rr~ ~ record of any indication that any of them has ever sought to 
.:~J.. ~  'ntervene or to participate in any way in this action. 
/j,U> ~ ~ 
1 
CA5 reversed in an opinion containing very little 
~~ysis. 
___ vV"' 
named plaintiffs' attitude toward this appeal. The attitude of --- _..-.. 
the the unnamed class members is reflected by the absence in the 
The basic thesis was that the satisfaction of a named 
plaintiff's claim neither precludes him from appealing nor excuses 
his duty of doing so. Noting that a plaintiff who pursues the 
case to judgment may appeal the adverse class determination 
whether he wins or loses on the merits (citing court of appeals 
authority), CA5 found that a constitutional controversy still 
exists. These plaintiffs should be entitled to pursue it because 
they have a personal stake in procuring class-wide relief. This 
would be true whether or not they accepted the settlement. 
Otherwise, the erroneous class denial would be reviewable only 
upon the intervention of an unnamed class member, who is not 
entitled to notice that the action has been settled. 
On the merits of the certification issue, CA5 found that 
the DC had abused its discretion. Of particular interest because 
7. 
of its bearing on the plaintiffs' interest in the case is CAS's 
conclusion that plaintiffs were willing to finance the case and 
able to do so through an advance offered by counsel. Plaintiffs 
had apparently agreed to sign a note evidencing that debt, and to 
secure it by a mortgage on real property. Because the DC had 
erred on the certification question, the case was remanded. Judge 
Thornberry concurred specially to disassociate himself from the 
broad dicta of the majority opinion. He felt the case was not 
moot because no true settlement had taken place. 
II. THE COMMON MOOTNESS ISSUE 
A. The Authorities. 
This Court has dealt with the issue of mootness in a 
class action context on a number of occasions. First and foremost 
is~osna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), in which the Court relied 
on two factors in holding that the case was not moot.~ the 
~ _ ~Court said: 
~ :,.....---- ,, ,, 
~ .. rlJ -~, When the District Court certified the propriety of 
1 """~. \ -o,.P- v' the class act 1on, the cl"ass o'£ unnamed persons 
~ 
: described in the certification acquired a legal 
~v _ , .C- status sep§rate from the interest asserted by 
fll~~ a~pe~l~nt. Weffare of the view thdat thi~ fa~tor 
~ : 
1 
~Jl s1gn1f1cantly a ects the mootness eterm1nat1on. 
l v ~~~ FN 8: [Certification] has important consequences 
1 ~~~ _ -~~ for the unnamed members of the class. If the suit 
ArV'1-·· fi -...,~_.c..~~.. proceeds to judgment on the merits, it is 
~r contemplated that the decision will bind all persons 
who have been found at the time of certification to 
1'_ ~' be members of the class ..•• Once the suit is 
~~ ~~r~t~!~~s=~ :i~~~~~ ~~!i~~~r~~a~a;fn~~eb~o~~~~led 
~ ~~e Court relied on prior cases holding that Article 
III permits adjudication notwithstanding apparent mootness 
when the controversy is "capable of repetition, yet evading 
review". That situation was not presented as to the named 
plaintiff, but did apply to the unnamed members of the class. 
Accordingly, the case did not "inexorably become moot by the 
intervening resolution of the controversy as to the named 
plaintiffs." Explaining that this conclusion in no way 
detracts from prior Article III jurisprudence, the Court 
said: 
There must not only be a named plaintiff who has 
such a case or controversy at the time the complaint 
is filed, and at the time the class action is 
cerltfied by the District Court pursuant to Rule 
\
23, but tQere must be a live controversy at tne 
t~me this Court reviews the case. The controversy 
may exist, however, b etwe en a named defendant and a 
member of the class represented by the named 
plaintiff, even though the claim of the named 
plaintiff has become moot. [citation omitted] 
There may be cases in which the controversy 
involving the named plaintiffs is such that it 
becomes moot as to them before the distrct court can 
reasonably be expected to rule on a certification 
motion. In such instances, whether the 
certification can ' be sa~~o "relate back" to the 
filing of the complaint ~ depend upon the 
circumstances of the particular case and especially /{ 
t~ ~eality of the cl~m that otherwise the issue 
WOUld evade reVleW. 
8. 
( 
Footnote 11 bore fruit almost immediately, in 
~erstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). In footnote 11 of ~ 
 
that decision, you wrote for the Court that the case belonged -to the "narrow class" in which the termination of the named 
plaintiff's claim does not moot the claims of unnamed class 
•·. 
members. Because of the inherently temporary nature of 
pretrial detention, the claim was distinctly capable of 
-------~------------
repetition, yet evading review. The record did not reveal 
whether any of the named plaintiffs were in detention (and 
thus members of the class) at the time the District Court 
certified the class. Although that showing "ordinarily would 
be required to avoid mootness under Sosna," Gerstein fell 
within the FN 11 exception because it was impossible to be 
sure that any named plaintiff would be in pretrial custody 
long enough for a district judge to certify the class. In 
addition, the constant existence of an appropriate class was 
certain, and the named plaintiffs' attorney had other clients 
with a continuing live interest in the case. Footnote 11 was 
again applied in Swisher v. Brady, 438 u.s. 204, at 213-214 
N.11 (1978), dealing with a double jeopardy question raised 
by state juvenile court practice. 
On the same day it decided Gerstein, the Court 
applied the Sosna test to order a case dismissed for 
mootness. ~polis School Commissioners v. Jacobs, 420 
u.s. 128 (1975). In its brief per curiam opinion, the Court 
noted that all of the named plaintiff high school students, 
who were contesting restrictions on their school newspaper, 
had graduated. The case was therefore moot unless it was 
"duly certified as a class action", a controversy still 
existed between the school and present members of the class, 
and the issue was capable of repetition, yet evading review. 
9. 
1 0. 
Although the District Court had said in the course of ruling 
on a motion for a preliminary injunction that the plaintiffs 
were qualified as proper representatives, there was no other 
effort to certify a class. The case was therefore remanded 
with instructions to dismiss as moot. 
In the next major case, the Court eliminated the 
"capable of ~}?etiti..Qnf_y__et evading review" criter~on as a 
prerequisite to avoidance of mootness through 
~ 
class actions. 
Franks v. Bowman Transportation~, 424 U.S. 747 (1976). 
Justice Brennan wrote for the Court that that criterion was ~,-
4t \\ ~ ...-
merely a factor in the discretionary determination whether ~ ~~~ 
reach the merits of a particular case. "Given a properly ,.,t.G,~ 
certified class", the constitutional minimum is provided by ~
an adversary relationship between unnamed class members and ~v 
the class opponent sufficient to fulfill the function of 
sharpening the issues for presentation to a court. In your 
concurring opinion, you agreed that the case was not moot, 
and that "in the context of a duly certified class action," 
the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" criterion was 
discretionary. 
The next major new development was United Airlines, 
_________ M_c_D_o _ n_a_l_d, 432 U.S. 385 (1977), the meaning of which ;)~ 
is something of a puzzle. Justice Stewart never addressed ~~ 
the mootness question, skipping over it by asserting that 
eded that the named plaintiffs could have a ea d ~ 
the class action determination despite having settled their 
11. 
individual claims. In any case, the parties cannot stipulate 
to jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Co~rt ruled sub silentio ~ 
that the denial of class certification is not an insuperable 
------------------------------------------------· - --------- {A,v~ barrier to adjudication ~fter all of the named plainti f fs' _____ ___........_-._.... ~ 
claims become moot. At least, the denial of certification is  
ap~e behest of an intervening unnamed class ~~ 
ll • -u-~ 
member. The SG attempts to explain this rather peculiar ~~ 
" L 1 .'.l h~lding... by reference to footnote 14, in which the Court says U+--~' 
that the characterization of the resolution of the action as 
a "'settlement' could be slightly misleading". If the Court 
viewed the case as a litigated victory for the named 
plaintiffs, there is authority for the proposition that the 
case is not moot and they could appeal the adverse class 
determination. This is a rather strained reading of the 
United, however, since a settlement - unlike a litigated 
judgment on the merits - is intended to resolve the entire 
dispute, and apparently did so in United since none of the 
named plaintiffs sought to appeal. 
Whatever United stands for, it cannot mean that the 
Article III requirement of Sosna has now been stripped of the 
"certification" criterion as well as the "capable of 
repetition, yet evading review" criterion. The former 
criterion has been too well established in too many decisions ~ 
to be eliminated in such an offhand manner. The other cases ~ ~ 
invoking it are: ~-
Indiana Employment Security Division v. Burney, 409 
U.S. 540 (1973). Although the plaintiff purported 
./ 
to represent a class adversely affected by Indiana's 
hearing procedures regarding ~nemployment benefit 
cutoffs, the named plaintiff had been paid. In a 
one page per curiam, the Court vacated and remanded 
for consideration of mootness. 
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). The 
Court heard this case arising from the California 
state courts and treated there as if it were a class 
action. However, it noted that if the case had come 
from the federal courts, there would have been 
serious doubt as to whether it could have proceeded 
as a class (and, presumably, whether the Court could 
have heard it). Id., at 39. 
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975). In a 
brief per cur1am op1nion, the Court ordered this 
prisoner action dismissed as moot. The respondent 
had sued the North Carolina parole board, seeking 
due process procedural protections in parole 
decisions. The district court refused to certify 
the action and dismissed the complaint. Since the 
respondent had been released,the Court said he could 
have no interest in the procedures. The case was 
"not a class action", and it did not satisfy the 
"capable of repetition, yet evading review" test. 
This case puts to rest any argument resp Geraghty 
may have that his individual claim is not moot under 
that criterion. 
Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, at 310 n.1 
(1976). The Court rejected a mootness claim in a 
prisoner suit challenging disciplinary procedures. 
One named plaintiff had been released and the other 
had died. Although the DC treated the action as a 
class action, it failed to certify it. The Court 
said that "without such certification and 
identification of the class, the action is not 
properly a class action," citing Jacobs. The case 
was saved, however, by the intervent1on of another 
inmate. It is not at all clear whether the 
intervenor arrived on the scene prior to the mooting 
of the original plaintiffs' claims, and it is 
therefore possible that the Court allowed a "dead" 
action to be "revived". The parties have argued 
this point back and forth, but I would not be 
inclined to rely on it either way, as it was 
obviously not considered in Baxter •• 
Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 
u.s. 424, 430 (1976). The Court rejected a mootness 
claim in this desegregation action brought by 
schoolchildren who had since graduated, but only 
1 2. 
~~~-~J-.~~ 13. 
~ ~""'~ becatusethe United States had intervened. Alt~oug~--------~ 
all the parties had treated ~he action as a class 
action and counsel argued the failure to obtain 
certification was a "meaningless verbal recital", 
the Court found that because there had been no 
certification the case was clearly moot. 
Kremens v. Bartley, 431 u.s. 19 (1977). Because the 
certif1ed class had been "fragmented" by amendment 
to the applicable civil commitment statute, the case 
was remanded for redefinition of the class, 
exclusion of moot claims, and substitution of new 
class representatives. The Court rejected the 
contention that the mere fact of certification 
required adjudication on the merits. Doubting that 
the class could satisfy Rule 23 under the amended 
statute, the Court pointed out that it is "only a 
'properly certified' class that may succeed to the 
adversary position of a named representative whose 
claim becomes moot", citing Jacobs. This is a 
somewhat peculiar result, because the case was 
remanded for further proceedings despite the 
asserted mootness. Apparently, even a defective 
certification will save the case, but the merits 
cannot be adjudicated until the defects have been 
corrected. 
~Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 
U.S. 1 (1978). Because the Court of Appeals had 
affirmed the District Court's refusal to certify a 
1 
class, the existence of a continuing case or 
controversy depended entirely on the named 
plaintiffs' individual claims (which were not moot 
because damages were sought). 
In light of all of these cases, it is clearly too ---
late in the day to argue, as does the amicus in Geraghty, 
that certification is a mere technicality that cannot ge -
allowed to dictate jurisdictional results. Resps simply 
;t;;:::L 
enlarge 
ignore this mass of authority in arguing that Rule 23 
procedures such as certification cannot in themselves 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and that the 
Constitution does not require any particular form of class 
determination. CA3's view that the crucial question is 
'· 
.•. 
I 
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whether a class was "certifiable" seem,s to spring from this C./I '5 
"mere technicality" argument, and thus must fall with it. In~ 
addition, I would question the wisdom of basing the 
jurisdiction of an appellate court on such a fact-specific 
determination, which it may be incapable of making on the 
record made below. 
I find CAS's argument that a named plaintiff has a 
duty to the class notwithstanding denial of certification --- - -
equally unpersuasive. If he does, he is placed in an 
l1A~ intolerably ambiguous position. He has been denied the right 
6v to represent the class, yet he retains some sort of fiduciary 
duty to them, the extent of which is wholly undefined. This 
makes no sense. It is also inconsistent with this Court's 
emphasis on certification as the turning point in a class 
action. If the named plaintiff should choose to appeal the 
class certification issue after pursuing his claim to 
judgment, so much the better for the unnamed class members. 
But that is a windfall for them, just as the initial filing 
of the action is a windfall. They have no right to either, 
and the courts should impose no corresponding duty. 
~ 
It is also much too late to assume CA3's position 
-----~----------------------------------# 
C/f :5 
that the question is simply whether there is real ~~ ~ 
--------~-------------------------------~ ~ . 
adverseness, and that class certification is merely one ~ ---- ~~ 
factor in that analysis. That battle has already been ('~~ II-JJ 
fought, and the Court has elected to lay down a framework of ~) 
relatively bright line rules: The cases clearly show that a 
~ named plaintiff must have a live claim at the outset of the 
1\ 
case, O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1973), and at the 
time of class certification unless the facts fall within FN 
11, Gerstein v. Pugh. If a class is certified, it succeeds 
to the named plaintiff's adversary position and the case 
survives the mooting of his individual claim unless the 
certification is subsequently overturned. Under Kremens, it 
may survive even though the class must later be redefined. 
If, on the other hand, the named plaintiff fails to obtain a 
ruling on the certification issue or if he loses on that 
issue and fails to appeal it, and if in addition his claim 
subsequently becomes moot, then the case is over under 
Jacobs, Weinstein, Baxter, and Spangler. 
Petrs say these cases are dispositive here. The 
Court's actions in Jacobs and Kremens, together with its 
statements in Richardson, Weinstein, Baxter, and Spangler 
that the case would be moot but for some intervening factor 
not present here, all support petrs. Petrs are also correct 
in dismissing the "relation back" argument as a legal fiction 
which simply serves as a shorthand for the "capable of 
repetition, yet evading review" category of non-mootness in 
the context of class actions. There is simply no argument 
that the claims raised in either of these cases fall within 
that category because of their transient nature. Weinstein 
disposes of that claim for Geraghty, and Roper is a damage 
action. 
.• ' 
1 5. 
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United Airlines gives petrs mpre trouble. As noted 
above, they seek to distinguish it on the ground that it did 
'- ~ -... 
not really involve a settlement. Several courts of appeals 
have ruled that a named plaintiff who wins on the merits may 
appeal an adverse class determination, and petrs read United 
the same way. They reason that the prevailing party does not 
lose his stake in the controversy simply by winning, if there 
are collateral consequences of significance. If a named 
plaintiff has suffered because of an adverse class action 
determination, he has not obtained all the relief he sought 
and may appeal. He may suffer from that denial because of _an 
'-- ~------------------------
inability to spread costs among the class, as resps in Roper 
contend. Even if the resolution of United could properly be 
characterized as a litigated judgment, there is a problem 
with this logical construct: it applies equally to Mr. 
Geraghty and to Messrs. Roper and Hudgens. Neither has 
actually "settled" the case upon a basis fully acceptable to 
him, although each has received or been offered all of the 
relief he individually sought. If he have suffered because 
of an adverse class action determination, why can't he appeal 
it? 
If United were the only sticking point in an 
otherwise solid front of authority and reasoning, it would be 
possible simply to limit it to the post-judgment intervention 
situation. I am not so sure, however, that this Court's 
other decisions compel the result sought by petrs here. 
B. The arguments 
The gap in petrs' impressive . show of authority is ~. 
that this Court has never addressed the mootness issue in a 
case in which the named plaintiffs sought to appeal an 
adverse class determination. In Memphis Light, the 
__...,-
plaintiffs had appealed that determination to the CA, but 
there is no indication they continued to do so in this Court. 
When the named plaintiffs continue to contest an . 
adverse class determination, there is obviously a live issue ~ 
-)lh.;l ~ 
for decision. Arguably, however, ~ the_J?~~intiffs have no more -~ 
interest in the class determinatio~ than they do in the ~ Jk4$;)·~ 
The Roper petrs 
1Ti~ 
merits, once their own claim becomes moot. 
say their personal stake is provided by a desire to share 
~ 
costs with class members, and the Court indirectly endorsed ~~ 
this rationale by citing Share v. Air Properties G. Inc., 528 ~~ 
F.2d 279, 283 (CA9 1976), in United Airlines, 432 U.S. at 393 
n. 14. It is not, however, a satisfying one, particularly in 
light of the enormous cost burden imposed on the named 
plaintiffs in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action such as Roper, 
without any guarantee of a return. It is also unpersuasive 
~~ 
-~ Y!u_ 
~? 
I 
in Geraghty, where resp's attorney 
-:7 bono. 
appears to be working pro 
If the Court finds that the named plaintiffs have no 
more personal stake in the class determination controversy 
than they do in the merits, the various resps suggest that 
two other theories may support jurisdiction in these cases. ---------------- . ~----_..____________________________ _ 
,. 
1. Insulation of the class certification issue 
from review~ 
1 8. 
Resps argue that the defendant in a class action ~ t1 
ought not to be able to insulate the class determination from~~ 
review simply by giving a few individuals the relief they ~~ 
sought. This is a defensible position that could be derive
from the FN 11 strain of analysis. If a defendant is ab~~ 
~ 
"buy off" or parole the named plaintiffs seriatim, then the 4 
class determination issue will be capable of repetition yet ~ 
 
evade review. Since this Court rejected the "death knell" ~ lT-5 
doctrine in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 ('~~E) 
(1978), and Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 473 
U.S. 478 (1978), a defendant can prevent review of a denial 
of class action status simply by paying off each individual 
-----~ ._~ ~ ........ 
plaintiff. Although the claim on the merits may be capable 
of decision in innumerable individual actions, the question 
of the propriety of a class action will never proceed beyond 
the initial district court decision. 
Additional support for this position is drawn from 
United Airlines, in which intervenors were allowed to 
resurrect the class certification issue for purposes of 
appeal. Given the theoretical justification outlined above, 
the Court could clarify United and straighten out its 
anomalous position in mootness jurisprudence by holding the 
class determination to be appealable on the basis of the 
"capable of repetition, yet avoiding review" rationale and 
Coopers & Lybrand. 
19. 
Although this analysis is de~ensible, there are 
------------~-------------------~ 
strong arguments against it. First, as a practical matter it 
would place the case in a rather strange posture. If, as in 
Roper, there has been no decision on the merits below, the 
situation is not intolerable. Assuming that the class denial 
is reversed, the named plaintiffs can simply go back to the 
lower courts and pursue the merits. They will presumably 
have little personal stake in the action, but the situation 
is no worse than the case of a named plaintiff whose claim is 
mooted after certification of a class. Although this sort of 
headless class action raises strong suspicions of being~ ,__________ - - - -------------
lawyers' case, the courts have universally approved ---- .... _ ----------------------------------
representation by plaintiffs with moot claims provided they 
-------------o.~r -- - - -
were mooted ee£oro certification. FN 11 itself contemplates --- _.....,.. 
that this sort of thing may occur. Moreover, the district 
court may in its discretion seek new named plaintiffs to 
intervene. The problem is more acute when, as in Geraghty, 
the case has been pursued to judgment in the district court 
and the named plaintiff has lost on the merits. The 
appellate court has no jurisdiction to consider the merits 
under this Court's decisions. When the issue is one that 
will be dispositive of all of the class members' claims, it 
would be peculiar to reverse the class determination and send 
the case back for litigation in a court that has already 
decided the merits against the class. As CA3's decision 
shows, the appellate court will necessarily have to reverse 
the merits in order to justify its re~and. In these 
circumstances, then, the effect of resp's argument is in fact 
to circumvent the clear authority holding that there is no 
jurisdiction to consider the merits. 
On a more theoretical plane, this analysis carries ______ ...,__ - - --
FN 11 far beyond its present status. The Court in Sosna said 
that courts should examine the ~ality of the suggestion that 
the claim would evade review. This suggests a case-by-case 
inquiry rather than a per se rule of non-mootness in these 
situations. I~ such an inquiry were pursued in these cases, 
I have no doubt they would fail to qualify. In a damage 
action like Roper, there would have to be much more of an 
indication that the defendant was pursuing a policy of 
avoiding class-wide liability by evading review, rather than 
merely settling a single case. Similarly, in Geraghty, 
there would have to be a showing either that no potential 
plaintiff is likely to stay in jail long enough to pursue the 
appeal (clearly not the case) or that the Parole Commission 
is deliberately using involvement in the case as a factor in 
paroling inmates who might otherwise take an appeal. 
Except for those cases that qualify under the case-
20. 
~~ 
by-case analysis as cases where mootness would inevitably 
intervene to prevent an appeal, there would appear to be no ~ ~ 
need to fear that denials of certification will evade revi~~ 
The issue will be reviewable under United if some other name~ 
plaintiff prevails on the merits. If all named plaintiffs ~ 
Vk...~ 
,.,~ 
~ 1-f z...u._ 
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lose on the merits, the court of appe~ls can review the 
adverse class determination, although the result would 
probably be foreordained under East Texas Motor Freight v. 
Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977). In this sense, class action 
denials in losing causes will effectively be insulated from 
review. Review on the merits is clearly available, however, -- ~ 
and it seems a bit silly to propose a rule of non-mootness in~
order to preserve the rights of unnamed class members to 
participate in actions finally determined to be non-
meritorious. In sum, since the class action denial would be 
reviewable at the instance of a winning plaintiff, it is not 
without more an issue that is capable of repetition, yet 
avoids review. This reasoning could also supply a 
justification for the United result. If a winning plaintiff 
could not appeal, the class action denial would indeed always 
evade review in the case of a meritorious claim. 
Accordingly, United falls within an expanded reading of FN 
11. 
There are two difficulties with this approach: ____ ___..... 
First, it rewrites United to some extent, since 
notwithstanding the SG's view and the Court's footnote, that 
case was in fact settled. Second, it is not clear that there 
is a logically justifiable distinction between prevailing and 
mooted plaintiffs. Neither has any real stake in the case on 
appeal. The prevailing plaintiff has tradition on his side, 
as he would ordinarily be allowed to appeal collateral 
rulings after final judgment. There is also a stronger case 
for evasion of review, as a class action in a meritorious 
cause would always escape review if appeal were denied. 
Finally, as a matter of policy, it makes sense to allow 
prevailing but not mooted plaintiffs to appeal in order to 
encourage settlement, allow finality when the parties 
contemplate it, and vindicate the defendant's traditional 
right to "buy peace". For these reasons, the better rule 
would appear to be one in which the prevailing plaintiff may 
appeal but the mooted plaintiff may not. 
2. The role of intervenors. 
Resp in Geraghty strenuously objects to the SG's 
characterization of United as a litigated judgment, and as 
noted above I agree that that case was in fact settled. The 
case was therefore moot, but, resp says, the intervention of 
unnamed class members promptly after the settlement was 
sufficient to revive the action in the unique context of a 
class action and for the limited purpose of appealing the 
adverse class determination decision. I find this reading 
more in accord with the United opinion. It also finds some 
support in Weinstein v. ~radford, where the Court didn't seem 
particularly interested in finding out whether the 
intervenors had managed to file their papers before the case 
became moot. The proposed rule has the advantage of avoiding 
reliance on the fortuity of particular dates of settlement or 
release and dates on which unnamed class members learn of 
22. 
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such events. It is also attractive i~ that it allows cases 
to continue when there is shown to be some interest outside 
the named parties and avoids the practical repercussions of 
dismissal in just those cases where they are likely to be 
significant. 
In general, I find these practical arguments to be 
vastly overstated. There is a valid judicial economy 
argument in cases like Roper where the parties have built an 
enormous record on the class action issue, if you believe 
that certification was erroneously denied. If there is 
enough interest in the case to obtain new named plaintiffs, 
however, that body of information could presumably be used in 
a subsequent case which, under the District Courts' related 
case rules, would be assigned to the same judge. Resps also 
suggest that unnamed class members may have been relying on 
the named plaintiffs to appeal. Since the class was not 
certified, they receive no notice of mootness and may not be 
aware that they could intervene to continue the action; yet 
if they do not do so their claims may be barred by 
limitations. Again, i~ anyo~s really interested, they 
will, like the intervenors in United, keep in sufficient -
touch to be aware of significant developments of this nature. ------------ -- ------------
If settlement or release on parole is impending and will moot 
the case, they should be able to intervene in sufficient time 
to protect their interests. 
Despite the probable insignificance of these 
concerns in most cases, I can envision situations where they 
~~;£r-~~· 
idll.- ~ 1.4--~ ~ £iZ, 
would be of considerable importance. A rule barring named 
plaintiffs from appealing when their own claims become moot 
but allowing intervenors to do so even if they intervene 
after the event causing mootness (but within the time allowed 
to take an appeal) could pick up just those situations. 
The problem with this entire line of thinking is 
that it assumes mootness is controlled by practical concerns. 
The Court in Richardson v. Ramirez rejected that proposition. 
41· 8---U_._S_. __ ' __ a_t __ 3_6 __ . ___ U_nder Sosna and its progeny, the absence of I 
a _case or controversy between an uncertified class and a 
defendant is an Article III problem - not an aspect of the 
Court's discretionary decision to hear a case. The parties 
have cited no authority allowing a court to resurrect a dead 
case simply because a new party has shown an interest in it, 
and the SG has cited a number of lower court cases holding to 
the contrary (Brief at 42-43). Accordingly, a rule allowing 
intervenors to revive a case after it has become moot is 
difficult to square with Article III. 
3. Lower court authority. (~~) 
Much effort in the briefs has been devoted to an 
analysis of the Court of Appeals' decisions in this area. In 
general, I find those decisions unhelpful. On the issues 
raised in these cases, the conflict is between CA3 and CAS 
(in the decisions below) on the one hand, and CA9, CA10,and 
CA7 on the other. The other circuits have taken no position 
on the issue, and their decisions in related areas are 
unenlightening since they simply appl~ this Court's 
precedents in a straightforward way. 
CA9 has held that this Court's precedents deprive it 
of jurisdiction whenever a named plaintiff's claim is moot 
and no ·class was certified below. VunCannon v. Breed, 565 
F.2d 1096 (1977)(reserving, however, the issue of 
jurisdiction when the named plaintiff's effort to obtain 
jurisdiction was "frustrated" by the district court); see 
also Kuahulu v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 557 F.2d 1334 
(1977). CA10 and CA7 have both ordered dismissal for 
mootness even when they believed that certification was 
erroneously denied below. Neither the merits nor the adverse 
class determinations were reviewable. Napier v~ Gertrude, 
542 F.2d 825 (CA 10 1976); Winokur v. Bell Federal Savings & 
Loan Assn., 560 F.2d 271 (CA7 1977). 
Some support for a more flexible analysis may be 
found in CA7's subsequent decision in Susman v. Lincoln 
American Corp., 587 F.2d 866 (1978). When a defendant sought 
to moot the class action prior to certification by tendering 
the amount claimed by the named plaintiff, CA7 held that FN 
11 allowed the court to rule on the certification motion, 
provided it had been pursued with reasonable diligence. That 
footnote requires that courts always have a reasonable 
opportunity to consider certification motions, in CA7's view. 
The same reasoning would appear to support a limited 
exception to mootness on appeal, and CA7's citation to Roper 
25. 
suggests that its view may have chang~d since it decided 
Winokur. CA6 has come to the same conclusion regarding 
precertification tenders, Weathers v. Peters Realty Corp., 
499 F.2d 1197 (1974), but CAS has disagreed, Bradley v. 
Housing Authority of Kansas City, S12 F.2d 626 (CAS 197S). 
CAS stated that its conclusion was compelled by Article III 
as interpreted in Jacobs and Sosna, but went on to analyze 
the case as if it had some discretion, listing three factors 
militating against mootness: the DC had failed to act on the 
plaintiffs' motion for certification, the defendants 
"deliberately mooted the issue to avoid judicial review", and 
substantial discovery had been undertaken. Because the 
challenged statute had been amended and the class would have 
to be redefined, however, CAS concluded that the interests of 
all concerned would be best served by requiring the remaining 
class to being anew. At least some of the factors considered 
by CAS would be relevant in a case by case analysis to 
determine whether the case did in fact fall within FN 11's 
"capable of repetition, yet evading review" rubric. 
Except insofar as these pre-certification decisions 
support resps, the decisions below are the only Court of 
Appeals authority in resps' favor. There is dictum in a 
previous CAS decision in which the Roper holding is perhaps 
more fully explained. Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, S7S 
F.2d 9S7 (197S). CAS there says that the class should be 
allowed to continue when certification is denied and 
26. 
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plaintiff subsequently loses his claim, because there is a 
record on which a reviewing court can determine whether or 
not the denial was improper, the named plaintiff has done all 
he could to obtain certification, and the DC's error will go 
uncorrected if the case is moot. This reasoning is 
symptomatic of CAS's balancing test for mootness, a test 
which I find inconsistent with this Court's precedents. In 
fact, the entire opinion is a morass, indicating that the 
balancing test is not of much use in practice. 
c. Conclusion. ( //)A...~~~~ ''~~ ..... p~ 
For the reasons given, I would reject petrs' view 
that mootness is inevitably required by this Court's past 
:0:41 ~ 
~--7 
decisions. There is some room for flexibility in cases 
falling within the FN 11 rationale; that is, where the class 
certification issue would in reality escape review if the 
mootness of the named plaintiff's claim mooted the entire 
action. ~s is a case-by-case inquiry, however, and neither 
~------------------of these cases falls within the category described. I would 
also reject resps' broad arguments against mootness. Except 
for the limited FN 11 exception, the mooting of the named j 
pl~ after d~of certificat1on should moot 
the entire action. I would hesitate to endorse the _____.,._..., 
"resurrection by intervention" exception proposed by resps. 
On the other hand, it is difficult to explain United Airlines 
any other way. The SG's explanation is somewhat 
disingenuous, but it is defensible in light of the United 
~ 
footnote and may be the best way to e~plain that otherwise 
inexplicable case. 
III. ADDITIONAL ISSUES 
v 
A. Roper. 
1. Absence of a complete settlement. 
If the Court decides the common issue in favor of 
mootness, there is a secondary issue as to whether these 
individual claims are really moot. 
28. 
It appears that the Roper and Hudgens have never ~ 
accepted the proffered money, although that fact~ou~~ be~~ 
)4-d .. ~ 
confirmed at argument. If they have not, there is some ~~ 4-r., Ll,-~ 
question as to whether a settlement sufficient to moot their ~ ~ 
claims has really occurred here. In a genuine settlement, ~ ~ 
all issues are resolved and both parties come to an 
agreement. Here, the defendant has agreed to pay the 
individual claim, but has not agreed to give up its 
~ 
~ 
~ 
opposition to the collateral issue of class representation. ~. 
Nor have Roper and Hudgens agreed to relinquish it. 
Ordinarily, of course, this would not be a true sett lement ---and the case could continue as to the remaining issue. The 
problem is that the named plaintiffs don't seem to have a 
legally cognizable personal interest in this particular 
collateral issue, and the class does not have a "legal -
existence" sufficient to allow it to assert its interest. 
As noted above, I do not find resps' "sharing costs" 
theory of a continuing stake in the litigation particularly 
29. 
convincing. The only possible intere9t is a moral or 
political one - in seeing justice done, or in making sure the 
bank "pays for its sins". This sort of interest has never 
been thought sufficient to supply the adverseness required by 
Article III. Consequently, I would conclude that these 
plaintiffs' refusal to accept the proffered settlement does 
~ ------------~-----------------------
not affect the mootness of the action. If they could point - ~ 
to any other collateral consequences not resolved in the ~ 
settlement, they could continue. But when the only issue 
~~ 
sought to be appealed is the class determination, the absence 
of agreement on that point adds nothing to the analysis 
outlined above. 
2. Amendment to the usury statute. 
If the Court should decide that the action is not 
otherwise moot, petr has another string in its bow. It 
points to an amendment in the Mississippi usury statute that 
clearly validates the practices challenged here. Petr also 
says that the statute is retroactive. If so, of course, the 
action is moot without regard to Part II's analysis. But the 
statute (Petr's Brief at 46) does not appear to be 
retroactive. Finance charges imposed before the effective 
date of the statute will be valid only if they comply with 
"the provisions of this act or other law then in effect." 
"This act" would appear to be modified by "then in effect", 
especially since the statute goes on to say that loans that 
are modified after the effective date will be governed by the 
30. 
amendments - a provision that would b~ unnecessary if the 
entire statute were retroactive. 
Although the amendment makes the violations alleged 
incapable of repetition, it is not retroactive and 
accordingly cannot moot this damage action. 
B. Geraghty_. ~/-~1 ~ e::t-J-4.. ?-U> ~ ~ 
If the Court should decide that the aqtio~ is ~oot, 
there are no more issues and the case should be remanded for 
-
dismissal. If the case is not automatically moot by reason 
of Geraghty's release, there are several possibilities. If 
the rationale depends on the presence of intervenors, then 
the action should be remanded for a determination whether 
there are any timely intervenors with live claims left to 
pursue the action. Before doing so, however, the Court 
should probably take a preliminary look at the class 
determination issue and the merits. If the denial of 
certification or the denial of relief on the merits was 
clearly correct, it would indeed be a waste of resources to 
remand for a replay of the trial on behalf of a class. 
To return to the rationale for mootness, if the 
Court decides that Mr. Geraghty himself may appeal despite 
the mootness of his own claim, the issue of certification is 
properly before the Court and should be decided. If the 
class should have been certified, it would again be 
appropriate to review the merits to determine if there is 
enough there to justify litigation on behalf of a class. If 
31. 
the denial of certification was correct, then the case is of 
course moot: there was no class. 
1. Denial of class certification. 
There is no question that the DC applied the wrong 
standard: Rule 23 was applicable. Resp contends that this 
alone requires reversal and that the "subclassing" issue is 
not properly before the Court. However, the DC's conclusion 
that a class was "inappropriate" tracks the requirements of 
Rule 23. If Geraghty's claim was indeed atypical or the 
questions raised not common to the members of the class, then 
the denial can be affirmed on that basis. It is obvious that 
the class sought was much too broad. It included issues 
unique to Geraghty, and it included prisoners whose interests 
were directly contrary to his. It is equally obvious that 
there probably was an appropriate subclass: those prisoners 
whose sentences would expire in full before the date of their 
recommended release under the guidelines. The only question 
is whether the DC was obliged by rule 23 to narrow the class 
and the issues to an appropriate subclass on its own motion. 
Resp has not addressed this issue, believing it to 
be irrelevant to the case. Nothing in Rule 23 suggests that ~!7 
d-uc--y 
the court has a duty to create subclasses sua sponte, and the #2(., CuwA-
only authority cited by CA3 is one of its own prior decisions ~ 
 
involving a decertification motion. Samuel v. University of ~-
Pittsburgh, 538 F.2d 991 (CA3 1976). Contrary to petr's ~ 
suggestion, however, CA3 does not seem to have created a 
of law requiring district courts to consider and rule out the 
possibility of subclasses in every case. Although the 
opinion is not entirely clear on this point, the court 
appears to have held only that the failure to do so in the 
circumstances of this case was an abuse of discretion. 
The SG does not really contend, and I doubt that the 
Court should hold, that a district court can never abuse its 
discretion by failing to consider subclasses. There are 
clearly situations in which the facts of the case simply cry 
out for subclassing. In such instances, the contours of the 
appropriate subclass emerge without additional effort from 
the court's delineation of the the conflicts of interest and 
uniqueness of issues that make a broader class inappropriate. 
If the court is able to say that petr's claim conflicts with 
the interests of a certain subset of the class, it can also 
say that that subset ought to be excluded from the 
appropriate class. All of the problems with the remaining 
class are likely to have been raised by the defendant already 
as part of its effort to defeat the larger class. 
Accordingly, the court can very often rule without further 
briefing. It could also, however, tentatively certify the 
smaller class and ask for additional briefing or factual 
submissions concerning that class. 
Neither alternative imposes the horrendous burden 
described by the SG. There might be, as the SG contends, 
some problem with certifying more than one subclass, since a 
32. 
single petr is unlikely to be able to ,represent both. It is 
thus somewhat misleading to speak of "subclassing" rather 
than simply of narrowing the proposed definition of the 
class. And there would certainly be an unacceptable burden 
if the obligation to narrow the issues for the parties was 
imposed in every case, no matter how poorly briefed or how 
complex the facts. On a case-by-case basis and subject to 
review under the "abuse of discretion" standard, however, I 
see no problem with this rule. 
It is less clear that the denial of certification 
was properly reversed on this record. The SG points out that 
resp never argued that a narrower class should have been 
certified. Indeed, he has failed to so argue even in his 
brief in this Court. Arguably, this contention was waived. 
The SG also says the obligation imposed by CA3 is 
inconsistent with the adversary system. I do not agree that 
this is so in every case. Courts have taken an activist role 
in class action litigation, and Rule 23 gives them fairly 
broad discretion in the management of class actions. As a 
practical matter, the class determination is similar to the 
fashioning of equitable relief: the alternatives are 
infinite and the court should be free to design the class in 
accordance with the dictates of the Rule and of 
manageability, even if the parties have failed to suggest the 
most appropriate solution. 
In the circumstances of this case, I doubt that it 
was necessary for resp to have raised his "objection" (in the 
33. 
form of a proposal for subclasses) in the district court in 
order to raise it on appeal. Since the district court ruled 
on the merits in the same order denying class certification, 
there was no point in asking for reconsideration of the class 
question or seeking a narrower class. The SG may be right, 
however, that CA3 has gone beyond the limits of the adversary 
system in this case, when resp failed to suggest the narrower 
class even on appeal. 
In addition, the SG argues that even the narrow 
class described above would not have been appropriate, 
largely because decisions are sometimes made outside the 
guidelines, and some members of the class might have been 
released early on that basis. This is unconvincing since 
such prisoners would probably also have been released early 
in the absence of the guidelines. The SG's argument that it 
is impossible to predict what would have happened to any 
given class member before the guidelines is also 
unconvincing, since no member of the narrow class suggested 
could have done any worse in the absence of the guidelines. 
On this record, then, it is probable that a single, narrowly 
defined class would have been appropriate. It is difficult 
to make such fact-specific determinations at this rarified 
level of review, but I would be quite prepared to affirm the 
CA3 on this point were it not for resp's failure to raise or 
argue the issue. Since resp has failed to do so, I believe 
the issue could go either way, if, of course, the case is not 
otherwise moot. 
34. 
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2. The merits. 
Because I doubt that the Court should reach the 
merits, I will treat them rather summarily. The two issues 
are those reserved last term in Addonizio v. United States, 
47 U.S.L.W. 4628. In general, it appears that CA3 has erred 
in adopting resp's view of the Parole Commission and 
Reorganization Act, and in finding a significant ex post 
facto law issue in the case. 
The short answer to the ex post facto clause 
argument is that even if the guidelines could be viewed as an 
ex post facto law as applied to some members of the putative 
class, resp himself is not among them. It is not disputed 
that resp was resentenced in October, 1975, for the sole 
purpose of taking the ~ffect of the guidelines into account. 
The district judge reduced his sentence from 4 years to 30 
months because it concluded that application of the 
guidelines would frustrate its previous expectations. I am 
at a loss to understand how resp can claim in these 
circumstances that he has been denied an opportunity for more 
lenient punishment. Since petr has not suffered from the 
alleged infirmity in the challenged practice, he is simply 
ineligible to represent a class of persons who did. East 
Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, supra. Accordingly, there 
was no error in failing to certify a class on this issue, and 
there is no reason to remand for certification of such a 
class even if such a remand is otherwise proper. Finally, 
even if intervenors can "revive" a dead case under United 
Airlines, they certainly cannot at this point insert an issue 
that could never have been raised in the first place. 
If the Court should disagree and wish to consider 
the merits of the ex post facto claim, I believe that it ------
36. 
borders on the ~ous. There is certainly authority for ~ f.o 
the proposition that parole eligibility is an aspect of ~ 
punishment and that official post-sentence action delaying~~ 
eligibility for parole would be invalid. Pet. App. at 59a-
61a. But those principles simply do not apply to this case, 
as every other circuit to have considered the point has held. 
Zeidman v. US Parole Commission, No. 78-1590 (CA7 1979); 
Rifai v. USPC, 586 F.2d 695 (CA2 1977); Shepard v. Taylor, 
556 F.2d 648, 654 (CA2 1977); Ruip v. United States, 555 F.2d 
1331, 1335-1336 (CA6 1977). Rodriguez v. USPC, No. 78-2051 
(CA7 1979), holding that denial of a hearing at the 1/3 
sentence point violated the ex post facto clause, is not to 
the contrary even if it was correctly decided. 
As petr has argued, the guidelines do not deny a 
prisoner eligibility for parole. They are simply one aspect 
of the exercise of the Commission's discretion. The prisoner 
has a right to the exercise of informed discretion, just as 
he always did. The Commission says it makes that informed 
decision in every case. Resp contends that the low figure of 
decisions outside the guidelines (6-10%) rebuts that 
assertion. I do not find his contention persuasive, since 
the presence of any decisions at all ~utside the guidelines 
seems to me to demonstrate that they are not automatically 
applied. CA3's suggestion that the guidelines would be valid 
if 60% of the decisions went outside them but are invalid 
because only 6% go outside seems to me absurd. It seems to 
require only that the Commission adopt less helpful 
guidelines. But even if the guidelines are "automatic" in 
some cases, it is difficult to find in the ex post facto 
clause any reason to require the Commission to exercise its 
discretion on an individual rather than a class basis. The 
prisoner was and is entitled to the exercise of discretion. 
He has never had any expectation of any particular exercise 
of discretion at any given time. 
The absurdity of the argument is demonstrated when 
one tries to imagine what relief could be granted. Should 
the Commission be ordered to exercise untrammelled discretion 
without regard to what it now considers to be the best 
knowledge in the field (embodied in the guidelines)? Should 
it be ordered to reach different results in cases it would 
otherwise find similar under the guidelines? Neither resp 
nor the CA3 has answered these arguments, and I find them 
unanswerable. 
For the reasons stated, the ex post facto issue is 
------~----------------insubstantial. The question of the validity of the 
~
guidelines is somewhat more difficult, although it appears 
that CA3 has erred on this score as well. Nothing in the 
,, ... 
. . 
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language of the Parole Commission and ,Reorganization Act 
supports resp's claims, see petr's Brief at 60, and CA3 found 
that the statute could be read either way, ptn. app. 38a. 
However, the legislative history cited in petr's brief, at 
61-69, strongly suggests that Congress intended to endorse 
the Commission's use of the guidelines as practiced at the 
time. CA3 found that the guidelines were improper under the 
Act because they failed to provide for sufficient 
individualized consideration and because they do not allow 
consideration of the length of the sentence imposed. On the 
first point, petr argues that individualized decisions are in 
fact made in each case. But CA3 held that the small number 
of decisions made outside the guidelines, together with 
resp's assertion that they were automatically applied, raised 
a factual issue for trial. CA3's reasoning seems directly 
contrary to at least two statements from the Conference 
Reports: 
The promulgation of guidelines to make parole less 
disparate and more understandable has met with such 
success that this legislation incorporates the 
system into the statute • . . . 
S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-648, at 20; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 
94-838, at 20. 
If decisions to go above or below parole guidelines 
are frequent, the Commission should reevaluate its 
guidelines. 
S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-648, at 27; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 
94-838, at 27. 
Resp may be correct that the Senate's wholesale adoption of 
the Commission's practices was compromised in the conference. 
Yet these statements from the Conference Report indicate that 
38. 
the use of guidelines was still wholeheartedly endorsed, and 
that Congress did not contemplate that departures from the 
guidelines need be made in a large number of cases. 
The history is less clear on the need to consider 
the length of sentence imposed. A specific provision 
authorizing the Commission to disregard which of the 
sentencing alternatives was selected by the court was deleted 
in Conference, as was a reference in the Senate Report to 
parole as an "extension of the sentencing process." On the 
other hand, the Conference Reports emphasized that "parole 
has the practical effect of balancing differences in 
sentencing policies and practices between judges" and that 
"it is important for the parole process to achieve an aura of 
fairness by basing determinations of just punishment on 
comparable periods of incarceration for similar offenses 
committed under similar circumstances." Conference Reports, 
supra,, at 19, 26. These statements strongly suggest that 
the Commission is performing a standardizing function 
mandated by Congress. Although it could certainly exercise 
its discretion to consider the length of sentences, I doubt 
very much that the statute requires it to do so in every 
case. 
Although the legislative history cited by petr seems 
to refute CA3's view of the statute, it could nevertheless be 
argued that the DC erred in granting summary judgment. If 
the guidelines were applied blindly, without any regard to 
39. 
/ 
individual circumstances, the Commissi'on would probably 
violate the Act. Resp contends that they are applied in just 
this automatic a manner. However, he cannot stand on bare 
assertions on motion for summary judgment if petr has 
produced affidavits or evidence contradicting those 
assertions. Apparently, petr failed to come up with 
affidavits. I wonder, though, if the mere fact that some 6 
to 10% of the cases are decided outside the guidelines is 
sufficient to refute the bare assertion that the guidelines 
are applied so mechanistically as to violate the statute. 
Does anyone seriously contend that the Commission exercises 
no discretion at all? If not, summary judgment may have been 
proper. 
The final question is the constitutionality of the 
guidelines. Resp challenges them on three grounds: that the 
Commission is usurping the function of the Courts in 
violation of the separation of powers; that Congress has 
improperly delegated, without sufficient guidance, its 
function of assigning punishment in criminal cases; and that 
the guidelines deny prisoners due process. The last argument 
is of course foreclosed by Greenholtz v. Inmates, 47 U.S.L.W. 
4581 (1979). The others simply disregard the appointed roles 
of courts, Congress, and the Commission in the sentencing 
process. Congress defines offenses and limits the range of 
sentences a court may impose. The court fixes the sentence 
and in so doing establishes minimum and maximum terms of 
40. 
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imprisonment which the Commission must respect. Within those 
limits, the Commission exercises virtually absolute 
discretion under explicit congressional direction. The 
discretion is channelled, however, by specified criteria. 18 
U.S.C. §§4206, 4207. There is no basis whatever for finding 
a constitutional violation under any traditional analysis, 
and CA3's decision to the contrary is simply inexplicable. 
IV. RECOMMENDATION 
As stated in the conclusion to Part II above, I 
think these cases became moot when the named plaintiffs' - - .....-. .. 
claims were mooted. I do not believe Roper and Hudgens can ------- -
avoid mootness by refusing to accept the proffered 
settlement. Accordingly, I would remand Roper with 
instructions to dismiss as moot. Finally, I am not convinced 
that the Court should allow intervenors to revive Geraghty 
even if an intervenor with a live claim could be found. I 
would therefore come to the same result in Geraghty without 
reaching any of the issues treated in Part III. If the Court 
should find that the case is not moot, I would find that CA3 
was correct on the class certification issue, but wrong on 
the merits. Because there would be no point in remanding for 
class certification and further litigation in a losing cause, 
I would hold that the issues raised are too insubstantial to 
warrant any further expenditure of judicial resources. 
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SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Ellen 
DATE: September 21, 1979 
RE: Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, No. 78-904 
Petr has filed a reply brief in which it reargues the 
case. Only two points deserve mention. First, if these named 
plaintiffs continue to have an individual personal stake in the 
controversy because of their desire to spread non-taxable costs 
among class members and because of their loss of "personal 
respect and credibility", no class action will ever die. 
Second, petr says that the desirability of class actions 
generally is no reason to ride roughshod over the mootness 
doctrine in these cases. The decision below embodies CAS's 
"class at any cost" approach, which sees class actions as per se 
!
desirable. In fact they are not. With the potential of 
enormous benefits come potential enormous damages - to class 
members as well as defendants. Since class members may be 
irreparably harmed by being bound to a judgment litigated by 
inadequate representatives, I would emphatically reject the 
"class at any cost" attitude. So ~fl~ -
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class action pursuant to Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 23 (a) and 
(b)(2), and further stated that "[p]laintiff class mem-
bers are all high school students attending schools man-
aged, controlled, and maintained by the Board of School 
Commissioners of the City of Indianapolis." At the time 
this action was brought, plaintiffs were or had been in-
volved in the publication and distribution of a student 
newspaper, and they alleged that certain actions taken by 
petitioner Board or its subordinates, as well as certain of 
its rules and regulations, interfered or threatened to in-
terfere with the publication and. distribution of the news-
paper in violation of their First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights. The plaintiffs (respondents here) prevailed 
on the merits of their action in the District Court, 349 
F. Supp. 605 (SD Ind. 1972), and the Court of Appeals, 
one judge dissenting in part, affirmed, 490 F. 2d 601 
(CA7 1973). Petitioners brought the case to this 
Court, and we granted certiorari, 417 U. S. 929 (1974). 
At oral argument, we were informed by counsel for 
petitioners that all o the named plaintiffs in the action 
lt_ad grad~ei! from the In Ianapo IS sc ool system; iri 
these circumstances, it seems clear that a case or con-
troversy no longer exists between the named plaintiffs 
and the petitioners with respect to the validit~ the 
rules at issue. The case is therefore -~ot ~~ was' jJ._.,~-L 
duly ce~ed as a class action pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. l , , 
Proc. 'J!f/K controversy still exists be1J&.6{1 petitioners and
1 
CtttC ._ ' "'\ 
the present members of the class, ~-jlhe issue in con- \ 
troversy is such that it is capable of repetition yet evad-
ing revie~ Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 (1975). Be-
cause in our view there was inadequate compliance with 
the requirements of Rule 23 (c), we have concluded that 
the case has become moot. 
The only formal entry made by the District Court be-
low purporting to certify this case as a class action is con-
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Re: 78-904 - Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. 
Roper, et al. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Enclosed is the proposed opinion in the above case. I 
have placed the holding on the narrow grounds of the named 
plaintiffs' economic interests leaving to later cases the 
development of just what are the "representative" 
obligations, if any, owed to an uncertified class when 
property interests are involved. 
I would p r efer to ke ep the holding narrow and await 
developments in the other courts. Harry's opinion in 
Geraghty deals with liberty interests and may be on a 
broader ground. If so, some accommodation may be called 
for. I doubt there will be any conflict. 
Regards, 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 78-904 
Deposit Guaranty National Bank,' On Writ of Certiorari to 
Jackson, Mississippi, Petitioner, I the United States Court 
v. of Appeals for the Fifth 
Robert L. Roper et al. Circuit. 
[November -, 1979] 
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari to decide whether a tender to named 
plaintiffs in a class action of the amounts claimed in their 
individual capacities, followed by the entry of judgment in 
their favor on the basis of that tender, over their objection, 
moots the case and terminates their right to appeal the denial 
of class certification. 
I 
Respondents, holders of credit cards issued on the "Bank-
Americard" plan by petitioner Deposit Guaranty National 
Bank, sued the bank in the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Mississippi; seek to represent both 
their own interests and those of a class of similarly aggrieved 
customers. The complaint alleged that usurious finance 
9 ~·-r 
t7:· 
~~ 
~~ 
~~ 
~~ 
d..v!-_[i )_-
~~ 
t.-r-~. 
~~ 
charges had been made against the accounts of respondents .-U-~ 
and a putative class of some 90,000 other Mississippi credit 
card holders. ~ h-z- )l':o 
Respondents' cause of action was based on sections 85 and _,- -f-
86 of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S. C.§§ 85 and 86, which ~ ~~ 
permit banks within the coverage of the Act to charge interest Al-l .?l~ _ ~. ~ , . 
"at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or ........ I 
District where the bank is located," § 85; and, in a case where ~ L/J...J 
a higher rate of interest than allowed has been "knowingly" 
~ ·~ 
~~.;. 
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charged, allow a person who has paid the unlawful interest 
to recover twice the total interest paid, § 86.1 
The modern phenomenon of credit card systems is largely 
dependent on computers which perform the myriad account-
ing functions required to charge each transaction to the 
customer's account. In this case, the bank's computer was 
programmed so that, on the billing date, it added charges, 
subtracted credits, added any finance charges due under the 
BankAmericard plan, and prepared the customers' statements. 
During the period in question, the bank made a monthly serv-
ice charge of l'th% on the unpaid balance of each account. 
However, customers were allowed 30 days within which to 
pay accounts without any service charge. If paymeut was 
not received w1thin that time, the computer added to the cus-
tomer's next bill 1~% of the unpaid portion of the prior 
bill, which was shown as the new balance. This charge is 1 
alleged to have been usurious because under certain circum-
stances the effective annual interest rate of the 1 lj:!% monthly 
service charge allegedly exceeded the maximum rate permitted 
under Mississippi law. 
The effective annual percentage rate of the finance charge 
macle against each account would vary from customer to 
customer because the same 1 lj:!% service charge was assessed 
against the unpaid balance 110 matter when the charged 
trausaction actually occurred within the 30-day period prior 
to the billing date. In additiou, the actual finance charges 
paid by each customer would vary depending on the stream 
of transactions and the repayment plan selected. 
There was evidence before the District Court that it was 
possible to tabulate both the finance fees charged to each 
cardholder and the fees each actually paid during the period 
eucompassed by the complaint. There also was evidence 
1 Rt•;;pondeut:s' complaint also all!'ged a cau:se of action bm:;ed on the 
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1640 et seq., but that claim wa::; 
di:::mis~:~ed with preJudwc at re:;pondent::;' requc:;t, 
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that it would be possible to reconstruct each account in full 
by again processing all the transactions.2 
The District Court qenied re~ondents' motion to certify 
the class, ruling that the circumstance& did not meet all the 
requmiments of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b) (3) .3 The Dis-
trict Court certified the order denying class certification for 
discretionary interlocutory appeal, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. 
~ 1292; the proceedings were stayed for 30 days pending pos-
sible appellate review of the denial of class certification. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
denied respondents' motion for interlocutory appeal. The 
bank then tendered to each named plaintiff, in the form of an 
"Offer of Defendants to Enter Judgment as by Consent and 
Without Waiver of Defenses or Admission of Liability," the 
maximum amount that each could have recovered. The 
amounts tendered to respondents Roper and Hudgins were 
$889.42 and $423.54 respectively, including legal interest and 
court costs. Respondents declined to accept the tendet' and 
made a counter offer of judgment in which they attempted to 
reserve the right to appeal the adverse class certification 
ruling. This counteroffer was declined by the bank. 
2 The partie~ di::;agrecd on the costs al:lsociated with thrSl' operations. 
E~timates ranged from $45,575 to $125,000 for computation of tlw financo 
charges and from $367,700 to $3,432,000 for reconstruction of tlw 90,000 
account. The potential total liability of thr defendant::;, :>hould plaintiffs 
suceePd on bl•half of the cardholder ela::;::;, was variou:sly estimated a::; be-
twren $12 million and $14 million . 
a The Dl::;fnct Court fauna that the requirements of Rule 23 (b) (3) 
were not met beeause the putative clas::; rPpre~entatives had failed to e::;-
tablish the predominance of question!:! of law and faet common to class 
members, and beeau;,;e a cla~s al'tion wa:s not JShown to be a l:iUperior 
method of adjudication due to (1) the availability of traditional proce-
dures for proHecuting individual claims in Mi:ssJ:sl:iippi courts; (2) the 
"horrendoul:i penalty," whch could rr~ult in "de~truction of the bank" if 
claill1i' were succe,.;~fully aggrrgated; (3) the Hub"tantive law of Mi::;si::;sippi 
which view:; the aggregatiOn of usury claiml:i a,.: undesirable; and (4) the 
tremendous bmden of handling 90,000 claim,;, particularly if l'ounter-
claint.,; were filed. 
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Based on the bank's offer, the District Court entered judg-
ment in respondents' favor, over their objection, and dis-
' D missed the action. The bank deposited the amount tendered 
~~ into the registry of the court, where it remains. At no time 
 did any putative class members seek to intervene either to 
~ J...,/ litigate tlie illerits o;to appeaTtlie certifiCatJ;iu ruling. It 
~ U'' r appears that by the time the District Court entered judgment 
VI~· _. and dismissed the case, the statute of limitations had run on 
tf' l,~ _~. r . _,..Jthe individual claims of the unnamed class members.4 
"~Y ~n • When respondents sought review of the class certification 
f'l- 'j ~ ruling in the Court of Appeals, the bank _argued that the case 
/)'IAV hl!d J.leen moote<L!?Y the entry ohude;~1t in respondents' 
~Arav?y ~ing the bank's contention, the court relied 
wv ~ on V nited Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977). 
.fl -V ~ I There we held that an adverse determination on the class 
Y~.1" ~~-.A.. certification question could be appealed notwithstanding a 
~~-ru,- favorable entry of judgment on the merits. The Court of 
~f-V"- Appeals also relied on holdings of other courts of appeals.5 
 Two members of the panel read Rule 23 as providing for a _ -:~.J~ fiduciary-type obligation of the named plaintiffs to act in a 
t:J"Yr'' : J representative capacity on behalf of the putative class by 
seeking certification at the outset of the litigation and by 
.#...r-. appealing an adverse certifica.tion ruling. In that view, the 
.vr, District Court also had a responsibility to ensure that any 
dismissal of the suit of the named plaintiffs did not prejudice 
putative class members. One member of the panel, concur-
ring specially, limited the ruling on mootness to the cir-
cumstances of the case, i. e., that, after filing of a class action, 
4 HPver::ml of the Di~trict Court '::; denial of certification by the Court 
of Appeals would relate back to the time of the original motion for cer-
tification for the purposes of tolling the ::;tatute of limitations on the 
elaim::; of the elm;~ member::> . See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432· 
u. s. 885 (1977) . 
5 Gl:'lman v. Westinghouse Electric C'm·p., 556 F. 2d 699, 701-702 (CA3 
1977) ; Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F . 2d 94 (CAlO 1968), cert. denied, 394 
u. s. 928 (1969) . 
?4--o ~ 
~~ 
I.M,'~
'- ~~~-o 
~~uA..lz 
~~ 
P'vlo 
~ 
{.by~ 
~~ 
~~ 
~~~ 
~fijC.I ~ 
s--;~ ~ 
~~ 
~ 
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the mere tender of an offer of settlement to the named plain-
tiffs, without acceptance, does not moot the controversy so 
as to prevent the named plaintiffs from appealing an adverse 
certification ruling. 
Having rejected the bank's mootness argument, the Court 
of Appeals reviewed the District Court's ruling on the class 
certification question. It concluded that all the requisites 
of Rule 23 had been satisfied and accordingly reversed the 
adverse certification ruling; it remanded with directions to 
certify the class and for further proceedings. 
Certiorari was sought to review the holdings of the Court of 
Appeals on both mootness and class certification. We granted 
the writ limited to the question of mootness, to resolve con- ' 
flicting holdings in the courts of appeals.6 440 U. S. 945. 
II 
We begin by identifying the interests to be considered when 
questions touching on justiciability are presented in the class 
action context. First i~est of the named plaintiffs: 
their personal stake in the substantive controversy and their 
related right as litigants in a federal court to employ the 
procedural device of a Rule 23 class action in appropriate 
circumstances to pursue their individual claims. A separate 
consideration, distinct from their private interests, is the re-
spousibility of named plaintiffs to represent the collective 
interests of the putative class. Two other interests are 
i~: the rights of putative class membe;;-ag poten-
tial intervenors, and the re~onsibi~ a._district COl!.!:,t to 
protect both the absent class a.udthe integrity of the judicial -process by surveillance of the a.ctions of the parties before it. 
The Court of Appeals did not distinguish among these dis-
tinct interests. It reviewed all possible interests that in its 
view had a beariug on whether an appeal of the deuial of 
6 Winokw· v. Bell 'Federal Saviugs and Loan Assn., 560 F . 2d 271 (CA7 
1977) , cert. denied, 435 U . S. 932 (1978). 
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certification should be allowed. These diverse interests ar~ 
interrelated, but we distinguish among them for purposes 
pf analysis, and conclude that resolution of the narrow ques-
tion presented requires consideration only of the private 
interest of the named plaintiffs. 
-------------- ~ 
III 
A 
The critical iuquiry, to which we now turu, is whether re-: 
spondents' indiviaual and private case or controversy became 
~noot by reason ~e entry of judgment in their faVOr. --Respondents, as holders of credit cards issued by the bank, 
plaimed damages in their private capacities for alleged 
usurious interest charges levied iu violation of federal law1 
Their complaint asserted that they had suffered actual damage , 
as a result of illegal acts of the bank. The '~omplaint ' ~ 
satisfied the case or controversy requirement of Art. III of the 
Constitution. 
As parties in a federal civil action, respondents exercised 
their option as putative members of a similarly situated card-. 
holder class to assert their claims under Rule 23. Their right 
to assert their own claims in the framework of a class 
action is clear. However, the right of a litigant to employ 
Rule 23 is a procedural right only, ancillary to the litigation 
of substantive claims. Should these substantive claims be-
come moot in the Art. Ill sense, by settlement of all personal 
claims for· example, the court retains no jurisdiction over the 
controversy of the individual plaintiffs. 
The factual context in which this question arises is impor-
tant. At no time did the named plaintiffs accept the tender 
in settlemeut of the case; instead, judgment was entered iu 
their favor by the court and the case was dismissed over their 
continued objections.7 Although a case or controversy is 
7 The ;;ettlemeut of all i:iUb::;tantive clairru; in a. litigation typically moots 
~thy i"':sueil associated with it. 13 C. Wright, A. Miller, and E. Cooper. 
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mooted in the Art. III sense upon payment and satisfaction of 
a final. binding judgment, a decision that is "final" for pur-
poses of appeal does not absolutely resolve a case or con-
troversy until the time for appeal has run. Nor does a 
confession of judgment by defendants on less than all the 
issues moot an entire case; other issues in the case may be 
appealable. We can assume that a district court's final 'ud -
me11t which ful y satis es name plamtift's' )rivate substan-
tive c aims wou preclude their ap )eal 011 that aspect of the 
b'ilaf']Udgi"nent; ~er, it does not follow tfi'a't this ci~um­
stance -would terminate the named plaintiffs' right to take an 
appeal on the issue of class certification. 
Congress has vested appellate jurisdiction in the courts of 
appeals for review of final decisions of the district courts. 28 
U. S. C. § 1291. Ordinarily, only a party aggrieved by a 
j udgme11t or order of a district court may exercise the statu-
tory right to appeal therefrom. A party who receives all that J ~ 
he has sought is not aggrieved by the judgment affording the 
relief and cannot appeal from it. Public Service Comrn'n v. 
Brashear Freight Lines Inc., 306 U.S. 204 (1939); New York 
Telepho·ne Co. v. Maltbie, 291 U. S. 645 (1934); Corning v. 
Troy Iron & Nail Factory, 15 How. 451 (1853); J . W. Moore, 
Federal Practice and Procedure§ 3533, p. 271 (1975). Under this rule, a 
voluntary settlement of the named plaintiff~' individual substantive claims 
would prerlude them from appealing the vrocedural ruling on elas:s cPr-
tification in their individual rapacitie~. Sec United Ail'liues, luc . v. 
McDonald, 432 U. S. 385, 4()(}-401 (Hl77). We note, however, that Hule 
23 (e) pre~cribe;:; cert.aiu reHponsibilit ie;:; of a cli;:;t rict eomL in n c:a.~e 
brought. a~ a elm;s artiou: n clu~:s action may not be "di~mi:;~(·d or l'Ulll-
promist>d without the approval of the court, <llld notice of tlw ]>ropo~ed 
di~mi~sal or compromi~e ::;hall be given to all member~ of the !'Ia:-:~ in ~u('h 
manner as the court dirrcts." Tlwre muy be circum,.;l<HW<',;, whidt np~·d 
not be dPfinecl hrre. wlwre the di~trid court ha~ a reRpon;,:ibility, prior 
to nrceptanrc of a settlement and iti:l cli;:;mi~sal of thr ela~:> nc·t ion, to 
providr au opportunit.y for iutPrvcntion by a membPr of tlw putative 
cla::;s for the purposP of appealing the dPrwtl of etas::; rcrtifieation. StH·h 
intervention ocrurr<>d in McDonald. 
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Federal Practice para. 203.06. The rule is one of federal appel~ 
late practice, however, derived from the statutes granting 
appellate jmisdiction and the historic practices of the appel-
late courts; it does not have its source in the jurisdictional 
limitations of Art. III. In an appropriate case appeal may be 1 
permitted from an adverse ruling collateral to the judgment on ' 
the merits at the behest of the party who has prevailed in 
the lower court, even though the appellant is not directly 
affected by the adverse ruling. 
In Electrical Fittings Corp. v. 'Phomas & Betts Co., 307 
U. S. 241 (1939), respondent sued petitioner for infringemf'nt 
of a patent. In such a suit. the defense may prevail f'ither 
by successfully a.ttacking the validity of the patent or by suc-
cessfully defending the charge of infringement. In Electrical 
Fittings the decree of the District Court adjudged the patent 
valid but dismissed the complaint for failure to prove infringe-
ment. The respondents did not appeal, but petitioners sought 
review in the Comt of Appeals of so much of the decree as 
adjudicated the patent valid. Respondents filed a motion to 
dismiss the appeal "based on the ground that the appeal can 
raise no questions not already moot because of the fact that 
the [petitioners] have already been granted in the dismissal 
of the bill all the relief to which they are entitled." 100 F. 
2d, at 404. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on 
this ground after ruling that the decree of the District Court 
would not in subsequent suits, as a matter of collateral estoppel 
or otherwise, influence litigation on the issue of the patent's 
validity. On review here, this Court did not question the 
view that the ruling on patent validity would have no effect on 
·ubsequent litigation. Nevertheless, a unanimous Court 
allowed the appeal to rf'form the decree : 
" A party may not appeal from a judgment or decree in 
his favor , for the purpose of obtaining a review of the 
findings he deems erroneous which arc not necessary to 
support the decree. But here the deeree itself puqJorts. 
78-904-0PINION 
DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK v. ROPER 9 
to adjudge the validity of [the patent], and though the 
adjudication was immaterial to the disposition of the 
cause, it stands as au adjudication of one of the issues 
litigated. We think the petitioners were entitled to have 
this portion of the decree eliminated, and that the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals had jurisdiction, as we have held 
this Court has, to entertain the appeal, not for the pur-
pose of passing on the merits, but to direct the reforma-
tion of the decree." 307 U. S., at 242 (footnotes 
omitted). 
Although the Court limited the appellate function to ref-
·ormation of the decree. the holding relevant to the instant 
case was that the federal courts retained jurisdiction over the 
controversy notwithstanding the District Court's entry of 
judgment in favor of petitioners. This Court had the ques-
tion of mootness before it, yet because policy considerations 
permitted an appeal from the District Court's final judgment, 
the case was still live and dismissal was not required by Art. 
III. The Court perceived the critical distinction between the 
definitive mootness of a case or controversy, which ousts the 
jurisdiction of the federal court and requires dismissal of the 
case, a11d a judgment in favor of a party at an intermediate 
stage of litigation, which does not in all cases terminate the 
right to appeal.8 
In our view, the denial of cl!lss certification similarly is an 
example of a }roc.e.dural rulmg, collateral to the merits of a 
li~on, but one that is appealable after the entry of final 
BIn a ::;ense, the petitioner in Electrical Pittings sought review of the 
Dist.riC"t Court's procedural error. Tlw District Court was correct in 
inquiring fully into the validity of the patent, Sinclair <(: Carroll C'o . v. 
lntachemical Corp., 325 U. S. 327, 330 (1945), hut wn:s incorrect to ad-
judge the pateut. valid after ruling that then• had bN•n no infringement. 
By doing so the District Court llftd dPcided a hypothetical eontrover:;y, 
Altvater v. llreeuwn, 319 l l. S. 359, 368 (194a); yet petitioner cmtld take 
the apJX'al to correct. thi:s error becau:;e there had been an advPr~e de-
•cision on the litiga,ted issue. 
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juclgnH'nt." The denial of class c<'rtifieation stands as an 
adjudication of on<' of tlH' issu<'s litigat<'tl. As in h'lectr£cal 
F-ittings, W<' think tht' p<'titiml<'rs here W<'f'<' C>ntitkd to lu:tv<' 1/) tJ .I . .'i ~ 
this portion of th<' District Court's judgnWJlt r<'vi<'"'C'<l. and ~
w.Q_ l:glil that the Couri_0 Aruwals had juri§ilir.tion to C'ntcr-
tain tll C' appPal to rrvi<'\\' thC' ass<'rtr<l p rocPdural C'rror of 
th; ~1rt. but nof1(n' th<' purpose '7>f passing on 
the merits of the substanti,·c controversy. 
B 
Pt>rhaps because the question was not ti1ough t to he open 
to doubt we havr stat<'cl in tlw past, without <'XtC'Il(kd disetls-
sion. that "an ord<'r df'nying class certification is suh.i<'Ct to 
efi'<'ctiw review after final judgment at the })(']wst of the 
na11wd plaintiff .... " CoO])ets & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 
U .• '. 463. 469 (1078). The ap]walahility of the issue of class 
certification after final judgment ou the nwrits war; an im-: 
porta11t ingrPdient in our unanimous r<'jcction in Livesay of 
tht> argumrn t. advanced in favor of afforcli ng interlocutory 
app<'al as a matter of rioht, that au adverse class C<'rtifieation 
ruling came within tlw "collateral order" <'XC<'ptiolt to the 
fi11al-judgment rul<'. For the Livesay proposition. tlw Court 
cit('(] United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 4:32 F .• '. 38.1 ( 1D77). 
ThaL easC' involved, as docs this. a judgment enkn'd on the 
merits in favor of the named plaintiff. The ~vicDouald Comt \ ~ ~ 
assumed that the named plaintift' would have been entithl to 
appeal a dPnial of class rNtification. 
The usc of the class action procedure for litigation of in-
9 In tr;;;;pers c~· Lybrand Y. Livesay. 437 F. 8. 4G:l (1078). we• held that 
the <'i:ts;-"c!'rtific·ation rulin~ did not fall within that ll:t!T0\1' c·:lfl'p:OI·~ · of 
cin·tuu,.:tnnc·<•;o: whrrc inl<'rlo('nto'r~· a ppc•:tl wa,.; :tllowc•d a;o: a 111:11 t l'l' of 
right. .Howc·\·c·r, our rulin~ in Lybm11d \\';t:;; not iJttt•ndC'd to pre<·ludc' 
motion~ :<('('kin~ di~t·n·tionar~· intNlo<'utor~· appPal for n·,·ic•w of the· 
I <'<'rtifiea1 ion nding. In ~onw ra,.:c•;o: ~u<'h :lll ap]H.':tl would pmnli"c' sub-~ stantial ;o:aYin~;o: of time and re;,;oun·c,; or for other n•a;o:oJI;o: ~hould be tJ 1 viewed lto,.,pitably. 
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dividual claims may offer substantial advantages for named 
plaintiffs, which may motivatR them to bring cases that for 
ecollomic reasolls might not be brought otherwise.10 It is 
clear that there has been a growth of litigation stimulated by 
contingency-fee agreemf'nts and the role this type of fee 
arrangf'ment has played in vindicating the rights of iudivid-
uals who otherwise might 11ot find it economically feasible to 
seek or obtai11 legal redress. The prospect of such fee a.rrange-
ments offers advallta es for litigation T) a named laintiff 
in ~tions as well as or t 1e1t· attoD,leys.11 The financial 
inceu tive that class actions offer to the legal profe"SSioilis a 
nat~outgrowth of the increasing reliance on Tile ' 'private 
attoruey gmlCral" for the vindication of legal rights; obviously 
this development has been facilitated by Rule 23. The aggre-
gation of individual claims in the context of a class-wide suit 
is an evolutionary response to the existence of injuries 
umemedied by the regulatory action of government. Where 
it 1s not econmmciilly fi~as161e to o6ta.iu relief withi11 the tradi-
tional framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits for 
damages, aggrieved persons may be without any efl'ective 
redress unless they may employ the class-action device. 
The district court's ruling on the certification issue is often 
the most significant decision rendered in such a class-action 
10 A l'ignifieant. bcm•fit. to elaimants who chooi"C to litignte their individ-
ual elaim.~ in a ela,;,;-aetion eon! ext i~ the pro~pt•ct of reducing; their cc::;t~ 
of litiga tiou, part ieularJ~r attorney~' fl'('>', h) ::ill orating ,;uch co;,; I:, among all 
nwmbc:fS of tlw class who betwfit ftmn any rPcovrry. Typically, t.he attor-
neys' frr~ of the' nanwd plaintiff~ proceeding without rrliatH"<' 011 Hulr 23 
could rxrred thr valur of the individual judgment in favor of any onr 
plaintiff. Hen' I lw damagr~ elaimed by tlw two named ]llaintiff:o totaled 
$1 ,006.00. Such plaintiff" would he unlike!~· to obtain legal rrdre>'S at an 
aC'erpt;lbiP cost, mtle~s coun~el were motivatrd by the ft-r-sprrading incP!l-
tive and proceeded on a, eon! ingency-fee basis. This, of cour~r, i~ a 
cent raJ rourept of Rule 23. 
11 This cas<• doc·~ not raise auy que~tion a~ to the propriety of con• 
tingrncy-fce agreements. 
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proceeding.12 To deny the right to appeal simply becaus<' the 
named defendant has sought to pay off the individual private 
claims of the named plaintiffs, would be contrary to sound 
judicial administration. Requiring multiplr plaintiffs to 
bring separate actious, which effectively could be "picked off" 
by a defendant's tender of judgment before an affirmative 
ruling on class certification could be obtained, obviously 
would frustrate the objectives of class actions; moreover it 
would invite waste of judicial resources by stimulating suc-
cessive suits brought by others claiming aggrievement. It 
would be in the interests of a class-action defendaut to fore-
stall any appeal of denial of class certification if that could 
be accomplished by tendering the individual damages claimed 
by the named plaintiffs. Permitting appeal of the district 
court's certification ruling-either at once by interlocutory 
appeal, or after entry of judgment on the merits-also mini-
mizes problems raised by "forum shopping'' by putative class 
( representatives attempting to locate a judge perceived as 
sympathetic to class actions, That small individual claims 
f otherwise might be limited to local and state courts rather 
than a federal forum does not justify ignoring the overall 
problem of wise use of judicial resources. Such policy con-
siderations are not irrelevant to the determination whether an 
adverse procedural ruling on certification should be subject 
to appeal at the behest of named plaintiffs. Courts have 
certain latitude in formulating the standards that govem the 
appealability of procedural rulings even though, as in this 
case, the holding may determine the absolute finality of a 
judgment, and thus, indirectly, determine whether the con-
troversy has become moot. 
'\\'P conclude that on this record the District Court's entry 
of judgment in favor of uamed plaintiffs over their objections 
did not moot their private case or controversy, and that re-
1 ~ Sec Miller, An Overview of Fecl<·ral Class Action::;: Past, PretSeut, and 
Fuwre 12 (Federal Judicial Center 1978) . 
18-90.f--.OPINION 
DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK v. ROPER Ia 
sponden ts' individual in terpst in tho litigation-as distin-
guished from whatever may bf' their representative responsi-
bilities to the putative class '"-is sufficient to permit their 
a1))peal of the adverse. certification ruling. 
Affirmed, 
1 3 DifTieult qu(•:;tions arise a,: to wlw.t, if any, arr thP named plaintiffs' 
rcspon,;ibilitic:; to thf' putative class prior to cert ifi!'ation ; this crt. e does 
not, rrquiw u:; to rca('h these t11l<'Htion1'1. 
er 11/2/79 / 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Ellen 
DATE: November 2, 1979 
RE: No. 78-904 Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper 
I find this opinion extraordinary. It nowhere cites a 
single one of the Sosna line of cases. Of the Court's recent class 
action mootness jurisprudence, it cites only McDonald, and then only 
in passing. The real holding is found at page 7-8, to the effect 
that there is no Article III problem here at all. This proposition 
is plainly wrong. The only authority cited in support is the 
Electrical Fittings case, a 1939 one-page opinion which in fact 
stands for the opposite conclusion. As the language quoted on page 9 
shows, the Court held that there was in fact no jurisdiction to 
consider the merits (presumably because of Article III, although no 
rationale is stated). The Court of Appeals could take jurisdiction 
only for the extremely limited purpose of ordering the District Court 
to delete an unnecessary holding from the decree. The merits of the 
deleted holding were not to be decided. Electrical Fittings would be 
controlling if the only relief sought on appeal were to have the 
order denying class certification expunged from the record. 
Obviously, that is not this case. 
The policy considerations cited at pages 10-12 have little 
if anything to do with the Article III question. On their merits, I 
believe the "private attorneys general" theory on page 11 is probably 
wrong as a matter of Rule 23 policy. The judicial administration 
argument on page 12 is more properly addressed to the Coopers & 
Lybrand result than to this case (in fact on page 10 n.9 the opinion 
invites discretionary interlocutory appeals despite Coopers & 
Lybrand). 
Finally, the opinion concludes that it rests entirely on the 
plaintiffs• individual interest. Yet I find no identification 
~J anywhere as to what that individual interest is. The only interests 
cited are social interests. 
In short, the opinion is a "sitting duck." I would not 
consider joining it even if our tentative dissenting position does 
not "write" well. 
' 
* ·- ·~ 
t·. 
.*lu:prtnu <!}01trl o-f t1£t ~ttb' j;hdtS' 
,r~ltittgtttn. ~. <!}. 2ll.;t'!" 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
November 5, 1979 
Re: 78-904 - Deposit Guaranty National Bank 
__ .:_v ~[ Roper __ 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
TL 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
/ ' 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.:%uvuntt <qotttf of flp~ ~ltiUlt .:§t1ifcg 
'J)ltriH>lyi:tt:gton. lfl. <!f. 2!l.;TJ1.~ 
November 6, 
Re: No. 78-904 - Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper 
Dear Chief: 
I shall withhold my vote in this case until I am able to 
circulate a proposed opinion in No. 78-572, United States 
Parole Commission v. Geraghty. I think it desirable that 
these cases be considered together. This, of course, mere-
ly repeats what I stated in my note of October 9 to you. 
Sincerely, 
;!Ji. 
"---
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
~ 
r. 
1979 r 
CHAMBE RS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~ttprttttt <qcm-t ttf f4t ~tti:ftlt .;%)tu.Ug 
'J):agJrbtg-ftttt. to. <q. 20gi.lf,,;l 
November 6, 1979 
j 
Re: No. 78-904 - Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper 
Dear Chief: 
I shall withhold my vote in this case until I am able to 
circulate a proposed opinion in No. 78-572, United States 
Parole Commission v. Geraghty. I think it desirable that 
these cases be considered together. This, of course, mere-
ly repeats what I stated in my note of October 9 to you. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
.•' .. 
•. 
'•' "'' 
Sincerely, 
;/!fl. 
""' 
CHAMI!5ERS OF" 
I ~tntt ~ou:rfltf tlrt ~b .ihtftg 
Jl~~ ~. <lJ. 2UbiJi.c1 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
November 6, 1979 
Re: 78-904 - Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper 
Dear Chief: 
Although I agree with your opinion as presently 
written, I shall withhold my vote until Harry•s 
opinion in the Geraghty case is circulated. The 
two cases are, as Harry says, necessarily related, 
and very probably accommodations will have to be 
made in both opinions. 
Sincerely yours, 
') ~ . 
I • 
/ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
I 
I 
I 
j 
I 
I 
I 
I 
CHAMBERS 01'" 
JUSTICE Wt<. J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.ittprtmt C!Jqnrl qf flrt ,~b .im±t~ 
~as~~. C!J. 20~~~ 
November 6, 1979 
RE: No. 78-904 Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. 
Roper 
Dear Chief: 
I agree. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS O F 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
,ju.prttttt {!fttltrl of Urt ~tb j)tatts 
jilasfri:n:gton. ~. <!f. 211~'1$ 
November 6, 1979 
Re: No. 78-904 - Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. 
Ro er 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me in your present draft. I think that 
I disagreed more than some of the Conference with the treat-
ment of Geraghty by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 
and I don•t think Harry•s earlier forecast that the two 
opinions may not dovetail is totally unfounded. I say this 
becau.se I doubt that I could join an opinion affirming 
Geraghty for the reasons that the Court of Appeals did. So 
I deliberately use the words 11 this draft 11 of your opinion. 
If it were to be revised to indicate approval of CA 3•s 
treatment of Geraghty, I reserve the right to 11 jump ship .. 
on you! 
Sincere 1 y ,{/I"'Yl"'/ / 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
·,. 
Dear Chief: 
In accord with my vote at 
circulate a dissent in due time. 
Sincerely, 
lfp/ss 
cc: The 
: .. )' 
j : ~ 
' ;.~ ~· 
...... 
" ' 
.Sttprtmr <!fourt of tire 'J!lnittb '$.ltatu 
'l'Daalringtctt. ~. <!f. 20.?>~2 
CHAMBE:RS OF 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
November s, 1979 
Re: No. 78-904 - Deposit Guaranty National 
Bank v. Roper 
Dear Chief: 
I shall withhold my vote until Harry's 
proposed opinion iti Geraghty is circulated. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
/.J'n. 
T.M. 
CHAMBERS OF 
_§1~ ~o:ttrt cf tqt ~nif.dt ;§tahs 
~agl}ingfon. ~. <q. 2!l.;tJ!..;t · 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE November 9, 1979 
.. 
Re: 78-904 - Deposit Guaranty National 
Bank v. Roper, et al. 
Dear Chief, 
Please join rrie. 
Sincerely yours, 
' ' 
The Chief. Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
erne 
To: Mr. Justice Brenn~u 
D /_ j~ llr . Justice Stewart 
r 
u1C11 (£1. >, llr . Justice Wh1. te 
U,~~ J~ Mr . Justice Mars}1all 
~ ~ \ ~ Mr . Justice Bldckm~n 
J~ J , .if~{/~ Mr. Justice Powell , tJil ~~ Mr · Justice Rehnouist 
i 
/~ ,..,.. ..&e'HtP Mr . Justice Stev~ns 
t-J u From: The Chief Justice / 11 r vs:r clb) '<'I've( Circulated: 
J (' eciroulated: 
2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 78-904 
Deposit Guaranty National Bank, I On Writ of Certiorari to 
Jackson, Mississippi, Petitioner, the United States Court 
v. of Appeals for the Fifth 
Robert L. Roper et al. Circuit. 
[November -, 1979] 
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari to decide whether a tender to named 
plaintiffs in a class action of the amounts claimed in their 
individual capacities, followed by the entry of judgment in 
their favor on the basis of that tender, over their objection, 
moots the case and terminates their right to appeal the denial 
of class certification. 
I 
Respondents, holders of credit cards issued on the "Bank-
Americard" plan by petitioner Deposit Guaranty National 
Bank, sued the bank in the United States District Court fot 
the flouthern District of Mississippi, seeking to represent both I 
their own interests and those of a class of similarly aggrieved 
customers. The complaint alleged that usurious finance 
charges had been made against the accounts of respondents 
and a putative class of some 90,000 other Mississippi credit 
card holders. 
Respondents' cause of action was based on sections 85 and 
86 of the :National Bank Act. 12 U.S. C. ~~ 85 and 86. Sec- I 
tion 85 permits banks within the coverage of tlw Act to charge 
interest "at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Terri-
tory, or District where the bauk is loeatecl." In a case where 
a higher rate of interest than allowed has been "knowingLy'r / 
----
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charged § 86 allows a person who has paid the unlawful inter~ I 
est to recover twice the total interest paicJ.l 
The modern phenomenon of qredit card systems is largely 
dependent on computers, which perform the myriad account-
ing functions required to charge each transaction to the 
customer's account. Iu this case, the bank's computer was 
programmed so that, on the billing date, it added charges, 
subtracted credits, added any finance charges due under the 
BankAmericard plan, and prepared the customers' statements. 
During the period in questiou, the bank made a monthly serv-
ice charge of 1%% on the unpaid balance of each account. 
However, customers were allowed 30 days within which to 
pay accounts without any service charge. If payment was 
not received within that time, the computer added to the cus-
tomer's next bill 11/2 % of the unpaid portion of the prior 
bill, which was shown as the new balance. The actual finance 
charges paid by each customer varied depending on the stream 
of transactions and the repayment plan selected. In addition, 
the effective annual interest rate paid by a customer would 
vary because the same 1 lh% service charge was assessed 
against the unpaid balance no matter when the charged trans-
actions occurred within the 30-60-day period prior to the 
billing date. This llh o/r monthly service charge is asserted to 
have been usurious b€'cause under certain circumstances the 
resultiug effective annual interest rate allegedly exceeded the 
maximum interest rate permitted under Mississippi law. 
The District Court denied respondents' motion to certify 
the class, r·uling that the circumstances did not meet all the 
requirements of Fed. Rule Civ. · Proc. 23 (b) (3) .t The Dis-
1 Respondents' complaint also alleged a cause or action based on the 
Tmth in Lending Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1640 et seq., but that claim wa 
dismis:sed with prejudice at respondents' reque:st. 
@rlw Di8trict Court found that the requircmentR of Rule 23 (b) (3) 
were not met because the putative class repre:;cntatives had· failrd to es-
tablish the predominance of que:stions of law and fact common to cla~s 
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trict Court certified the order denying dass certification for 
discretionary interlocutory appeal, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1292 (b) ; the proceedings were stayed for 30 days pending 
possible appellate review of the denial of class certification. 
The Ullited States Court of Appeals for· the Fifth Circuit 
denied respondents' motion for interlocutory appeal. The 
bank then tendered to each named plaintiff, in the form of an' 
"Offer of Defendants to Enter Judgment as by Consent and 
Without Waiver of Defenses or Admission of Liability," the 
maximum amount that each could have recovered. The 
amounts te11dered to respoudents Roper and Hudgins were 
$889.42 and $423.54 respectively, including legal interest and 
court costs. Respondents declined to accept the tender and 
made a counteroffer of judgment in which they attempted to 
reserve the right to appeal the adverse class certification' 
r-uliug. This counteroffer was declined by the bank. 
Based on the bank's offer, the District Court entered judg-
ment in respondents' favor, over their objection, and dis-
missed the action. The bank deposited the amount tendered 
into the registry of the court, where it remains. At no time 
did any putative class members seek to intervene either to 
litigate the merits or to appeal the certification ruling. It 
appears that by the time the District Court entered judgment 
and dismissed the case, the statute of limitations had run on 
the individual claims of the unnamed class members.3 
members, and becauHe a class action wa~ not shown to be a supenor· 
method of adjudication due t,o (1) the nvailability of traditional proce-
dure:; for pro::;ecuting individual clairrt1:1 in Mi~:>~:>i~:>~>ippi courts; (2) the 
"horrt>ndous p<>nalty," whirh rould re:mlt in "de::;truction of tht> bank" if 
claims were successfully aggregated; (3) the substantive law of Mississippi 
which views the aggr<>gation of usury claim:; as unde1:1irable ; and (4) the 
' 
' 
tremendous burden of bundling 90,000 claims, pa.rticularly if counter- r'. 
claims were filed . , . ... '- -"' 
@Rrvrrsal of tlw District Court':; d(•nial of C<'rtification by thr Court) . or 
of Appt>als would rt>late baek to tlw timr of the original motion for cer- , fl)l.i~ l 1 
tifioolioo foe tho pucpo~' of toiling the "'"'"'' of HmiMio"' oo the / ·,~~ 
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\Vhen respondents sought review of the class certification 
ruling in the Court of Appeals, the bank argued that the case 
had been mooted by the entt•y of judgment in respondents' 
favor. In rejecting the bank's contention, the court relied in 
part on United Airlines, Inc. -v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 
(1977). There we held that a member of the putative class 
could appeal the denial of class certification by intervention, 
after entry of judgment in favor of the named plaintiff, but 
before the statutory time for appeal had run. Two members 
of the panel read Rule 23 as providing for a fiduciary-type 
obligation of the named plaintiffs to act in a representative 
capacity on behalf of the putative class by seeking certifi-
cation at the outset of the litigation and by appealing an 
adverse certification ruling. In that view, the District Court 
also hac! a responsibility to ensure than any dismissal of the 
suit of the named plaintiffs clicl not prejudice putative class 
members. One member of the panel, concurring specially, 
limitccl the ruling on mootness to the circumstances of the 
case, i. e., tha.t. after filing of a class action, the mere tender 
of an offer of settlement to the named plaintiffs, without ac-
ceptance, does not moot the coutroversy so as to prevent the 
namE'd plantiffs from appealing an adverse certification ruling. 
Having rejpcted the bank's mootness argument, the Court 
of Appeals reviewed the District Court's ruling on the class 
certification question. It concluded that all the requisites 
of Rule 23 had been satisfied and accordingly reversed the 
adverse certification ruling; it remanded with directions to 
certify the class and for further proceedillgs. 
Certiorari was sought to review the holdings of the Court of 
Appeals on both mootness and class certification. We granted 
the writ limited to the question of mootness, to rPsolvc con-
flicting holdings in the courts of appeals.4 440 U. S. 945. 
<'laim~ of the clas:< member~. See United Airlinl's, Inc. v. ll!cDonald, 432' 
u.s. as5 (1977). 
VJWinvkur v. Bell Federal Savinys awl Loan Assn., 550 F. 2d 271 (CA7 
1977.), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 932 (1978). 
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II 
We begin by identifying the interests to be considered when 
questions touching on justiciability are presented in the class 
action context. First is the interest of the named plaintiffs: 
their personal stake iu the substantive controversy and their 
related right as litigants in a federal court to employ in appro... / 
priate circumstances the procedural device of a Rule 23 class 
action to pursue their individual claims. A separate con-
sideration, distinct from their private interests. is the re-
sponsibility of named plaintiffs to represent the collective 
interests of the putative class. 'Two other interests are 
implicated: the rights of putative class members as poten-
tial intervenors, and the responsibilities of a district court to 
protect both the absent class and the integrity of the judicial 
process by monitoring the actions of the parties before it. J 
The Court of Appeals did not distinguish among these dis-' 
tinct interests. It reviewed all possible interests that in its 
view had a bearing Oll whether an appeal of the denial of 
certification should be allowed. These diverse interests are 
interrelated, but we distinguish among them for purposes 
of analysis, and conclude that resolution of the narrow ques-
tion presented requires consideration only of the private 
interest of the named plaintiffs. 
III 
A 
The critical inquiry, to which we now turn, is whether re-
spondents' individual and private case or controversy became 
moot by reason of the entry of judgment in their favor. 
Respondents, as holders of credit cards issued by the bank, 
claimed damages in their private capacities for alleged 
usurious interest charges levied in violation of federal law. 
Their complaint asserted that they had suffered actual damage 
as a result of illegal acts of the bank. The complaint 
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satisfied the case or controvf'rsy requirement of Art. III of the 
Constitution. 
As parties in a federal civil action, respondents exercised 
their optiou as putative mf'mbers of a similarly situated card-
holder class to assert their claims under Rule 23. Their right 
to assert their own claims in the framework of a class 
action is clear. However. the right of a litigant to f'mploy 
Rule 23 is a procedural right only, ancillary to thE' litigation 
of substantive claims. Rhould these substantive claims be-
come moot in the Art. Ill sPnse, by settlement of aU personal 
claims for example, the court retains no jurisdiction over the 
controversy of the individual plaintiffs. 
The factual context in which this question arises is impor-
tant. At no time did the named plaintiffs accept the tendel' 
in settlemeut of the case; instf'ad, judgment was e11tered in 
their favor by the coui't and the case was dismissed over their 
continued objections.5 Although a case or controversy is 
mooted in the Art. III sense upon payment and satisfaction of 
a final, unappealable judgment, a decision that is "final" fol' ) 
purposes of appeal does not absolutely resolve a case or cou-
CYThr 1-'ett!ement of all sub8tantive claims in a litigntion typically moots 
any i~stte;; associated with it. 13 C. Wright, A. Miller, and E. Cooper, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 353:3, lJ. 271 (1975). Under this rule, a 
voluntary srttlement of the named plaintiffs) individual substantive claims 
would prPchlde them ftonl appeallng the procrdural ruling 011 class cer-
tification in their individuai capacities . See VnitPd Airlines, Inc. v. 
McDonald , 432 n. s. 385, 400-401 (1077) (.POWELL, .J., dissenting). We J 
notP, however, thnt Rule 23 (e) pre:-;cribes certain re::;ponsibilitirs of a dis-
trict rourt in a <'Hsc brought as a clas::; action: a ela;;s action may not be 
"uismi~~ed or cou'lproml;;rd without the approval of the comt, and notice 
of the proposed dl;;mis&'ll or rompromlse ;;hall be given to all member;; of 
the cia~::; in :s1ich manner a;; the court directs ." There may be circum-
'stane<>i<, which need not be defined here, where thP district court has <~ 
responl"ibility, prior to acceptance of a sPttlement and its di~mis::;al of the 
clar:;.~ artion, to provide an opportunity for intervrntion by a member ot 
th<' putativ<:> clas~:< for the purpo,;e of appealing the d<:>nial of clas;; certifi<'LL~-
tiou. Such inil'rvention oceurrrd in McDonald . 
• 
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troversy until the time for appeal has run. Nor does a 
confession of judgment by defendants on less than all the 
issues moot an en tire case; other issues in the case may be 
appealable. We can assume that a district court's final judg~ 
ment fully satisfying named plaintiffs' private substantive / 
claims would preclude their appeal on that aspect of the 
final judgment; however. it does not follow that this circum~ 
stance would terminate the uamed plaintiff's' right to take an 
appeal on the issue of class certification. 
Congress has vested appellate jurisdiction in the courts of 
appeals for review of final decisions of the district courts. 28 
U. S. C. § 1291. Ordinarily. only a party aggrieved by a 
judgment or order of a district court may exercise the statu-
tory right to appeal therefrom. A party who receives all that 
he has sought generally is not aggrieved by the judgment af-
fording the relief and cannot appeal from it. Public Service 
Comm'n v. Brashear Freight Lines Inc., 306 U.S. 204 (1939); 
New York Telephone Co. v. Maltbie, 291 U. S. 645 (1934); 
Corning v. 'Pray Iron & Nail Factory, 15 How. 451 (1853); 
J . W. Moore, Federal Practice para. 203.06. The rule is one 
of federal appellate practice, however, derived from the stat-
utes granting appellate jurisdiction and the historic practices 
of the appellate courts; it does not have its source in the juris-
dictional limitations of Art. III. In an appropriate case 
appeal may be permitted from an adverse ruling collateral to 
the judgment on the merits at the behest of the party who has 
prevailed on the merits. 
In Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 
U. S. 241 (1939), respondent sued petitioner for infringement 
of a patent. In such a suit, the defense may prevail either 
by successfully attacking the validity of the patent or by suc-
cessfully defending the charge of infringement. In Electrical 
Fittings the decree of the District Court adjudged the pateut 
valid but dismissed the complaint for failure to prove infringe-
tnent. The respondents did not appeal, but petitioners sought. 
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' . l 
review in the Court of Appeals of so much of the decree as 
adjudicated the patent valid. Respondents filed a motion to 
dismiss the appeal "based on the ground that the appeal can 
raise no questions not already moot because ·of the fact that 
the lpetitioners] hiwe already been granted in the dismissal 
of the bill all .. the re~ief to which they are entitled." 100 F: 
2d, at 404. The Oourt of Appeals .9ismissed the appeal on 
this ground after ruling that the decree of · the District Court 
.would not in subsequent suits, as a matter of collateral estoppel 
or otherwise, influence litigation on th\'l ·issue of the patent's 
validity. On review here, this ·court did not question the 
view that the ruling on patent validity would have no effect on 
subsequent litigation. Nevertheless;· a unanimous Court 
allowed the appeal to reform the decree i 
"A party may not appeal from a judgment or decree iri 
his favor,'· for the "T)urpo~e pf obtaining a review of ) 
findings. he deen1s , erroneou~;? ·which are not necessary to 
support the decree. But here the de~r.ee itself purports 
to adjud~e the validity- ~{ [the p~ten,t], and though the 
adj1,1dication was immaterial . to _ the disposition of the 
cause, .it stands a& an adjudipation of one of the issues 
litigated. . We think the petitioners were entitled to have 
this portion of the . decree eliminated, -and that the Cir~ 
cuit Court of Appeals had. jurisdiction, as we have held 
this Court has, to. entertain the appeal1 not for the pur-
pose of passing on the merits, but to direct the reforma~ 
tion of the decree." 307 U. S., at 242 (footnotes 
omitted). 
Although the Court limited the appellate function to ref-: 
ormation of the decree, the holding relevant to the instant 
case was that the federal courts retained jurisdi·ction over the 
controversy notwithstanding the District Court's entry of 
judgment in favor of petitioners. . This Court had the ques-
tion •of mootn~ss befbre it, yet because policy considerations. 
pemil.tted an aiJpeal from the District Court's final judgment~ 
78-904-0PINION 
DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK v. ROPER 9 
the case was still live and dismissal was not required by Art. 
III. The Court perceivrd the critical distinction between the 
definitive mootness of a case or controversy, which ousts the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts and requires dismissal of the 
case, and a judgment in favor of a party at an intermediate 
stage of litigation, which does not in all cases terminate the 
right to appeal.6 
In our view, the denial of class certification similarly is an 
example of a procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of a 
litigation, that is appealable after the entry of final juclgment.7 
The denial of class certification stands as an adjudication of 
one of the issues litigated. As in Electrical Fittings, we think 
the petitioners here were entitled to have this portion of the 
District Court's judgment reviewed, and we hold that the 
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal to 
review the asserted procedural error of the District Court, but 
not for the purpose of passing on the merits of the substantive 
controversy. 
'ijhn a sen::;<>, the petitionrr in Electrical Fittiugs sought review of OlC 
Dist.rict Court'~> procedural error. The Dit~trict Court was correct in 
inquiring fully into the validity of the patent, Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. 
lnterchemical Corp., 325 U. S. :327, 330 (1945), but wa::; incorrect. to ad-
judge the patent valid after ruling that there had been no infringement. 
By doing so the Dit~t.rict Court had decicl<>d a hypothetical controversy, 
Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. S. 359, 363 {1943); yet petitioner could take 
the appeal to correct this error because there had been 311 adverse de- I 
riHion on a litigated i'it~Ue, petitioner wa,\; continuing to as:s<>rt an intPrest 
in thr ont comP of that i&me, and for poliey reasons thi:s Courl considered 
tlw procedural question of ::;uffici<>nt importance to allow an appeal. 
, {?>In Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), we held tha~ 
the class certification ruling did not fall within that. narrow category of 
circumstances where appeal was allowed prior to final judgment at~ a mat- / 
ter of right undrr :2!-1 U. S. C. § 1291. HowPvrr, our ruling in Livesay was 
not int<•ndrd to prrcludr motion~ under 2R U. S. C. § 1292 (b) :scrking 
diHcretionary intrrlocutor~ ' nppral for rrvif'w of thr certification mling. 
Ser 4:37 U. S., at 474-475. In ~onw <'Hk<'~' l'uch nn np]wnl would promi:;<' 
I'UIJ:,tantial ~:wing~ of tinw :wd rf>Rourr<'~ or for othrr rea~on,; ~hould be 
v~ewed ho~l1itahly. 
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Perhaps because the question was not thought to be open 
to doubt we have stated in the past, without extended discus-
sion, that "an order denying class certification is subject to 
efl'ective review after final judgment at the behest of the 
11amed plaintiff .... " Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 
U. S. 463, 469 ( 1978). The appealability of the issue of class 
certification after final judgment on the merits was an im-
portant ingredient in our· unanimous rejection in Livesay of 
the argument, advanced in favor of affording preJudgment J 
appeal as a m,atter of right, that an adverse class certification 
ruling came within the "collateral order" exception to the 
final-judgment rule. For the Livesay proposition, the Court 
cited United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977). 
That case involved, as does this, a judgment entered on the 
merits in favor of the named plaintiff. The McDonald Court 
assumed that the named plaintiff wou1d have been entitled to 
appeal a denial of class certification. 
The use of the class action procedure for litigation of in-
dividual claims may offer substantial advantages for named 
plaintiffs, which may motivate them to bring cases that for 
economic reasons might not be brought otherwise.8 It is 
clear that there has been a growth of litigation stimulated by 
contingency-fee agreements and an enlargement of the role 
this type of fee armngement has played in vindicating the 
(JA ~ignifirant brnf'fit io rlnimnnts who rhoosr to Jitigatr thrir individ-
ual daim.~ in a cla.-:>-actwn ronfext i~ the 1)rospect, of reducing their costs 
of lit.igRtion, pa.rticnlarly aitornryR' fer.-<, by allocating o;uch co::;t,.: among all 
member:; of the clas,; who bf'Iwfit from any recovf'ry. Typica1ly, the attor-
neys' ff'e::; of the named plamtiffH proceeding without reliance on Rule 23 
could f'XCPE'd the value of fhe individual judgment in favor of any one 
phtintiff. }lrre tlw dnmagf'H claimed by thE' two named plaiutiffs totaled 
$1,006.00. Suc11 plaintiffs would be unlikely to obtain legal rcdre&; at an 
accept<tble cost, unlcs~ coun::;el were motivated by thE' ff'e-sprE':tding incen-
tive and proceeded on a contingency-fee b.asib. This, of 1course, js .a 
centra1 'Concept of Ru1c '23. 
78-904-0PINION 
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rights of individuals who otherwise might uot fine! it economi-
cally feasible to seek and obtain legal redress. The prospect ( 
of such fee arrangements offers advantages for litigation by 
11amed plaintiffs in class actions as well B.S for their attorneys.0 
The financial incentive that class actions offer to the legal pro-
fession is ~ natural outgrowth of the increasing reliance on the 
"private attorney general'' for the vindication of legal rights; 
obviously this development has been facilitated by Rule 23. 
The aggregation of individual claims in the context of a class-
wide suit is an evolutionary response to the existence of in-
juries unremedied by the regulatory action of government. 
Where it is not economically feasible to obtain relief within the 
traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual 
suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effec-
tive redress unless they may employ the class-action device. 
The distdct court's ruling on the certification issue is often 
the most significant decision rendered in these class-action I 
proceedin;10 To deny the right to appeal sirnply because 
the defen'Jant has sought to pay off the individual private 
claims of the named plaintiffs would be contrary to sound 
judicial administ-ration. Requiring multiple plaintiffs to 
bring separate actions, which effectively could be "picked off" 
by a defendant's tender of judgment before an affirmative 
ruling on class certification could be obtained, obviously 
would frustrate the objectives of class actions; moreover it 
would invite waste of judicial resources by stimulating suc-
cessive suits brought by others claiming aggrievement. It 
would be in the interests of a class-action defendant to fore-
stall any appeal of denial of class certification if that could 
be accomplished by tendering the individual damages claimed 
by the named plaintiffs. Permitting appeal of the district 
@Thi:,; case does not misr any question as to the propriety of con-
tl!3.&.ency-fee agreements. 
\(?Srr Miller, An Overview of FPdrral Cla<l::l Action~ : Pa;-:i , Present, and 
Future 12 (Federal J11dicinl Center 1 978). 
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court's certification ruling-either at oncP by interlocutory 
appeal, or after entry of judgment on the merits~also mini~ 
m.izes problems raised by "forum shopping" by putative dass 
representatives attempting to locate a judge perceived as 
sympathetic to cl~,ss actions. That small individual claims 
otherwise might b~ limited to local and state courts rather 
than a federal forum does not justify ignoring the overall 
problem of wise use of judicial resources. su'cp policy con~ 
siderations are not irrelevant to the determination whether an 
adverse proced4ral ruling on certification should be subject 
to appeal at the behest of nameq plaintiffs. Courts have a 
certain latitude in formulating the standards that govern the 
appealability of procedural rulings even thollgh, as in this 
case, the holding may determine the absolute finality of a 
judgment, and thus, indirectly, determine whether the con~ 
troversy has become moot. 
We conclude that on this record the District Cotlrt's entry 
of judgment in favor of named plaintiffs over th~ir objections 
did not moot their private case or controversy, anq that re-. 
spondents' individual interest in the litigation-as distin~ 
guished from whatever rnay be their representative responsi~ 
bilities to the putative class11-is sufficient to permit their 
appeal of the adverse certification ruling. 
Affirmed, 
@Difficult que~Stions ari~;o as to what, if any, arf' tho named plaintiffs; 
responsibilities to the putative class prior to certification ; this case does 
not tequire us to reach these questions, 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CH 1 EF .JUSTICE 
.:§\ 14tr ttt1 c <q onrt !1f Up• ~ttiir b $'it atr s 
'J]la.slyingwt~ ~· ~· 20~J~2 
November 16, 1979 
Re: No. 78-904 -Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 
et al. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Attached is a revised draft of the opinion with 
editorial changes throughout . 
. ' 
' .t 
' 
,.,.. r • • ~ ) (li ~ 1 ~ '' •.t 
C"' \ ' ..J -.J (,. C' • i• • I,.. C.'·~ 
L ,iAt-1 H:. ~S OF 
,JIJSTICI-: liNlRY A. AI.ACKI•1U N 
Dear Chief : 
Re : No. 73 -·904 -· Oc:posit G11ar0nLy Na.U.ona l ~~ .. nk v. RopE r 
No. 78 ·-") /2 · Unil:_cd ;:;_t:at:_es [';::nolc_CoJ,1fl1'n_ v~G_,,r_<,rJhl._y 
Changes mad e in the last two drafts of your opinion in 
J3:<?_p_e.I._ require some minor chan')cs in my proposed opinion in 
Gcr ~ighty . The is p:r i !nar i.ly oc;"llSC I (1uo i·ed nopP~ an d made 
rcp(~al:ed citations to it. I t;1i11k you wil l fin<1 those 111inor 
changes acceptable . L . 
There is, in my view , one point of tension that remains 
between the two opinions . In my footnote 10, I state flatly 
tha t we intimate no v j evv as to whether a n.l,nod plaintif f, 
who se ttles his individua l claim afte r den i a l of class 
certification, may appea l from that denia l. I much prefer 
to retain that "no view" posture. In footnote 5 of your 
November 28 recirculation of Roper, however, the Court 
decides this i ssue. The basic authority for this is Lewis' 
dissent in United Airlines which you and Bryon joined. In 
that diss e nt he states flatly that "this question has not 
been decided by this Court," although he further states that 
"the answer on principle is clear." 432 u.s., at 400. As I 
indicated in my letter of November 17, I am not convinced 
that "the settlement situation is all that easy and clear." 
I, for one, would not resolve the question by dictum, and I 
would prefer that it be left open until it is specifically 
presented to us. I therefore could not join footnote 5 of 
Rope r and would concur only in your result in that case if 
that footnote remains. 
Since;;;, 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
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TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Ellen 
RE: No. 78-904, Roper 
1. Page 2, second full sentence. I have changed this to 
accord better with the Court's definition of the issue quoted on ~ 
page 4. See what you think. 
2. Page 2, first line of first full paragraph. I do not 
think there are any differences between the cases "material" to the 
question presented here. But the analysis differs slightly because 
of potential economic interests in Roper. I suggest we say only 
that there are "some differences." 
3. Page 4, last sentence of Part I. It seemed odd to me 
to refer to a "client-less" class action. It is not the action but 
the lawyer that has no "client." Would "headless" do? I stole fA~ 
that phrase from an earlier dissentinq opinion from the CAS. -d' 
4. Page 5, third sentence of first full paragraph. I 
phrased the "critical distinction" this way because it is much 
closer to the language actually used by the Court (slip op. p. 9) 
than what I had said in ~qhty, which was: "between mootness 
deriving from a judgment and mootness resulting from events 
extrinsic to the litigation." I still think that the language on 
.. 
}1A.Jo 
2. 
page 5 is more accurate. /-~-~ also serves us better here by setting 
up the issue of "appealability" to which the Court (and the 
dissent) then turn. If you still prefer the other phraseology, we 
can simply lift it from 6eraqhty. __ .....___.,_ 
5. Page FN1, notes 2 & 3. The respondents asked the DC 
to order an award of attorney's fees comprising 25% of the "funds 
and judgment to be paid Plaintiff and other persons similarly 
situated." Note 2 is intended to show only that the attorney's 
fees were not in · addition · to the damage recovery. Note 3 then goes -------
on to attempt some reconstruction of what the actual fee 
qrrangement is and whether the respondents would benefit by paying 
a smaller proportion of their iudgment in fees if the class 
recovers. Although the arrangement is not entirely clear, it 
appears to be a strc:~~~-~-2_~_%~~~~~e of whatever is 
recovered by plaintiffs or the class. I do not believe they are 
-···--· .... --. _ _..,.. ~. __.... ,----.--
inconsistent, and have reworded note 2 to try to remove the 
ambiguity. 
6. Page FN9, note 19. I have changed this around 
somewhat, mainly in the interest of brevity. But I have one 
substantive concern. I'm not sure that the DC can exercise 
---------------- ----------
equitable discretion for the petitioner in the class certification 
ruling. If it is assumed that the bank has violated the law and 
the requirements of Rule 23 otherwise are met, I am not sure that a 
DC should refuse to certify simply because the liability is too 
~ large or because class members have taken no individual action 
3. 
while the class action was pending. At least, it seems that there 
is more room for equitable discretion on the question of tollinq of 
the statute of limitations, which would arise if the DC were to 
conclude that these respondents could not represent the class. 
~~
footnote as written now is s qmewhat open-ended,- b6t refers 
~I) r 
The _~ 
specifically only to the tolling issue. If you want to refer 
----------~..-....__--~-'-­
specifically to the certification issue, we 
9~~ 
~~. 
might omit reference to 
tolling altogether and put back in, at the beginning of the last 
sentence, "When acting on today's mandate to reconsider class 
certification, ••• " 
7. I have inserted A and B headings in Part II, and also 
the headinqs you had placed in Part III. But that makes a lot of 
sections. Since Part II~/2 paqes long, do you think we ~ 
could do without the subparts there? · Or, alternatively, what about 
iust part A (comprising present parts A and B) and B (now C)? 
CJ.. 2/1/80 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Ellen 
RE: No. 78-904 Roper 
David's review of the Chambers Draft in this case 
provided some stylistic improvements, which I have marked on pages 
2, 4, 7, and 8 of the draft, and correction of one minor inaccuracy 
on page 2. There is also a typo on page 6. All of these could be 
corrected on a second draft after circulation. But David had two 
somewhat more substantive concerns which I felt were well-taken. -------·--
First, on pages 10-11, he was confused by the sudden jump 
from the discussion of Electrical Fittin~s and Altvater as cases in 
which there was no personal stake to the conclusion referring back 
to the part of Electrical Fittings in which there was such a stake. 
I have added a sentence that we both feel solves this problem. 
Second, on pages 14-15, he felt the paragraph dealing with the 
problems created by the Court's result was jumpy and unclear. On 
reflection, I agree, and have drafted a revised and I believe 
clarified version of that paragraph. (Rider A). 
David also suggests that we strike the second paragraph 
of Note 19, because the mere introduction of legislation is a slim 
reed on which to rely. In this instance, the bill we describe 
would commit substantial resources of the Justice Department to 
. ' 
2. 
oversight of the new actions, a move that may not be popular in 
Congress these days. The bill may also have due process problems 
in eliminating pre-judgment notice in some of these actions, but 
providing that class members will be bound by the judgment. I tend 
to agree with David on this too. 
I would recommend that we have the draft reprinted to 
adopt the changes, together with any others you may wish to make, 
and circulate on Tuesday. 
.. 
February 6, 1980 
No. 78-904 Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper 
· Dear Bill: 
·~ I now have my dissent in this case ready for 
circulation. 
In view, howpvor, of the tPnsion that may exist 
between your "join" in this case and your being good enough 
to join my Geraghty opinion, I am delivering two copies to 
you before circulating it to other Chambers. Althouqh I 
doubt that I could make maior changes, if you have 
suggestions as to language I certainly will consider them 
sympathetically. 
In your join note to me you stated that there is 
some authority supporting Harry's position in Geraghty. I 
think on~ can s a y that Geraghty mer9ly continued the process 
in class actions of eroding Articl~ III that commenced in 
Sosna and Bowman. One also must say, 1 think, that Geraghty 
accelerates an~ significantly Pxtends that process - perhaps 
to the point of making Article III meaningless in class 
actions. 
I do agree that dicta in McDonald and Coopers & 
Lybrand support the result in Geraghty. Again, however, - as 
stated in my note 10 in Roecr - the dicta hardly ca.n be 
viewed as r.efl0cting any considered judgment by the Court. 
But back to the problem at hand, if you have 
thoughts about changes in Roper do let me know. ln view of 
Harry's understandable discomfort, I would like to circulate 
my dissent in Rope~ fairly promptly. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
LFP/lab 
CHAMBERS O F" 
~ttp-rtntt ~onrlttf Hrt ~lt ~fattg 
'Jfa,g~ ~. ~ 2llgf'l-~ 
J USTICE POTTER STEWART 
February 8, 1980 
Re: No. 78-904, Deposit Guaranty Nat. 
Bank v. Roper 
Dear Chief, 
Lewis Powell •s dissenting op1n1on has 
persuaded me that the issue in this case 
is analytically almost identical to that 
presented in the Geraghty case. Accordingly, 
I have decided to join his dissenting opinion. 
My regret for this shift from my pre-
viously expressed tentative view is mitigated 
by the fact that it will in no way change the 
result. 
Sincerely yours, 
ne 
' /. 
\ I 
The Chief Justice / 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
CHAMBERS OF 
~,_- ~~~_,s#:s~ 
~uprtmt <l}ltltttof tltt~b _jtatts ¢ ~~ • 
Jfa;g fri:ttgLm. ~. <1}. 2U.;t'! ~ 
..JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
February 8, 1980 
Re: No. 78-904, Deposit Guaranty Nat. 
Bank v. Roper 
Dear Lewis, 
Please add my name to your dissenting 
opinion. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
' 
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MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring. 
~~· ~h e Chief Justibe 
' 'r . Jn~+: 1 ca B""··· n'"~.:n 
T U!::' ~.J. ~ e ': '! '; t 
Jt.mti "e v~ · 
· :- .. ·. Jmrti~~ i¥;·.• ·~: .. ,li 
'{·c . JuBt1oe Bla.okmun 
~~- Juetioe Powell 
Mr. Ju.et1ce 'Bebnqu1SI 
Fr ona U:F. Justice S'teY8tll! 
C" ,..,..~Jle.ted ~ FEB 1 l ,., 
In his dissenting opjnion MR. JUSTICE POWELL states that, 
because the District Court erroneously refused to certify the 
class and because no member of the class attempted to 
intervene, the respondents "are the only .plaintiffs arguably 
' 
present in court." Post, at 2. I respectfully Clisagree. In 
my opinion, when a proper class action compla i nt . is filen, the 
absent members of the class automatically become parties to the 
case or controversy for purposes of the court's Article I I I 
jurisdiction. If the district judge fails to certify the 
class, I believe they remain parties until a final 
determination has been made that the action may not be 
maintained as a class action. Thus, the continued viability of 
the case or controversy, as those words are used in Article 
III, does not depend on the district judge's initial answer to 
the certification question; rather, it Clepends on the 
plaintiffs' right to have a class certifieo.~/ 
1/ The adoption of MR. JUSTICE POWELL's pos i tion woulo make 
an-erroneous failure to certify a c l ass unreviewable even in a 
case in whjch the name0 pJaintiff prevailed on the merits or 
. 11\M -\a1u OM ~~j ~~ fowf-i~'l~-v)S, 
fwM t{wt o~ ~ f~A1L\ovrh1 · fts 0 · ~~ ) . _ 0 
N. tk.Lgh . S~' ~CQ.. ti\IL +tuL clas~ ~\a.ets fe'tr~ 
~~~-t'se9._ ~· ,ltl(PfM~ w1-\t.. ~CJit;S~~~- 1t~o 
~tt.uL~\~w we.- 4:4Al.tMR-_J~A.cr,sd,~ c •. e.7 ~-
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Accordingly, even if the named plaintiff's personal stake 
in the lawsuit is effectively eJiminater~l, no question of 
mootness arises simply because the remaining aoversary parties 
are unnamed. Rather, the issue which arises is whether the 
named plaintiff continues to be a proper class representative 
for the purpose of appeaJing the adverse cJass determination. 
See United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, u.s. 
( s 1 i p . op. , at J 6) • In my judgment, in thjs case, as in 
Geraghty, the named plaintiffs clearly remained appropriate 
representatives of the class at least for that Jimited purpose. 
I therefore join the opinion of the Court. 
1/ (continued) 
his claim. Post, at ]1. Nothing in ejther Article III or Rule 
23 of the Feaeral Rules of Civil Procedure requires the ~ourt 
to reach such a counterproductive result. Rule 23 simply 
establishes procedures for managing class actions~ it roes not 
purport to determine whether the erroneous denial of class 
certification may destroy the interests of absent class members 
for purposes of Article III jurisdjction. Ana I fail to see 
how the constraints imposed by Article III would be offenCier by 
an appellate court's adjudication of a live controversy over 
the right of absent class members to share in the jurgment won 
by the class representative. 
2/ I agree with the Court's determination in this case ana 
in-Geraghty that the respective named plaintiffs continue to 
have a sufficient personal stake in the outcome to satisfy 
Article II! requirements. See ante
1
at 1.2~ Geraghty, u.s., 
at ( s 11 p op. , at 15) . 
... . 
' 
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ttr. J'ootice Rebnqu1SI 
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring. 
F:romt U:F. lootice SteY81'1S 
c~ ..,,..~1 lat.oo: FEB 1 l "M 
In his dissenting op j nion MR. JUSTICE POWELL states that, 
because the District Court erroneously refused to certify the 
class and because no member of the class attempted to 
intervene, the respondents "are the only plaintiffs a~guab1y 
present in court." Post, at 2. I respectfully Cljsagree. In 
my opinion, when a proper class action compla i nt is file0, the 
absent members of the class automatical l y become parties to 
case or controversy for purposes of the court's Article ITI 
jurisdiction. If the district judge fails to certify the 
class, I believe they remain parties until a final 
determination has been made that the action may not be 
maintained as a class action. Thus, the contjnued viability 
the case or controversy, as 
III, does not depend on the 
the certification question; 
plaintiffs' right to have a 
those words are used in Artjcle ~ 
djstrict judge's initial answer(~ 
rather, it Oepends on the ~)'1 
class certified.~/ ~ 
ci. ~ 
1/ The adoption of MR. JUSTICE 
an-erroneous failure to certify a 
case in which the name~ plaintiff 
POWELL's pos i tion woul(! make~ 
c l ass unreviewable even in a -A:- • 
preva i Jed on the merits of· t.Ac.~ 
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Accordingly, even if the named plaintiff's personal stake 
in the lawsuit is effectively eliminate0~1, no question of 
mootness arises simply because the remaining aoversary parties 
are unnamed. Rather, the issue which arises is whether the 
named plaintiff continues to be a proper class representative 
for the purpose of appealing the adverse class determination. 
See United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, u.s. 
( s 1 i p . op. , at J 6 ) • In my judgment, in this case, as in 
Geraghty, the named plaintiffs clearly remained appropriate 
representatives of the class at least for that Jimited purpose. 
I therefore join the opinion of the Court. 
1/ (continued) 
hi~ claim. Post, at 11. Nothing in either Article III or Rule 
23 of the Feaeral Rules of Civil Procedure requires the ~ourt 
to reach such a counterproductive result. RuJe 23 simply 
establishes procedures for managing class actions~ it ooes not 
purport to determine whether the erroneous denial of class 
certification may destroy the interests of absent class members 
for purposes of Article III jurisdiction. Ana I fail to see 
how the constraints imposed by Article III would be offen~e0 by 
an appellate court's adjudication of a live controversy over 
the right of absent class members to share in the ju0gment won 
by the class representative. 
2/ I agree with the Court's determination in this case and 
in-Geraghty that the respective named plaintiffs continue to 
have a sufficient personal stake in the outcome to satjsfy 
Article III requirements. See ~nt~1at 12~ Geragh!Y, __ u.s., at ( s 1 i p op. , at 15) • 
:··· 
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Second Draft 
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Mr. Justice Brtmnfi'l 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
llr. Ju.st1 oe White 
J4r. Jtl.'\Jt1.ee Marah.all 
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Mr. Ju~t1ce Powell 
f4r. Ju.st1ce Rahnqu1et 
78-904- Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper F:zoonu l.r. Justioe Stevens 
C11.'0Ulat-ed1 --------
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurrjng. 
In his dissenting opinion MR. JUSTICE POWE~L states that, 
because the District Court erroneously refused to certify the 
class and because no member of the class attempted to 
intervene, the respondents "are the only plaintiffs arguably 
present in court." Post, at 2. This position is apparently 
based on the notion that, unless class members are present for 
all purposes (and thus may be liable for costs, bound by the 
judgment, etc.}, they cannot be considered "present" for any 
purpose. I respectfully disagree. In my opinion, when a 
proper class action complaint is filed, the absent members of 
the class should be considered parties to the case or 
controversy at least for the limited purpose of the court's 
Article III jurisdiction. If the district judge fails to 
certify the class, I believe they remain parties until a final 
determination has been made that the action may not be 
,. . 
.. 
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the case or controversy, as those words are used in Art. III, 
does not depend on the district iudge's initial answer to the 
certification question: rather, it depends on the plaintiffs' 
right to have a class certified.!/ 
J/ There is general agreement that, if a class has been 
properly certified, a case does not become moot simply because 
the class representative's individual interest in the merits of 
the litigation has expired. In such a case the absent class 
members' continued stake in the controversy is sufficient to 
mainta~n its viability under Art. III. In a case in which 
certification has been denied by the district 
CQUrt of appeals cannot determine whether the * 
class continue to 'n the ou 
determ1ne whether the action can pro erly be maintained as a 
class actiop. I 1t 1s not a proper class act1on, then the 
entire case is moot. If, on the other hand, the district 
court's refusal to certify the class was erroneous, I believe 
there remains a live controversy which the cou~ts have 
jurisdiction to resolve under Art. III. 
I recognize that there is tension between the approach T 
have suggested and the Court's sua sponte decision in 
Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 u.s. 128. See also 
FaSadena City Bd of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 430. 
As MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN po1nts out 1n Un1ted States Parole 
Comm'n v. Geraghty, ___ u.s. ___ , ____ n. 7 (slip op. at 12, n. 
7), that case is distinguishable from this case because it 
involved an attempt to litigate the merits of an appeal on 
behalf of an improperly certified class. I agree that the 
Court did not have jurisdiction to consider the merits until 
the threshold question of whether a class should have been 
certified was resolved. However, I disag~e with the Court's 
conclusion that the entire action hacr-to be dismissed as moot. 
In my view, the absent class members remained sufficiently 
present so that a remand on the class issue would have been a 
more appropriate resolutJon. 
Just as absent class members whose status has not been 
fully adjudicated are not "present" for purposes of litigating 
the merits of the case, I would not find them present for · 
purposes of sharing costs or suffering an adverse judgment. If 
a class were ultimately certified, the class members would, of 
course, retain the right to opt out. 
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Accordingly, even if the named plaintiff's personal stake 
in the lawsuit is effectively eliminated~/, no question of 
mootness arises simply because the remaining adve~sary parties 
are unnamed. Rather, the issue which arises is whether the 
named plaintiff continues to be a proper class representative 
for the purpose of appealing the adverse class determination. 
Cf. United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, u.s. 
( s 1 i p . op. , at , 6) • In my judgment, in . thjs case, as in 
Geraghtl, the named plaintiffs clearly remained appropriate 
representatives of the class at least for that 1 jmite~ 
purpose.}/ 
I therefore jojn the opjnjon of the Court. 
2/ I agree with the Court's determination in thjs case and 
in-Geraghty that the respective named plaintiffs continue to 
have a sufficient personal stake jn the outcome to satisfy 
Article III requirements. See ante at 12; Geraghtl, ___ U.S., 
at ( s 1 i p op. , at 15) • 
3/ My view of the jurisdictional issue would not necessarily 
enlarge the fiduciary responsibilitjes of the class 
respresentative as MR. JUSTICE POWELL suggests, see post, at 16 
n. 2. In any event, I do not share his concern abou~e 
personal ljability of a class representative for costs and 
attorneys' fees if the case is ultimately lost. Anyone who 
voluntarily engages in combat--whether in t~e courtroom or 
elsewhere--must recognize that some of his own blood may a 1 so 
be spilled. 
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V"\.;- . · . J ~ 1 MR. CHIEF JusncE BuRGER delivered the opinion of the ''~ ~ _ w~ Court. 
lA . L We granted certiorari to decide whether a tender to named ~ 
zA / v~- . plaintiffs in a class action of the amounts claimed in their ~~ '\- r -v -- -~": ... ~individual capacities, followed by the entry of judgment in 
~ ~fl . their favor on the basis of that tender, over their objection, 4. ~ 
1 _ )A/- - -I moots the case and terminates their right to appeal the denial ~ 
~,- .- of class certification. _ .f--
1 ~~ 
~ Respondents, holders of credit cards issued on the "Bank- ~.f. ./3.--"-- ~ tJ 11 , Americard" plan by petitioner Deposit Guaranty National J--.:-. --:::~=--:----------
~ Bank, sued the bank in the United States District Court for 
-"' the Southern District of Mississippi , seeking to represent both ~ 
/} i ./lA~ their own interests and those of a class of similarly aggrieved /1..-~ 
~ - 1 !ft., q customers. The complaint alleged that usurious finance ~~ 
j ~~ _. charges had been made against the accounts of respondents 
/f) l 1 and a putative class of some 90,000 other Mississippi credit ~ - 7 
V' card holders. 
~ _ .~1 Respondents' cause of action was based on sections 85 and ~ 
"'~ · S6 of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S. C.§§ 85 and 86. Sec- • 
1 , -I -~on 85 permits banks within the coverage of the Act to charge ?t, ~ y/fl 7 
A~ • ~~terest "at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Terri-_______ _ 
/ { -- /J .• ~ \-tory, or District where the bank is located." In a case where 
~ _ D ~~ ighe~at~ of interest than allowed has been "k~owingl¥'~ ~ '--
// llJ f~bvv~·~ -13 
:. Y' ,, 
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charged § 86 allows a person who has paid the unlawful inteF" 
est to recover twice the total interest paid.1 
The modern phenomenon of credit card systems is largely 
dependent on computers, which perform the myriad account., 
ing functions required to charge each transaction to the 
customer's account. In this case, the bank's computer was 
programmed so that, on the billing da.te, it added charges, 
subtracted credits, added any finance charges due under the 
BankAmericard plan, and prepared the customers' statements. 
During the period in question, the bank made a monthly serv-
ice charge of 1 Y2 % on the unpaid balance of each account. 
However, customers were allowed 30 days within which to 
pay accounts without any service charge. If payment was 
not received within that time, the computer added to the cus-
tomer's next bill llh% of the unpaid portion of the prior 
bill. which was shown as the new balance. The actual finance 
charges paid by each customer varied depending on the stream 
of transactions and the repayment plan selected. In addition, 
the effective annual interest rate paid by a customer would 
vary because the same 1 Jh% service charge was assessed 
agaiust the unpaid balance no matter when the charged trans-
actions occurred wl.th1n the 30-60-day period prior to the 
billing date. 'this 1 ~% monthly service charge is asserted to 
have been usurious because unrler certain circumstances the 
resulting effective annual interest rate allegedly exceeded the 
maximum interest rate permitted under Mississippi law. 
The District Court denied respondents' motion to certify 
the class, ruling that the circumstances did not meet all the 
requirements of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b) (3).2 The Dis-
1 Respondents' complaint also alleged a cause of action based on the 
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1640 et seq., but that claim was 
dismis~ed with prejudice at respondents' request. 
2 The District Court, found that the requirements of Rule 23 (b) (3) 
were not met becau,;e the putative class representatives had failed to es-
t~bnsh the predolhinance of questions of law and fa~t common to claS& 
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trict Court certified the order denying class certification for 
discretionary interlocutory appeal, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1292 (b) ; the proceedings were stayed for 30 days pending 
possible appellate review of the denial of class certification. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
denied respondents' motion for interlocutory appeal. The 
bank then tendered to each named pHtihtiff, in the form of an 
"Offer of Defendants to Enter judgment as by Consent and 
Without Waiver of Defenses or Adniission of Liabiiity," the 
maximum amount that each couid have recovered. The 
amounts tendered to respondents Roper and Hudgins were 
$889.42 and $423.54, respectively, inciuding legai interest anJ 
court costs. Respondents declined to accept the tender and 
made a counteroffer of judgment in which they attempted to 
reserve the right to appeai the adverse class certificatiort 
ruling. This counteroffer was deciined by the bank. 
Based on the bank's offer, the District Court entered judg.o 
ment in respondents' favor, over their objection, and dis· 
missed the action. The bank deposited the amount tendered 
into the registry of the court, where it remains. At no time 
} has any putative class member sought to intervene either to 
litigate the merits or to appeal the certification ruling. It 
appears that by the time the District Court entered judgment 
and dismissed the case, the statute of limitations had run on 
the individual claims of the unnamed class members.3 
members, :md because a class action was not shown to be a superior 
method of adjudication due to (I) the availability of traditional proce-
dures for prosecuting individual claims in Mississippi courts; (2) the 
"horrendous penalty," which could result in "destruction of the bank" if 
claims were successfully aggregated; (3) the substantive law of Mississippi 
which views the aggregation of usury claims as undesirable; and (4) the 
tremendous burden of handling 90,000 claims, particularly if counter-
claims were filed. 
3 Reversal of the District Court's denial of certification by the Court 
of Appenb may rcla1e back to the time of the original motion for cer-
tification for the purposes of tollin_g the st{ttule of lin;) ita tions op the 
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When respondents sought review of the class certification 
ruling in the Court of Appeals, the bank argued that the case 
had been mooted by the entry of judgment in respondents' 
favor. In rejecting the bank's contention, the court relied in 
part on United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 
(1977), in which we held that a member of the putative class 
could appeal the denial of class certification by intervention, 
after entry of judgment in favor of the named plaintiff, but 
be{ore the statutorx time for armeal had_.!2!n. Two members 
of the pa'iief read Rule 23 as providing for a fiduciary-type 
obligatiou of the named plaintiffs to act in a representative 
capacity 011 behalf of thr putative class by seeking certifi-
cation at the outsrt of the litigation and by appealing an 
advers(' certification ruling. In that view, the District Court 
also had a responsibility to ensure than any dismissal of the 
suit of the named plaintiffs did not prejudice putative class 
membrrs. One member of the panel, concurring specially, 
limited the ruling on mootness to the circumstances of the 
case, i. e., that, after filing of a class action, the mere tender 
of an offer of settlement to the named plaintiffs, without ac-
ceptance. does not moot the controversy so as to prevent the 
named plan tiffs from appealing an adverse certification ruling. 
Haviug rejected the bank's mootness argument, the Court 
of Appeals reviewed the District Court's ruling on the class 
certificatiou question. It concluded that all the requisites 
of Rule 23 had been satisfied and accordingly reversed the 
adverse certification ruling; it remanded with directions to 
eertify the class and for further proceedings. 
Certiorari was sought to review the holdings of the Court of 
Appeals on both mootness and class certification. We granted 
the writ limited to the question of mootness, to resolve con-
flicting holdings in the courts of appeals.4 440 U. S. 945. 
claims of the clas,., members. See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 
U. S. 385 (1977) 
1 E. g .. Winokur v. Bell Federal Savwgs and Loan Assn., 560 F. 2d 211 
€CA7 1977}, C'ert. dt>vitrl, 435 U.S. 932 (1978) . 
·~ 
78-004-0PINION 
DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK v. ROPER 5 
II 
We begin by identifying the interests to be considered when 
questions touching on justiciability ~ presented in the class 
action context.L!)'irst is the interest of the named plaintiffs: 
their personal stake in the substantive controversy and their 
related right_ as lli,i~ts in a federal court to employ in appro-
priate circumstances the procedural device of a Rule 23 class 
action to pursue their individual claims. A sepa~ con-
sideration, distinct from their private interests, i~ & 
sponsibility of named plaintiffs to represent the collective 
interests ~the putative class. Two other interests are 
implicatcc@ the righ~s 9J.. putative class members as poten-
tial intervenors, and tft#fesponsibilities of a district court to 
protect both the @sent cl!§.s ~d the ij; tegrity of the judicial 
process b~litori;"g the actions of the parties before it. 
The Court of Appeals did not distinguish among these dis-
tillct interests. It reviewed all possible interests that in its 
view had a bearing on whether an appeal of the denial of 
certification should be allowed. These diverse interests are 
interrelated, but we distinguish among them for purposes 
of analysis, and conclude that resolution of the narrow ques- /J ~ 
tion prcsen ted requires consideration only of the rivate '\ I~~ 
i~sl of the namec p aintiffs. - ) ~ ~ 
I 
A IA.A/~ 
trt~711 The criti~Unquirl, to which we now turn, is whether re-
spol!_,dents' i~~nd prixaje c~r controversy became 
moot hy reason of petitioner's tender or the entry of judgment 
in respoud(•n ts' favor. Rcsponden ts, as holders of credit canis 
issued by tlw ba11k , claiuwd damages in their private capacities 
for alleged usurious interest charges leviPcl in violation of fed-
eral law. Th<'ir complaint asserted that they had sufi'er<'cl 
actual dan1age as a result of illegal acts of the bank. The 
complain L satisfied the case or con trovcrsy requiremeut of 
Art. Il1 of the Constitution. 
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As parties in a federal civil action, respondents exercised 
their option as putative members of a similarly situated card-
holder class to assert their claims under Rule 23. Their right 
to assert their own· claims in the framework of a class 
action is clear. However, the right of a litigant to emnloy 
Rule 23 is a procedural right only, ancillar~ to the litigation 
of substantive cla1ms. Should these substantive claims be~ 
come moot~ the Art. III sense, by settlement of all personal 
claims for example, the court retains no jurisdiction over the 
controversy of the individual plaintiffs. 
The factual context in which this question arises is impor-
tant. At no time did the named plaintiffs accept the tender 
in settlement of the case; instead, judgment was entered in 
their favor by the court and the case was dismissed over their 
continued objections.5 Although a case or controversy is 
mooted in the Art. III sense upon payment and satisfaction of 
a final, unappealable judgment, a decision that is 11final" for 
purposes of appeal does not absolutely resolve a case or con-
troversy until the time for appeal has run. Nor does a ~ 
confession of judg~nt by defen:dants on ·1:ss than all _the 
is~s moot- an entii~case; other J.ssu~ iii the case may be 
appealable. We can assume h~ judg-
me nt f ully satisfyin ~plaintiffs' private substantive 
cla1ms wo preclude t eir appeal on t at aspect of the ,___., 
final judgment; however, it does not follow that this circum-
5 We note that Rule 2:3 (e) prc:;cribe:; certain responsibilitic:; of a district 
court in a eaHe brought a:; a cia~;::; action: once a c.!iu>~ i:; certified, a clas~:; 
action may not. b<-' "dismi,;sc•d or compromi:;l:'d withont:the flJ)provaJ of the 
court , and notirr of the propo:;ed di::;mi:-;;;a] or compromil:le shall be given 
to all m<'mbc·r~ of the cia~ in such manner as the court direct:;." Con-
eeivably, there abo may bt• eirrum:;tanct'ti, which need n2,t l!.e define~, 
where the diHt rid rourt ha:s n re,.;pon:sibility, prior to approval of a l:lettlc-
ment and it" di~miH:saJ of the clas:; actiou, to provide an opportunity for 
intervention b~· a member of the putative cla:;s for the purpose of appeal-
ing the denial of cla::;s certification. Such intervention occurred in United' 
4irliues, !lie . v. lvfcDunaltl, 432 U.S. 3~5 (1977). 
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stance would terminate the named plaintiffs' right to take an 
appeal on the issue of class certification. 
Congress has vested appellate jurisdiction in the courts of 
appeals for review of final decisions of the district courts. 28 
U. S. C. § 1291. Ordinarily, o,gly a 12arty aggrieved by_a 
judgment or order of a district court may exercise the statu-
to?y right~al ilierefrom. A party who receives illthat 
henas sought generally is not aggrieved by the judgment af-
fording the relief and ca.nnot appeal from it. Public Service 
Comm'n v. Brashear Freight Lines Inc., 306 U.S. 204 (1939); 
New York Telephone Co. v. Maltbie, 291 U. S. 645 (1934); 
Corning v. Troy Iron & Nail Factory, 15 How. 451 (1853); 
J. W. Moore, Federal Practice para. 203.06. The rule is one 
of federal appellate practice, however, derived fron1 the stat~ 
utes graining appe1late jurisdiction and the historic practices 
of the appeTiate court8;1t "does not have its source in the juris~ 
diciloilarllmit~s of Art. III. In· an appropriate case 
appeal may be permitted from an adverse ruling collateral to 
the judgment on the merits at the behest of the party who has 
prevailed on the merits, so long as tl_!.at 2,art~ retains a s)&ke 
in _{he a,pp~eaJ satisfying the requirements of Art. IIV' 
An illustration of this principle in practice is Electrical Pil-
t'ings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U. S. 241 ( 1939). In 
that case. respondents sued petitioners for infriHgement of a 
patent. In such a suit. the defense may prevail either by 
successfully attacking the validity of the patent or by sue~ 
cessfully defending the charge of infringement. In Electrical 
a Tlw di~til'llt t'on,:tru<:':s tlw l\otiel• of App<'al as a complete abaudomueut 
by re~<pmH.Ients of tlwir Art. Ill pl'l'sonal stake in the appeal. Pust, nt 3. 
Such il:' not tlw ea~e. Indeed, th!' ap]l!'al wars taken by the named plain-
tjiL-:, nlthough it:-: onl.\' ]HII'JlOS(' Wll~ to !'CCIII'(' class certi fication. Tl~ugE­
out thi~ litigation, r<':-:pondenti'i havl' a:;:<Prted as their Jersoual ~tak<' iu the 
a •· t H'ir dP:<in· to ~ uf t J •• ·c· •,.;,;fnl elaRs 1tigants a portion of those 
-fe<'s and expenH'" that have be· n incurred in t is Ihgatimi anil for which 
thC'~' Hl:'sC:rtH ~ontinning oblig t.tion. See Plaintiffs-Appellant:;' Brief in 
Oppo,:ition to Motion to Di~ml."' Ap]wul uud Reply Brief in No. 76-:~600,, 
~­
~~ 
~ 
~,c~ 
e-v~~ 
~)~ 
~~ 
~J-tu...t' 
01ed in the C<>mt <>f Apt""'" f ,. tho Fifth Ci<euit 4, 12, 16, 17, .  
~s~~ 
~·~~ 
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Fittings the decree of the District Court adjudged the patent 
valid but dismissed the complaint for failure to prove infringe-
ment. The respondents did not appeal, but petitioners sought 
review in the Court of Appeals of so much of the decree as 
adjudicated the patent valid. Respondents filed a motion to 
dismiss the appeal "based on the ground that the appeal can 
raise no questions not already moot because of the fact that 
the [petitioners] have already been granted in the dismissal 
of the bill a.ll the relief to which they are entitled." 100 F. 
2d, at 404. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on 
this ground after ruling that the decree of the District Court 
would not in subsequent suits, as a matter of collateral estoppel 
or otherwise, influence litigation on the issue of the patent's 
validity. On review here, this Court did not question the 
view that the ruling on patent validity would have no effect on 
subsequent litiga.tion. Nevertheless, a unanimous Court 
allowed the appeal to reform the decree: 
"A party may not appeal from a judgment or decree in 
his favor, for the purpose of obtaining a review of 
findings he deems erroneous which are not necessary to 
support the decree. But here the decree itself purports 
to adjudge the validity of [the patent], and though the 
adjudication was immaterial to the disposition of the 
cause, it stands as an adjudication of one of the issues 
litigated. We think the petitioners were entitled to have 
this portion of the decree eliminated, and that the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals had jurisdiction, as we have held 
this Court has, to entertain the appeal, not for the pur-
pose of passing on the merits, but to direct the reforma-
tion of the decree." 307 U. S., at 242 (footnotes 
omitted) . 
Although the Court limited the appellate function to ref-
ormation of the decree, the holding relevant to the instant 
· case was that the federal courts retained jurisdiction over the 
J 
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controversy notwithstanding the District Court's entry of 
judgment in favor of petitioners. This Court had the ques-
tion of mootness before it, yet because policy considerations 
permitted an appeal from the District Court's final judgment 
and brcause petitioners alleged a stake in tho outcome, 
the case was still live and dismissal was 110t required by 
Art. IlL The Court perceived tho distinction between the 
definitive mootness of a case or controversy, which ousts the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts and requires dismissal of the 
case, and a judgment in favor of a party at an intermediate 
stage of litigation, which does not in all cases terminate the 
right to appeal.7 
B 
'We vit>w the cl('llial of c1as~ certification as an example of a 
procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of a liti ·ation, th;t' 
is appeal~brc:-;ftt>r Uw Pntry of nal JU gment." The Jenial 
of class certification stauds as an adj uclicatiou of one of the 
7tn a ,.;pn"'e , tht• pc•titioner in Elecirical Fittings ~ought review of the 
Distrirt Court'· prorPdural error. The Di~trict Court was correct in 
inquiring fully into the v:~lidity of the patent, Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. 
Interchemical Corp., 325 U. S. 327, 3:30 (1945), but was incorrect to ad-
judge the patent valid after ruling that there had been no infringement. 
By doing so the District Court had decided a hypothetical controversy, 
Altvater 1. Freeman. ;~JD F. R :3.'59, ;{():3 ( Hl·!:l): yet petitioner:; eould take 
the appeal to correct this error because there had been an adverse de-
{ ci~ion on a litigated i~suc, they eontinuecl to a~~crL an interc~t in the out-
com<> of that i~u<•, and !'or poli<·~· n·a~on ~-; this Court <·on~idercd the proce-
dural quc•stion of sufficient importan<·P to allow an appeal. 
s ln Cl!~l!l'li ct· L!fbrand '. Li'l'l.'8a!f. ,n7 U. ~. -!0:3 (1978), we held that 
the clas CE'rtificatfon r uling did not fail Within that narrow category of 
circumstnnrP~ where appeal wa;; allowNl pnor to final judgment as a mat-
ter of right under 28 F. S. C. § 1291. However, our ruling in Livesay was 
not intPndrd to precludP motion;; undC'r 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (h) Rrrking 
discrrtionary interloeutory appeal for revil'\1' of the rrrtificntion ruling. 
See 437 U. S., at 474-475. ln 'omr ra.~rs ;;ueh an appeal would promise 
substantial saving" of time and resources or for other rrason~ should be 
viewed hospitably. 
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issues litigat<'cl. As in Electrical Fittings, the respondents 
h<'re. who assert a continui1lg stake• in the ou come of the 
appeal, \\'er<' entitled to hav<' l£.h'is porti01 o th..L.]2istrict 
Court's judgm<'nt reviewed. TVe hold tha th<' C'ourt of 
Appeals i1ad .lui~cti~to entertaiu the app al only to review 
the ass<'rted procedural <'rror, not for the urpose of passing 
on the n1('ri ts of th<' substantive con trover y. 
vVe agrrP "·ith th<' dissent. post, at 9, t at federal app<'llatc 
ju,risdrctionl~lhJlit!'d l )y_J h<' ap12ellant' personal stake in _the 
appeal. I~~)OJ~Hts J;';V(. ;;7'~tained throughout this appel-
Iat;'litigation that thry rrtai1~a continuing individual int(•rest 
in thr rc•solution of tlH' rlass certification question. Ree n. 6, 
supra. This individual intNest may be satisfied fully once 
effect is giv<'ll to tlw dc•eision of the Court of Apjwals setting 
a!'lidr what it hrld to b<' a11 erronrous District Court ruling on 
class c<'rtification. In Electrical I~~ittings, supra, the petition-
ers assc>rtcd a concc•rn that their success in some uuspccifiPtl 
future li LigaLion would be i mpaircd by stm·e decisis or col-
lateral estoppel applieation of thP District Court's ruli11g on 
patent validity. This concern supplied the personal stake in 
the appeal rc•quirPd by Arl. III. lt. was satisfied fully \vlwn 
the p<'Litionc'rs srrured an ap]wllatc- dC'cision elimillating tho 
erroneous ruling from the decree. After the drcree in Elec-
trical Vittinys was rC'fol'llwd. the tlwn unreviewable judgnwnt 
put an C'lHl to th<' litigation. mooting all substantive claims. 
Here the procC'rdings aftc•r remand may follow a diffrcnt pat~ 
tern. but tlwy are goYNlH'cl by tlw samC' principles. 
\Ve cannot say (h•finitively what will becorne of respond-
ents' continuing personal iuterest in their own substantive con-
troversy with the p<'titioncr when this case returns to the Dis-
trict Court. Petitioner has denied liability to thP respondC'nts, 
but tendC're<l \vhat tlwy appear to regard as a "nuisance set-
tlement.. , Hesponden ts ha vc' JH•ver accepted the tender or 
judgment as satisfactio11 of tlwir substantive claims. C'f. 
Oover v. ~I'IW'artz, 1:~:~ F. 2d 541 (CA2 HJ42) , cikd by the 
, r, '"' 
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dissent, post, at 10, a11d n. 12. The judgment of the District 
Court accepting petitioner's tender has now been set aside by 
the Court of Appeals. We ueecluot speculate on the correct-
ness of the action of the District Court in accepting the tender 
in the first instance, or on whether petitioner may now with-
draw its tender. 
Perhaps because the question was not thought to be open 
to doubt we have stated in the past, without extended discus- / ~ 
sion, that "an order denying class certification is subject to 
effective review after final judgment at the behest of the 
named plaintiff .... " Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 
U. S. 4()3, 4()\) ( Hl78). In Livesay, we unanimously rejected 
the argunwnt. advanced in favor of affording prejudgment 
appeal as a matter of right, that an adverse class certification 
ruling came within the "collateral order" exception to the 
final-.i udgment rule. The appealability of the class certifica-
tion qu<'stion after final judgmrnt 011 the merits was an inlpor-
taut ingrcdit>11t of our ruling in Livesay. For that proposition, 
the Court cit<·d United Airl-ines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 
385 (lD77). That case involved, as does this, a judgment 
enten'd on the merits i11 favor of the named plaintifl'. The 
McDonald ( 'ourt assumed that the named plain tift' would have 
been en titled to appeal a dPnial of class certification. 
The use of the class action procedure for litigation of in-
dividual claims may offer substantial advantages for named 
l p1aintift's; it may motivate them to bring cases that for economic reasons might uot be brought otherwise.9 Plainly 
0 A ~ignific·nnt h·nefit to claimant~ who ehoo~c to litigatt> thPir individ-
ual claim · in a class-action context is the prospect of reducing their costs 
of litigation, particularly attorneys' fees, by allocating such costs among all 
members oJ the elass who benefit from any recovery. Typically, the attor-
neys' fees of a nnmNI plaintiff pro<'l'<'ding without reliance on Hulc 23 
could excped the value of the individual judgment in favor of any one 
plaintiff. Here the damap;Ps claimed by the two named plaintiffs totaled 
$1,006.00. Such plmntlifs wo1.Jld be unlikely to obtain le~al .redress at a~ 
78-904-0PINION 
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there has bPen a geowth of litigation stimulated by contingent-
fee ageeemcuts and all enlargement of the role this type of 
fee arrangement has played in vindicating the rights of 
iJI(lividuals who otherwis(• might not consider it worth the 
cancll(• to embark on litigation in which the optimum result 
might be more than consumed by the cost. The prospect of 
such fee arrangements offers advantages for litigatioll by 
nanwd plaintiffs in class actions as well as for their attomeys.10 
For l)('ttcr ot· worse, the financial inc<>ntive that class actions 
offer to the legal profession is a natural outgrowth of the 
increasing reliance on tlw "private attonwy general'' for the 
villdication of legal rights; obviously this development has 
bee11 facilitatPd by H ule 23. 
TlH' aggregation of individual claims in the context of a 
class-wide suit is all evolutionary response to the cxiste11Ce of 
injuries umemediPd by tlH' regulatory action of government. 
Where it is not economically feasible to obtain relief within the 
traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual 
suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effec-
tive redress unless they may employ the class-action device. 
That there is a potential for misuse of the class action mecha-
nism is 1obvious. Its benefits to class members are often 
nomii1al 1and symbolic, with persons other than class mem-
bers becdming the chief beneficiaries. But the remedy for 
abust>s doPs not liP in denying the relief sought here, but with 
re-examination of Ruk :2:3 as to untoward consequences. 
The district court's ruling on the certification issue is often 
the most significant decision rendered in these class-action 
prOC('<'ding.11 To de11y tlw right to appeal simply lwcause 
acceptable cost, unless counsel were motivated by the fee-spreading incen-
tive and proceeded on a contingency-fee basis. This, of course, is a 
central concept of Rule 23. 
fu 'l'hi,; c ·u~e dor,: not rai"(' un~ que,:1ion m; to the propne1y of t;on-
1 tingen1-fl'(' agrcl•mcnt~ . 
:u Sl'(' >\li!IPr , A11 0Vl'I'VH'W of Fed(•nd C'la~~ Aetions: Pa~t , Prc~cnt, m1ct 
Future 12 (Federal Judicial Center 197 ) . 
'I 
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the defendant has sought to "buy off" the individual private 
1 
claims of the named plaintiffs would be contrary to sound ' 
judicial administration. Requiring multlp1e plaintiffs- to ---- . bring separate actions, which effectively could be "picked off" 
by a defendant's tender of judgment before an affirmative 
ruling on class certification could be obtained, obviously 
would frustrate the objectives of class actions; moreover it 
would invite waste of judicial resources by stimulating suc-
cessive suits brought by others claiming aggrievement. it 
Would be in the interests of a class-action defendant to fore-
stall any appeal of denial of class certification if that could 
be accomplished by tendering the individual damages claimed 
by the named plaintiffs. Permitting appeal of the district 
coures certification ruling-either a.t once by interlocutory 
appeal, or after entry of judgment on the merits-also mini-
mizes problems raised by 1'forum shopping, by putative das~ 
representatives attempting to locate a judge perceived as 
sympaUwtic to class actions. 
F.rhat s111all individual claims otherwise might bP limited to 
local and state courts r-ather than a federal forum does not 
justify ignoring the overall problt-m of wise use of .i udicial 
rc'sourc<'::;. Such policy considerations art- not irrelevant to the 
determi11ati0l~·he£fier an iW"v<'rse procNlural ruling on cer-
tification should be subject to appeal at the behest of named 
plaintiffs. Courts have a certain latitude in formulating fhc 
standards that govrrn the app<'alability of procedural ruli11gs 
cveJl though, as in this cas<>, the holding may determine the 
absolute finality of a judgment. and thus, iudirectly, det<'nnine 
whether the controversy has become moot. 
We conclude that on this record the District Court's entry 
of judgment in favor of named plaintiffs over their objections 
did not moot their private case or controversy, and that re-
spondents' individual interest in the liti a 'on-as distin-
guished fromw hateve"'; JXta y be eir representative responsi-
~~~ 
~­
~ ,.....--. 
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bilities to the putative class 12-is sufficient to permit their 
appeal of the adverse certification ruling. 
Affirmed. 
c .fDiilicult qup;;tiou:; arise HH to what, if any, are the namrcl plaintiffs' 
rcspon>;ibil it ie:s to the putative class prior to certification; this cas_e d.ors. 
not require tt$ to rcac:h these qpestioos 
' . I 
i 
:: . 
To: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
M'r. Justice Stewart 
Ur. Justioe ib1 te 
~r. Ju~ tioe lersball 
Mr. J w Uoe Blaokmun 
Mr . ,J\ta t7 <'13 Powell 
U.r . J t:..R';t0 e ~lmquist 
F~m: Mr . Justice Stevens 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 78- 904 
Deposit Guaranty National Bank, I On Writ of Certiorari to 
Jackson , Mississippi, Petition er, tf.1e United fltates Court 
v. of Appeals for the Fifth 
Robert L. Roper ct al. Circuit. 
[February - , 1D80] 
Mrt. JtrSTICJ<J, ''l'EVL rs, eoncurring. 
In his dis enting opinion 1\IH. JrsTICF.J PowELL states that, 
because the District ( 'ourt <'rronc•ously refused to certify t.he 
class and because no mcmlwr of the class attempted to inter-
venE', the respondents "arc the only plaintiff's arguably present 
in court. •· Post, aL 2. This position is apparently based on 
the notion that., un kss class nH•mbcrs arp present for all 
purposrs (and thus may be liable for costs, bound by the 
judgment, etc.), tlwy cann ot lw considered "prPsettt'' for any 
purpos<'. I respectfully disagreP. In my opinion, when a 
proper class-action complaint is filed, the absent members of 
the cla~s should h<' considerPd parti<'S to the case or con-
troversy at least for tlw limited purpose of the court 's Art. 
ITI jurisdiction. If the district judge fails to certify thr class, 
I believe they remain parties until a final determination ha.S 
b0en mack that th<' action may not be maintainrd as a class 
action. Thus. th<> continued viability of the case or con-
troversy, as those words arc used in Art. II[ , does not de-
pend on tlH" district judge's initial answ<'r to the• certification 
question ; rather, it. depPtHls 011 th<:' plaintiffs' right to have a 
class ccrtificcl.1 
1 There is grneral agrrrmE'nt. that, if n eln»ti has IX'rn propE'rly certifird, 
lhP ra~<' do\'~< not l!C'C'O ilH' moot simp!~· h<•rausr th\' <'lfl"" n•prP~<·nlativl' 's 
indiYidual intcn·~t in thr merit,- of thr litigation ha ~ <'xpilwl. ln ~<llth a 
ra.~n tlw ah:<rut class mrmi><'r::;' eontintH•d stak<• in thr rolltrov<·r~~- is 
··ufficicnt to mai11tnin it::; viability undrr Art. Ill. Iu a ra~<l' i11 which 
,..,. 
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Accordingly, even if the named plaintiff's personal stake in 
the lawsuit is effectively eliminated,~ no question of mootness 
arises simply because the remaining adversary parties are 
unnamed. Rather, the issue which arises is whether the 
named plaintiff continues to be a proper class representative 
for the purpose of appealing the adverse class determination. 
Cf. East 'l'exas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 } 
U.S. 395, 403-406; United States Parole Comm'n v. Gerayhty, 
- U. S. -,- (slip op., at 16). In my judgment, in this 
crrtification has been denied by the }listrict Jl'ourt , however, a court of 
appeal :;; cannot determine whether the members of the class continue to 
have a. stake in the outcome until it has determined whether the action 
can properly be maintained as a class action . If it is not a proper class 
:tction, then the entire case is moot. If, on the other hand, the y{istrict 
ylourt ':; rpfu"al lo crrtify the class was erroneous, I believe there remains 
a live controversy which the court~ have jurisdiction to resolve under 
Art. III. 
I recognizE' t hat there is tension between the approach I have suggested 
and the Court's sua sponte decision in Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. 
Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128. See abo Pasadena City Bd. of Education v. 
Spangle~', 427 U. S. 424, 430. As MR. Jus'l'ICE BLACKMUN points out in 
Uf!-i ted States Parole Comrn'n v. Geraghty, - U. S. -, -, n. 7 (slip 
op., at 12, n . 7), that ca~(· i~ distinguishable f rom this case bPcause it 
involVE'd an attempt to litigate thr merits of au appeal on behalf of an 
improprrl)· crrtified cla!:'~. I ag ree that the Court could not properly f 
consider tht> merit>< until the threshold question of whether a class should 
ha~e been certified wa~; re~olvrd. However, I di~agree with the Court's 
eorlclu ·ion that the mtirP artion had to be dismi~sed a::; moot. In my view, 
the absrnt rla~s member~ rrmained ::;ufficiently present ~o that a remand 
011 the cia::;:; i~::;ue would hav(• been a more appropriate re::;olution. 
Just as absent cla><S member::; whose status has not been fully adjudicated 
are not "prPsent" for purpc~;es of litiga ting the merits of the case, I 
would not find them present for purposes of sharing costs or suffering an 
adverse judgment.. If a cla:;s were ultimately certified, the class members 
would, of course, retain the right to opt out. 
~I agree with the Court'~ detcrmina tion in this case and in Geraghty 
that the respective named plaint iffs continue to have a sufficient personal 
st~1ke in the outcomr to satisfy Art .. III requirements. See ante, at 12; 
Gerayhty,- U. S,, at- (slip op., ttt 15). 
--
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case, as in Geraghty, the named plaintiffs clearly remained 
appropriate representatives of the class at least for that limited 
purpose.8 
I therefore join the opinion of the Court. 
8 My view of the jurisdictional issue would not necessarily enlarge the 
fiduciary responsibilities of the class repre::;entative as MR. JusTICE PowELL 
sugge::;t::;, see post, at 16, n. 2. In any event, I do not share his concern 
about the personal liability of a clru;s repre::;entative for co<>1:s and at-
tomeys' fees if the case is ultimately lost. Anyone who voluntarily engages 
in combat-whether in the coul'troom or el::;ewhere-must recognize that 
some of hi~ own blood may be spilled. 
--
er 2/21/80 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Ellen 
RE: Nos. 78-572 and 78-904 Roper and Geraghty 
The Chief's revision of the Roper opinion 
substantially changes his analysis. In his new page of text, in 
the new FN 6, and in a number of new qualifying phrases 
throughout the opinion, the Chief now rests squarely on the 
respondents' alleged interest in sharing costs with a prevailing ---------- - -- ~ 
class. Much of the rest of the opinion, including the entire 
discussion of the Electrical Fittings case is, I believe, now 
entirely surplusage. In fact he now says that "[wle agree with 
I 
the dissent, post, at 9, that federal appellate jurisdiction is 
limited by the appellant's personal stake in the appeal." P. 10. 
In light of these changes, I think that our discussion 
of the Court's unprecedented elimination of Art. III 
requirements from the realm of appellate jurisdiction, and our 
explanation of Electrical Fittings, are now unnecessary. We 
will also have to redo our summary of the Court's analysis, and 
(
I believe that we should now put our refutation of the "cost-
spreading interest" analysis in text. Fin~lly, we will need to 
change our discussion of Roper in Geraghty, since the Court no 
longer appears to rest on the "critical distinctiOn" we 
2. 
identified there. The Court does not use the language "critical 
dis.tj. nction" a~-IDG-fe.---see ·p~ 9. More significantly, its 
present reliance on an asserted personal stake in the outcome 
makes it unclear that there is any distinction at all. 
In short, I believe that substantial adjustments are 
necessary because th~ Chief has accepted one of our major 
points. There need be no substantive changes, however, and the --adjustments will be largely deletions. I am proceeding on this, 
subject to your approval, but we certainly will not be ready to 
bring it down on Monday. 
'· / 
C HAMBERS OF" 
.:§u.prtmt Qitmri of t4t 1fuitt~ ~taltg 
Jfagltittghtn. ~. <!}. 2llgt'l>~ 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE / February 25, 1980 
Re: 78-904 - Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper 
Dear Lewis: 
Re your February 25 memo, I agree my February 21 
draft has more than the form and stylistic changes of 
all the preceding drafts, but it hardly rises to 
the levels of a "new analysis." I concluded that I 
should try to meet strong February 13 dissent. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
rl'' 
February 25, 1979 
78-904 Deposit Guaranty v. Roper 
Dear Chief: 
The fifth draft of your opinion, recirculated on 
Thursday, substantially rewrites its analysis. 
This will require equally substantial rewriting of 
my dissent. As we are in the middle of our February arqument 
sessions, I may not be able to recirculate until the end of 
this week. 
Sincerely, ,, 
I" ,.:; 
•:, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
er 3/3/80 
TO: MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: Ellen 
RE: No. 78-904 Roper. 
I have made the language changes you suggested, and 
rewritten Part liB based on a combination of your proposed redraft 
and footnote. The result shortens my dr a ft by about a page~ it is 
also somewhat shorter than your first proposal. I have tried to 
make less of an issue of attorney•s fees by combining the costs and 
fees issue. I believe this is an accurate way to view the case: 
fees are simply one other item of the "expenses" that are claimed 
in the vaguest terms and in any event legally irrelevant. I have 
made these two points generally about the entire expense question. 
As redone, I don•t think the "cannot be traced" section is overly 
long, and I don•t think it is marginally relevant. I suspect that, 
as a matter of fac~ there are some costs that have not been 
a~tt 1 
recou?edJ that would be sufficient - if petr were liable for them -
to satisfy Art. III under the Court•s precedents. Consequently, I 
would recommend that we leave in text the few remaining sentences 
in this draft that explain what would happen if the record did 
support the Court•s assumptions. 
1 ~r7 Mo.d.L 0 #I tl 0V o/1 CIM.f 0'"-. fd 
tsJ- s~~·P.M~ DF f~ f-· ]lL~ · 
1 
I 
[I~~ 
LFP/lab 3/3/80 
u. S. Parole Commission v. Geraqhty 
Remind me to talk to Ellen about the possibility of 
adding a footnote with a Cf. reference to HAB's dissent in 
Vitek in which he addresses the subject on Article III 
requirements. 
~""·'4.,,'(~,~~ 
l; . .f; 
.,.· J' 
March 10, 
Guaranty v. Roper 
Dear 
Here is the proposed revision of my dissent in this 
case. 
Althouqh the rationale has not been chanqed, I have 
made substantial revisions to meet the Chief's even more 
substantial chanqes in his opinion for the Court. In his 
present draft, the Chief - unlike Harry's opinion in Geraqhty 
- recoqnizes what I have thouqht were settled Article III 
principles. He then misapplies them, as I view it, by 
findinq the continuinq "personal stake" in the sharinq of 
fees and expenses. But the fee arranqement was a 25% 
continqency, and no present expenses are identified for which 
petitioner has any responsibility. 
I send this to you before circulatinq as you are my 
only constituent. If you find it to be satisfactory, I will 
recirculate promptly and possibly these cases can be brouqht 
down next week. 
I hope you had a qood trip to San Francisco. 
SincerES>ly, 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
lfp/ss 
CHAMBERS 0~ 
·( 
,jupumt <!}curl~tf tlft ~a .§bdtg 
JbtsJri:nghttt. ~. Q]'. 2.0:.;t'!' 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
March 10, 1980 
Re: No. 78-904, Deposit Guaranty v. Roper 
Dear Lewis, 
Your revised dissenting op1n1on seems 
fine to me, and I am glad to continue to add my 
name to it. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
CHAMBERS OF 
~-~~~~ 
;%>u.pumt Qfttnrl of t~t ~ b .:%>tatt 11 
~as-fri:nghrn. ~. Qf. !W,?)~2 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
March 13, 1980 
Re: 78-904 - Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE : 
The opinion circulated March 12 is being amended as 
follows: 
Line 4, second paragraph, page 6, by inserting 
after "court" "without their consent" 
Line 5, second paragraph, page 6, by inserting 
a new sentence: 
"Neither the rejected tender nor the dismissal 
of the action over plaintiffs' objections mooted 
the plaintiffs' claim on the merits so long 
as they retained an economic interest in class 
certification." 
CHAMBE R S OF 
;§u.pumt Q}ou.rt ttf tqt 'Jtlnitt~ .§tatts 
~asqingtan, ~ . (!}. 2!1.?'~2 
THE CHIEF .JUSTI CE 
March 14, 1980 
Re: 78-904 - Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
A small change in this op~n~on is made to add 
the essence of note 6, on page 7, to a sentence on 
page 10, line 5, first full paragraph, following 
the word "question": 
"in their desire to shift part/, of the costs of 
litigation to those who will share in its 
benefits if the class is certified and 
ultimately prevails." 
CHAMBE R S OF 
TH E CHI E F ..JU S T ICE 
.:§u.prnnt <!Jaurt llf t4.t ~b .§taic£l 
~a.sipngtllt4 ~. <!f. 211~)!.~ 
March 14, 1980 
Re: 78-904 - Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper 
N~i~ 
v~ MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
~)~~ ' A small change in this opinion is made to add 
the essence of note 6, on page 7, to a sentence on 
.~UAA~ page 10, line 5, first full paragraph, following 
(l)C\ V\U the word "question": 
"in their desire to shift part/, of the costs of 
~ litigation to those who will share in its 
benefits if the class is certified and 
~ ultimately prevails." 
h"'A~e (j._, 
vv """- u . L -. . " ()/.J >{...,. 
.(e,w ('foO~ -~l 
tl~ 
~, " JJ• 
' 
March 14, 
Deposit Guaranty v. Roper 
Dear John: 
I did not see your new footnote 3 until after we 
adjourned today. Perhaps my use of the term "fiction" did 
not convey my thought. 
You have now added citations to cases that require 
some response, and I also take this opportunity to clarify 
the use of the term "fiction". I have trie~ to make clear 
that it seems to me you would r.reate 11 leqal fiction for the 
purpose of achieving review of denial of certificAtion. This 
might be one way to achieve this purpose, although I would 
'> , prefer that it be worked out more can:• fully in a much needed 
revision of Rule 23. 
I suggest, that you and I agree on our "battle of .,, · 
footnotes" before we recirculat~. An~, if you would prefer 
that I omit the word "fiction", I will bP most happy to do 
so. 
Sincerely, 
.. 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
Respondents are two credit card holders who claim that 
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the 
National Banking Act and Mississippi law.1/ They filed this 
action in late 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty 
equal to the same amount, for a total of$ 683.30 and $ 322.70 
respectively. App., at 59. They also sought relief on behalf of 
a class alleged to include 90,000 people who are said to be 
entitled to some 12 million dollars in damages. After four 
years of litigation, the District Court denied respondents' 
motion for class certification. Seven months later, petitioner 
tendered to respondents the full amount of their individual 
claims, plus legal interest and court costs. Over respondents' 
objection, the District Court entered final judgment in their 
favor. 
It is not disputed that respondents themselves have 
received everything they could have recovered from petitioner in 
this action. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 
2. 
however, rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and 
reversed the denial of class certification. This Court affirms 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals without identifying a case 
or controversy remaining to be ljtigated between petitioner and 
respondents. The Court defines the issue as appealability 
rather than mootness, and bases its decision on policy grounds. 
But the crucial distinction does not withstand analysis. Since 
the respondents lack a continuing interest in the outcome of the 
litigation, the Court of Appeals was powerless to hear their 
appeal. Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
This case, like United States Parole Commission v. 
Geraghty, post, at , requires us to decide whether putative 
class representatives may appeal the denial of class 
certification after receiving everything they sought on their 
own behalves. Since the District Court refused to certify the 
~ 'l1..() ~ ~ ~LI;_ fi; ~~) 
~ court. Yet 
"' 
respondents have no continuing interest in the injuries alleged 
in their complaint. They sought damages only; they have 
received those damages in 
!Y 
full. Respondents have not suggested 
that success on the certification motion would entitle them to 
additional relief from the petitioner.~/ Their personal claims 
to relief have been abandoned so completely that no appeal was 
t:jv~~JU)~~ftul-~ 
~ ·nd.y ~~ 3. 
~  ~'lv t. l-t4·11~-~~~ t.,ll~- ;t,_J-
'\ ~k-h...l Ut.~~A. •• fL ~~J'-- ~ 
----::::::::::~~r:.~~k,u_.-~ ~ ~ ~
I ~ k ~...,.. .,_.~e«« J-,;Zi,.,_st in their own names. A::> J4u,-~J.?i;D 
~ ..., 14.- .A~L --.. - .. ~k ~~ , , ~ ,, 
In my view, Art. III and the precedents of this ~.._L · 
C1-k./z . s~ 
a&...a..cA s-. 
Court require a dismissal in these circumstances. See Geraghty, 
post, at (POWELL, J . , dissenting). There is no 
suggestion that respondents' claims are "capable of repetition , 
yet evading review." See Gerstein v . Pugh, 420 u. s. 103, 110-111 
~~~h. t')UL t>f ~ ~~ JfJ:J. t:Jt:rt!:> 
n. 1 1 · (1975) .!1 And~ putative class member has sought to 
~ 
intervene in the ~9ht years since this action was filed. See 
United Airlines , Inc . v. McDonald, 432 u.s. 385 (1977). Nor 
have the allegedly usurious charges been challenged by informal 
complaint or protest over the years . Tr. of Oral Arg. , at 4 . 
Even after certification was denied, the action lay dormant for 
seven months without provoking a response from anyone who 
previously may have thought that the class action would protect 
We are not told what , if anything, motivates 
/ t 
·.?* 1 L: i> ~~"'t...-' 
respondents to continue this crusade on behalf of persons who~ 
./... • ....-<.. ~
ha¥e ~vinced no interest in obtaining recovery for themselves .~/ 
1t!l " AJ._ _ .1\ .~~~ ·~A, 
Tl~· ~ 6. ''c!ZA ·iL&.+j4&-0c=na ~~:::?-;~:;g; 7 ~ 
ffi.dee4, •uch o¥-erwheJ m i n.q 1 ack of intere.st is symptomat ie of the ;r-
~~-.~bf~ 4...< 
~e.-l. ~ ~Lk./­
J..U.~r ~ ;,& e.. ... ' 
4 C11ilf~,. 
4. 
wrongs "unremedied by the regulatory action of government." . A __ _ .. :J 
(~~ ~~~-"'~vuLr~~ 
Ante, at 1 ~· If this lawsuit ~~ismissed as moot, the Court ~ 
~A; 
l::t£,~  H.-- p*'.v=e-h4"'-f ~ \ 
~ (~, class action defendants will destroy ~it ¢eel by /· 
~ ~ 
deliberately mooting every case in which the individual stakes 
are small and the potential liability large. Id.,at12. 
~~is perceive::~:: ~ z:;::;;:~l-;;... 
J.lcr&iiO~ ~ 
pr~ creat~ a new form of class action not 
1\ ~ u--r•U ~--~ ~W "'1-k~ 
contemplated by Rule 23.~ ·.;., J..CA<... ;-~~JL Hu-~ 
~ ~ 
-n 4-f-~·~  H,.c_..,._ 
._ ..,..~P(~ 2.,~~ .. n...,c_ ~
ja. ...... cL. •• .-e.t. J..,..L. .,.........,... ~ ...,._ ~~1 
The heart of the Court's analysii is a distinction 
Lil(.~ 
between a plaintiff who loses his stake in the outcome throuq~  
~ 
.~ 
an event extrinsic to the litigation and one who simply obta1ns ~~ 
a favorable judgment in the trial court. The Court says tha~ 
the right to appeal from such a judgment is governed by ru~~ 
policy and practice that may be approached with "a certain 
latitude." Ante, at 12. The rule that a litigant may not 
appeal a ruling by which he is not "aggrieved" is said to have 
nothing to do with Art. III. The Court therefore decides that 
it may hear this case a~~ly wi~o~t re~ara to tne absence 
~.pe~~nw.l .......eake i~ t"Re- e1:1te~ in order to advance policy 
objectives. Ante, at 10-12. As long as the appeal is proper, 
5. 
the Court concludes that the judgment is not final and the case 
is not moot. Id., at 6-7, 12. Although the Court's reasoning 
serves to avoid an articulated confrontation with Art. III, the 
~~-...... t'{ 
distinction it draws is unprecedented 
£-.. AAW.Af ~ ~ ..:...., 
and unsound. 
1\ 1\ 
~ p.tc. ...... ,e., 41A-
The Court eites Electrical ~ittings Corp v. Thomas & 
Betts Co., 307 u.s. 241 (1939), as a case in which the "critical 
distinction" was applied.~/ Ante, at 9. In that case, the 
trial court entered a decree holding a patent valid but not 
infringed. Although the alleged infringer won the case, it 
sought to appeal the finding that the patent was valid. This 
Court held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to 
consider the issue of patent validity when the trial court had 
found no infringement, because "the adjudication was immaterial 
to the cause." Id., at 242. Since the decree "purported to 
adjudge the validity of [the patent]," ~ the Court of 
Appeals had jurisdiction for the limited purpose of issuing an 
order eliminating the finding of validity from the decree. Ibid. 
The Court~ its reasoning in a single paragraph which 
is reprinted in its entirety in the Court's opinion today. 
~, at 8. 
While the meaning of Electrical Fittings is~~ 
i~:fitel~~ subsequent decisions~~e Court 
never intended to create the distinction drawn today. In 
6. 
Altvater v. Freeman, 319 u.s. 359 (1943), the Court explained 
that the question of validity was not justiciable in Electrical 
Fittings: "To hold ~ patent valid if it is not infringed is to 
decide a hypothetical case." Id., at 363. Mr. Justice Douglas' 
opinion for the Court relied on Cover v. Schwartz, a case in 
which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered in 
some detail the relationship of Art. III to the requirement of 
"standing to appeal." 133 F.2d 541, cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 
(1943). Although the appellant in Cover- like the respondents 
here and the petitioners in Electrical Fittings - sought to 
appeal from the entry of a judgment which had eliminated his 
~ 
stake in the outcome,~/ the court ~Ao~~e~ that its jurisdiction 
)\ 
was measured by the standards of Art. III. Because the appellant 
sought "no relief against anybody before the court ••• but •• 
~ #/' 4-H'• .4c.., c:::,a~~ &L..f J-
• want [ed] an advisory opinion," the~co~H'"& feo.~u~e i1!seif "without ~ 
~ Ct.L~ 
discretion" to hear the appeal. Id. at 544, 545._l.Q./.(ihis Court 
A RSiA ~,....~ 4-ttl.-..c. ._A:-11~•-rA.cAJ~ ~ L -.1~~-1--, ~~-- ~~ • ~ 
took tbe sa~e approach iR AltvatQr, permitt _ the action to 
1~0.~~ 
continue because "tne controversy between the parties"\had not 4l<a.J-
~pl~ 
been concluded by the dismissal of the' ~ 319 u.s., at 363-
364. 
As Altvater and Cover show, the question posed in 
Electrical Fittings was whether a case or controversy in the 
constitutional sense continued to exist notwithstanding the 
7. 
entry of judgment in favor of the appellant. Since the 
petitioner could obtain no additional relief by prevailing on 
the merits, his attempt to litigate the validity question did 
not present a case or controversy cognizable in a federal Court 
of Appeals. ~' e.g., Kapp v. National Football League, 586 
F.2d 644, 650 (CA9 1978)~ Hall v. u.s. Fiber & Plastics 
Corporation, 476 F.2d 418, 420(CA3 1973)~ cf. Barry v. District 
of Columbia Board of Elections, 580 F.2d 695 (CADC 1978). But 
i-.,/4-J 
the petitioner was injured( as • p~actical ma~te•, by the 
~ ~~LZ..:f-. 
inclusion of the unnecessary and adverse validity ruling~i~e 
dee~. In re Trimble Company, 479 F.2d 103, 111 (CA3 1973)~ 
Harries v. Air King Products Co., 183 F.2d 158, 161 (CA2 1950). 
~JW. ... ~·"" J/-, ~ .J ~ 
11/ Because of this~~~ prejudice the petitioner~had ~ 
J.,.1....-4',.. ~ ....... ::J_,_ A person stake in obtaining ~ reform~tion of the decree. 
The Court today hJi~d~ itoe~f~ the principles~ 
«P~ri~~ ~ Electrical Fittings. Nothing in that case suggests 
that a "procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of a 
litigation," may be appealed after final judgment merely because 
the ruling "stands as an adjudication of one of the issues 
litigated." Ante, at 9. Such collateral rulings - like other 
rulings - may be appealed under Electrical Fittings when the 
~.~..._. 4-;a,~ i..,;u 
litigant Aa~etAin~ to ~ain f~em a favorable resolution of 
1 
his appeal and not otherwise.12/ In Electrical Fittings, there 
~ q;j J4w --...ze,•v ~ ~ 41'~4.c.A..A..,(t&" =~>' 
~ I>~~..., .a •• ..tJ-fo.'-.e-~ , B. 
~ _.-, - . ~ ~l-lac --..&. ~L..J. ~~ 
Uw.- ~s- ~C.4~ • .! ~ ~ 
/.2 4£,-A:, - ~  J. 41,.c.IC ~ ~~.CC,~~C.,f 
~~~·~~.u.. .... Hc-~ 
was .such an interest; here there is none. Because there is no
~·r~~-.4. 
longer a controversy between adverse parties having a personal ~~ 
l4tc , 
·-~ 
stake in the outcome, a federal court ~e no alternative 
/\ 
~• 
but to dismiss the case. 
in support of such a 
~,~ ..:;:___ 
,f\118Ff:i-lo oAOot i.-A~ ftQ.l¥9-u~,. ti.a.t; 1i!: lorl!! consequences of a finding of 
*_.,J-4 
mootness LA j;Ais ciS€ would ~ be as dire as the Court 
"" 
predicts. On the other side o 
find mootness has birth to an unusual legal 
~59 c:c_ 
:E e H t e .C~M :::wet~ eu ""'F!nd ~~~~-HH~~-"":t-~~"!>!5 <1 ho 1 d i ng 
~ 
would have repercussions in two distinct situations. First is 
1\ 
the case in which a named plaintiff fails to obtain class 
certification but pursues the case to a successful, litigated 
judgment. In my view any subsequent attempt to appeal the denial 
J4u.. ~:: .. C.~ '(..r 
of certification is barred by Art. III. But t tAis not 
~ ~«-jiJal<l#._, ti'.J4-0'&J ~;•c•/-~~~ ,... .,_~,......., ~~~~;J: 
a~ 1.1Rmiti~to9--€l'tlo.i.l. If the ~iQR san'jht injunctive or 
~~JJ-, 
declaratory reliefA the absent members of the putative class 
.~7::~-tO?:::::d by force of stare decisis most of the 
benefits of actual class membership. If ,..-on ~e -etfi~r l"ta-nd;., the 
~ ~~~~~~--=--s-~-&:1/ 
action ~ one for damage~~ as 1n this case 
(~ 
9. 
certification ruling would countenance the same sort of "one-way 
intervention" that the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended 
to eliminate. Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Amendments 
to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 105-106 (1966); see Comment, Immediate 
Appealability of Orders Denying Class Certification, 40 Ohio St. 
L. J. 441, 470-471 (1979). Knowing that one plaintiff had 
prevailed on an issue common to 
class members would be permitte 
favorable judgment without assuming the risk of being 
Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will 
when the defendant attempts a "forced settlement" prior to 
judgment, as petitioner did in this case. A defendan~e 
1 
tl.--~~ 
an ~oo~om~c incentive to take such action in certain 
I\ 
circumstances. Th ~ 
e Court that the result will be the 
denial of relief for injuries too small to justify separate 
lawsuits and th 
' e unnecessary consumption of judicial resources 
77 I ' 
. I~ vt_., t.-t<-c(Q?-12. ~~ ,- /') ~ LA L"L- , 1n the · · · __. . ~ -, ~tFv~. 
- lltlqat1on of succe 1ve su1ts by pu ative class members. 
~,at 11-12. 
A 
c::n.-~ 
am unts to judicia  
policymakinq with respect to the adequacy of compensation and 
enforcement available for 
particular substantive claims. Such 
j ~~/A..._ __ ~ •. -. 
ndeed it has been argued that ict~~~of Rule 23 ~ 
I ~ \f 
1 0. 
~ runs afoul of the Rules Enabling Act. Landers, Of 
Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions 
and the ,Substance...;Procedure Dilemma, 4 7 s. Cal. L. Rev. 8 4 2, 8 60 
~lu:.J2 
At t he very least, resort to~ criteria ~tee (1974). ~ 
~J_ 
procedura± ~rena mu~ be consistent with the substantive law 
1\ 
giving rise to the claim. Note, Developments in the Law - Class 
Actions 89 Harv. L. Rev. 13..-18, 1358-1359 (1976). In this case, 
both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found that the 
aggregation of usury claims is condemned by Mississippi law. 
Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 ( 1941) ·li/ 
~~~~~ 
~~ The Court's concern for~  could, of course, 
~ be~ telling il+ a more appro~: :::~~~1~ 
1f, ,..}-1..A---~-- -.......__~~ atR ~,..-c • .,..., c ... ~. " 
]Udic1al administration if realA But these problems can and 
, 
should be addressed by measur'es short of·~ the law 
)~~~4>~~~~~~ 
of mootness)A ~ imperta~first~p~otlld b~ the authorization ~ 
~~~~t..-(-.~~~k~~ ~-
9[ interlocutory appeals from the denial of class certification. 
1\ 
The District Courts ~ alreadyZempowered to certify such 
appeals in appropriate cases under 28 u.s.c. § 1292(b). In many 
cases both parties will desire to obtain a final settlement of 
~ 
that ~uei~ question. In others, the District Court may use 
-1 
its powers of management under Rule 23(d) to require some sort 
of notice of the impending settlement or to provide an 
~M.w~~}, 
opportunity for putative class members to intervene)\ See 3 H. 
11. 
Newberg, Class Actions § _ ( 197 ) • Altheugfi Btlefi meastites ate y-
ext"tffine, t'A~vailability .::J.._e~~~~s a "'---
-- -1 A . 
s4g~~terrent to the deliberate mooting of class 
actions. Indeed, District Court management of the problem by 
measures tailored to the case at hand would be far~ 
.1\ 
~ -t~J.4_ 
the Court's ~~t approval of the continuation of the action 
"' ' 
in all circumstances. To the extent managerial powers are 
lackinq, it is for Congress - not this Court - to correct the 
deficiency ·.J.2/ 
The Court's attempt to "solve" the problem of 
deliberate mooting of consumer class actions is ill-conceived as 
well as inappropriate. There is no warrant in Rule 23 for the 
appointment of a "quasi-class representative" for purposes of 
obtaining class certification only. Since the representative 
can gain nothing from a certification order, his participation 
in the case can only be intended to benefit the class. Yet he 
( tn"; s~o~o~m~a~e~~ Leguards of 
:-:::----... When 1t:Comes to the ruling on the certification 
motion itself, how is the District Court to determine whether 
"the claims or defenses of the repreCn~v~a~s~e ~ 
typical of the claims or defenses of the class" under Rule 
23(a)(3)? 
(~) 
The most troubling 
/\ 
practical implication of the ~-
1 2. 
Court's decision is the suggestion that its rule of nonmootness 
may not apply if the action is settled voluntarily. Ante, at 6 
n. 5. If this is so, the class defendant may prevent an appeal 
of the class certification ruling by obtaining the named 
plaintiff's agreement to the settlement, although he could not 
do so merely by paying the named plaintiff's individual claim in 
full. This reasoning invites unscrupulous named plaintiffs to 
"sell" their right to appeal for whatever the traffic will bear 
- a result thoroughly inconsistent with the equitable 
administration of the class action. 
~ 
In ~,1 the Court's attempted solution to the 
problem of "forced settlement" of the consumer class action 4:-s-
J~~~~~ 
at.,tendod b¥ significant problems of its own. ~ 
1\ 
circumstansQS ~~1r;~~~t~i~ 
jurisprudence. i~ 
Ol?'der tG "ea:na~" .. tf1~ c.,a8Q. I would vacate the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals and remand with instructions to dismiss the 
case as moot. 
c P??TrTES 
•• I •=•r 4 r 'lt:Q Jh4 · 1 2 g 
FOOTNOTES 
~/ Jurisdiction was premised on the National Banking 
Act, 12 u.s.c. ~S 85, 86, and 28 u.s.c. s 1355. But the 
National Banking Act adopts the interest limits set by state 
law. 
~/ The Court suggests that class action plaintiffs 
generally derive a "significant benefit" from certification 
because it may ultimately permit them to reduce litigation costs 
by allocating them among the members of a prevailing class. 
Ante, at 10 n. 8. As applied to this case, the Court's 
suggestion is both factually and legally deficient. First, 
respondent~ have not identified any costs - other than 
attorney's fees - incurred to date that are not covered by 
v~ petitioner's tend~ with the exception of attorney's fees. 
The record does not show whether respondents' lawyers are 
proceeding on a contingent fee basis, as the Court implies they 
~l may. Ibid. If the share of the judgment paid to the lawyers 
under such an arrangement is fixed without regard to the number 
of claims recovered, respondents' actual recovery might not be 
increased even if they were to obtain relief for the class. 
Respondents thus have failed to show that this benefit will 
accrue to them. Second, no one has suggested that 
petitioner is or ever will be liable for attorney's fees. The 
FN2. 
theory must therefore be that the prospect of asserting future 
claims against unrelated third parties gives rise to a case or 
controversy against petitioner. Such a theory is unprecedented, 
and its consequences are bizarre. If a named plaintiff obtains 
full satisfaction before filing his complaint, ~r this theory 
would still permit him to litigate the class claims in order to 
17 recoup legal costs incurred in investigating the violation. 
Since class representatives cannot share costs unless they 
obtain relief for the class, this theory would require an 
appellate court to hear and decide substantive issues in 
addition to the class certification question. But that result 
is flatly inconsistent with the Court's express exclusion of 
"the merits of the substantive controversy" from the scope of 
the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction on remand in this case. 
il The notice of appeal filed with the District Court 
that respondents appeal "on behalf of all others 
similarly situated ••• " App., at 63. 
!/ If a class action defendant were shown to have 
embarked on a course of conduct designed to insulate the class 
certification from appellate review in order to avoid classwide 
liability, a court in proper circumstances might find the 
Gerstein test satisfied and the case not moot. See 13 Wright, 
Miller & Cooper~ 3533, at 171 (1979 Supp.). 
FN3. 
L44 .. c. .. ~~~ 
2/ An attempted interlocutory appeal was r:.ehntfe(! by 
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the interim. 
~/ As the Mississippi usury statute was amended in 
1974 to authorize the charges at issue here, damages are the 
only available remedy. 
21 I do not suggest that respondent's lawyer acted 
improperly in pursuing this case. His activities have led to 
the resolution of a previously undecided question of law. 
opinion 
ground in the first 
step of its analysis, analogizing respondents to plaintiffs 
have obtained a litigated judgment. 
There is~ 
d l;u;)w~ue;r:.., considerable authority holding that the tender itself 
~- moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. California 
Jj,..c.~ 
~ v. San Pablo & Tulare Railroad, 149 u.s. 308, 313-314 (1893); 
~.~ 
~~ Drs. Hill & Thomas Co. v. United States, 392 F.2d 204 (CA6 
~-~ 
4U•• .. --~ 1968); Lamb v. Commissioner 390 F.2d 157 (CA2 1968); A.A. Allen 
~;,:t.. It-
~~ Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F.2d 89 (CA5 1965). In each of 
t4,.,~ 
~~ the cited cases the plaintiff refused to accept a proffered 
~! ~ 
settlement, but ~~ court concluded that it was powerless to 
review the the abstract questions remaining and dismissed the 
FN4. 
action as moot. 
~/ The appellant in Cover was the losing plaintiff in 
a patent infringement action. After the trial court found the 
patent invalid and not infringed, the plaintiff took an appeal 
on the validity question without contesting the finding of non-
infringement. By accepting the judgment to that extent, he lost 
his right to recover from the defendant - and thus his interest 
in the litigation - by "intrinsic" means. 
lQI Judge Frank wrote for the court: 
"[W]here there is no 'iusticiable' dispute, there 
are no 'merits.' There is merely an unreal entity 
resembling that disembodied smile which Lewis 
Carroll immortalized. Many Supreme Court 
decisions teach•us that appellate iurisdiction, 
when no iusticiable dispute exists on appeal, 
cannot be rested upon the recollection that such a 
dispute previously existed when the case was in 
the trial court." Id., at 551 (footnotes 
omitted). 
~/ The Court did not expressly disagree with the Court 
of Appeals' finding that collateral estoppel would be no bar to 
relitigation of the validity question. But the commentators 
suggest that reformation could have eliminated future contests 
as to the preclusive effects of the decree, a question that was 
not free from doubt. 15 C. Wright, A. Miller, and E. Cooper, 
FN5. 
Federal Practice and Procedure §3902, at 403 (1976): 1B Moore's 
Federal Practice' 0.443[5], at 3925 (1974): 9 Moore's' 203.06, 
at 716 (1975). As Judge Learned Hand explained, the decree might 
create "some presumptive prejudice." Harries v. Air King 
Products Co., 183 F.2d 158, 161 (1950). 
~/ The Court appears to recognize this in passing, 
ante, at 9 n. 7, but fails to apply the rule to this case. The 
Court does not show that respondents have any concrete interest 
in obtaining class certification, or that they will be adversely 
affected by the mere existence of the order denying 
certification. Of course, if the latter interest were the only 
one that could be identified, Electrical Fittings would limit 
~~ Jt.J--
our jurisdiction to o~def~~ the order denying certification 
expunged from the record. 
2il In the ordinary case brought under Rule 23(b)(3), 
the class member must decide at the time of certification 
whether or not to "opt out" of the action under Rule 23 (c)(2). 
This provision brought an end to the "spurious" class action in 
which class members had been permitted to intervene after a 
decision on the merits in order to secure the benefits of the 
decision. Notes of the Advisory Committee on Proposed 
Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 105 (1966). 
1!1 Since petitioner is a national bank, its failure 
FN6. 
to comply with Mississippi's interest limits would violate the 
National Banking Act. 12 u.s.c. ~ 85. But the federal statute 
seeks to assure that national banks are treated no less 
favorably than state banks, and limits the penalty for violating 
state usury laws to double the amount of interest paid. 12 
U.S.C. § 86. In light of the plain intent to protect national 
banks from undue penalties for usury, the federal statute cannot 
be said to displace state policy disfavoring the agqregation of 
such claims. 
~/ Congress currently has before it a bill that 
attempts to remedy the difficulties infecting this troubled 
area. H.R. 5103, 96th Congress, 1st Session (1979). The bill 
/~~ ::r~ ~;:t~:mma and to 
eliminate some of the problems of claims too small to justify 
individual lawsuits, by creating a federal right of action which 
may be obtained in actions brought in the name of the United 
States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory appeals from a 
grant or denial of the ruling that will, in the proposed new 
form of action, take the place of class certification. 
1J. J~6 ~~ ~ ~ P-j ~ /2 "~G~4.~ 
v( ~ ~~ t_f-~ ,__,.,.,~~.....--c 
~~~~~~ 
~ .Lo -~ -~~~~ 
~'7~-:IIL  ~ 
~~7-
lfp/ss 2/11/80 Rider A, (Rop~r) 
This novel view, for which no authority is cite~, cannot he 
reconcileo with Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 
u.s. 128 (1975), where an oral certification orner was hel~ 
insufficient to identifv the interest of absent class mernbes 
for Article III purposes. The result hardly coul~ be 
different when thP class has not been identifien at all (here 
cite Memphis ~iqht, etc.) 
The theorv of automatic oartv statuR rais~s a 
number of interestina nuestions 
.. 
er 2/12/80 
No. 78-904 Roper footnote, second draft. 
P.2: 
2a/ MR. JUSTICE STEVENS states, in his concurrinq 
opinion, that all persons alleqed to be members of a putative 
class "automatically become parties to the case or controversy 
for the purposes" of Art. III, and that they "remain parties 
until a final determination has been made that the action may 
not be maintained as a class action." ~' at This novel 
view, for which no authority is cited, cannot be reconciled with 
Indianapolis - School - eommJrs - v~ - Jacobs, 420 u.s. 128 (1975), 
where an oral certification order was held insufficient to 
identify the interests of absent class members for Art. III 
purposes. The result hardly could be different when the class 
has not been identified at all. See also Memphis - Liqht, -Gas - & 
Water Div; - v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 8 (1978); Baxter - v; · Palmiqiano, 
423 U.S. 308, 310 n. 1 (1976); Weinstein - v; -Bradford, 423 u.s 
147 (1975); Pasadena City Board - of - Education - v; -Spanqler, 427 
u.s. 424, 430 (1976). 
The proposed rule 
. , 
- tA-f_ ~ t:: ~ .. --. ~-f" tJ, D () o ~ "-'L,.e.,._ ~ 
of automatic party status raises ~· ~ 
-"" 
of unnamed "parties" cannot be extin ished at the whim of those 
who filed the action in names, the theory must be that 
every person who 1ates a class action irrevocably assumes a 
~ ~~ )"-<-~4 
~~·¢d.<.~ 
I 
' fiduciary duty to fiqht class certification to the end. Are 
respondents, then, required by law to continue this action on 
remand? Must they assume ultimate personal responsibility for 
2. 
the costs, in excess of $15,000, that will accompany 
certificatio~Would responsible litiqants~lv~ f~e class 
actions if they thereby assumed such long-term fiduciary 
obligations? These questions are substantial. They are not 
resolved by Rule 23, and I believe they merit careful study by 
Congress before this Court - perhaps unwittingly - creates a 
major category of clientless litigation unique in our system. 
lfp/ss 2/11/80 
~ 
~~~-------- Presumably ~ purpose of such a rule would be to 
assure that satisfaction of the claims of named parties would 
not terminate the litigation. Nor could the rights of the 
unnamed parties be extinguished by the failure of the named 
parties to appeal. Thus, if the rule proposed by Mr. Justice 
Stevens is to be meaningful, I suppose that a fiduciary duty 
must be imposed upon named parties to continue the litigation 
where - as here - the unnamed parties remain unidentified or 
failed to intervene. As fiduciaries, would the respondents 
not only be required to continue to litigate, but to assume 
personal responsibility for costs and attorney's fees if the 
case ultimately is lost? 
lfp/ss 2/11/80 Footnote at (Roper) 
Ellen: What do you think of addinq a note somewhat 
alonq the followinq lines: 
____ / Mr. Justice Stevens states, in 
his concurrinq opinion, that all members of a 
proper class action "automatically become parties 
to the case or controversy for the purposes" of 
Article III. He states that they also "remain 
parties until a final determination has been made 
that their action may not be maintained as a class 
action". These views pose interestinq and 
heretofore unanswered questions. Assume in this 
case that the named plaintiffs had accepted 
settlement, and advised counsel that they did not 
wish to appeal the denial of certification. Assume 
further that no member of the class souqht to 
intervene within the appeal period. Would the 
riqhts of class members then be extinquished? If 
so, does this mean that their riqhts turn on 
whether or not the named plaintiff (or counsel 
actinq on its own motion) elects to appeal? Or, 
does Mr. Justice Stevens imply that a person who 
initiates a class action assumes a fiduciary duty 
to fiqht class certification to the end, even 
2. 
thouqh such party has been paid in full? Aqain, if 
so, who becomes responsible for attorney's fees if 
counsel is unwillinq to litiqate on a continqent 
fee basis, especially for unidentified clients? 
One need not suqqest the riqht answer to 
these questions. They are not resolved by Rule 23. 
My view is that the constitutional and policy 
considerations are substantial and merit careful 
consideration by Conqress before this Court -
perhaps unwittinqly - creates a type of clientless 
litigation unique in our system. 
lfp/ss 2/11/80 Rider · 5; - p; - 11 - (Roper) 
12b. The Court attempts to limit the 
sweeping consequences that could flow from the 
application of these criteria, see infra, at 12-13 
and n. 15, by asserting that "[e]ach case must be 
~ecided on its own facts", considering the 
"practicalities and prudential considerations". 
~' at 17 n. 11. The Court long has recoqnized a 
difference between prudential and constitutional 
(Article III) standing. I am not aware that the 
Court, until today, has ever merged these 
considerations for the purpose of eliminating the 
constitutional requirement of a personal stake in 
the litigation. The Court cites no prior case for 
this view. Moreover, the Court expounds no 
limiting principle of any kind. Adverse practical 
consequences, even if relevant to Article III 
analysis, cannot iustify today's holding as none 
whatever would flow from a decision of mootness. 
See n. 15, infra. Nor does the Court's reliance 
upon a "relation back principle",~' at 18, n. 
11, further analysis. Indeed, although this may 
provide a shorthand label for the Court's 
conclusion, it is hardly a principle and certainly 
not a limiting one. 
lfp/ss 2/11/80 Footnote - 12a - (Geraqhtv) 
The Court states that "respondent 
suffered actual, concert iniury [thatl 
continued up to and beyond the time the District 
Court denied class certification. ~, at 18 n. 
11. Apparently this statement is based on the 
assumption that "damaqes" were - or could have been 
- souuqht. We need not consider whether the 
situation would be different if damaqes had been 
souqht, had respondent souqht onlv iniunctive and 
declaratory relief. Indeed, counsel for 
respondent, frankly conceded that his client "can 
obtain absolutely no additional personal relief" in 
this case. Tr., Oral Arq., at 25. In view of this 
cateqoric concession, I invite the Court to 
identify the "actual, concrete iniury" suffered bv 
respondent after his unconditional release from 
prison. 
lfp/ss 2/11/80 Footnote ·-- i - at · (Roper) 
' 
Ellen: What do you think of aodinq a note somewhat 
alonq the followinq lines: 
____ / Mr. Justice Stevens states, in 
his concurrinq opinion, that all members of a 
proper class action "automatically become parties 
to the case or controversy for the purposes" of 
Article III. He states that they also "remain 
parties until a final determination has been made 
that their action may not be maintained as a class 
action". This novel view, for which no authority 
is cited, cannot be reconciled with Indianapolis 
School Comm•rs - v. · Jacobs, 420 u.s. 128 (1975), 
where an oral certification order was held 
insufficient to identify the interest of absent 
class members for Article III purposes. The result 
hardly could be different when the class has not 
been identified at all (here cite Memphis Liqht, 
etc.) 
The theory of automatic party status 
raises a number of interestinq questions. Assume 
in this case that the named plaintiffs had accepted 
settlement, and advised counsel that they did not 
wish to appeal the denial of certification. Assume 
2. 
further that no member of the class sought to 
intervene within the appeal period. Would the 
rights of such class members then be extinguished 
even though they were "parties"? If so, does this 
mean that their rights turn on whether or not the 
named plaintiff elects to appeal? Or, /is it 
suggested that a person who initiates a class 
action irrevocably assumes a fiduciary duty to 
fight class certification to the end, even though 
such party has been paid in full? Again, if so, 
who becomes responsible for court costs and 
attorney's fees if counsel is unwilling to litigate 
for unidentified "parties" on a contingent fee 
basis.Certainly these costs and fees cannot be 
assessed against non-intervening class emmbers if 
the class action is lost. And would responsible 
persons we willing to initiate class actions if 
they thereby became fiduciaries with potential 
long-term liabilities even after their claims had 
been satisfied? 
One need not suggest the right answer to 
these questions. They are not resolved by Rule 23. 
My view is that the constitutional and policy 
3. 
considerations are substantial and merit careful 
study by Conqress before this Court - perhaps 
unwittinqly - creates a maior cateqory of 
clientless litigation unique in our system. 
~ ... 
I J~ I 
-~ 
--) 
2nd Dl'tAlfT ~p 
SUPREME COURT OF TilE UNITED STAT)S 
No. 78-904 
Deposit Guaranty /National Bank, JOn Writ of Certiorari to 
Jackson, Mississippi, Petitioner, the United States Court 
v. of Appeals for the Fifth 
Robert L. Roper et al. Circuit. 
[February -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART 
joins, dissenting. 
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that 
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the 
National Bank Act and Mississippi 1aw.1 'They filed this 
action late in 1971 to recover 'those charges plus a penalty 
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and 
$322.70. App. 59. Resp'ondents also sought relief on behalf 
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claim~;J. aggre .. 
gating $12 million. After four years of litigation, t~e District 
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification. 
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the 
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and 
COl;lrt costs. Over responde1i'ts' objection, the District Court 
entered fina] judgment in their favor. Petitioner then depos-
ited the full amount due with the clerk of the court. 
No one disputei:i that the petitioner has. tEmdeted every-
thing that respondents could have recovered from 'it in this 
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir:- · 
cuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed 
tqc denial of Class certification. This Court affirms the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals without identifying the c1;1se or 
controversy that remains to be litigated between the parties.~ 
1 Jurisdict ion was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. §§ 85, 
86, which adopts the interest limits set by state law, and .28 TJ. S. ·C. 
§1355. ~ 
... 
;J-
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The Court decideiS that the central issue is not mootness but 
appeal:ibility. But the characterization does not withstand 
analysis. Sine~ respondents lack a continuing interest in the 
outcome of the litigation, the Court of Appeals was powerless 
to hear their appeal. Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
Although there are some differences, this case is similar to 
United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at -, 
in one important respect: both require us to decide whether 
putative class representatives may appeal the denial of class-cer-
tification when they can derive no benefit from the relief sought 
ill the action. In this case, as in Gerayhty, the District Court 
refused to certify a class. Since no Olle has sought to inter-
vene, responde11ts are the only plaintiffs arguably present in ~ 
court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in th~ 
injurie~ alleged in their complaint. They so~ht only dam~ 
ages; those damages have been tendered in full~ Respondents 
have not suggested that success on the certification motiot;
1 
would entitle them to additional relief from the petitioner:f 
,_3Aithough respondcnte also asked for attorney's fees, their complaint 
shows that fee,.: were to be granted only f10m tlw damages ultimately 
awarded to them or tltr cla~:>s. App. 13-14. 
I#R(·:spon<.lrnts do a!lseit that (Wtification woul<.l enable them to reduce the 
rxpPnRc of litigation by a.llocatiug. costs among the members of a prevailing 
clasH. Briel' for Hespondf'llt~ 33. Exet'pt for n.tlorney's fees, however, 
rcspondetlttl do not iul'nt if.v any cost1:1 incurrt'd · to date t.hat, a.re not 
covered by the prt1t10nPr's tPnder. Although the record does not, reveal 
the detail~:> of the fl'<' arrangemrnt between respondents and their lawyers, 
the complaint suggt't>ts that the lawyers have agr~ed to accept as full com-
pen~ation 25% of the amount recoverrd from the pl'titioner. App. 13-14. 
If this j,., the agreement as to · fees, respondt'nts have no continuing interest. 
Only ('Ottnl'r! is concPrncd wlwtht'r thl' recovrry is enlarged: 
Even if one a~~Ulll(>tl that respondent::;' liability to their lawyers could be 
reducro by a da,;~ r(•covery, no one has b'ugge:::ted that petitione·r is or ever 
will he liablt' for fPel' that uhima tt•ly may be owed by . re::;pondents: Re-
spondent,.,' jurbchetioual throry appea.rs to be tha.t the mere po&;ibility of 
UdRerLillg fut.ure elaimf' for aJt.orne 's fa'::! against other membel'l! of .a 
er 2/12/80 
No. 78-904 Roper, INSERT on p. 2. 
!/ MR. JUSTICE STEVENS states, in his concurrinq 
opinion, that all persons alleqed to be members of a putative 
class "automatically become parties to the case or controversy 
for the purposes" of Art. III, and that they "remain parties 
until a final determination has been made that the action may 
not be maintained as a class action." Ante, at --- . This novel - ---
view, for which no authority is cited, cannot be reconciled with 
Indianapolis -School Comm'rs v. -Jacobs, 420 u.s. 128 (1975), 
where an oral certification order was held insufficient to 
identify the interests of absent class members for Art. III 
purposes. The result hardly could be different when the class 
has not been identified at all. See also Memphis · Liaht; ·G~ 
Water Biv. v. -Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 8 (1978); Baxter · v; - Palmiqiano, 
423 U.S. 308, 310
1 
n. 1 (1976); Weinstein v; - Bradford, 423 U.S 
147 (1975); Pasadena City Board of - Education v; - Spanqler, 427 
u.s. 424, 430 (1976). 
The proposed rule of automatic party status - in this 
case for 90,000 unidentified persons - has troublesome and far-
reachinq implications that could preiudice the brinqinq of class 
actions. Presumably a purpose of such a rule would be to assure 
that satisfaction of the claims of named parties would not 
terminate the litiqation. Nor could the riqhts of unnamed 
2. 
parties be extinguished by the failure of the named parties to 
appeal. Thus, if the rule proposed by Mr. JUSTICE S~EVENS is to 
be meaningful, I suppose that a fiduciary duty must be imposed 
upon named p arties to continue the litigation where - as here -
the unnamed parties remain unidentified and fail to intervene. 
As fiduciaries, would the respondents not only be required to 
continue to litigate, but to assume personal responsibility for 
costs and attorney's fees if the case ultimately is lost? Would 
responsible litigants be willing to file class actions if they 
thereby assumed such long-term fiduciary obligations? These 
questions are substantial. They are not resolved by Rule 23, and 
I believe they merit careful study by Congress before this Court 
- perhaps unwittingly - creates a maior category of clientless 
litigation unique in our system. 
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Indeed, their personal claims to relief have been abandoned 
so completely that uo appeal was taken in their own names. ~ 
The uotice of appeal filed with the District Court recites tha~ 
respondents appeal only "on behalf of all others similarly 
situa.ted .... " App. 63. 
Since respondents have no continuing personal stake in the 
ou teo me of this action, I believe that Art. III aud the prece-
dents of this Court require that the case be dismissed as moot. 
S<'c Oeraghty, post, at --- (PowELL, J., dissenting). 
Tlwre is no suggestion that respondents' claims are "capable 
of repetition, yet evading reviev.~' Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 -
U. R. 103, 110-111. n. 11 (1975)~ And not a single one of the e, 
allt>ged 90,000 class members has sought to intervene in tpe 
nine years since this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines, 
Iuc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone 
ever challenged the allegedly usurious charges by inforn)al 
complaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certifi-
cation was denied, the action lay dormant during ·the seven 
mouths in which responcle11ts sought to take an interlocutory 
appeal, without provoking a response from anyone who pre-
viously may have thought that the class action would protect 
his rights. We are not told what, if anything, motivates re-
spondents to continue this crusade on behalf of persons who 
pui<LlivP rlass giv~ ri::;e to a case or controversy against the class defend~ 
ant. Such u. lhoory i:-l unprecedE>ntcd, [Uld its consequences are biza.rre. 
}'or nxample, reRpondents' theory would prm1it. a person to file tt class 
nrfion, <'Wll though he had previou,.,ly a.errpted full settlemPnt of hil.l in-~ 
rli\'irlual cbim, on tlw ground tlw.t. tho fees incurred in anticipation of the 
litigntion might ult~ma.trly be ~han•d with the cla.-s. 
/If a class-action · dE>fendant were ,;hown to have E>mbarked on a course 
oT'C'ondurt. d<•signPd t.o immhde the cia.,;; cert.ifiea.tion issuf' from appellate 
review in order to nvoid classwide !i<Jbility, a court in propC"r circull1Stances 
might find the Gerste-in tr:-;l f<atisfiPd 1Uld tlw ea::;e not moot. See Su.srnan v. 
Lincoln Arnetican Corp ., 5R7 F. 2cl H6o (CA7 1978); 18 Wright, Miller & 
Cooper, Federal Practir·e nnd ProredurE> § 35:33, a.L 171 (Supp. 1979); 
Comment, C01itinuation and RepreHenfation of Cla~<s Artions Following 
pj~.mi~~al of the Clab~ RHpre~entat,ive, 1974 Du~e L. J. 573, 59!}-600,. 
,; .. · 
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for years have evinced no int€rest whatever in obtaining ra .. 
covery for themselves.b On its face, this appears sin1ply to 
be a "lawyer's case." · 
Des}Jite traditiou and policy considerations to the contrary, ~ 
the Court seems undisturbed that this federal action will be~ 
litigated on remand _by a -lawyer ·whose only "clients'' are 
unidentifiecj class members who have shown no desire to be 
represented by anyone1' ''fhe Court also neglects established 
principles of Art. III 'jurisprudence, and remands to the Dis-
trict Court a headless class action that does not meet the 
requirements of Rule 23. 
II 
The Court identifies the question for decision in this case 
as "whether respondents' individual and private case or con .. 
troversy became moot by reason of the entry of judgment in 
their favor." ld., at 5. Wholly ignoring the fact that 
respondents themselves elected to appeal only on behalf of 
third parties, the Court concludes that "respondents' individual 
interest in the litigation-as distinguished from whatever may 
be their representative responsibilities to the putative class-
is sufficient to permit their appeal. .. . " ld., at 12. One 
might expect that the Court would reason to this conclus!on 
by pinpointing the individual interest on which it purports to 
rely. But no such reasoning appears in the Court's opinion. 
Although there is some discussion of advantages that generally 
may accrue to named plaintiffs from the use of the class-actio11 
device, the Court never attempts to ascertain whether these 
,The Mi:S.'lissippi usury statute was amPnd('C! in 1974, and it apparently 
!lOW. auUwrize:;; the fees cha.rged by JWtitioner. 1974 Mi~s. Gen. Laws, ch~ 
564, § 7; see Miss. CodE:' Ann.§ 75-17-1 (6). Thus, there is no 4uestion of 
prOl;pective l'elief. 
':f I do not suggest, that respondt>nts' htwyer a.cted improperly in pursuing 
this ease. Since he has prevuiled both in thi:; Cou·rt and in the Court 
of Appeal,;, the responsibility for allowing client-less litigation fa.lls 'Ill~ 
'the 'feJc'tal coilfts. 
J 
t 
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particular respondents can derive any such benefit from thit'J ~ 
action.f ~ 
A 
The Court does not explain how it is able to find an 
"individual interest" in the litigation without identifying 
the injury in fact required by Art. III. It simply ignores this 
essential inquiry and relies on the "factual context" of the 
case: When respondents refused the proffered settlement, the 
trial court entered judgment in their favor over their objec~ 
tion. Id., at 6. The single fact of respondents' refusal in~ 
spires thP Court to draw a "critical distinction" between 
mootness deriving from a judgment and mootness resulting 
from events extrinsic to the litigation. ld., at 9. The Court 
appears to hold that a litigaut who attempts to appeal from 
a favorable judgment has an "individual interest" in exercis-
illg his "statutory right to appeal." !d., at 7. If the statutes 
and rules governing "federal appellate practice" confer such 
a right, the Court concludes that Art. III requires no more. 
Ibid.; see id., at 12. 
Having shifted the inquiry from Art. III mootness to the 
"formulat[ion] [of] standards . . . govern[ing] the appealabil-
ity of procedural rulings," ibid., the Court determines that 
respondents are aggrieved by the denial of certification for two 
~Any advantage, that ordinuril) nm:y flow from "the use of the class 
action procedure for litigation of individual cljlims," ante, at 10, cannot 
accrue to thE-Se reHpondents who will not b:l litigatmg their own claims 
on remand. Nor doeb the Couri tdentify nny unrecovered cost of litiga-
tion that these re:;pondenb; can rf'duce if they obtain relief for a class. 
See td., at. 10, n 8; n . 3, supra. Indeed, the Court refers to respondent~ 
only to point out that. their total damagei:l wpre so ~mall that they "would 
be unlikely to obtnin legal redre:;« at. nn acceptable cost" if they could not 
do so by mean:, of 11 elm;;, action. Ante, ut 10, n. R We may assume 
that r~pondents had ::;ome mterP~t in t.he l'las;;-action procedure as a means 
of interesting their Jawyf'r,; in the Cili:>e or ol>tainiug a satisfactory settle-
ment. This may Le a·n intere:;t propf'rly furthered by Rule 23, but once 
re~pondent::; obtained both Hl'('e.~:5 to court and full indtvidual relief that 
interest dbappeart:d. 
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reasous. Pirst, the certification order is a "procedural ruling1 
collateral to the merits of [the] litigation," th,at "stands as 
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." ld., at 9. 
Second, the contrary result would frustrate the goals of 
Rule 23. Td. , at 10-12. 
The effect of the Court's analysis, if I understand it cor. 
rectly, is to avoid a direct confrontation with settled princi~ ~ 
pies that unambiguously dictate a finding of mootness in this~ 
case. But the Court cannot escape the impact of these author-
ities simply by refusing to consider the respondents' evident 
lack of intet·est iu thf' outcome. The "critical distinction" by 
which it attempts to justify its failure to do so is both factually 
~nd legally um;ound. 
B 
As a matter of fact , there is substantial doubt that this case 
involves the effect of "a judgment in favor of a party at an 
intermediate stage of litigation.'; i d., at 9. Petitioner has 
never contended that the controversy became moot merely 
1'by reason of the entry of judgment in [respondents'l favor." 
l d. , at 5. Instearl, petitioner argues that its tender of fuli 
relief has remedied the respondents' individual injuries and 
thus eliminated their stake in the outcome. Considerable 
authority supports petitioner;s contention that the tender itself 
moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. This 
Court, among others, has held that a federal court is powerless 
to review the abstract questions remaining in a case when the 
plaintifi' has refused to accept a proffered settlement that 
fully satisfies his claims. California v. San Pablo & Tulare 
R . Co .. 149 U. S. 3o8, 313- 314 (1893) ; Drs. Hill "& Thomas 
Co. v. United States, 392 }'. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per curiam); 
Lamb v. Commis.sioner, 390 F . 2d 157 (CA2 1968) (per 
curiam); A. A. Allen RevivAls, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F. 2d 
89 ( CA5 1965) (per C'Ur-iam ) ';1 
1 The Co~\rt make, no diort to di:;tiugubh ihe:,e ca~es.· Yet it cm1cedes 
'that tfie ''i-ight to employ Rule 23'' i~ a ' 'procedural· right only, ancillary 
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I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result 
should differ because the District Court has entered a judg-
ment in ft:~.vor .9..flrespondents instead of dismissing thei~ 
lawsuit as moot!2/It is certainly true, ~s the Court observes, 
that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in 
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any 
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally 
favorable judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wright, 
Miller, aud Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3902 
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practice 1T 203.06 (1975). But 
federal courts uniformly have required a showing of some 
adverse effect in order to confer ustanding to appeal." Ibid.; 
see Barry v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections,- U. S. 
App. D. C.-. 580 F. 2d 695 (1978). Indeed, Art. III itself 
requires a continuing controversy betweeu adverse parties at 
all stages of the litigation. E. g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 
402 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10 
(1974) . If any statute or rule purported to authorize an 
appeal in contravention of Art. III, that rule would yield to 
the constitutional command. 
c 
The Court relies almost entirely on ElectriW~ Fittings Cor-p_. ~ 
v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307l;. S. 241 (1939)-!!.J But that deci~ 
lo thl· litigation of ~ub~tantive claim~," and it admitb that "the court 
retain>< no jurbdiction over the controven;y" when the "~ubstantive claims 
be('ome moot in the Art . III ~cm;e." Ante, at o. If the tender itself 
mooted the respondent:,' claim~ without regard to the entry of judgment~ 
then the Court'~ own unaly~I::I require~ it to conclude that the case is 
moot. 
l-9:i'he ":;ta.tutor) right" to appeal it.self cannot supply a. personal stake 
m the outcome, for C011gre~s cannot abrogate Art. III limitations on the 
juri:;diC'lion of the ft·deral court:, . Gla1Mune, Realtors v. Village of Bell-
WtJOd, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) . 
If, The only other authoritie~ etted by the Comt are United Atrlines, Inc. 
v. McDonald, 432 U. S 385 '(1977), and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 
437 U. S. 463 (1978). Dictum in both case:; stated that the denial of class 
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sion simply reaffirms our obligation not to review judgments 
by ''vhich no individual is aggrieved. The trial court there 
·had entered a decree holding a patent valid but not infringed. 
Although the alleged infringer won the case, it sought to 
apJwal the finding that the patent was valid. This Court 
held that the Court of Appeals lac.ked jurisdic'tion to con-
sider the issue of patent validity after the trial court found 
no infringement, because "[a] party may not appeal from a 
judgment ... in his favor, for the purpose of obtaining a 
t·eview of findings . . . which are not necessary to support the 
decree." I d., at 242. But the trial court had erred by includ-
ing in the decree itself a .ruliug that "purport[ eel] to adjudge 
·the validity of j thf' patent] .J' Ibid. Since that ruling "was 
immaterial to thr disposition of the cause," the Court of 
AppPals had jurisdiction for the limited purpose of elimiuating 
the extraneous ruling from the decree. Ibid. 
The Court reaus Electrical Fittings as a case that was "still 
live" in the Art. III sense "because policy considerations per-
mitted an appeal" Ante, at 8-9. But Electrical Fittings was 
a "live" controversy only because-and to the limited extent 
that-the petitiouer there asserted a continuing personal stake 
in the outcome. As Judge LeatJJecl Hand later explained, the 
petitioner in Electncal Fittings was injured in fact because the 
unnecessary ruling that the patent was valid could have 
created "some presumptive prejudice'' against him in a future 
case. Harries v. Air King Products Co. , 183 F. 2d 158, H31 
eertifica t iou is sulJjt•et, lo appellate review after final ,judgment n.t the 
behe~t or llw named plaintiff:>. Neither c·a~t> di~w11~~ed mootne~~. and 
neillwt· Hnalyzed tllC' propo:-iition in any way. Indeed, the only aut bority 
eitrd in Coopers c~ Lyb1'and wa~:- l'11ited Airluu's, c'(·e 437 U. S., at Min, and 
thr oul~ authority rited in Umted Airlhtes wa~ t~ eon<'C'l-i<~ion made• by the 
defendant aud a li,.;t of rnRes from the Courts of ApJH'al::;, none of which 
dealt. wtth a suggr~tion of mootne~:; m an analo~ou:; 1-iituation, ."ee 482 
U. S., ai. a93, and n . 1.4 Surh ,;tatemmts, casually enuut·mh·d without a ~ 
word of explanahou iu opinion" dealmg wtth unrelated legal que"t wn,, ary-
not root rollmg or even pen;ua:;ive when they are ~hown on further re!lee--
tion to have been incon:-;i:,'t.ellt with c.~tabli:;hed law. 
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(CA2 ]_95/J); see In re Trimble Co., 479 F. 2d 103, 111 (CAy----3 
1973) .!.tf This genuine prejudice to the petitioner himself 
supplied the requisite personal stake in obtaining reformatio 
of the decree. 
Thus, the Court's view of Electrical Fittings is plainly incon-
sistent with the holding of that case. The Court of Appeals 
wa.rs told to reform the decree. but expressly forbidden to 
considPr the merits of the patent va.Iidity question. In other 
words, the court's appellate jurisdiction was only as broad as 
the petitioner's personal stake in the appeal. Just four years 
lat<:>r. Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. S. 359 (1943), explained 
that the limitation was constitutionally based. Reversing a 
deci~:;iou that had re1ied on Electrical Fittings in refusing to 
cousider the merits of an appeal, the Court distinguished 
Electrical Fittings as a case in which the parties sought deci-
sion of "a hypothetical case." The appeal in Altvater, by 
contrast, satisfied "th<:> requirements of case or controversy" 
be<;ause the parties continued to contest a counterclaim that 
had not been concluded by the dismissal of the orginal com-
plaint. 319 U. S .. at '363-366. 
Altvater and Elect?-ical Fittinys entil'ely foreclose the 
Cour·t's argument that a party who has no personal stake in 
the outcome of his appeal may invoke the jurisdiction of a 
federal court merely because policy-based "rules of practice~ 
permit him to do so. Any doubt is dispelled by Altvater's 
express reliance on Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 (1942), 
cerL. df!nied. 319 U.S. 748 (1943), a case in which the Court 
of Appeals' for the Second Circ4it discussed at length the 
1-.AHhough the Court of Appeals in Electrical Fittings held that col-
lateral e~toppel would be no bar to relitigation of the validity que;;tion, 100 
F. 2d 403, 404 (CA2 1938), other eourt.~ had taken a dtfferent view 01~ 
similar i~suPs of collateral estoppel. If the validity finding werE' permitted 
to stand, the petitioner could have brrn forced to litigate the 4uestion of its _/" 
preclmnve pffect. in futurr ca~e:; . 15 Wright, Nhller, and Cooper, supra/ 
n. 4, § 3902, at 403 (1976) ; IB Moore's Federa,l Practice ,I 0.443 [5], at 
3925 (1974) ; 9 id., ,[ 2o:3.06, at 7L6 (1975). 
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constitutional limits on appellate jurisdiction. 319 U. S., at 
363, n. 2. Like the respondents here and the petitioner in 
Electrical Fittings, the appellant in Cover sought to appeal 
froltl .~judgment that had eliminated his stake in the out- ~ 
come.~ The Court of Appeals emphatically declined to as~ 
sume jurisdiction over an appe~ which sought "no relief 
against anybody before the court ... but ... want[ed] an 
advi~~ljY opinion that [a] patent [was] valid." 133 F. 2d, at 
544.~ Since there was no case or controversy, the Court of 
Appeals coucluded that it was "without discretion" to hear the 
app<'al. I d., at 545. 
These cases demonstrate that the requirements of Art. III 
do not change with the "factual context'' in which a suggestion 
of mootuess arises. See ante, at 5. Whatever the context, 
Art. III asks but a single question: Is there a continuing con-
troversy between adverse parties'? In Electrical Fittings, the 
ro11troversy continued with respect to the single narrow 
issue whether the District Court's ruling on patent validity 
properly was incluued in the decree. But nothing in that 
case suggests that a "procedural ruling, collateral to the merits 
f6The appellant in Cover v. Schwa1·tz. 133 F. 2d 541 (CA2 1942), cert. ~ 
denied, 319 11. S. "748 (1943), was the lo~iug plaintiff m a patent infringe/ 
lnt>ut Hrtion. After the trial C'Oilrt found the patent invalid and not 
infringPd, the phuhtiff took an appeal on ihc validity que::;tion without 
contr:;tmg the finding of nouinfringemeut. By accepting the judgment to 
that Pxtent, he lost hi:; right to recover from the defendant-and thus his 
int rrc:;t in the litigatio11. 
#1Jll(1ge Frank wrote tor tho courf,: 
"[W]here there b no 'j u~ticiable' dispute, there arc no 'merits.' There is 
nwrely au unrPal entity re:;rmbling that di~embodied smile which Lewis 
Catoll immortalized. Many Suprpme Court decisions teach us that appel-
late juriodiction, wheu no ju::;ticiabiP dispute exi:;t:; on appeal, cannot be 
re:slcd upon the recollection that :;uch a dispute previously existed when 
the ca"e wa:; in tlw trial eourt." 138 F. 2d, at 551 (footnotet:; omitted). 
See a!:so Kapp v. National /l'ootball League. 5~6 F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9 
197&); Hall v. U. S. Fiber & Plast1cs Corp., 476 F . 2d 418, 420 (CA3 
1973); cf. Lewis v. United StateiS, 216 U. S. 611 (1\HO) (per curiam). 
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of a litigation," may be appealed after final judgment because 
"policy considerations permi [ t] the appeal" or because the 
t•trliug "stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated.') 
Ante, at 8-9. Such collateral rulings-like other rulings-may 
be appealed only when th~¥tigant has a personal stake in the __,---
resolution of his appeal.~ In Electrical Fittings, there was/"" 
a stake; here there is none. Since nothing remains of the 
ease or controversy, the Court of Appeals should have dis-
missed this case. 
III 
It is clea from thP Court's extendf'd discussion of policy 
and practical considerations, ante, at 10-12, that these weighed 
heavily in its decision. I am not aware that such considera-· 
Lions ever• be£ote have inftueuced this CoUl't in determining 
whetlwr the Co'nst,itution confers jutisJiction on the federal 
courts. fn any event, the consequences of a findiug of moot-
hess w1mld not be as severe as the Court predicts. 
A .fill(ling- of' mootuess would have repet·cussions primarily 
in two ::;ituations. the fi'rst involves a named plaintiff who 
fails to obtain class cel'tiflcation auJ then pursues his case to 
a successful , litigateJ· judgment. i believe that a subsequent 
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification 
generally wouid· bP barred by Art. 11I. But the consequences 
of applying settled rules of mootness in this situation would 
not b<-' uujust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were 
granted, the absent members of the putative class would have 
obtained by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of 
the benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand, 
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of 
the cPrtification ruling would enable putative class members to 
I£TIJC ~urt apvear~ to recognize thi:, in pa~;:;ing, ante, at 9, n. 7, bu~ 
fuib to apply the rult> to thitS ca~e. Siuc<· the Court i:)Ugg('Hts that TCI:ipond-
ent::;' int ('fl'l;t in the eertitieation ruling derivel:l from the mere fact that it 
":,;land:; as an adjuclication of one of the il'~lw:s litigated," id,, at 9, Elec-
trical J/1ttiny~ Itself would limit u::; to the i~:mance of an order directing that 
the oft~nl:-ive rnbng he expunged from the recorql !307 U.S., af, 242. 
: 
78-904-DISSENT 
12 DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK v. ROPER 
take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability 
without assuming the risk of being bound by' an unfavorable 
judgment. Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in 
this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" tha.~ / 
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate!J 
Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise 
wheu the defendant attempts to force a settlement before 
.iuugment, as petitioner did in this case. A defendant cer-
tainly will haye a substantfal incentiv_e to use this tactic in 
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny 
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the 
enforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney[s] 
general." Ante, at 10-11. The practical argument is not 
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns 
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the ade-
quacy of compensation and enforcement availab1e for particu-
lat· substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best 
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be 
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim. 
Today, howeJer, the Court never pauses to consider the law "Of 
usury. Sinc1l¥ississippi law condeJUns the aggregation of 
usury claims,~he Court's concern for compensation of puta-
' jilee Commeht, Immediate Appealability of Order~ Denying Class Cer- ~ 
tification, 40 Ohio St. L. J . 441, 470-471 0979). In action,; brought under.,............-
Rule 23 (b) (3), ~ class mt•mber must decidP at the time of certification 
whether to "opt put" of the action under Rule 23 (c) (2). This provision 
was designed to 'Qring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class 
members w~re permitted to intervene after a decision on the merits 
in order to secure the benefits of that deci~ion. Notes of the Advisory 
Committee on Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F. R D. 69, 105,-106 
(1966). 
/ILiddell v. Litton Systems, Inc., 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting bor-
rowers' elM; action); Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941). 
Petitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply with Mis-
sis.;ippi':• interest limitl:l would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U. S.D. 
§ 85. But I do 9ot under;,;tand that the Nntional Bank Act displaces state 
lJoli<:y di::;favorin~ the Hggregation of URUI') daims. A primary 1mrpose of 
; 
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tivc class members in this case is at best misplaced and at 
worsj, ipconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling ~ 
Act.'if ~ 
The Court's concern for putative class members would be 
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced 
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litiga-
tion of successive suits by members of the putative class. I 
do Hot doubt that tbe consequent problems of judicial admin-
istration would be real. But tbese ·problems can and should 
be addressed by measUres sbort of rewriting the law of moot-
ness, as the Court seems to have done today. The first step 
should be the autborization of inteilocutory appeals from t~ / 
denial of class certification in appropriate circumstances.liJ 
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292 
(h) to certify such appeals when they involve certain con-
trolling questions of law. In many cases, a class-action 
-defendant undoubtedly would forgo the opportunity to settle 
·with an individual plaintiff in order to obtain an immediate 
and final determination of tbe class certification question on 
appeal. 
·where a defendant does attempt to moot a class action by 
forced settlement, the Uistrict Court is not powerless. In at 
that Act b lo protect national bank;; from discriminatory treatment or 
·undue penaltie::; that may bt• imposed by ~ta.te law. See 12 U. S. § 86. 
~The Aet provide>; tha.t rule~ of procedure promulgated by this Couy--rt 
"~hall not ... enlarge or modify any sub::;tantive right." 28 U. S. C. 
§'2072. Sec American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 53 , 
557-558 (1974); Developmentl; in the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. 
llev. 1318, 1058-1359 (1976). See generally Landers, Of Legalized :Black-
mail and Legalized Theft: Con~umer Cia~;~ Actionti and the Sub~;tance-
Pz~edure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev . 842 (l!J74) . 
ffln Coopets &· Lybrand' · Livesay. 4:37 U. S. 463 (1978), this Court 
]l(•ld I hat 1 ho dcuml of cia::;::; eerhfication is not a ''fuwl dcci::>ion" appeal~ 
ahle Hl:i of right under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We relied in that case on the 
ctanger;; of "indi~erimllla.le" mtrrlocutory review. !d., at 474. Although 
Co1~7Jers & Lybrand no\\ !ll'Pveut.~ review in cases in whi?h it w?ulcl. ~~ ~ 
,cl(ll'll'!i.bl(•, Congrf'l% may remed the llrohlem by appropnate legislatlO/ 
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leasL, some circumstances,-it may require that putative class 
mem hers receive some sort of noti-ce and ·· an opportun.ity to 
intervene .within the appeal period. Rule 23 (d)(2). The 
availability <!>f such measures could be a significant deterrent 
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, Distrivt 
Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the 
case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-end 
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent inter-
locutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are 
lacking, it is for Congress--not, this Court-to correct the 
deficiencyle/ 
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it, 
judicially fashioned "solutions'' to legislative problems often 
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their 
own. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respond-
ents will serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for- the 
purpose of obtaining class certification. · Since they can gain 
nothing more from the action, their participation in the case 
ean be intended only to "benefit the putative class. Yet they-
or· their lawyers-serve on their own motion. Since no court 
has certified the class. there has been no considered determina-
tion that respondents will fairly ana adequately represent its 
members. Nothiug ii) Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure, 
and the requirements of the Rule· are not easily adapted to it. 
Are respondents menibers of the class they seek to represent'? 
See East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 
~C'ongre&> currently has before it a. bill that attempts to remedy .the 
difiicultie~ infecting this troubled area. H. R. 5103 , 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
( 1979) . The bill, ~up ported by the Department of .Tu~tice, proposes to 
bypa;:;:< the Rules Enabling Act problem, see n . 17, supra. and to eliminate 
some of the problems of claims too small to ju~tify mdividual lawsuits, b,v 
creatiug a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provides .for 
the enforcement of thi:; right in somE' instance·s through actions brought in 
the IH1lllP of the United States. The bill also authorize~ interlocutory 
appeals from the grant, or denial of the ruling that will replace class cer~ 
tifir·ation nnder the proposed procedures. 
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40:3--404 .. (1977). Are their currently nonexistent claims "typi .. ~ 
cal of lhe cl~tiJhs ... of the class'' within the meaning of Rule 
23 (a)(3)?1!/ 
The Court's holding well may prevent future "forced set-
tlelllents," and may even foreclose all settlements, of class 
action litigation. See ante, n. 5. Thus, the difficulties faced 
by tlw District Court on remand iu this case may not arise 
again in precisely analogous circumstances. But today's result 
also authorizes appeals by putative class representatives who 
have prevailed on the merits of their individual claims. If the 
order denying class certification is reversed in that situation, 
the named plaintiffs on remand will have no more continuing 
relationship to the putative class than respondents have 
Jwre. A remand for certification could also lead to "one-way 
intervention" in direct violation of Rule 23. Seep. 11-12, and 
n. 15, supra. These tensions. arising from the express terms 
of the Rule, undermine the Court's conclusion that the 
policies underlying Rule 23 dictate the result reached today. 
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of 
JJI;he District Court properly may conclude on remand that re~pondents, 
for llwl't' or other rea~ons, cannot adequatE>Iy represE>nt the cla~s. Should 
int1•rvention be proposed. the D1striet Court on equitable grounds might wl'If ~ 
rcfll>"<' to toll the statute or limitations in order to permit it. Nearly nine,.............. 
yl'ar:; have passed ,;ince thi:; action wa~ filed and six since the governing' 
suht<tautive ~tatute was amended to authorize the challenged conduct. In 
it" ordf'r denying certification on SPptembPr 29, 1975, the District. Court 
ns,.igned <lS onp of it~ rea::<on~ the po;;~ibl<' "destruction of the [petitioner's] 
lJank'' by damage::: then alleg<'d to total §12,000,000 and now potent,ially 
augmented by the acerual of inter<'st. App. 47, Se£' ante. at 2, n. 2. The 
po::<~1ble de:struction of petitioner's bank is irrelevant to the centntl i~::;ue of 
mootne>':;, but ::;Prious mdeed to tlepo:;itors, i:ilockholder:s, 11nd the community 
~ervPd . A::; this Court rPliPs f>O heavily ou itb practiral and equitable con-
N'l'll~ for putative elas::: membPr~, Jt will hardly b<' inappropriate for the 
Di~t rict Court on remand to eons1der practicalities and equities on both 
sidl'~ lu thl' circ·uiustam•p::; prcsPuted, tlw D1strict Court may well see no 
rra~on to exereise it:-; eqllltable disrretion in favor of putative class memfreTSi 
wltQ han ~h'I!t on their rights t.hp;oe many year:, .. 
·" 
\ 
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forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from 
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. It also unneces-
sarily creates significant problems. in the administration of 
Rule 23. I would vacate the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and remand with instructions to dismiss the appe&} 
~as '~moot. 
er 2/11/80 
No. 78-905 Roper, possible response to Mr. JUSTICE STEVRNS. 
P.2: 
2a/ MR. JUSTICE STEVP.NS' concurrinq opinion would 
i\ 
hold that the absent members of a putative class are "parties" 
to the action for Art. III purposes even after certification is 
denied. ~, at That theory cannot be reconciled with 
Indianapolis $chool · Comm'rs v; Japobs, 420 u.s. 128 (1975), in 
which an oral certification order was held insufficient to 
identify the interests of absent class members for Art. III 
purposes. I do not understand how the result can chanqe when the 
class has not been identified at all. See also Memphis Liqhtr 
Gas &·Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 8 (1978); Raxter v. 
Palmiqiano, 423 u.s. 308, 310 n. 1 (1976); Weinstein v; 
Bradford, 423 u.s 147 (1975); Pasadena ·City · Board of Education 
v. Spanqler, 427 u.s. 424, 430 (1976). Nor do I . believe it 
"counterproductive," ~, at n. 1, to insist that an action 
be maintained by adverse parties until the interests of absent 
members of a putative class have been identified by proper 
certification. See infra, pp. 11-14; United States Parole 
Commission v ; · Geraqhty, post, at (slip op. at 6 n. 7) 
(POWELL, J., dissentinq). 
~ er 3/1/80 
No. 78-904 Roper: INSERT to replace pages 2-11. 
This Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals, after 
finding that respondents retain a personal stake in sharing the 
expense of litigation with members of the putative class. Ante, 
at 7 n. 6. This speculative interest simply will not sustain 
the jurisdiction of an Art. III court under established and 
controlling precedents. Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
Although there are differences, this case is similar 
to United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at 
, in one important respect: both require us to decide 
whether putative class representatives may appeal the denial of 
class certification when they can derive no benefit whatever 
from the relief sought in the action. Here, as in Geraghty, the 
District Court refused to certify a class. 
~ 
this case, I 
1 
u~, the Court recognizes established Art. III 
7 
It Qel"'r:'rt~y states that the "right to employ Rule 
23" is a "procedural right only, ancillary to the litigation of 
substantive claims." Ante, at 6. It also agrees that a federal 
court "retains no jurisdiction over the controversy" when the 
parties' "substantive claims become moot in the Art. III sense." 
Ibid. Moreover, the Court acknowledges the familiar principle 
2. 
that a party who has no personal stake in the outcome of an 
action presents no case or controversy cognizable in a federal 
court of appeals. !£., at 7, 10. These are indeed the 
dispositive principles. My disagreement is with the way in 
which the Court applies them in this case. In my view, these 
principles unambiguously require a finding of mootness. 
A 
Since no class has been certified and no one has 
sought to intervene, respondents are the only plaintiffs 
arguably present in court. Yet respondents have no continuing 
interest in the injuries alleged in their complaint. They 
sought only damages; those damages have been tendered in full.!/ 
Respondents make no claim that success on the certification 
motion would entitle them to additional relief of any kind from 
the petitioner.l/ Their personal claims to relief have been 
abandoned so completely that no appeal was taken in their own 
names. The notice of appeal filed with the District Court 
recites that respondents appeal only "on behalf of all others 
similarly situated •••• " App. 63. 
This in itself is compelling evidence that respondents 
have no interest in the "individual and private case or 
controversy" relied on by the Court today. Ante, at 5. But 
even without such evidence, this and other courts routinely have 
3. 
held that a tender of full relief remedies a plaintiff's 
injuries and eliminates his stake in the outcome • ealifornia · v. 
...;;,...;o~;;.;;..;~~..o;._...;.._ 
San · Pablo &·Tulare · R; · Co;, 149 u.s. 308, 313-314 (1893); ~ 
Hill &· Thomas Co. v; · United ·States, 392 F.2d 204 (CA6 1968)(per 
curiam); Lamb v; · Commissioner, 390 F.2d 157 (CA2 1968) (per 
curiam); A;A; ·Allen Revivals; - Inc; - v; - Campb@ll 353 F.2d 89 (CAS 
1965) (per curiam). It is the tender itself that moots the case 
whether or not a judgment is entered. Ibid. Thus, the law is 
clear that a federal court is powerless to review the abstract 
questions remaining in a case when the plaintiff has refused to 
accept a proffered settlement that fully satisfies his claims. 
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the 
result should differ because the District Court has entered a 
judgment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their 
lawsuit as moot.4/ It is certainly true, as the Court observes, 
that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in 
itself moot his case. Ante at 7, 9. There never has been any 
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally 
favorable judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wright, 
Miller and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 3902 (1976); 
9 Moore's Federal Practice ,r 203.06 (1975). But the requirement 
of adverse effect is more than a rule "of federal appellate 
practice." Ante at 7. As we have held repeatedly, Art. III 
)\ 
4. 
trhe-- etiteome "throughout the entirety of the litigation." Sosna 
v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 (1975). See, e.g., Preiser v. 
Newkirk, 422 u.s. 395, 401-401 ( 1975). 
It is this constitutional limitation, and not any rule 
of practice, that has impelled federal courts uniformly to 
require a showinq o~=~;~ect in order to confer "standinq 
'1 
to appeal." 15 Wright, Miller and Cooper, supra, ~ 3902. Barry 
v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections, U. S. App. D. C. 
, 580 F.2d 695 (1978); see Altvater v. Freeman, 319 u.s. 359 
(1943); Electrical Fittings v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 u.s. 241 
(1939); Kapp v. National Football League, 586 F.2d 644, 650 (CA9 
1978); Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F.2d 541 (1942), cert. denied, 319 
U.S. 748 (1943).~/ As these cases show, the requirements of Art. 
III are not affected by the "factual context" in which a 
suggestion of mootness arises. See ante, at 6. Whatever the 
context, Art. III asks but a single question: Is there a 
continuing controversy between adverse parties who retain the 
requisite stake in the outcome of the action? 
Electrical Fittings v. Thomas & Betts Co., supra, is 
the case primarily relied upon by the Court. It provides little 
or no support for today's ruling. In Electrical Fittings, a 
limited appeal was allowed because the petitioner himself was 
5. 
~ .. -..-~prejudiced by the inclusion of an unnecessary and 
adverse finding in a generally favorable decree. See ~' at 
10. Here, the existence of the District Court's order denying 
certification has no effect whatever on the respondents. Thus, 
the personal stake that justified the Electrical -Fittings appeal 
i s not present in this case. Absent such a stake, it is simply 
irrelevant that "policy considerations" sometimes may favor an 
appeal from "a procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of a 
litigation." Nor is it significant that the ruling "stands as 
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." .!.E.·r at 9-10. 
Collateral rulings - like other rulings - may be appealed only 
when the requirements of Art. III are satisfied. 
B 
After recognizing that the right to appeal is subject 
to the "jurisdictional limitations of Art. III," the Court 
agrees that only a "party [who] retains a stake in the appeal 
[can satisfy] tpe requirements of Art. III." ~' at 7; see 
id~, at 10. 
a~~ 
The Court @81'\ee~~~l'\~ that k espondents have no 
1\ 
remaininq stake in "the merits of the substantive controversy." 
id., at 9-10. ~r:he Cour~~ndents retain a 
I\ 
personal stake in this appeal because they "desire to shift to 
successful class litigants a portion of those fees and expenses 
~ that have been incurred in this litigation and for which they 
94- vf 
6. 
assert a continuing obligation." Id., at 7 n. 6; see id. at 
10.6/ This conclusion is neither legally sound nor supported by 
the record. 
The Court observes that respondents "have maintained 
throughout this appellate litigation that they retain an 
individual interest" in sharing expenses with the putative 
class. Id., at 12. But neither the Court nor the respondents 
; 
ar/-~ ~_I' 1~~.,V~ 
have identified any expense incurred te-Q~e 
-\ 
~t is not oov~red 
by-the petitioner's tend~~. Nor did respondents identify any 
such cost in their brief in the Court of Appeals, on which the 
Court relies. Id., at 7 n. 6. The only "continuing 
~ 
obliqation," ibid., mentioned in the respondents' brief is not a 
~ [presen~ obligation at all. Respondents assert that they have 
./ tl (]) ;'I) 
~ } offered l - but not executed -a note and mortgage on realty as 
~,_,..,~~ 
~f-0~ security for a $15,000 loan to defray notice costs that may be 
V~V-
r~~ incurred if the District Court grants certification on remand. 
v~ ,, ; 
11rVYv . 
~~~ Brie; for Respondents 33; App. 78. This possible future 
~ '1' • 
tvvt..bf obligation cannot supply a personal stake in the pending appeal. 
~ ~-,,;._. ~ 
11 ( ~0-- 1 ~ Petitioner paid into court the full amount of (,f'l .OJ ) ~.,_.{ / 
~ , respo~dents' claims and ~ court cost:; ~l~o~qk nothing was 
W ~-~/ v J_!.a ~ tt.t4.J. ' < ~ ~ ~ a.. t U J ~.t.4_) t'lA.c d._ 
+~-added s~y for lawyers' fee ::X A there was no reason 
~~J.iQ"" . and """t-ainly no reason· : o assume that any such fees t:. r- ~,1 9 • ... 
CV' ~fl would be assessed against petitioner. The complaint suggests 
~ ui·J /~ 
~~f/'Yvr~~ 
~ ... ..J-~-~ 1 
N-~Ari">d~' 
7 0 
that respondents' lawyers have agreed to accept as full 
compensation a contingent fee equal to 25 per cent of the amount 
recovered from the petitioner. App. 13-14. The record reveals 
no further details, and the respondents have offered no contrary 
interpretation. On this record, therefore, it is fictional to 
suggest 
~ fees. 
-U.,.~ ~~o-r-
that respondents have any continuing interest in costs 
1\ 
~)~ 
Only counsel is concerned with whether the recovery is 
" 
enlarged. ( Prior decisions of this Court establish that 
unadorned speculation will not suffice to invoke the federal 
judicial power." Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 
u.s. 26, 44 (1976). I would adhere to that principle today.]~ 
2$'7~~~...,d· /-U--
Even if one assumed that respondents' liab1lity to 
~(.~ 
their~~e~Acould be reduced by a class recovery, no one has 
sugqested that the petitioner is or ever will be liable for that 
~-(., · J t 
obligation. The Cour~.~e holds that the ~ possibility 
of a future claim for attorney's fees against the members of a 
class that possibly may be certified, is sufficient to establish 
a case or controversy against a class defendant who has afforded 
full relief to the only identified adverse parties. This is an 
unprecedented theory that drains all substance from the personal 
stake requirement of an Art. III case or controversy.2/ The 
jurisdictional limitations of Art. III "requir[e] that a federal 
court act only to redress injury that fairly can be traced to 
8. 
the challenged action of the defendant • • • II Simon v. 
Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., supra at 41-42; see Gladstone, 
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 u.s. 91, 99 (1979). The 
"injury" - if any - represented by respondents' attorney's fees 
scarcely can be "traced" to the petitioner, who is not obliged 
to pay them. As respondents seek no further relief from the 
petitioner; their appeal can have no effect upon any right or 
obligation obtaining between the parties. It is axiomatic that 
"federal courts are without power to decide questions that 
cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them." 
North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971). In the 
circumstances presented, this elementary principle disposes of 
the case. 
c 
Since respondents have no continuing personal stake in 
the outcome of this action, Art. III and the precedents of this 
Court require that the case be dismissed as moot. E.g., 
Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 u.s. 171, 172-173 (1977) (per curiam); 
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1976) (per curiam); Preiser 
v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401-404 (1975); Indianapolis School 
Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 
U.S. 312, 316-320 (1974) (per curiam); North Carolina v. Rice, 
404 U.S. 244,246 (1971) (per curia.m); SEC v. Medical Comm. for 
9. 
Human Rights,404 U.S. 403, 407 (1972).8/ 
Respondents do not suggest that their claims are 
"capable of repetition, yet evading review." Cf. Gerstein v. 
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110-111, n. 11 (1975) .. ~./ Not a single one 
of the alleged 90,000 class members has sought to intervene in 
the nine years since this action was filed. Cf. United 
Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald 432 u.s. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone 
challenged the allegedly usurious charges by informal complaint 
or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certification was 
denied, the action lay dormant during the seven months in which 
respondents sought to take an interlocutory appeal, without 
provoking a response from anyone who previously may have thought 
that the class action would protect his rights. Apart from the 
persistence of the lawyers, this has been a non-case since the 
petitioner tendered full satisfaction of the respondents• 
/~,~~ 
individual claims. To be sure ~ t-l:le la-wye't'~ bau~ a.A _ interest in 
JA_, 1.-u~ 
an enlarged recovery that,t aiso woard inereaoe t..b.e contingent fee 
~~~Offiplaint. But I know of no decision by any 
~ ~c-'... ~ ~ ~~- -/-o -d, 
court that holds that a lawyer's interest in a larger fee 
1\ 
creates the personal stake in the outcome required by Art. III. 
Despite tradition and policy considerations to the 
1 0. 
contrary, the Court allows this federal action to be litigated 
on remand by lawyers whose only "clients" are unidentified class 
members who have shown no desire to be represented by anyone.~/ 
The Court appears to endorse this form of litigation for reasons 
of policy and practice. It is said to be an effective "response 
to the existence of iniuries unremedied by the regulatory action 
of government." Ante, at 12. I am not aware that such 
considerations ever before have influenced this Court in 
determining whether the Constitution confers iurisdiction on the 
federal courts. In any event, the consequences of a finding of 
mootness are not likely to be as restrictive as the Court seems 
to fear. And the Court fails even to recognize that allowinq 
this action to proceed without an interested plaintiff will 
itself generate practical difficulties of some magnitude. 
3. 
relief that interest disappeared. 
21 For example, consistent application of this theory 
would permit a person who previously had accepted full settlement 
of his individual claim to file a class action. Apparently, the 
putative plaintiff need only "asser[t] ," ante, at 7 n. 6, that fees 
incurred in anticipation of the litigation ultimately might be 
shared with a class. 
~/ These cases are discussed more fully in United States 
Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post at (POWELL, J. , 
~
dissenting). 
2/ FORMER N. 4 
lQI I do not suggest that counsel acted improperly in 
pursuing this case. Since they have prevailed both in this Court 
and in the Court of Appeals, the responsibility for allowing 
client-less litigation falls on the federal courts. 
er· 3/1/80 
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~/ As noted above, p. , supra, respondents took no 
appeal in their own names. One would think that this candid 
disclaimer of personal interest would destroy the foundation upon 
which the Court predicates Art. III jurisdiction. Ante, at 7~ see 
p. , supra. 
INSERT NO. 3, p. 17 
~/ The Court's resurrection of this dead controversy 
may result in irreparable injury to innocent parties, as well as to 
the petitioner bank. When the District Court denied certification 
on September 29, 1975, it assigned as one of its reasons the 
possible "destruction of the [petitioner] bank" by damages then 
alleged to total $ 12,000,000 and now potentially augmented by the 
accrual of interest. App. 47, see ante, at 2 n. 2. The possible 
destruction of the bank is irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue, 
but serious indeed to d e positors, stockholders, and the community 
served. It is said that this is necessary to redress injuries 
suffered by members of the putative class. Yet, no such person has 
come forward in the nenrlv n ine years that have passed since this 
action was filed. Indeed, the challenged conduct was authorized by 
~<..'(" 
statute ~six years ago. As the District Court may be called 
upon to determine whether the equitable doctrine of "relation back" 
permits it to toll the statute of limitations on remand, ante, at 3 
2. 
n. 3, it will hardly be inappropriate for that court to consider 
the equities on both sides. In the circumstances presented, the 
District Court may well see no reason to exercise its equitable 
discretion in favor of putative class members who have slept on 
their rights these many years. 
FOOTNOTES 
~ Although respondents also asked for attorney's fees, 
their complaint shows that fees were to be granted only from the 
damages ultimately awarded to them or the class. App. 13-14. 
There is no possibility of prospective relief because the 
Mississippi usury statute was amended in 1974 to authorize, inter 
alia, the charges at issue in this case. 1974 Miss. Gen. Laws, ch. 
~
564, § 7; see Miss. Code Ann. § 75-17-1 (6). 
ll Neither the Court nor the respondents have asserted 
that the petitioner's tender fails to include all costs and fees 
for which it could be held liable. See Part II-B, infra. 
!/ The "statutory right" to appeal, ante, at 7, itself ----------
cannot supply a personal stake in the outcome, for Congress cannot 
abrogate Art. III limitations on the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts. Gladstone; · Realtors - v; -village - of -Bellwood, 441 u.s. 91, 
100 (1979). 
~/ United Airlines; · Inc; · v; · McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 
(1977), and Coo3ers & Lybrand · v; · Li~esay 437 U.S. 463 (1978), are 
not to the contrary. Incidental dictum in both cases stated that 
the denial of class certification is subiect to appellate review 
after final judgment at the behest of the named plaintiffs. 
Neither case discussed mootness, and neither analyzed the 
proposition in any way. Indeed, the only authority cited in 
Cogpers &· Lybrand was United -Airlines, see 437 U.S., at 469, and 
the only authority cited in United ·Airlines was a concession made 
2. 
by the defendant and a list of cases from the Courts of Appeals, 
not one of which dealt with a suggestion of mootness in an 
analogous situation, see 432 u.s., at 393, and n. 14. Such 
statements, casually enunciated without a word of explanation in 
opinions dealing with unrelated legal questions, are not 
controlling or even persuasive when they are shown on further 
reflection to have been inconsistent with settled law. As the 
Court agrees today, neither case creates an exception to the 
fundamental rule that "federal appellate jurisdiction is limited by 
the appellant's personal stake in the appeal." Ante at 10 
!/ The Court also mentions that "[t]he use of the class 
action procedure for litigation of individual claims may offer 
substantial advantages for named plaintiffs •••• " ~' at 11 n. 
9. But any such advantages cannot accrue to these respondents, who 
will not be litigating their own claims on remand. Indeed, the 
Court refers to respondents in this context only to point out that 
their total damages were so small that they "would be unlikely to 
obtain legal redress at an acceptable cost" if they could not do so 
by means of a class action. We may assume that respondents had some 
interest in the class action procedure as a means of interesting 
their lawyers in the case or obtaining a satisfactory settlement. 
This may be an interest properly furthered by Rule 23, but once 
respondents obtained both access to court and full individual 
LFP/lab 3/3/80 Footnote p. Roper 
Ellen: What about adding a footnote along the following 
lines: 
_! Responoents, in their brief here and in the 
Court of AppeaJs, have been conspicuously vague in 
identifying the "fees and expenses" relied upon as supplying 
the adverse interest essential to a live controversy. 
Perhaps their strongest statement is: 
"Of course, the interest of the [respondents] 
in assertion of the right to proceed on behalf 
of the class incluoes such matters as the 
prospect for spreading attorneys' fees and 
expenses among more claimants and thus reducing 
the percentage that would otherwise be payable 
by them". Br. Court of Appeals, p. 4. 
The only expense ever mentioned, apart from court costs 
already paid by petitioners f;ndPr, is an alleged offer to 
~be:ft~ ~~!iass ultimately is certified. 
""' 
·,_ 
.... ...... ·" 
2. 
See supra at No s~Gif~ reference is mane to any 
obligation of respondents to pay attorneys' fee~eyond that 
in the complaint to a 25% contingent fee. See supra at 
~ 
Iooeed..,-1'\ it is clear f' .... ,'~"'~O""m'"" "1i~im":1(~1~ bee n- .said--0-y-eeu~ that 
~~~~ 
the 11 fees and expenses 11 a~I-H-i~Wfi.J.· ..ct~t;.U~~'Ft'-. 't". ~-€ .. a.re those 
-1 
incurred in connection with this appeal, and which may arise 
in the future if a class should be certified. These are 
hardly fees and expenses that create any present controversy 
between petitioner and respondents • 
1 ••• . . 
LFP/lab 3/3/80 Rider A, pg. 7 Roper 
The Court's reliance on its attorneys' fees 
argument is more than puzzling. No one has suggested, or 
mathematically could suggest, how respondents' obligation to 
pay 25% of what they may recover could be reduced if other --· 
parties also should become obligated to pay 25% of what they 
- :,).-
recover. 
Even if we were to assume that respondents had 
obligated themselves imprudently to pay a fee that possibly 
could exceed the amount recovered by them, the applicable 
principles of mootness would be no different. Under the 
American Rule, the petitioner could not he held liable under 
a fee agreement made between respondents and their counsel. 
The iniury claimed to be suffered by respondents is the loss 
of opportunity to spread costs and fees if a class is 
·,, -.. 
<' .. 
2. 
eventually certified. The jurisdictional limitations of 
Article III "require [e] that a federal court act only to 
redress injury that fairly can be traced to the challenged 
action of the defendant •• " Simon v. Eastern Kentucky 
We] fare Rights Organization, Orq., supra at 41-42: see 
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 u.s. 91, 99 
(1979). No such injury exists in this case as petitioner has 
~ 
no responsibility 9Y a fee arrangement between respondents 
and their counsel. Indeed, it is wholl.y speculative whether 
there ever will be such ~n injury. Respondents could share 
fees with others only if a class ultimately is certified ~~ ­
) 
if it prevails in the subsequent litigation, and if a fund is 
created from which fees may be paid. Quite apart from this 
"unadorned speculation [that isl not sufficrient] to invoke 
the federal judicial power", Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights 
Organization, supra at 44, respondents' "injury" - if any 
3. 
should ever exist - cannot be "traced" to the petitioner /i!sJo f 
J --~ 
is not obligated to pay any part of respondents' attorney's 1 
fees;] "Federal courts are without power to decide questions 
that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before 
them." North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971). 
This elementary prjnciple disposes of this case, even if one 
were to assume some fee obligation other than the 25% 
contingent arrangement mentioned in the complaint. 
* * * 
Ellen: 
The more I think about the attorney fee question, 
the more frivolous it seems. 
Perhaps we should omit from the text the 
hypothetical assumption as to what would happen if there were 
·, . 
. ,_ 
4. 
no continqent fee arrangement. I have not rechecked the 
briefs, but I do not recall that either counsel or the Court 
_tyy;.~~e. 
disclaims the e~n of a contingent fee arrangement. The 
1\ 
Court, in one of its footnotes, vaguely suggests that other 
fees may be owed . 
.. 
/ 
_ .... . 
lfp/ss 3/4/80 Rider A, p. 6 (Roper) 
The only expense mentioned by respondents - apart 
from Court costs included in the petitioners' 
tender - is not a present obligation at all. It is 
an offer to provide security for costs in the event 
a class ultimately is certified. Brief for 
respondents 33; app. 78. Nor does the fee 
arrangement in this case create any obligation, 
present or future, that can be affected by 
continuing this partyless litiqation. Petitioners' 
complaint identifies the fee arrangement as 
"twenty-five percent (25%)" of the amount of the 
final judgment. App. 13, 16.* No other fee 
arrangement is identified in the record or briefs. 
Even if it were relevant one has suggested, how 
respondents' obligation to pay 25% of what they may 
recover could be reduced if a class subsequently is 
certified and its members become obligated to pay 
25% of what they recover. Thus, the "spreading 
[of] attorneys' fees and expenses" relied upon as 
providing the necessary live controversy between 
petitioner and respondents,? relates to no 
present obligation. It is merely an expectation of 
respondents and particularly their counsel in the 
event a class is certified. It is irrelevant to 
2. 
the existence of a present controversy between 
petitioner and respondents. 
*Ellen: What do you think of actually quoting the 
two provisions of the complaint with respect to the 
attorneys fees. 
9. 
or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certification was 
denied, the action lay dormant during the seven months in which 
respondents sought to take an interlocutory appeal, without 
provoking a response from anyone who previously may have thought 
that the class action would protect his rights. Apart from the 
persistence of the lawyers, this has been a non-case since the 
petitioner tendered full satisfaction of the respondents' 
individual claims. To be sure, respondents' counsel may have 
the same interest in an enlarged recovery that is inherent in 
any contingent fee arrangement. But I know of no decision by any 
court that holds that a lawyer's interest in a larger fee, to be 
paid by third persons not present in court, creates the 
personal stake in the outcome required by Art. III. 
II 
Despite the absence of an Art. III controversy, the 
Court directs a remand in which this federal action will be 
litigated by lawyers whose only "clients" are unidentified class 
members who have shown no desire to be represented by anyone.ll/ 
The Court appears to endorse this form of litigation for reasons 
of policy and practice. It is said to be an effective "response 
to the existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action 
---of government." Ante, at 1 2. ~Apart from the fact that no 
I 
"unremedied" injuries are known to exist, I am not aware that 
) 
1 0 • 
such a consideration ever before has influenced this Court in 
determining whether the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the 
federal courts. In any event, the consequences of a finding of 
mootness are not likely to be as restrictive as the Court seems 
to fear. And the Court fails even to recognize that allowing 
this action to proceed without an interested plaintiff will 
itself generate practical difficulties of some magnitude. 
lfp/ss 3/4/80 Rider A, p. 6 (Roper) 
The only expense mentioned by respondents - apart 
from Court costs included in the petitioners' 
tender - is not a present obligation at all. It is 
an offer to provide security for costs in the event 
a class ultimately is certified. Brief for 
respondents 33; app. 78. 
~~~, 
Nor does th~ 
arrangement in this case create any obligation, 
present or future, that can be affected by 
litigation. Petitioners' 
the fee 
-hJ -t-e., Jd•c. •l 1 4-4c.l~4o·f tio ~ 
arraA~~e~t~ as ~ 
"twenty-five percent (25%)" of the amount of the 
79 . ~1-ttlwo/~~ 
final judgment. App. 13, 16. ~r fee f-t-c- ~ 
~~~~ 
arrangement is identified in the record or briefs. ~.~ 
?£.<9 
Even if it were relevant~one has suggested~ow 
respondents' obligation to pay 25% of what they may 
recover could be reduced if a class subsequently is 
certified and its members become obligated to pay 
25% of what they recover. Thus, the "spreading 
[of] attorneys' fees and expenses" relied upon as 
providing the necessary live controversy between 
petitioner and respondents,? relates to no 
present obligation. It is merely an expectation of 
~ 
respondentsJand particularly their counsel in the .. .., 
event a class is certified. It is~vant to 
'\ 
2. 
the existence of a present controversy between 
petitioner and respondents. 
*Ellen: What do you think of actually quoting the 
two provisions of the complaint with respect to the 
attorneys fees. 
5. 
or no support for today's rulinq. In Electrical · Fittinqs, a 
limited appeal was allowed because the petitioner himself was 
prejudiced by the inclusion of an unnecessary and adverse 
findinq in a qenerally favorable decree. See ~' at 10. Here, 
the existence of the District Court's order denying 
certification has no effect whatever on the respondents. Thus, 
the personal stake that iustified the Electrical - Fittinqs appeal 
is not present in this case. Absent such a stake, it is simply 
irrelevant that "policy considerations" sometimes may favor an 
appeal from "a procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of a 
litiqation." Nor is it significant that the ruling "stands as 
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." ~., at 9-10. 
Collateral rulinqs - like other rulinqs - may be appealed only 
when the requirements of Art. III are satisfied. 
B 
After recoqnizinq that the riqht to appeal is subiect 
to the "iurisdictional limitations of Art. III," the Court 
agrees that only a "party [who] retains a stake in the appeal 
[can satisfy] the requirements of Art. III." Ante, at 7; see 
-----------
id;, at 10. The Court also aqrees that respondents have no 
remaining stake in "the merits of the substantive controversy." 
id;, at 9-10. 
~ 
Nevertheless, th~~Q~~t holds that respondents 
~ 
retain a personal stake in this appeal because they "desire to 
6. 
shift to successful class litigants a portion of those fees and 
expenses that have been incurred in this litigation and for 
which they assert a continuing obligation." Id;, at 7 n. 6; see 
id; at 10.6/ This conclusion is neither legally sound nor 
supported by the record. 
The Court fails to identify a single item of expense, 
chargeable to the petitioner, that was incurred before the 
petitioner's tender. Nor have respondents supplied this 
information. Both here and in the Court of Appeals, respondents 
have been conspicuously vague in identifying the "fees and 
expenses" relied upon as supplying the adverse interest 
----essential to a live controversy.!/ i The only expense mentioned 
by respondents - apart from court costs included in the 
petitioner's tender - is an alleged offer to provide security 
for costs in the event a class ultimately is certified. Brief 
for Respondents 33; App. 78. No reference is made to any 
obligation to pay attorney's fees beyond the 25 per cent 
Jlo . 
contingent fee mentioned in the complaint. App. 14)~ Thus, it 
appears that the "fees and expenses" relied upon by respondents 
counsel are those that may arise in the future if a class should 
be certified. These are hardly "iniuries" of the sort required 
to support a finding of present controversy between petitioner 
and respondent~ 
7 • 
. ;' The record does not positively rule out the hypothesis 
that respondents have altered their fee arrangements or incurred 
some obligation for costs in the period between the filinq of 
the complaint and the petitioner's tender. But neither is 
. t:l the slightest factual support for any such hypothesis. ~ We have 
held repeatedly that "unadorned speculation will not suffice to 
invoke the federal iudicial power." E;g;, ~imon · v; · Eastern · Kv; __...__ 
'Jul ~ 
Welfare · Riqhts ·Orq;, 426 u.s. 26, 44 (1976). M.G.repveP-["~ht!!re 
" ~~~~ 
ha~ been-no suqqest~ that the petitioner is or ever will be 
t 
rl fl., ~~~~-~' 
liable for any ~ hypq or expenses. Indeed, the 
American Rule would bar an award of attornev's fees aqainst this 
petitioner. Thus, respondents' "injury" - if any exists - is 
not one that "fairly can be traced" to the petitioner. Id;, at 
41-42; see Gladstone; · Realtors · v; · Villaqe · of · Bellwood, 441 u.s. 
91, 99 (1979).~/ Wha tever may be the basis for the respondents' 
u 4~..U 
asserted desire to reco~ osts~ unnamed members of ~ 
()., fl.;.;.. ,. I 
p.t:Pt,at]¥-e class , the petitioner is at most a bystander. ee tltai? 
1\ 
"[F]ederal courts are without power to decide 
questions that cannot affect the riqhts of litigants in the case 
before them." North · earolina · v; · Rice, 404 u.s. 244, 246 (1971 ). 
~---.... -oen i:f on""S. wer~t the ~ttrt:J.s a s'oumpt i.oA'e":-t"his 
\ 
~ 
elementary principle~dispos~ of the case. 
, 
c 
'I 
I 
) 
8. 
Since respondents have no continuinq personal stake in 
the outcome of this action, Art. III and the precedents of this 
Court require that the case be dismissed as moot. E;q;, 
Ashcroft - v; ·· Mattis, 431 u.s. 171,172-173 (1977) (per · curiam); 
Weinstein · v; · Bradford, 423 u.s. 147 (1976) (per - curiam); Preiser 
v; ·Newkirk, 422 u.s. 395, 401-404 (1975); Indianapolis - School 
Comm'rs - v; · Jacobs, 420 u.s. 128 (1975); BeFunis · v; · edeqaard, 416 
u.s. 312, 316-320 (1974) (per · curiam); North · earolina · v; · IHce, 
. ---
404 u.s. 244, 246 (1971) (per - curiam); ~F.e · v; · Medical · eomm; · for - ·---
Human - Rights,404 u.s. 403, 407 (1972)._!/ 
Respondents do not sugqest that their claims are 
"capable of repetition, yet evading review." Cf. ~erstein · v; 
Pugh, 420 u.s. 103, 110-111, n. 11 (1975).l8/ Not a sinqle one - -
of the alleged 90,000 class members has sought to intervene in 
the nine years since this action was filed. Cf. enited 
Airlines; · Inc; · v; · McDonald 432 u.s. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone 
challenged the allegedly usurious charges by informal complaint 
or protest. Tr. of Oral Arq. 4. Even after certification was 
denied, the action lay dormant durinq the seven months in which 
respondents sought to take an interlocutory appeal, without 
provoking a response from anyone who previously may have thouqht 
that the class action would protect his rights. Apart from the 
persistence of the lawyers, this has been a non-case since the 
9. 
petitioner tendered full satisfaction of the respondents' 
individual claims. To be sure, respondents' counsel may have 
the same interest in an enlarged recovery that is inherent in 
any contingent fee arrangement. But I know of no decision by any 
court that holds that a lawyer's interest in a larger fee, to be 
paid by third persons not present in court, creates the 
personal · stake in the outcome required by Art. III. 
II 
Despite the absence of an Art. III controversy, the 
Court directs a remand in which this federal action will be 
litigated by lawyers whose only "clients" are unidentified class 
members who have shown no desire to be represented by anyone.!l/ 
The Court appears to endorse this form of litigation for reasons 
of policy and practice. It is said to be an effective "response 
to the existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action 
~r~;- ~;.-t-~ --·~:~ . 
of government." Ante, at 12 .I\ I am not aware that such 
~ ,J. ~ considerationr ever before have influenced this Court in 
determininq whether the eonstitation confers iurisdiction on the 
federal courts. In any event, the consequences of a finding of 
mootness are not likely to be as restrictive as the Court seems 
to fear. And the Court fails even to recoqnize that allowing 
this action to proceed without an interested plaintiff will 
itself generate practical difficulties of some magnitude. 
3. 
relief that interest disappeared. 
ll Perhaps the stronqest of respondents' statements is: 
"Of cou1e, the interest of the [respondents] in 
assertion of the riqht to proceed on behalf of the 
class includes such matters as the prospect for 
spreading attorneys' fees and expenses amonq more 
claimants and thus reducing the percentaqe that would 
otherwise be payable by them." Plaintiffs-Apellants' 
Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Appeal and 
Reply Brief, filed in Roper - v; - Consarve (CAS, No. 76-
3600), Jan. 10, 1977. 
~/ Far-reachinq consequences could flow from a rule that 
injuries compensable by putative class members could be "traced" to 
the class defendant for purposes of the case or controversy 
requirement. At the least, this rule would support a claim that a 
person who previously had accepted full settlement of his 
individual claim was entitled to file suit on behalf of an 
unrecompensed class. Apparently, the putative plaintiff need ~ly 
"asser[t] ," ante, at 7 n. 6, that fees incurred in anticipation of 
the litiqation ultimately miqht be shared with a prevailinq class. 
9/ These cases are discussed more fully in Hnited - States 
Parole · Commission · v; - ~eraqhty, post, at (POWELL, J., 
dissenting) • 
.!..Q_/ FORMER N. 4 
ll/ I do not suqqest that counsel acted improperly in 
4. 
pursuing this case. Since they have prevailed both in this Court 
and in the Court of Appeals, the responsibility for allowing 
client-less litigation falls on the federal courts. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~ ............._~~ 
No. 78-904 
Deposit Guaranty National Bank, l On Writ of Certiorari to 
Jackson, Mississippi, Petitioner, the United States ~ourt 
v. of Appeals for the Fifth 
Robert L. Roper et al. Circuit. 
[February - , 1980] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, with ·whom MR. JusTICE SnJWAH.'rj 
joins, dissenting. 
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that 
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the. 
National Bank Act and Mississippi law.1 They filed this. 
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty 
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and 
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf 
of a class alleg<.'u to include 90,000 persons with claims aggre-
gating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District 
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification. 
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the 
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and 
court costs. Over respondents' objection, the District Court 
entered final judgment in their favor. Petitioner then depos-
ited the full amouut due with the clerk of the ·court. 
1 Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. §§y-5, 
86, which adopts the interest limits set by state Jaw, and 28 U. S, C. 
§ 1:355. 
. . 
' .. 
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This Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals, after 
finding that respondents retain a personal stake in sharing the 
expense of litigation ~ith members of the putative class. Ante, 
at 71n. 6. This speculative interest simply will not sustain 
the jurisdiction of an Art. III court under established and 
controlling precedents. Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
Although there are differences, this case is similar 
to linited ·States · Parole .. eommission · v; · @eraqhty, post, at 
_, in one important respect: both require us to decide 
whether putative class representatives may appeal the denial of 
class certification when they can derive no benefit whatever 
from the relief sought in the action. Here, as in @eraght~, the 
District Court refused to certify a class. In this case, 
however, the Court recognizes established Art. III doctrine. It 
states that the "right to employ Rule 23" is a "procedural right 
only, ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." Ante, 
at 6. It also agrees that a federal court "retains no 
iurisdiction over the controversy" when the parties' 
"substantive claims become moot in the Art. III sense." Ibid. 
Moreover, the Court acknowledges the familiar principle that a 
2. 
party who has no personal stake in the outcome of an action 
presents no case or controversy cognizable in a federal court of 
appeals. Id., at 7, 10. These are indeed the dispositive 
principles. My disagreement is with the way in which the Court 
applies them in this case. In my view, these principles 
unambiguously require a finding of mootness. 
A 
Since no class has been certified and no one has 
sought to intervene, respondents are the only plaintiffs 
arguably present in court. Yet respondents have no continuing 
interest in the injuries alleged in their complaint. They 
sought only damages; those damages have been tendered in full.z/ 
Respondents make no claim that success on the certification 
motion would entitle them to additional relief of any kind from 
the petitioner.3/ Their personal claims to relief have been 
abandoned so completely that no appeal was taken in their own 
names. The notice of appeal filed with the District Court 
recites that respondents appeal only "on behalf of all others 
similarly situated ••• " App. 63. 
This in itself is compelling evidence that respondents 
have no interest in the "individual and private case or 
controversy" relied on by the Court today. ~' at 5. But 
even without such evidence, this and other courts routinely have 
.J 
3. 
held that a tender of full relief remedies a plaintiff's 
injuries and eliminates his stake in the outcome. ealifornia ~ v; 
San · Pablo · &·Talare · R; ·· eo;, 149 u.s. 308, 313-314 (1893); Drs ·; 
Hill · &· Thomas ·· eo; · v; ·· united ·· states, 392 F.2d 204 (CA6 1968)(per 
curiam); Lamb · v; · commissioner, 390 F.2d 157 (CA2 1968) (E!! 
cariam); A;A; · Allen - Revivalsi ~ Inc; ~ v; · eampbell 353 F.2d 89 (CAS 
1965) (per ~ cariam). It is the tender itself that moots the case 
whether or not a iudqment is entered. Ibid. ~hus, the law is 
clear that a federal court is powerless to review the abstract 
questions remaining in a case when the plaintiff has refused to 
accept a proffered settlement that fully satisfies his claims. 
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the 
result should differ because the District Court has entered a 
judgment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their 
lawsuit as moot.4/ It is certainly true, as the Court observes, 
that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in 
itself moot his case. Ante at 7, 9. There never has been any 
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally 
favorable iudqment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wriqht, 
Miller and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 3902 (1976); 
9 Moore's Federal Practice ,I 203.06 (1975). But the requirement 
of adverse effect is more than a rule "of federal appellate 
practice." Ante at 7. As we ha~e held repeatedly, and as the 
4. 
Court concedes, ~' at 10, Art. III itself requires a live 
controversy in which a personal stake is at issue "throughout 
the entirety of the litigation." Sosna · v; - Iowa, 419 u.s. 393, ____ .;....__ 
402 (1975). See,~' Preiser · v; ·· Newkirk, 422 u.s. 395, 401-401 
(1975). 
It is this constitutional limitation, and not any rule 
of practice, that has impelled federal courts uniformly to 
require a showing of continuing adverse effect in order to 
confer "standing to appeal." 15 Wright, Miller and Cooper, 
supra, § 3902. Barry · v; · District - of - eolumbia - Bd; - of - Elections, 
U.S. App. D.C. , 580 F.2d 695 (1978)~ see Altvater · v; 
Freeman, 319 u.s. 359 (1943)~ Electrical · Fittings · v; · Thomas · & 
Betts · Co;, 307 u.s. 241 (1939)~ Kapp · v; -National · Football 
I:Jeagoe, 586 F.2d 644, 650 (CA9 1978)~ Cover · v; ·Schwartz, 133 
F.2d 541 (1942), cert. denied, 319 u.s. 748 (1943).5/ As these 
cases show, the requirements of Art. III are not affected by the 
"factual context" in which a suggestion of mootness arises. See 
~' at 6. Whatever the context, Art. III asks but a single 
question: Is there a continuing controversy between adverse 
parties who retain the requisite stake in the outcome of the 
action? 
Electrical - Fittings - v: -Thomas · &-Betts -eo:, supra, is 
the case primarily relied upon by the Court. It provides little 
s. 
or no support for today's ruling. In Electrical Fittings, a 
limited appeal was allowed because the petitioner himself was 
prejudiced by the inclusion of an unnecessary and adverse 
finding in a generally favorable decree. See ante, at 10. Here, 
the existence of the District Court's order denying 
certification has no effect whatever on the respondents. Thus, 
the personal stake that justified the Electrical Fittings appeal 
is not present in this case. Absent such a stake, it is simply 
irrelevant that "policy considerations" sometimes may favor an 
appeal from "a procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of a 
litigation." Nor is it significant that the ruling "stands as 
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." Id., at 9-10. 
Collateral rulings - like other rulings - may be appealed only 
when the requirements of Art. III are satisfied. 
B 
After recognizing that the right to appeal is subject 
to the "jurisdictional limitations of Art. III," the Court 
agrees that only a "party [who] retains a stake in the appeal 
[can satisfy] the requirements of Art. III." Ante, at 7~ see 
id., at 10. The Court also agrees that respondents have no 
remaining stake in "the merits of the substantive controversy." 
id., at 9-10. Nevertheless, it bolds that respondents retain a 
personal stake in this appeal becaus2 they "desire to shift to 
' - - . .i 
6. 
successful class litigants a portion of those fees and expenses 
that have been incurred in this litigation and for which they 
assert a continuing obligation." Id., at 7
1 
n. 6; see id. at 
--J 
10.6/ This conclusion is neither legally sound nor supported by 
the record. 
The Court fails to identify a single item of expense, 
chargeable to the petitioner, that was incurred before the 
petitioner's tender. Similarly, the respondents have been 
conspicuously vague in identifying the "fees and expenses" 
relied upon as supplying the adverse interest essential to a 
live controversy.z! The only expense ~entioned by respondents, 
apart from court costs included in the petitioner's tender, is 
not a present obligation at all. It is an offer to provide 
security for costs in the event a class ultimately is certified. 
Brief for Respondents 33; App. 78. Nor does the attorney's fee 
arrangement in this case create any obligation, present or 
future, that can be affected by the certification of a class. 
Respondents' complaint identifies the fee to be paid, subiect to 
court approval, as "twenty-five percent (25%)" of the amount of 
the final judgment. App. 14, 16.8/ No arrangement other than 
this customary contingent fee is identified in the record or the 
briefs. Yet, no one has explained how respondents' obligation 
to pay 25% of their recovery to counsel could be reduced if a 
7. 
class is certified and its members become similarly obligated to 
pay 25% of their recovery. Thus, the asserted interest in 
"spreading (of] attorney's fees and expenses"2_/ relates to no 
present obligation. It is at most an expectation - of the 
respondents' and particularly of their counsel - that certain 
fees and expenses may become payable in the event a class is 
certified. That expectation is wholly irrelevant to the 
existence of a present controversy between petitioner and 
respondents. 
The Court's reliance on unidentified fees and expenses 
cannot be reconciled with the repeated admonition that 
"unadorned speculation will not suffice to invoke the federal 
judicial power." E.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights 
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 44 (1976). Such speculation is particularly 
inappropriate in this case, since neither the Court nor 
respondents have suggested that the petitioner is or ever will 
be liable for the fees or expenses relied upon. Indeed, the 
American Rule would bar an award of attorney's fees against this 
petitioner. Thus, respondents' "injury" - if any exists - is 
not one that "fairly can be traced" to the petitioner. Id., at 
41-42; see Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 
91, 99 (1979).10/ Whatever may be the basis for the 
respondents' asserted desire to share fees and expenses with 
8. 
unnamed members of a class, the petitioner is merely a 
bystander. "[F]ederal courts are without power to decide 
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case 
before them." North Carolina v. Rice, 404 u.s. 244, 246 (1971). 
This elementary principle should dispose of t 
he case. 
c 
Since respondents have no continuing personal stake in 
the outcome of this action, Art. III and the precedents of this 
Court require that the case be dismissed as moot. E.g., 
Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 u.s. 171, 172-173 (1977) (per curiam): 
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 u.s. 147 (1976) (per curiam): Preiser 
~ 
v. Newkirk, 422 u.s. 395, 401-404 (1975): Indianapolis School 
Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. · 128 (1975): DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 
U.S. 312, 316-320 (1974) (per curiam): North Carolina v. Rice, 
404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (per curiam): SEC v. Medical Comm. for 
Human Rights,404 u.s. 403, 407 (1972).11/ 
Respondents do not suggest that their claims are 
"capable of repetition, yet evading review." Cf. Gerstein v. 
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110-111, n. 11 (1975).12/ Not a single one 
of the alleged 90,000 class members has sought to intervene in 
the nine years since this action was filed. Cf. United 
Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald 432 u.s. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone 
challenged the allegedly usurious charges by informal complaint 
9. 
or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certification was 
denied, the action lay dormant during the seven months in which 
respondents sought to take an interlocutory appeal, without 
provoking a response from anyone who previously may have thought 
that the class action would protect his rights. Apart from the 
persistence of the lawyers, this has been a non-case since the 
petitioner tendered full satisfaction of the respondents' 
individual claims. To be sure, respondents' counsel may have 
the same interest in an enlarged recovery that is inherent in 
any contingent fee arrangement. But I know of no decision by any 
court that holds that a lawyer's interest in a larger fee, to be 
paid by third persons not present in court, creates the 
personal stake in the outcome required by Art. III. 
II 
Despite the absence of an Art. III controversy, the 
Court directs a remand in which this federal action will be 
litigated by lawyers whose only "clients" are unidentified class 
members who have shown no desire to be represented by anyone.ll/ 
The Court appears to endorse this form of litigation fo~ reasons 
of policy and practice. It is said to be an effective "response 
to the existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action 
of government." Ante, at 12. I am not aware that such a 
consideration ever before has influenced this Court in 
1 0 • 
determining whether the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the 
federal courts. In any event, the consequences of a finding of 
mootness are not likely to be as restrictive as the Court seems 
to fear. And the Court fails even to recognize that allowing 
this action to proceed without an interested plaintiff will 
itself generate practical difficulties of some magnitude. 
_,. 
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The Court decides that the central issue is not mootness b~;J 
appealability. But the characterization does not withsta d 
analysis. Since respondents lack a continuing interest in the 
outcome of the litigation, the Court of Appeals was n erless 
to hear their appeal. Accordingly, I dissent, 
I 
Although there are some differences, th case is similar to 
United States Parole Commiss·ion v. G aghty, post, at - , 
in one important respect: both requ· us to decide whether 
putative class representatives may a eal the denial of class cer-
tification whe11 they can derive no enefit from the relief sought 
in the action. ln this case, as i · Gerayhty, the District Court 
refused to certify a class. s· ce no one has sought to inter-
vene, respondents are the ly plaintiffs arguably present in 
court. Yet respondents ave no continuing interest in the 
injuries allegeu in thei complaint. They sought only dam-
ages; those damages ve been tendered in fulP Respondents 
have not suggeste that success on the certification motion 
would entitle th 1 to additional relief from the petitioner.3 
2 Although l'PS ondPnt:,; also u~kPd for Mtoruey's feet;, their comJJiainL 
shows that f were to be granted only f:om the damages ultimately 
awarded to i em or the class. App. 13-14. 
8 Hespon entt; do m;sert that certifie;ttion would enable them to reduce the 
litigation by a.llocating costs among the members of a prevailing 
rirf for Respondents .8a. Except for attorney's fees, however, 
res1 dents do not. Jdentify any eosts incurred to date Lhat are not 
pov red by the petitioner's tender. Although the record does not reveal 
details. of the fee arrangement bet ween responden.ts and their lawyers, 
complaint sugge.;ts that the lawyers have agreed io accept as full com-
lsation 25% of the amount recovered from the petitioner. App. 13-14. 
If thiJS .i,; t.hr. agrrement as to fees, re~pondents have no continuing interest. 
Only counsel i,.; roneerned whethPr the recovery is enl:trged. 
Even if one assumed that rrspondents' liability to their lawyers could be 
reduced by a class recovery, no one has suggested that petitioner is or ever 
will be liable for feci' that u.Jt.imately ma.y be owed by respondents. Re-
.. __ sp_on.dcn.ts' juri:;dictional tJ1eory appea.rs to be tlmL the mere possibil~of __., 
.-
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Indeed. their personal clai1:~ 7o reli~;;:.:-been aband"'....{d 
so completely that no appeal was take11 in their own :z::~. 
'The notice of appeal filed with the District Court re9tes that 
respondeuts appeal only "on behalf of all qth's similarly 
sitmLted .... " App. 63. 
Since respondents have no continuing perS<)ll'al stake in the 
outcome of this action, I believe that Art. III and the prece-
dents of this Court require that the 'Case ne dismissed as moot. 
See Geraghty, post, at --- (l6WELL, J... dissenting). 
There is no suggestion that responpents' claims are "capable 
of repetition. yet evading review' Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 
U.S. 103, 110-111, n. 11 (1975 I And not a single one of the 
alleged 90,000 class member 1as sought to intervene in the 
nine years since this actio 1 was filed. Cf. United Airlines, 
Inc. v. J.1fcDonald, 432 !J. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone 
ever challenged the llegedly usurious charges by informal 
complaint or protes . Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certifi-
cation was denied, the action lay dormant during the seven 
months in whi h respondents sought to take an interlocutory 
appeal, with ut provoking a response from anyone who pre-
viously ma have thought that the class action would protect 
his rights We are not told what, if anything, motivates re-
assert.in • fuf .ul'C• <'laim:-; for attomey's fees against other members of a 
putati , class gh·~ rise to a cnse or controver&-y against the class defend-
auk , uch a u~eory is unprecedented, and its consequences are bizarre. 
Fo example, I'f..>spondents' theory would permit, t1 person to file a class 
t,ion, even t.hough he had previously a.cceptt>d full :settlement, of his in-
lividuaJ claim. on the ground Uwt, the fee.· incurred in unticipit.tio~he;. 
· · , , 'y he ~lmrec(witl · ~; ~ 
4 If a class-act ion defendant wt>re shown to have embarked on a course 
of conduct designed ttl immlatP the class certification i&.1te from appellate 
review iu ordf'r Lo avoid cla."<lwide liability, a court in proper circum~tances 
migh~ find tJw Gerstein test f:'.atisfied and the cH~e not. moot. See Susm . an v. 
Lincoln American Co1·p., 587 F. 2d 866 (CA7 1978) ; 13 Wright , Miller & 
Cooper, .Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 171 (SttJ1p. 1979) ; 
Comment , Continuation and Representation of Class Action;; Following 
Dismissal of the Class Repre;;entativc, 1974 Duke L. J~ 57:3, 599- 600, 
.. 
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spondents tO continue t'his crusii'Cie' Ol1 "behatl o"£ persons who 
for e s have evinced uo interest whatever in obtaining 
covery f themselves.5 On its face, this appears simp 
be a "lawy r's case." 
Despite tr clition and policy considerations to th contrary, 
the Court see 1s undisturbed that this federal action will be 
litigated on re and by a lawyer whose on "clients" are 
unidentified clas members who have show no desire to be 
represented by an one.0 The Court also eglects established 
principles of Art. I I jurisprudence, an remands to the Dis-
trict Court a headl s class actior/ hat does uot meet the 
II/ . 
The Court identifies e qu95tion for decision in this case 
as "whether respondents' 'ndnridual and private case or con-
troversy became moot by ason of the entry of judgment in 
their favor." ld., at §I Wholly ignoring the fact that 
respondents themselve~Felect d to appeal only on behalf of 
third parties, the Cour conclu s that "respondents' individual 
interest in the litigat on- as dis 'nguished from whatever may 
be their represen i¢live responsilf ities to the putative class-
is sufficient to ..Permit their app 1. . . . " 1d., at 12. One 
might expect that the Court woul reason to this conclusion 
by pinpoint' g the individual intere ton which it purports to 
rely. Bu no such reasoning appear in the Court's opinion. 
Althou there is some discussion of antages that generally 
may / ccrue to named plaintiffs from the se of the class-action 
~'hE> Mis,;issippi usury statute was amendE·d in 974, and it appa.rently 
now authorizes the fees charged by pet.itioner. 197 Miss. Gen. Laws, ch. 
564, § 7 ; see Miss . Code Ann . § 75- 17- 1 (6 ) . Thus, t ere iH no queHtJOn of 
prospective relief. 
6 I do uot, !:iuggt•:;t that rt>,;pondeu t~ ' lawyer artc·d· Jlllpt erly in pursuing 
this cru;e. Since he has prevailed both in this Court a d in the Court 
of A ppcal,, the re:;puu!:iibility for a llowing client~ le:;s liti · tion faUs Oil 
the fedeml courts 
... 
'' 
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device, the Court never attempts to ascertain whether t4 se 
particular respondents can derive any such benefit from" this 
action.' A / 
The Court does not explain how it is ap.le to find an. 
uindividual interest" in the litigation wi lout identifying 
the iuj ury in fact required by Art. III. I simply ignores this 
essential inquiry and relies on the "f tual context" of the 
case: Wh('n respondents refused the · offered settlement, the 
trial court e11t~red judgment in th r favor over their objec-
tiou. I d., at 6. The single fact of respondents' refusal in-
. pires the Court to draw a "•ritical distinction" between 
mootness deriving from a ju gment and mootness resulting 
from events extrinsic to the itigation. ld., at 9. The Court 
appears to hold that a li · ·ant who attempts to appeal from 
a favorable judgment h an "individual interest" in exercis-
j11g his "statutory righ to appeal." Id., at 7. If the statutes 
a11d rules governing 'federal appellate practice" confer such 
a right, the Court oncludes that Art. LII requires no more. 
Ibid.; see id., at 
Haviug shift the inquiry from Art. III mootness to the 
7 Any advan l!;hl that. onlinarily may flow from "the u:;e of the class 
adion proce re for litigation of individual claims," ante, at 10, cannot 
accrue to ese respondents who will not b3 litigating their own claims 
on reman . Nor do('s the Court identify :my unrecovered cost of litiga-
tion tlu these respondents can reduce if they obtain relief for a class. 
Sre id at 10, n. 8; n. 3, supra. Indeed, the Court refers to respondents 
only o point out that their total damages were ~o small that they "would 
be nlikely to obtain legal redress at an acceptable cost" if they could not 
so by means of a class action . Ante, at 10, n. 8. We may assume 
.hat rP..spondents had some interest in the class-nction procedure as a means 
of interesting their lawyer;; in I ho case or obtaining a. ~tisfa.ctory settle-
ment. This may be an interest properly furthered by Rule 23, but once 
respondents obtamed both accesH to eourt and full indiv1dual relief that 
inl·e:rest disappeared. 
1 _···r, 
.. 
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. ' 
;'formtrlattidu] [of] standards ... ~wvern [ing l tlie appealabil-
ity of procedural rulings," 1:bid., _the Court deter_mines that 
respoudents are aggriev~d by the denia.l of certification for twq 
reasons. First, t~e certification order is. a "procedural ruling, 
collateral to the merits of [the] litigation," that "stapds as 
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." ld., at 9, 
Second, the. contrary result would frustrate the goals of 
Rule 23. ld., at 10-i2. 
The effect of the Court's analysis, if I understand it cor-
rectly, is to avoid a direct confro tation with settled princi-
ples that unambiguously dictate a finding of mootness in this 
case. But the Court cannot escape the impact of these author-
ities simply by refusing to co,nsider the respondents' evident 
lack of interest in the outcome. The "critical distinction" by 
which it attempts to justify its failure to do so is both factually 
and legally unsound. / 
B 
As a matter of fact, there is subst11ntial doubt that this case 
involves the effect of "a judgm~nt in favor of a party at an. 
intermediate stage of litigation," l d., at 9. Petitioner has 
rwver conteuded hat the controversy became moot merely 
"by reason of t e entry of judgment in [respondents'] favor . " 
I d. , at 5. Instead, petitioner argues that its tender of full 
relief has rerlwdied the respondents' individual injuries anc;t 
thus eliminated their stake in the outcome. Considerable 
authority ftupports petitioner's contention that the tender itself 
moots tl)e case whether or not a judgment is entered. This 
Court, among others, has held that a federal court is powerless 
to rev ew the abstract questions remaining in a case when the 
plai;ftiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that 
ful(y satisfies his claims. California v. San Pablo & Tulare 
_ . Co._, 149 U. S. 308, 313- 314 (1893); Drs. Hill & Thomas 
yo. v. United States, 392 F . 2d 204 (CA6 i968) (per curiam); 
Lamb v. Commissioner, 390 ]'. 2d 157 (CA2 1968) (per 
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curiam); A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F 2d 
89 (CA5 1965) (per curiam).8 
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that e result 
should differ because the District Court has entered a judg-
ment in favor of respondents instead of dis issing their 
lawsuit as moot. 0 It is certainly true, as the ourt observes, 
that the entry of judgment in favor of a ~rty does not in 
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There · ever has been any 
doubt that a party may appeal those a ects of a generally 
favorable judgment that affect him adv sely. See 15 Wright, 
Miller, and Cooper, Federal Practic and Procedure § 3902 
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practic ~· 203.06 (1975). But 
federal courts uniformly have re9 ired a showing of some 
adverse effect in order to confer ''J an ding to appeal." Ibid.; 
see Barry v. District of ColumbiL Bd. of Ele'ctions,- U. S. 
App. D. C. -, 580 F. 2d 695 1978). Indeed, Art. III itself 
requires a continuing contro rsy between adverse parties at 
all stages of the litigation. . g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 
402 (1975); Steffel v. T mpson, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10 
(1974) . If any statute or rule purported to authorize an 
appeal in contraventio of Art. III, that rule would yield to 
the constitutional co and. 
c 
almost entirely on Electrical Fittings Corp. 
8 The Court rna · uo pffort to di~tingui8h the~e caselS. Yet it concedes 
that the "right t employ Rule 2:3" is a "procedural right only, ancillary 
to the litigatio of substantive claims," and it admits that "the court 
retains no juri iction over the controversy" when the "substantive claims 
become moot m the Art. III sense." Ante, at 6. If the tender itself 
mooted the sponJents' claims without regard to the entry of judgment, 
then the onrt's own analysis requires it to conclude that the case is 
moot. 
9 The '~tatutory right '' to appeal it~elf cannot supply a personal stake 
111 the outcome, for Congress cannot, abrogate Art.. III limitations on the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Gladstone, Realtol'l$ v. Village of Bell-
wood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979), 
.. 
·' 
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----~----~~--~-------..... v. l'homas & Betts Co., 307 U. S. 241 (1939).w · But the dec;-
sion simply reaffirms our obligation not to review judgments 
by which no individual is aggrieved. The trial court there 
had entered a decree holding a patent valid but not infringed. 
Although the alleged infringer won the case, it sought to 
appeal the finding that the patent was valid~ This Court 
held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to con-
sider the issue of patent validity after t trial court found 
no infringement, because " [a] party n y not appeal from a 
judgment . . . in his favor, for the urpose of obtaining a 
review of findings ... which are no necessary to support the 
decree." I d., at 242. But the tri court had erred by inclqd-
ing in the decree itself a ruling · at "purport[ed] to adjudge 
the validity of [the patent]." bid. Since that ruling "was 
immaterial to the dispositio of the cause," the Court of 
Appeals had jurisdiction for e limited purpose of eliminating 
the extraneous ruling fro he decree. Ibid. 
The Court reads Elect cal Fitt·ings as a case that was "still 
live" in the Art. III se e "because policy considerations per-
mitted an appeal." A te, at 8-9. But Electrical Fittings was 
a "live" controversy nly because-and to the limited extent 
that-the petitione here asserted a continuing personal stake 
in the outcome. s Judge Learned Hand later explained, the 
111 The only uthP authorities cited by the Comt are Un:ited A1:1·Unes, Inc. 
v. McDonald, 43 U. S. 385 (1977), and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 
437 U. S. 463 ( 78). Dictum in both cases stated that the denial of class 
certification i subject to appellate review after final judgment at the 
behest of t named vlaintiffs. Neither ease rliscusl:led mootness, and 
neither ana1yzed the proposition in any way. Indeed, the only authority 
cited in oopers (~ Lybrand was United Airlines, see 437 U. S., at 469', and 
the onl authority cited in United Ai1'lines was a concession made by the 
defendant and a list of cases from the Courts of Appeals, none of which 
de t with a suggestion of moot.ness in an analogous situation, see 432 
. S., at 393, and n. 14. Such statements, cal:lually enunciated without a. 
word of explanation in opinions dealing with umelated legal questions, are 
not controlling or even persuasive when they are shown on further reflec- · 
tion to have been inconsistent with established la,w. 
• mewzcwats~ 
! .. ... 
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petitione ·n Electrical Fittings was injured in fact because the 
unnecessary ruling that the patent was valid could have 
created "some presumptive prejudice" against him in a future 
case. Harries v. Air King Products Co., 183 F. 2d 158, 161 
(CA2 1950); see In re Trimble Co., 479 F . 2d 103, lll (CA3 
1973) . Ll 'l'his genuine prejudice to the petitioner himself 
supplied the requisite personal stake in obtainin reformation 
of the decree. 
Thus, the Court's view of Electrical F'ittin is plainly incon-
sistent with the holding of that case. T Court of Appeals 
was told to reform the decree, but e ressly forbidden to 
consider the merits of the patent va.li · y question. In other 
words, the court's appellate jurisdict' n was only as broad as 
the petitioller's personal stake in t appeal. Just four years 
later, Altvater v. Freeman, 319 . S. 359 (1943), explained 
that the limitation was constit wnally based. Reversing a 
decision that had relied on El ctrical Fittings in refusing to 
consider the merits of an peal, the Court distinguished 
Electrical Fittings as a case n which the parties soug4t deci-
sion of "a hypothetical c ." The appeal in Altvater, by 
contrast, satisfied "the r quirements of case or controversy" 
because the parties co inued to contest a counterclaim that 
had not been conclu d by the dismissal of the orginal com-
plaint. 319 U. S., 't 363-366. 
Altvater and ectrical Fittings entirely foreclose the 
Court's argumen that a party who has no personal stake in 
the outcome of is appeal may invoke the jurisdiction of a 
fcdera.l court erely because policy-based "rules of practice'~ 
11 Alt.lwttglyfhe Court of Appeals in Electrical Fittings held that col-
lateral er:.to!f;~ would be no bar to relitigatiou of tpe validity question, 100 
F. 2d 403f 404 (CA2 1988), other courts had taken a different. view on 
similar i¥'ues of collateral estopp~:>l. If the validity finding were permitted 
to o:tanff, the petitioner could have been forced to litigate the question of its 
preclu 1ve effect m future cases. 15 Wright, Miller, and Cooper, supra 
11 . 4, ·§ 3902, 1tt· 40a (1976); lB Moore's F~:>deml Practice ,I 0.443 [5] , at 
3,925 (1974) ; 9 id., 1208.06, at 716 (1975}. 
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..,. 
permit him to do so. Any doubt is dispelled by Altvatej's 
express reliance on Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 (1942), 
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943), a case in whiph the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed at ength the 
constitutional limits on appellate jurisdiction. 319 U. S., at 
363, n. 2. Like the respondents here and the petitioner in 
Electrical Fittings, the appellant in Cov sought to appeal 
from a judgment that had eliminated IS stake in the out-
come.12 The Court of Appeals emp tically declined to as-
sume jurisdiction over an appeal hich sought "no relief 
against anybody before the court ... but ... want[ed] an 
advisory opinion that [a] paten [was] valid." 133 F. 2d, at 
554.1 3 Since there was no ca or controversy, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that it w "without discretion" to hear the 
appeal. Id. , at 545. 
These cases demo11str e that the requirements of Art. III 
do not change with the factual context" in which a suggestion 
of mootness arises. ee ante, at 5. Whatever the context, 
Art. III asks but a ugle question: Is there a continuing con-
troversy between verse parties? Tn Electrical Fittings, the· 
12 Thr appellan1 . 1 rove?' V. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 (CA2 1942) ' cert. 
denied, 31!) U.S. 48 (194:3), was the losing plaintiff in a patrnt infringe-
ment arl'ion. er the trlal court found the patent invalid and not 
lnfringed, the aintilf took an appeal on the validity question without 
contesting the nding of noninfringement. By accept.ing the judgment to 
that extent, e lost his right to recover· from the defendant-and thus his 
interest in 1e litigation. 
1 3 Judg rank wrote for the court: 
"[Wl he there iR no ' justiciable' dispute, t.here are no 'merits.' There is 
merel~r an unreal entity resembling that disembodied smile which Lewis 
Carol immortalized. :\.fany Supreme Court derisions teach us that appel-
late urisdietion , when no justiciable dispute exists on appral, cannot be 
res d upon the rrcollection that such a dispute previously existed when 
t ease was in the trial court." 1:33 F. 2d, ai. 551 (footnotes omitted). 
See also Kapp v. National Pootball League. 586 F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9 
978); Hall v. U. S. F'iber & Plastics C'orp., 476 F . 2d 418, 420 (CA3, 
7-3); cf. Lewis . ·united States, 216 U. S 6l1 (J9W) (p~r curiam}. 
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'-- conh·oversy continued with re~pec~ to the, Wugle.-nar;ow 
issue whether the District Court's ruling on patent v lfdity 
properly was included in the decree. But nothi in that 
case suggests that a "procedut•al ruling, collat€ra.l the merits 
of a litigation," may be appealed after final j gment because 
"policy considerations permi[t] the appe ' or because the 
ruling "stands as an adjudication of one the issues litigated." 
Ante, at 8-9. Such collateral rulings ike other rulings--may 
be appealed only when the litiga as a personal stake in the 
resolution of his appeal.H !1 :.~lectricaJ Fittings, there was 
a stake; here there is uou . Since nothing remains of the 
case or controversy, the ourt of Appeals should have dis-
missed this case. 
III 
It is clear fro the Court's extended discussion of policy 
and practical c siderations, ante, at 10-12, that these weighed 
heavily in i decision. I am not aware that such considera-
tions eve)! before have influenced this Court in determining 
wheth the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the federal 
cou1>ts. In any event, the consequences of a finding of moot-
I1esa would~ {!,S ;vere. a~utt pJ..@Jcts .. 
A finding of mootness woufd have repercussions primarily 
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who 
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to 
a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent 
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification 
generally would be barred by Art. III. But the consequences 
of applying settled rules of mootness in~tuation would 
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were 
· , appE>ars .o rE>cognize thif; in passing, ante, ~ 9 1~ 
fails to apply the rule to this case. Since the Court. suggests that respond-
ents' interest in the certifici~tion rulin~ ,.deri ,s from the mere fact that it 
<;stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated," id., at 9, Elec-
trical Fittings itself would tfmit us to the issuance of an order directing that 
the offen~ive rulin'fbe expunged from the record. 307 U. S., at 242. 
<=-----------·------=-· ~=--------------
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granted, the absent members of the putative class would hay~ 
obta.int'd by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of 
th(: benefits of actual class membership. If, OJi the other hand, 
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of 
the certification ruling would enable putative class membe~ to 
take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability 
without assuming the risk o£ being bound by an unfavorable 
judgment. Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in 
this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" tha~ ~ ' 
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate. ~ 
Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise 
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before 
judgment, as petitioner did in this case. A defendant cer-
tainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic i:Q. 
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny 
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the 
enforcement of ce•·ta.in legal rights by "private attorney[s] 
general." Ante, a~~ The practical argument is not 
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns 
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the ade, 
quacy of compensation and enforcement available for particu-
lar substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best 
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be 
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim, 
Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of 
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of 
l!L See Comnwnt, Immedi;Lle Appealability of Orders Denying Class Cer- ~-~ 
tification, 40 Ohio St. L. J. 441, 470-471 (1979). In actions brought undev 
Rnle 23 (b) (:3), a class member must decide at the time of certification 
whether to "opt out" of the action under Rtlle 23 (c) (2). This provision 
was designed to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class 
members were permittrd to intervene after a decision on the merits 
in order to secure t.he benefits of that, decision. Notes of the Advisory 
Cpmmittce on Proposed An1endments to Rule 23, 39 F . R D. 69, 10~106 
'(1.9~6). 
,,)-
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usury dai1ns,~e Court's concern for compensation of puta-
tive class members in this case is at best misplaced and atv 
worst l.~JCpnsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling 
Act . .--J.ly 
The Court's concern for putative class members would be 
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced 
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litiga-
tion of successive suits by members of the putative cl~ss. I 
o not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial admin-
"'itrfttion wo11ld_ re 1 But these problems can and should 
e addressed by measures short of rewriti~i the law of moot-
ness, as the Court seems to have one today. The first step 
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the 1J/ 
denial of class certification in appropriate circumstances.-tt 
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292 
(b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain con-
I questions of law. In many cases, a class-action 
; 
P v. Litton Systems, Tnc., 800 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting bor-
rowers' class action); F1·y v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941) . 
Petitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply with Mis-
sissippi '3 interest limits would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U. S. C. 
§ 85. But I do uot understand that the National Bank Act displaces state 
policy disfavoring the aggregation of usury claims. A primary purpose of 
that AcL iti to protect national banks from discriminatory treatment or 
unr/ue penalties that may be imposed by st;:~.te law. See 12 U. S. § 86. ,--
Lb~The Act provides that rules of procedure promulgated by this Couv 
"shall not ... enlarge or modify any substantive right." 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2072. See Amm·ican Pipe &: Consti"Uction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 58 , 
557-558 (1974); Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1318, 1358-1359 (1976). See genera-lly Landers, Of Legalized Black-
.. and Legalizf'd The.ft: Consumer Class Actions and the Subetance-
cedure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974). 
In Coo1>ers c~ Lybrand v. Livesay, 487 U. S. 463 (1978), this Court 
d t,ha.t the denial of class certification is no1, a "final decision" appeal-
able as of right tmder 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We relied in that case on the 
dangers of "indi:,;criminate" interlocutory review. Id., at 474. Although 
Coopers & Lyb11and now prevents review in cases in which it would be 
desirable, Congress may remedy the prob1em by appropriate legislation •. 
/ 
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defendant undoubtedly would forgo the opportunity to settle 
with an individual plaintiff in order to obtain an immediate 
and final determination of the class certification question· on 
appeal. 
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a class action by 
d settlement, the District Court is not powerless. In at 
some circumstances, it may require th~t putative class 
members receive some sort of notice and an opportunity to 
intervene within the appeal period. Rule 23 (d)(2). The 
availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent ~ 
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, DistricV 
Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the 
case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended 
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent inter-
locutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are 
lacking, it ~s Jor Congress-not this Court-to correct the [: 
deficiency.VJ..tg -------------- J5 
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it~ 
judicially fashioned "solutions" ·to legislative problems often 
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their 
own. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respond-
ents will serve as "quasi-class representatives" ·solely for the 
purpose of obtaining class certification. Since they can gain 
nothing more from the action, their participation in the c· 
r----L can be intended only to benefit ss. 
- ....... -~- ·. serve on t mr own motio~. Since no cour 
~:ss currently has before it a Lill that attempts to remedy the 
difficulties infecting this troubled area. H. R 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1979). The bill, supported by the Department of Justice, proposes to 
bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, supm, and to eliminate 
some of the problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by 
creating a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provides for 
the enforcement of this right in some instances through actions brought in 
the name of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory 
appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace cla~s cer~. 
' tifi('ation under the proposed procedures, 
~~ I 
"'~.A--
~~ 
~~~ 
~" ....... 
...r *" 
_....;. . .Jc' , ... .kJ 3ll.ttr 
J!ii I , £:L 
-£ct./<., C'c t 
~ ¥ ' - u-
~ 
~
~ 
~~ 
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has certified the class, there has been no considered determina.; 
tion that respondents will fairly and adeq1ately re.present itvs 
members. Nothing in Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure, 
and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it. 
Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent. 
See East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 
403-404 (1977). Are their currently nonexistent claims "typi-
cal of t.he claims ... of the class'' within the meaning of Rule 
23 (a)(3)'? 2') 
The Court's holding well may prevent future "forced set-
tlemen " ~ud ll*& even foreclose ·lrll settle.men of class --a--
action litigation. See tmte, n. 5. r Thus, the difficulties faced 
by the District Court on rem~tnd in this case may not arise 
again in precisely analogous circumstances. But today's result 
also authorizes appeals by putative class representatives who 
\----1---.:h-:::a-v--..e prevailed on the merits of their individual claims. If the 
order denying class certification is reversed in that situation, 
the named plaintiffs on remand will have no more continuing 
relationship to the putative class than respondents have 
here. A remand for certification could also lead to "one-way 
2" The District Court properly may conclude on remand thnt respondents, 
for the::;e or other r<'asons, cannot adequately. represent the class. ~
'Eerventi~ P"~' t · crcourt on equitable grotm might. well 
tt8e t6 toH the- sfil'!'l'if.e 'Onim . m order fo J'X'nnit it. ~ N t•a rl~· nin 
) ea.rs have pa;;sed sincf' this ction wail filed <Uld six since he goV.ernin 
s tbsttmt·ive i:ltatute was am 1ded to authorize the challeng conduct. I . 
i s order denying certific· ion on September 29, 1975, t District. Cou 
· ·igned as one of it~; r ~ons the possible '·destruction of .he [petitioner's 
b k" by damages t n alleged to total §12,000,000 a. d now potept.iall 
a gmented by the · crual of intere.;t.. App. 47, see a· te, at 2, n. 2. Th 
p ssible destructi of pet.itiont:>r's bank is irrelevant the cent.ral ii:ll:iue o · 
m tness, but. SP ous indeed to depo;:;itors, stockhold K, and the communit~ 
se ved. As th ' · Court rdiel:l so heavily on its pra 1cal and equitable con 
c ns for pu tive Plas~ nwrnbPrs, it will hardly e inappropriate for th 
IJ. istrict Co rt on remand to consider pru.ctical' ics and equities on botl 
sfdP~. In e circumstances presented, the Dist ICt Court may well !lee n 
r 'a son t exPrcifie its equitabiP discretion in fav · of putative cla~;s InPUlbe s· 
. lio- h e slept on their right" thel:le many yea s, ___ _/' 
LFP:er 3/4/80 
J 
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!!I As noted above, p. supra, respondents took no 
appeal in their own names. One would think that this candid 
disclaimer of personal interest would destroy the foundation upon 
which the Court predicates Art. III iurisdiction. Ante, at 7: see 
p. supra. 
,. 
A-vtd if--m()./ J 
we k fA.. _ 
6e_( tOIA~ 
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intervention" in direct violation of Rule 23. Seep, t1-fJ~ and 
n. 15, supta. These tensions, arising from the express terms 
of the Rule, undermine the Court's conclusion that the 
policies underlying Rule 23 dictate the result reached' today. 
In sum, the Court's attem~ted solution to the problem of 
forced settlements in consumer class acti1ns :;arts from 
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. It ~ unneces-
sarily cflates significant problems in the administration of 
Rule 23. I would vacate the judgment of the Court of 
IV\ \t,tS~ i<Jt, j{) El 
Appeals and remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal ~"" 
~ as moot.~ · / 
~S'I'ICE STEYENR statE's, in hb concurring opinion, lhat all persons 
:tlll'gf'd to be mc·mbNs of a. put~t.tive ela.-;s "automaticall~· become parties 
i.o tlw ra,.;f' or routroversy for purpo,;es" of Art. Ill, and that they 
"remain partiE'>~ nnt.il a final determination hHs hc-'E'n made that the action 
may not. be mainta.i11(;'(l as a. clasll action." Ante, at. -. This novel 
viPw, for which no authority is cited, cannot be reconciled with Indian-
apolis School r'omm'1Js v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975), where an oral 
r~ ,s c.o..SD • · 
certification ortler wa:-; ht>ld insufficient to identify the interests of absent 
clasR memberl'l for Art. lii purposes. The result hardly could be different 
when the ela.s,: has 110t been ident.ifird a.t. all . See also M ern phis Light; 
Gas & Water Div . v. Craft. 436 U.S. 1, 8 (Hl78) ; Baxter v. Pabnigiano, 
423 U. S. 308, 310, n . 1 (1976); Weinstein v. Bradford. 42a U. S. 147 
(19i5); Pasadena City Board of Ed'Ucation v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 430 
(1976). 
The proposed rule of automatiC' party statu:>-in this cas<:> fot· 90,000 
unidentified person::r-has troublt>some and frtr-reaching implications that 
could prejudice the bringing of class actions. PrPsumably a purpose of 
such a rule would be to Hi-isure that satisfaction of the claims of named 
parties would not. terminate the litigation. Nor could the rights of 
unnamed parties be rxt.inguiHhed by the fa.ilurr of t.hc named pu.rties to 
appeal. Thus, if thr rule proposed by Mrt. Ju:;TrcE 8'!'~~\'ENl'l is to accom-
plish it:; purpo .. w, I ..:upposr that <L fiduciary duty must be imposed upon 
nam<·d partie>~ to eontinm~ the litigation where--as herl'--th<:> tmnamed 
parti(•s rrmain tutident.ifif'([ and fail to intc•rvene. AH fiduciaries, would the 
nauwd parti<'K not onl.v be required to continue ·to litigate, but to assume 
personal rf'l;ponsibility for costs aml attorncy '1; fee1; if the ca;;e ultinmtely is 
lost? Woulrl rp.-.;pon::<ible litigants be willing to file rlass actions if they 
thereb r "~:-:umed su!'h long-trrm fiducia.ry obligation"'? The;;e aud like 
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ql!(•::;tions are substantial. They are not resolved by Rule 23. I believe/ 
they merit carPfnl study py Congres<; before tJ1is Court-perhaps unwit-
tingly-creates a major category of clientless litiga.t.jon unique in our 
~;yst.em. 
• 
FOOTNOTES 
!/ Although respondents also asked for attorney's fees, 
their complaint shows that fees were to be granted only from the 
damages ultimately awarded to them or the class. App. 13-14. 
There is no possibility of prospective relief because the 
Mississippi usury statute was amended in 1974 to authorize, inter 
~' the charges at issue in this case. 1974 Miss. Gen. Laws, ch. 
564, § 7; see Miss. Code Ann.§ 75-17-1 (6). 
ll Neither the Court nor the respondents have asserted 
that the petitioner's tender fails to include all costs and fees 
for which it could be held liable. See Part II-B, infra • 
.!/ The "statutory right" to appeal, ante, at 7, itself 
cannot supply a personal stake in the outcome, for Conoress cannot 
abrogate Art. III limitations on the iurisdiction of the federal 
courts. Gladstone; - Realtors - v; ·village - of - Bellwood, 441 u.s. 91, 
100 (1979). 
~/ United -Airlines; - Inc; - v; - McDonald, 432 u.s. 385 
(1977), and Coopers - & · ~ybrand - v; - Livesay 437 U.S. 463 (1978), are 
not to the contrary. Incidental dictum in both cases stated that 
the denial of class certification is subiect to appellate review 
( 
after final iudgment at the behest of the named plaintiffs. 
Neither case discussed mootness, and neither analyzed the 
proposition in any way. Indeed, the only authority cited in 
Coopers - & - ~ybrand was United -Airlines, see 437 u.s., at 469, and 
the only authority cited in United - Airlines was a concession made 
2. 
by the defendant and a list of cases from the Courts of Appeals, 
not one of which dealt with a suggestion of mootness in an 
analogous situation, see 432 U.S., at 393, and n. 14. Such 
statements, casually enunciated without a word of explanation in 
opinions dealing with unrelated legal questions, are not 
controlling or even persuasive when they are shown on further 
reflection to have been inconsistent with settled law. As the 
Court agrees today, neither case creates an exception to the 
fundamental rule that "federal appellate jurisdiction is limited by 
the appellant's personal stake in the appeal." Ante at 10, 
---1 
~/ The Court also mentions that "[t]he use of the class 
action procedure for litigation of individual claims may offer 
substantial advantages for named plaintiffs. II Ante, at 11 n. 
9. But any such advantages cannot accrue to these respondents, who 
will not be litigating their own claims on remand. Indeed, the 
Court refers to respondents in this context only to point out that 
their total damages were so small that they "would be unlikely to 
obtain legal redress at an acceptable cost" if they could not do so 
by means of a class action. We may assume that respondents had some 
interest in the class action procedure as a means of interesting 
their lawyers in the case or obtaining a satisfactory settlement. 
This may be an interest properly furthered by Rule 23, but once 
respondents obtained both access to court and full individual 
relief that interest disappeared. 
21 Perhaps the strongest of respondents' statements is: 
;f.•of course, the interest of the [respondents] in 
assertion of the right to proceed on behalf of the 
class includes such matters as the prospect for 
spreading attorneys' fees and expenses among more 
claimants and thus reducing the percentage that would 
otherwise be payable by them." Plaintiffs-Apellants' 
Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Appeal and 
Reply Brief, filed in Roper v. Consurve (CA5, No. 76-
3600), Jan. 10, 1977. 
3. 
~/ Respondents' "Demand for Judgment" asked the court to 
award the "[c]ost of this action as well as attorney fees in the;' 
amount of 25% as hereinabove alleged, or such other amount as may 
~ ..... 
--~ --
be deemed ift and proper by the Court." App. 16. The request for 
fees was clarified in Paragraph VI of the amended complaint, which 
reads as follows: 
"Plaintiff alleges that the Clerk of this Court be 
designated custodian of the funds and judgment to be 
paid Plaintiff and other persons similarly situated, 
by Defendants and the Clerk deposit said funds in a 
suitable depository and, upon proper order of this 
Court, disburse said funds after deduction of 
necessary expenses and attorney fees to Plaintiff's 
attorneys herein of twenty-five per cent (25%) of the 
amount so paid, the same being reasonable by all 
standards, including that alleged and utilized by 
Defendants in suing certain members in of [sic] the 
class in State Courts for unpaid accounts." App. 13-
1 4. 
~/Seen~ 7, supra. 
0 
~/ Far-reaching consequences could flow from a rule 
4. 
that fees r coverable from putative class members could be "traced" 
to the class defendant for purposes of the case or controversy 
requirement. At the least, this rule would support a claim that a 
person who previously had accepted full settlement of his 
individual claim was entitled to file suit on behalf of an 
unrecompensed class. Apparently, the putative plaintiff need noly 
"asser[t] ," ante, at 7
1 
n. 6, that fees incurred in anticipation of 
the litigation ultimately might be shared with a prevailing class. 
~/ These cases are discussed more fully in United States 
Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at (POWELL, J., 
dissenting). 
~/ F ORMER N. 4 
lll I do not suggest that counsel acted improperly in 
pursuing this case. Since they have prevailed both in this Court 
and in the Court of Appeals, the responsibility for allowing 
client-less litigation falls on the fP.deral courts. 
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~ 
~/ The Court's resurrection of . this dead controversy 
may result in irreparable iniury to innocent parties, as well as to 
the petitioner bank. When the District Court denied certification 
on September 29, 1975, it assigned as one of its reasons the 
possible "destruction of the [petitionerl bank" by damaqes then 
alleged to totalS 12,000,000 and now potentially auqmented by the 
accrual of interest. App. 47, see ante, at 2
1
n. 2. The possible 
destruction of the bank is irrelevant to the iurisdictional issue, 
but serious indeed to depositors, stockholders, and the community 
served. It is said that this is necessary to redress injurie~ 
suffered by members of the putative class. Yet, no such person has 
come forward in the nearly nine years that have passed since this 
action was filed. Indeed, the challenged conduct was authorized by 
statute almost six years ago. As the District Court may be called 
upon to determine whether the equitable doctrine of "relation back" 
permits it to toll the statute of limitations on remand, ante, at 31 
n. 3, it will hardly be inappropriate for that court to consider 
the equities on both sides. In the circumstances/ presented, the 
District Court may well see no reason to exercise its equitable 
discretion in favor of putative class members who have slept on 
their riqhts these many years. 
2. 
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This novel view apparently derives from early cases in which 
this Court referred to class members who would be bound by a 
judgment as "absent parties," Hansberry v. Lee, 311 u.s. 32, 42 
(1940), or "parties in interest," Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 How. 
288, 303 (1853). Ante, at , n. 3. But these cases were 
decided before certification was established as the method by 
which a class achieved judicial recognition. Under Rule 23, no 
member of a putative class will be bound by a judgment unless a 
proper certification order is entered. That they may be 
"intP.rested parties," ibid., before that time does not make them 
parties to the litigation in any sense, as this Court has 
recognized. In Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs 420 u.s. 
128 (1975), the Court held that an oral certification order was 
insufficient to identify the interests of absent class members 
for Art. III purposes. The result hardly could be different 
when the class has not been identified at all. See also Memphis 
Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 u.s. 1, 8 (1978); Baxter 
v. Palmigiano 423 u.s. 308, 310, n.1 (1976); Weinstein v. 
Bradford, 423 u.s. 147 (1975); Pasadena City Board of Education 
v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 430 (1976). 
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS indicates that unnamed members of 
an uncertified class may be "present" as parties for some 
2. 
purposes and not for others. No authori: ::::..:::, ~~ 
selective "presence" in an action. Nor d.oei oop J~ ~'I'~ . . -1 
A/ 
~;.., -wby ~~c:rt is to determine when these 
unidentified "parties" are present. If their presence is to be 
limited to the satisfaction of the Art. III case or controversy 
requirement, then the rule of party status would have no content 
apart from Art. III and could only be described as a legal 
fiction. If, on the other hand, the proposed rule is to apply 
outside the Art. III context, it may have troublesome and far-
reaching implications that could prejudice the bringing of class 
actions. Presumably, a purpose of the rule of party status 
would be to assure that satisfaction of the claims of named 
parties would not terminate the litigation. 
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~s Court affi~ms the judgment of the Court of Appeals, after 
1\ 
finding that respondents retain a personal stake in "shift[ing] 
to successful class litigants a portion of those fees and 
expenses that have been incurred in this litigation •••• " 
~---~~ 
Ante, at 7 n. 6. .L eal"l'ftM- ~r-ee ~fia~ t~»-t:~.ove~ aAGl- wholJ y 
~ ~ ~ ~ .2llw#!!(: 
Aspeculative interest is sufficient to sustain the jurisdiction 
of an Art. III ;lourt. Accordingly, I dis_s_e __ n_t_·----------~ 
I 
Although there are~ d'fferences, this case is 
similar to United States Parole Co v. Geraghty, post, at 
, in one important respect: require us to decide 
whether putative class repre ntatives may appeal the denial of 
~ 
class certification when ey can derive no benefit
1
from the 
relief sought in Here, as in Geraghty, the District 
Court refused to cer fy a class. But in this case, unlike 
~14.t~--
Geraghty, the Court ~.\that "';;"e "right to employ Rule 23" 
is a "procedural right only, ancillary to the litigation of 
'l\ho C8~! also ~hat a 
J\. 
substantive claims." Ante, at 6. 
federal court "retains no iurisdiction over the controversy" 
when the parties' "substantive claims become moot in the Art. 
III sense." Ibid. 
~ ', ~ 
Moreover, the ~~cknowledq~h~ LV"-" S +e.-t-
familiar principle that personal stake in the 
outcome of an action presents controversy cognizable 
in a federal court of appeals. Id., :E believe that 
~ ~.,h~·· ~~-c..­
the~Q p'!':i:Aeifr:res iire .Q:i:erpo·s~±~, tooe~.Dd :tRB!t LlH!!)'Junambiguously 
~finding of mootness.i~ tRio eaSQ. 
i\ 
A 
Since no class has been certified and no one has 
sought to intervene, respondents are the only plaintiffs 
arguably present in court. Yet respondents have no continuing 
interest in the injuries alleged in th~r complaint. They 
sought only damages; those damages have been tendered in full.~/ 
~M.-ct:> ~ 
Respondents h~ze not ~et~d that success on the certification 
" 
motion would entitle them to additional relief~from the 
petitioner.l/ Their personal claims to relief have been 
abandoned so completely that no appeal was taken in their own 
names. The notice of appeal filed with the District Court ..,. 
recites that respodnents appeal only "on behalf of all others 
similarly situated .•.• " App. 63. • 
. ..,;,. . ~~ ~ ~ "'-
This ~~J:e~ompelling evidence that respondents 
~ ' 
have !b-e-&tl\interest in the "individual and private case or 
controversy" relied on by the Court today. Ante, at 5. But 
even without such evidence, this and other courts routinely have 
held that a tender of full relief remedies a plaintiff's 
3. 
injuries and eliminates his stake in the outcome. California v. 
San Pablo & Tulare R. Co., 149 u.s. 308, 313-314 (1893): Drs. 
Hill & Thomas Co. v. United States, 392 F.2d 204 (CA6 1968)(per 
curiam): Lamb v. Commissioner, 390 F.2d 157 (CA2 1968) (per 
curiam): A.A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell 353 F.2d 89 (CAS 
1965) (per curiam). It is the tender itself that moots the case 
whether or not a judgment is entered. Ibid. Thus, the law is 
clear that a federal court is powerless to review the abstract 
questions remaining in a case when the plaintiff has refused to 
accept a proffered settlement that fully satisfies his claims. 
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the 
result should differ because the District Court has entered a 
judgment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their 
lawsuit as moot.4/ It is certainly true, as the Court observes, 
that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in 
itself moot his case. Ante at 7, 9. There never has been any 
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally 
favorable judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wright, 
Miller and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure~ 3902 (1976): 
9 Moore's Federal Practice ,I 203.06 (1975). But the requirement 
of adverse effect is more than a rule "of federal appellate 
practice." Ante at 7. As we have held repeatedly, Art. III 
itself requires a continuing controversy between adverse parties 
I ~- !.)...<... ~ ~ .............. ,~ 
A-~---- /AA., q_~~ . 9 ~~~4{{ 
·,~~~ $~~~~~ 
~.)()~-~ -1 
at all stages of litigation. E.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 
402 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 n. 10 (1974). 
It is this constitutional limitation, and not any rule 
of practice, that has impelled federal courts uniformly to 
require a showing of adverse effect in order to confer "standing 
to appeal." 15 Wright, Miller and Cooper, supra, § 3902. Barry 
v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections, U.S. App. D.C. 
, 580 F.2d 695 (1978); see Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359 
(1943); Electrical Fittings v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 u.s. 241 
(1939); Kapp v. National Football League, 586 F.2d 644, 650 (CA9 
1978); Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F.2d 541 (1942), cert. denied, 319 
u.s. 748 (1943).2/ As these cases show, the requirements of Art. 
III are not affected by the "factual context" in which a 
suggestion of mootness arises. See ante, at 6. Whatever the 
context, Art. III asks but a single question: Is there a 
~s~~·-.t.~ 
continuing controversy between adverse ::_   L., ;u._ ~.?f 
.in Electrical Fittings v. Thorn etts Co., supra, ~ 
~rl-
-1 t~~.lile......c;c:,;;Q~eirlr~te-f!Jf!J-ee"t:t1tM"lT1"1t:"'il~e~etii a 1 i mite d a pp e a~ because the inc 1 us ion 
unnecessary and adverse finding in a generally favorable decree 
had a genuinely prejudicial effect on the petitioner himself. 
~ 
See ante, at 10. ButAthe mere existence of the District Court's 
~ 
order denying certification has no effect~on the respondents&~ 
~his casa. 
c 
Thus, the personal stake that justified the 
·~ 
 
~~~ 
~. 
... 
5. 
~Vlc-....~ .. 
Electrical Fittings appeal is not present h~. Absent such a 
stake, it is simply irrelevant that "policy considerations" 
sometimes may favor an appeal from "a procedural ruling, 
collateral to the merits of a litigation." Nor is it 
significant that the ruling "stands as an adjudication of one of 
the issues litigated." Id., at 9-10. Collateral rulings - like 
other rulings - may be appealed only when the requirements of 
Art. III are satisfied. 
The Court 
B ~ 
confines its ~!2 of the constitutional 
~- to a single footnote. Ante, at 7 n. 6. Respondents are 
retain a personal stake in the outcome of the class 
shift to the members of the putative class. Ante, S ,eL. 
see id., at 10.6/ Since the Court believes that 
may benefit in a concrete way if they obtain class 
on remand, it holds that they have a personal 
the "procedural ruling," although they have no such 
"the merits fo the substantive controversy." Id., at 
is both factually and legally unsound 
( 1 ) 
The Court observes that respondents "have maintained 
throughout this appellate litigation that they retain an 
~~ 
6. 
individual interest" in sharing expenses with the putative 
~ NK..tJ.u.J-~ (~ 
But-t respondents have identified r  class. Id., at 12. 
incurred to date that is not covered by the petitioner's tender. 
~
Nor did t~ identify any such cost in their brief in the Court 
""' 
of Appeals, on which the Court relies. Id., at 7 n. 6. The 
only "continuing obligation," ibid., mentioned in the 
I 
respondents' briej is not a present obligation at all . 
.,;J~~4~,'1~J! ~ c.k, ~ (~,;.., ~ ~) 
)· 
on realty as security for a $15,000 loan to defray 
notice costs that may be incurred if the District Court grants - • 
~·I This~future obligation cannot supply a personal stake ·.~ 
in the pending appeal. ,........ 1he Court identifies no currently 4; . ·~ ~ f 
) ~ ~1-·'*··~.,e,.~~ e_.-H+£ .. r~~e.,;( ,.,_#/A.;~ , t) 
certification on remand. Brief for Respondents 33: App. 78. 
outstanding obligation"' <f/-~~ ~ 
--==-===-== =~ =::: ~ .. #t¢1' ... "':t ~ ~#if rft..A._ 
~he~ear~. f..tn . · · ' ' ~ . ade a!:::;.,. 
-r .ca:::u ; ; s 4 11 J 
no """:t-'~UL..I...w...I..UJu.-..~~...a.i~>LL-~'-+-..--...,..J.J"""'"!,_,....- l: he comp 1 a in t suggests that vf ~--~ 1 - ~ ~-;;::;: 
respondent • s lawyers ~1::'::::- :a accept as full compensation~~ 
a..~~~~ 
~25 per cent of the amount recovered from the petitioner. App. ~~' 
~ 
13-14. The record reveals no further details, and the 
respondents have offered no contrary int'erpretation. H 
{),.._ ~ ~J ~.I ~~-- ~. ~~-It> 
tbira iii l:-RdQE!e! ts.fie-- .e~:tS:~e~u;u-~t as t.o f8~~~ndents 
/\ ~ u..--~~~"""~· 
have ~~continuing interestA Only counsel is concerned 
~ ~· ~whether the recovery is enlarged. Thus, the Court's 
7. 
assertion that respondents have incurred fees and expenses that 
they "desire to shift to successful class litigants," ante, at 7 
su -~ J-. : WUfA.IIII/I " &AooV 
n. 6, is( .nsupport..r. b~"L the record. "Prior decisions of this 
Court establish that unadorned speculation will not suffice to 
invoke the federal iudicial power." Simon v. Eastern Ky. 
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 44 (1976). I would adhere to 
that principle today. 
( 2) 
H-.~~ ~ J,c.u,;.-......-' 
~~,J,. ... ~~ ' 
/1c.A... f"'W ·~., • ...., 1&-f a,. ../~ JJr 
~.n,... Even if one assumed that re pondents' liability to 
their lawyers could be reduced by a cl ss recovery, no one has 
suggested that the petitioner is or eve will be liable for fees ~ 
that ultimately may be owed by responde ts~ 'Pfl:tts..., the Court 
~ ~ 
the~possibility of 
rJ 
asserting future claims ~ ! 1 holds today 
~ 
a .. ,t. ~ ... ' ' 1t.·~~ 
1: haa tli~ught 
Art. III • 
requires that a federal court act only to redress injury that 
fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, 
and not injury that results from the independent action of some 
third party not before the court." Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare 
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976); see Gladstone, Realtors 
v. Village of Bellwood, 441 u.s. 91, 99 (1979). /~ ~ .. ~ 
~~~ 
( 
8. 
Although respondents' liability - if any - for 
attorney's fees may be viewed as one consequence of the 
petitioner's putatively illegal conduct, the petitioner is not 
legally responsible for that "injury." I do not understand that 
an injury "fairly can be traced" to a defendant who will not be 
required to compensate for it. In holding that such an iniury 
may satisfy Art. III, the Court enunciates a principle of 
unknown dimensions. For example, today's holding could, if 
consistently applied, permit a person who previously had 
accepted full settlement of his individual claim to file a class 
action. Apparently, the putative plaintiff need only 
"asser[t] ," ante, at 7 n. 6, that fees incurred in anticipation 
AA--A-
~ 
~41...·--f 
k~ 
a~ 
~­
?~ 
of the litigation ultimately might be shared with a class. 
.ld ~ 
~ ... ...,. '"" 
~./-~ 
c 4..-~ -.tur ., 
Since respondents have no continuing personal 
tA- 12 ~" ~~,..u.P 
stake in lt:J ~. 
the outcome of this action, of eei~~"""+::fi&t A.rt. III and the 
~~cedents of this Court require that the case be dismissed as 
~ moot. See United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post at 
~ 
~~ 
~~ 
~~ (POWELL, J., dissenting). Respondents do not suggest 
that their claims are "capable of repetition, yet evading 
review." Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110-111, n. 11 
(1975).7/ And not a single one of the alleged 90,000 class 
members has sought to intervene in the nine years since this 
k•~.4~A~ 
~ 
~~~ 
~~ 
~H.~--~ 
.::J!ZI ~ 
~
~ 
~4ft.<.,., 
~,&.ect4-
M 4-c r.:~ ......... J 
"'~~· 
,Tt> k ~-'.I .. , 
( 
~ .& .. ..,~~ ~-<.. ....... ~ .. ...t;: --1-- -g-: 
~ ~~., .. z:,....,, ~.e.&-_, r=< ~ 
~ 2f>~D ~ ~ Jdk..ua~~.Z: ~. /i.-1-' ? ~ 
PI/~ 
action was filed. Cf. United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald 432 ~44~ 
~AictU( 
~&.I" 
Nor has anyone ever challenged the allegedly  A4L-
t-c-~ 
usurious charge~, informal complaint or protest. Tr. of Oral ~~
~ ,__ 
Arg. 4. Even after certification was denied, the action lay ~~~~- ~ 
- ---:;."\ ~.L..i.....~ cu. ~FI~fd)~ 
dormant during the seven months in which respondents sought to & .,4-C;A~ • 
~ ~--~~-1 
take an interlocutory appeal, without provoking a response from 
illusory, we cannot divine with any certainty what - if 
~ . anything- responde/a--con inue 
,,/~~ 
........... ...-· 
behalf f persons -f"or years have evinced no interest 
w in obtaining recovery for themselves.a/ 
appears, this is simply a "lawyer's case." In permitting ~ t ----- ----- ~ 
continue, the Court remands to the District Court a headless 
~~ 
class action thatA~t satisfy the most elementary 
III 
Despite tradition and policy considerations to the 
~ 
contrary, the Court seems ~Rdi~~reed tk~ this federal action 
v!ft be litigated on remand by a lawyer whose only "clients" are 
A 
unidentified class members who have shown no desire to be 
7f~ 
represented by anyone.~/ I~deee, the Court appears to endorse 
1 0. 
~~.......(~~~,~~- 1-1-~ 
litigation iJ1/!J' an effective "response to the ~ .Jo this form of 
"' Lvt. 
existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of 
government." Ante, at 12. I am not aware that such ~:~?acti~l 
~
CQflSIO~~~~~ftS ever before have influenced this Court in , 
determining whether the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the 
federal courts. In any event, the consequences of a finding of 
~wa..l<l ne~ <>~~~~~~ nretl;irts. 
~~~"' k.-.-.......~~~~~ 
~ 4 ;e.~~.~~~ ~~6-(~ 
Yt LTo pa ~ tl J ~ 
~ ~ ;.-.. ~..,_.,-/l. ~-~A P~..._. ~ 
~~.C.<fAo'1 ~ ~
rev._ c,.w....r-~ ~ 
L 
FOOTNOTES 
~/ Although respondents also asked for attorney's fees, 
their complaint shows that fees were to be granted only from the 
damages ultimately awarded to them or the class. App. 13-14. 
3/ Neither the Court nor the respondents have asserted 
~.~ 
that the petitioner's tender fails to eAaem~a~s all costs and fees 
for which it could ultimately be held liable. See Part II-B, 
infra. 
!/ The "statutory right" to appeal, ante, at 7, itself 
cannot supply a personal stake in the outcome, for Congress cannot 
abrogate Art. III limitations on the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 u.s. 91, 
100 (1979). 
21 United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 u.s. 385 
(1977), and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay 437 u.s. 463 (1978), are 
~
not to the contrary. ;ictum in both cases stated that the denial 
A-
of class certification is subject to appellate review after final 
judgment at the behest of the named plaintiffs. Neither case 
discussed mootness, and neither analyzed the proposition in any 
way. Indeed, the only authority cited in Coopers & Lybrand was 
United Airlines, see 437 U.S., at 469, and the only authority cited 
in United Airlines was a concession made by the defendant and a 
~~ 
list of cases from the Courts of Appeals,~ ~hich dealt with , 
a suggestion of mootness in an analogous situation, see 432 u.s., 
~ ~t 393, and n. 14. Such statements, casually enunciated without a 
2. 
word of explanation in opinions dealing with unrelated legal 
questions, are not controlling or even persuasive when they are 
shown on further reflection to have been inconsistent with settled 
~ •• I zs ,(b IIVU~ p;r: :e~~,.. 
S~ law;\ As the Court agrees today, neither case creates an exception 
to the fundamental rule that "federal appellate jurisdiction is 
limited by the appellant's personal stake in the appeal." Ante at 
1 0 
.§_/ The Court also mentions that "[t]he use of the class 
action procedure for litigation fo individual claims may offer 
substantial advantages for named plaintiffs .•• II Ante, at 11 n. 
9. But any such advantages cannot accrue to these respondents, who 
will not be litigating their own claims on remand. Indeed, the 
Court refers to respondents in this context only to point out that 
their total damages were so small that they "would be unlikely to 
obtain le~ redress at an acceptable cost" if they could not do so 
by means of a class action. We may assume that respondents had some 
interest in the class aciton procedure as a means of interesting 
their lawyers in the case or obtaining a satisfactory settlement. 
This may be an interest properly furthered by Rule 23, but once 
respondents obtained both access to court and full individual 
relief that interest disappeared. 
2/ FORMER NOTE 4, VERBATIM. 
~I FORMER NOTE 5, VERBATIM. 
~/ FROMER NOTE 6, VERBATIM. 
----
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This novel view apparently derives from early cases in which the 
Court referred to class members who would be bound by a judgment 
as "absent parties," Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940), 
or "parties in interest," Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 How. 288, 303 
(1853). Ante, at n. 3. But these cases were decided 
before certification was established as the method J y which a 
class achieve~judicial recognition. Under Rule 23, no member 
of a putative class will be bound by a judgment unless a proper 
certification order is entered. That they may be "interested 
parties," ibid., before that time does not make them parties to 
the litigation in any sense, as this Court has recognized. In 
Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs 420 u.s. 128 (1975), the 
Court held that an oral certification order was insufficient to 
identify the interests of absent class members for Art. III 
purposes. The result hardly could be different when the class 
has not been identified at all. See also Memphis Light, Gas & 
Water Div. v. Craft, 436 u.s. 1, 8 (1978); Baxter v. Palmigiano 
423 U.S. 308, 310, n.1 (1976); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 u.s. 
147 (1975); Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 
u.s. 424, 430 (1976). 
2. 
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS indicates that unnamed members of 
an uncertified class may be "present" as parties for some 
purposes and not for others. No authority is cited for such 
selective "presence" in an action. Nor is any explanation 
offered as to how a court is to determine when these 
unidentified "parties" are present. If their presence is to be 
limited to the satisfaction of the Art. III case or controversy 
requirement, then the rule of party status would have no content 
apart from Art. III and could only be described as a legal 
fiction. If, on the other hand, the proposed rule is to apply 
outside the Art. III context, it may have troublesome and far-
reaching implications that could prejudice the bringing of class 
actions. Presumably, a purpose of the rule of party status 
would be to assure that satisfaction of the claims of named 
parties would not terminate the litigation. 
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sarily creates significant problems in the administration of / .. 
Rule 23. And it may work a serious injustice in this case.~
arties w in ate Nor could the rights 
unnamed parties be extinguished by the failure of the named parties to 
appeal. Thus, if the rule proposed by MR. JusTICE STEVENS is to accom-
plish its purpose, I suppose that a fiduciary duty must be imposed upon 
named parties to continue the litigation where-as here-the unnamed 
parties remain unidentified and fail to intervene. As fiduciaries, would the 
named parties not only be required to continue to litigate, but to assume 
--....~~·sonal responsibility for costs and attorney's fees if the case ultimately is 
lost? Would responsible litigants be willing to file class actions if they 
thereby assumed such long-term fiduciary obligations? These and like 
questions are substantial. They are not resolved by Rule 23. I believe 
they merit careful study by Congress before this Court-perhaps unwit-
tingly-creates a major category of clientless litigation unique in our 
system. __.,--
22 The Court's resurrection of this dead controversy may result i~ 
irreparab!e injury to innocent parties, as well as to the petitioner bank. 
When the District Court denied certification on September 29, 1975, it 
assigned as one of its reasons the possible "destruction of the [petitioner] 
bank" by damages then alleged to total 12,000,000 and now potentially 
augmented by the accrual of interest. App. 47, see ante, at 2, n. 2. The 
possible destruction of the bank is irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue, 
but serious indeed to depositors, stockholders, and the community served. 
It is -said that this is necessary to redress injuries possibly suffered by 
members of the putative class. Yet, no such person has come forward 
in the nearly nine years that have passed since this action was filed. 
Indeed, the challenged conduct was authorized by statute almost six years 
ago. As the District Court may be called upon to determine whether the 
equitable doctrine of "relation back" permits it to toll the statute of 
limitations on remand, ante, at 3, n. 3, it will hardly be inappropriate for 
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I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot. 
that court to consider the equities on both sides. In the circumstances 
presented, the District Court may well see no reason to exercise its equi-
table discretion in favor of putative class members who have slept on their 
rights these many years. 
\ 
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v. of Appeals for the Fifth 
Robert L. Roper et al. Circuit. 
[February -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that 
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the 
National Bank Act and Mississippi law.1 They filed this 
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty 
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and 
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf 
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggre-
gating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District 
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification. 
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the 
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and 
court costs. Over respondents' objection, the District Court 
entered final judgment in their favor. 
No one disputes that respondents themselves have received 
everything they could have recovered from petitioner in this 
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed 
the de11ial of class certification. This Court affirms the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals without identifying the case or 
controversy that remains to be litigated between the parties. 
The Court decides that the central issue is not mootness but 
1 Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. §§ 85, 
86, which adopts the interest limits set by state law, and 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1355. 
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appealability. But the characterization does not withstand 
analysis. Since respondents lack a continuing interest in the 
outcome of the litigation, the Court of Appeals was powerless 
to hear their appeal. Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
Although there are some differences, this case is similar to 
United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at -, 
in one important respect: both require us to decide whether 
putative class representatives may appeal the denial of class 
certification after receiving everything they sought on their 
own behalves. Since the District Court refused to certify the 
class and no one has sought to intervene, respondents are 
the only plaintiffs arguably present in court. Yet respondents 
have no continuing interest in the injuries alleged in their 
complaint. They sought only damages; they have received 
those damages in fulP Respondents have not suggested that 
success on the certification motion would entitle them to addi-
tional relief from the petitioner. 3 Indeed, their personal 
2 Although respondents also asiced for attorney's fees, their complaint 
shows that fees were to be granted only from the damages ultimately 
awarded to them or the class. App. 13-14. 
3 Respondents do a8sert that certification would enable them to reduce 
litigation ro~t~ by allocating them among the members of a prevailing 
class. Brief for ReRpondentR 33. With the exception of attorney;s fees, 
however, they do not identify any costs incurred to date that are not 
covrrcd by the petitioner's trndcr. Although the record dors not reveal 
the details of the fee arrangemrnt between respondrnts and their lawyers, 
the complaint snggr~ts that the lawyers have agreed to accept as full com-
pensation 25% of the amount recovered from the petitioner. App. 13-14. 
If this is t,at~ft.t'!M-1~ifu''ic<~r.gaJ:d.l~~...tl.J~H:t 
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claims to relief have been abandoned so completely that no 
appeal was taken in their own names. The notice of appeal 
filed with the District Court recites that respondents appeal 
only "on behalf of all others similarly situated .... " App. 63. 
I believe that Art. III and the precedents of this Court 
require the dismissal of this case. See Geraghty, post, at 
--- (PowELL, J., dissenting). There is no suggestion 
that respondents' claims are "capable of repetition, yet evad-
ing review." Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 110-111, 
n. 11 (1975).4 And not a single one of the alleged 90,000 
class members has sought. to intervene in the eight years since 
this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 
432 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone ever challenged the 
allegedly usurious charges by informal complaint or protest. 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certification was denied, the 
action lay dormant during the seven months in which respond-
ents sought to take an interlocutory appeal, without provok-
ing a response from anyone who previously may have thought 
that the class action would protect his rights. We are not 
told what, if anything, motivates respondents to continue this 
crusade on behalf of persons who for years have evinced no 
attorney's fees against other members of a putative class gives rise to a 
case or controversy against the class defendant. Such a. theory is unpre~ 
cedented, :md its consequences are bizarre. For example, respondents' 
theory would permit a person to file a class action, even though he had 
previously accepted full settlement of his individual claim, on the ground 
that the fees incurred in anticipation of the litigation might ultimately be 
shared with the class. 
4 If a class-action defendant were shown to have embarked on a course 
of conduct designed to insulate the class certification from appellate review 
in order to avoid classwide liability, a court in proper circumstances might 
find the Gm·stein test satisfi0d and the case not moot. See Susmo:n v. 
Lincoln American Corp., 587 F. 2d 866 (CA7 1978); 13 Wright , Miller & 
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 171 (Supp. 1979); 
Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following 
Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 599-600. 
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interest whatever in obtaining recovery for themselves.5 On 
its face, this appears simply to be a "lawyer's case." 
Despite long traditions to the contrary, the Court seems 
undisturbed that this federal action will be litigated on remand 
by a lawyer whose only "clients" are unidentified members 
of a class who have shown no desire to be represented by 
anyone.6 The Court also neglects established principles of 
Art. III jurisprudence and remands to the District Court a 
headless class action that does not meet the requirements of 
Rule 23. 
II 
The Court identifies the question for decision in this case 
as "whether respondents' individual and private case or con-
troversy became moot by reason of the entry of judgment in 
their favor.;' !d., at 5. Wholly ignoring the fact that 
respondents themselves elected to appeal only on behalf of 
third parties, tl_J.e Court concludes that "respondents' individual 
interest in the litigation-as distinguished from whatever may 
be their representative responsibiiities to the putative class-
is sufficient to permit their appeal. ... )' 1 d., at 12. One 
might expect that the Cour~ would reason to this conclusion 
by pinpointing the individual interest on which it purports to 
rely. But no such reasoning appears in the Court's opinion. 
Although there is some discussion of advantages that generally 
may accrue to named plaintiffs from the use of the class-action 
device, the Court never attempts to ascertain whether these 
5 The Mississippi usury statute was amended in 1974, and apparently 
, authorizes the fees charged by petitioner. 1974 Miss. Gen. Laws, ch. 564, 
§ 7; see Miss. Code Ann. §.75-i7-t (6). There is thus no question of 
prospective relief. 
• 6 I do not suggest that respondent's lawyer acted improperly in pursuing 
this case. Since he has prevailed both in this Court and in the Court 
of Appeals, the responsibility of allowing client-less litigation is that of the 
federal courts. 
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requirGd by rules of practice, for two reasons. First, the cer-
tification order is a "procedural ruling, collateral to the merits 
of [the] litigation," that "stands as an adjudication of one of 
the issues litigated." Id., at 9. Second, the contrary result 
would frustrate the goals of Rule 23. Id., at 10-12. 
The effect of the Court's analysis, if I understand it cor-
rectly, is to avoid a direct confrontation with settled princi-
ples that unambiguously dictate a finding of mootness in this 
case. But the Court cannot escape the impact of these author-
ities simply by refusing to consider the respondents' evident 
lack of interest in the outcome. The "critical distinction" by 
which it attemps to justify its failure to do so is both factually 
and legally unsound. 
B 
As a matter of fact, there is substantial doubt that this case 
involves the effect of "a judgment in favor of a party at an 
intermediate stage of litigation." I d., at 9. Petitioner has 
never contended that the controversy became moot merely 
"by reason of the entry of judgment in [respondents'] favor." 
I d., at 5. Instead, petitioner argues that its tender of fuJi 
relief has remedied the respondents' individual injuries and 
thus eliminated their stake in the outcome. Considerable 
authority supports petitioner's contention that the tender itseif 
moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. This 
Court, among others, has held that a federal court is powerless 
to review the abstract questions remaining in a case once the 
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that 
fully satisfies his claims. California v. San Pablo & Tulare 
R. Co., 149 U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill & Thomas 
Co. v. United States, 392 F. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per curiam); 
Lamb v. Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968) (per 
curiam); A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F. 2d 
89 (CA5 1965) (per curiam).8 
8 The Court makes no effort to distinguish these cases. Yet it concedes 
that the "right to employ Rule 23" is a "procedural right only, ancillary 
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I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result 
should differ because the District Court has entered a judg-
ment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their 
lawsuit as moot.9 It is certainly true, as the Court observes, 
that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in 
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any 
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally 
favorable judgment that adversely affect him. See 15 Wright, 
Miller, and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3902 
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practice ~ 203.06 (1975). But 
federal courts uniformly have required a showing of some 
adverse effect in order to confer "standing to appeal." Ibid.; 
see Barry v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections, - U. S. 
App. D. C.-, 580 F. 2d 695 (1978). Indeed, Art. III itself 
requires a continuing controversy between adverse parties at 
ali stages of the litigation. E. g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 
402 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10 
(1974). If any statute or rule purported to authorize an 
appeal in contravention of Art. III, that rule would yield to 
the constitutionar command. 
c 
The Court relies almost entirely on Electrical Fittings Corp. 
v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1939).~0 But that deci-
to the litigation of substantive claims," and it admits that "the court 
retains no jurisdiction over the controversy" when the "substantive claims 
become moot in the Art. III sense." Ante, at 6. If the tender itself 
mooted the respondents' claims without regard to the entry of judgment, 
~ then the Court's own analysis requires it to conclude that the case is 
moot. 
9 The "statutory right" of appeal cannot itself supply a personal stake 
m the outcome, for Congress cannot abrogate Art. III limitations on the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bell-
wood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979). 
10 The only other authorities cited by the Court are United Airlines, Inc. 
v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977), and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 
437 U. S. 463 ( 1978). Dictum in both cases stated that the denial of class 
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sion simply reaffirms our obligation not to review judgments 
by which no person is individually aggrieved. The trial court 
there had entered a decree holding a patent valid but not 
infringed. Although the alleged infringer won the case, it 
sought to appeal the finding that the patent was valid. This 
Court held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to 
consider the issue of patent validity after the trial court found 
no infringement, because "[a] party may not appeal from a 
judgment ... in his favor, for the purpose of obtaining a 
review of findings ... which are not necessary to support the 
decree." !d., at 242. But the trial court had erred by includ-
ing in the decree itself a ruling that "purport [ ed] to adjudge 
the validity of [the paten] t." Ibid. Since that ruling "was 
immaterial to the disposition of the cause," the Court of 
Appeals had jurisdiction for the limited purpose of eliminating 
the extraneous ruling from the decree. Ibid. 
The Court reads Electrical Fittings as a case that was "still 
live" in the Art. III sense "because policy considerations per-
mitted an appeal." Ante, at 8-9. But Electrical Fit.tings was 
a '1live" controversy only because-and to the iimited extent 
that-the petitioner there asserted a continuing personal stake 
·in the outcome. As Judge Learned Hand explained, the peti-
tioner in Electrical Fittings was in}ured in fact because the 
unnecessary ruling tha.t the patent was valid could have 
created "some presumptive pre}udice" against him in a future 
case. Harries v. Air King Products Co., 183 F. 2d 158, 161 
certification is subject to appellate review after final judgment at the 
behest of the named plaintiffs. Neither case discusRcd mootness, and 
neither analyzed the proposition in any way. Indeed, the only authority 
cited in Coopers & Lybrand was United Airlines, see 437 U. S., at 469·, and 
the only authority cited in United Airlines was a conceRsion made by the 
defendant and a list of cases from the Courts of Appeals, none of which 
dealt with a suggestion of mootness in an analogous situation, see 432 
U. S., at 393, and n. 14. Such statements, casually enunciated without a 
word of explanation in opinions dealing with unrelated legal questions, are 
not controlling or even persuasive when they are shown on further reflec-
tion to have been inconsistent with established law. 
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(CA2 1950); see In re Trimble Co., 479 F. 2d 103, 111 (CA3 
1973) .11 This genuine prejudice to the petitioner himself 
supplied the requisite personal stake in obtaining reformation 
of the decree. 
Thus, the Court's view of Electrical Fittings is plainly incon-
sistent with the holding of that case. The Court of Appeals 
was told to reform the decree, but expressly forbidden to 
consider the merits of the patent validity question. In other 
words, the court's appellate jurisdiction was only as broad as 
the petitioner's personal stake in the appeal. Just four years 
later, Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. S. 359 (1943), explained 
that the limitation was constitutionally based. Reversing a, 
decision that had relied on Electrical Fittings in refusing to 
consider the merits of an appeal, the Court distinguished 
Electrical Fittings as a case in which the parties sought deci-
sion of "a hypothetical case.'1 The appeal in Altvater, by 
contrast, satisfied "the requirements of case or controversy" 
because the parties continued to contest a counterclaim that 
had not been concluded by the dismissal of the orginal com-
plaint. 319 U. S., at 363-366. 
Altvater and Electrical Fittings entirely foreclose the 
Court's argument that a party who has no personal stake in 
the outcome of his appeal may invoke the jurisdiction of a 
federal court merely because policy-based "rules of practice'~ 
permit him to do so. Any doubt is dispelled by Altvater's 
express reliance on Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 ( 1942), 
cert. denied, 319 U. S. 748 (1943), a case in which the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed at length the 
11 Although the Court of Appeals in Electrical Fittings held that col-
lateral estoppel would be no bar to relitigation of the validity question, 100 
F. 2d 403, 404, other courts had taken a different view on similar issues of 
collateral estoppel. If the validity finding were permitt!i'd to stand, the 
petitioner could have been forced to litigate the question of its preclusive 
effect in future cases. 15 Wright, Miller, and Cooper, supra n. 4, § 3902, 
at 403 (1976); 1B Moore's Federal Practice ,, 0.443 [5], at 3925 (1974); 
9 id., ,. 203.06, at 716 (1975). 
78-904-DISSENT 
10 DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK v. ROPER 
constitutional limits on appellate jurisdiction. 319 U. S., at 
363, n. 2. Like the respondents here and the petitioner in 
Electrical Fittings, the appellant in Cover sought to appeal 
from a judgment that had eliminated his stake in the out-
come.12 But the Court of Appeals emphatically declined to 
assume jurisdiction over an appeal which sought "no relief 
against anybody before the court ... but ... want[ed] an 
advisory opinion that [a] patent [was] valid." 133 F. 2d, at 
544.13 Since there was no case or controversy, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that it was "without discretion" to hear the 
appeal. I d., at 545. 
These cases demonstrate that the requirements of Art. III 
do not change with the "factual context" in which a suggestion 
of mootness arises. See ante, at 5. Whatever the context, 
Art. III asks but a single question: Is there a continuing con-
troversy between adverse parties? Nothing in Electrical Fit-
t'ings suggests that a "procedural ruling, collateral to the merits 
of a litigation," may be appealed after final judgment because 
·. "policy considerations permi [ t] the appeal" or because the 
ruling a stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated.'; 
12 The appellant in Cover v. Schwm·tz, 133 F. 2d 541 (CA2 1942), cert. 
denied, 319 U. S. 748 (1943), was the losing plaintiff in a patent infringe-
ment action. After the trial court found the patent invalid and not 
infringed, the plaintiff took an appeal on the validity queRtion without 
contesting the finding of noninfringement. ·By accepting the judgment to 
that extent, he lost his right to recover from the defendant-and thus his 
interest in the litigation. 
ts Judge Frank wrote for the court: 
"[Wlhere there is no 'justiciable' dispute, there are no 'merits.' There is 
merely an unreal entity resembling that disembodied smile which Lewis 
Caroll immortalized. Many Supreme Court decisions teach us that appel-
late jui·isdiction, when no justiciable dispute exists on appeal, cannot be 
rested upon the recollection that such a dispute previously existed when 
the case was 1n the trial court." 133 F. 2d, at 551 (footnotes omitted). 
See also Kapp v. National Football League, 586 F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9 
1978); Hall v. U. S. Fibe1· & Plastics Corp., 476 F. 2d 418, 420 (CA3 
1973); cf. Lewis v. United States, 216 U.S. 611 (1910) (per curiam). 
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I 
Ante, at 8-9. Such collateral rulings-like other rulings-may 
be appealed only when the litigant has a personal stake in the 
resolution of his appeal.14 In Electrical Fittings, there was 
a stake; here there is none. Since nothing remains of the 
case or controversy in this case, pedeffil-.e<TNrt=c~ h-;;;-BO 
_a.!temtttnoe Jom.t ~s!t'the-ease. 
III 
It is clear from the Court's extended discussion of policy if, 
and practical considerations, ante, at 10-12, that these weighed ----
heavily in its decision. I am not aware that such considera-
tions ever before have influenced this Court in determining nk.~hL ~ 
whether the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the federal I:::- <../' -----y-
courts. In any event, the consequences of a finding of lnoot• 
ness would not be as severe as the Court predicts. 
A finding of mootness would have repercussions primarily 
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who 
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to 
a successful, liti ted 'ud ment. I be 'eve ha any subse-
quent attempt to appeal t e ema of certi catlo would be 
barred by Art. III. But the consequences of applymg settled 
rules of mootness in this situation would not be unjust. If 
injunctive or declaratory relier'were granted, the absent mem-
bers of the putative class would have obtained by force of 
stare decisis or the decree itself most of the benefits of actual 
class membership. If, on the other hand, damages were 
awarded and an appeal is permitted, reversal of the certifica-
tion ruling would enable putative class members to take 
advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability 
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable 
14 The Court appears to recognize this in passing, ante, at 9, n. 7, but 
fails to apply the rule to this case. Since the Court uggests that respond-
ents' interest in the certification ruling derives from the mere fact that it 
"stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated," id., at 9, Elec-
trical Fittings it elf would limit us to the issuance of an order directing that 
the offensive ruling be expunged from the record. 307 U.S., at 242. 
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one. Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in this situa~ 
tion will reinstate the "one~way intervention" that the 1966 
amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate.1 5 
Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise 
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before 
judgment as petitioner did in this case. A defendant cer~ 
tainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in 
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny 
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the 
enforcement of certa.in legal rights by "private attorney[s] 
general." Ante, at 10-11. The practical argument is not 
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns 
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the ade~ 
quacy of compensation and enforcement available for particu-
lar substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best 
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be 
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim. 
Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of 
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of 
usury claims/6 the Court's concern for compensation of puta-
1 5 See Comment , Immediate Appealability of Orders Denying Class Cer-
tification , 40 Ohio St. L. J . 441, 470--471 (1979) . In actions brought under 
llule 23 (b) (3), a class member must decide at the time of certification 
whether to "opt out" of the action under Rule 23 (c) (2). This provision 
was de igned to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class 
members had been permitted to intervene after a decision on the merits 
in order to secure the benefits of the decision . Notes of the Advisory 
Committee on Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F. R. D . 69, 105-106 
(1966). 
16 Liddell v. Litton Systems, Inc., 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting bor-
rowers' class action); Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941) . 
Petitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply wi th Mis-
sissippi':o interest limits would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U. S. C. 
§ 85. But the National Bank Act cannot be read to displacr state policy 
disfavoring the aggregation of usury claims, since the federal Rtatutc seeks 
chiefly to protect national banks from discriminatory treatment or undue 
penalties that may be imposed by state law. See 12 U. S. C. § 86. 
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tive class members in this case is at best misplaced and at 
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling 
Act.17 
The Court's concern for putative class members could be 
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced 
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litiga-
tion of successive suits by members of the putative class. I 
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial admin-
istr~tion would be real. 
But these problems can and should be addressed by meas-
ur~s short of rewriting the law of mootness, as the Court seems 
to have done today. The first step should be the authoriza- ~ ~ 
tion of interlocutory appeals from the denial of class certifica-
tion. District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1292 (b) to certify such appeals in appropriate circum-
stances. In many cases, a class-action defendant undoubtedly 
would forgo the opportunity to settle with an individual plain-
tiff in order to obtain an immediate and final determination 
of the class certification question on appeal. Where a defend-
ant attempts to moot a class action by forced settlement, the 
District Court is not now powerless. In at least some cir-
cumstances it may require that putative class members receive 
some sort of notice and an opportunity to intervene within 
the appeal period. Rule 23 (d)(2). The availability of such 
measures could be a significant deterrent to the deliberate 
mooting of class actions. Indeed, District Court management 
of the problem by measures tailored to the case at hand may 
well be preferable to the Court's open-ended approval of 
appeals in all circumstances. To the extent interlocutory 
~ --t 17 The Act provides that rules of procedure promulg d by this Court "shall not ... enlarge or modify any substantive rig ." 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2072. See American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538, 
557-558 (1974) ; Developments. in the Law-Cia s Actions, 89 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1318, 1358- 1359 (1976). Sec generally Landers, Of Legalized Black-
mail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-
Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974) , 
¥- ~- ~tr~~~ 
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appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are lacking, it 
is for Congress-not this Court-to correct the deficiency.18 
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it, 
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems often 
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their 
own. Today's holding is no exception. There is no warrant 
in Rule 23 for the appointment of a "quasi-class representa-
tive" solely for the purpose of obtaining class certification. 
Since the representative can gain nothing from a certification 
order, his participation in the case can be intended only to 
benefit. the class. Yet he-or most often his counsel-serves 
on his own motion. No court has examined the adequacy 
of his representation as required by Rule 23, and no personal 
stake in the outcome assures that vigorous advocacy will con-
tinue. The requirements for certification under Rule 23 are 
not easily applied to a class action lacking a named plaintiff.10 
18 Congress currently has before it a bill that attempts to remedy the 
difficulties infecting this troubled area. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1979). The bill, supportrd by the Department of Justice, proposes to 
bypa~s the Rules Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, supra, and to eliminate 
some of the problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by 
creating a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provides for 
the enforcement of this right in some instances through actions brought in 
the name of the United State . The bill also authorizrs interlocutory 
appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class cer-
tification under the proposed procedures. 
In view of the pendency of this legislation, it seems particularly unfor-
tunate that the Court today has chosen to unsettle fundamental principles 
of Art. III Rtanding and mootness. 
10 Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent? See 
East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, -!31 U. S. 395, 403-404 (1977). 
Arc their currently nonexistent claims "typical of the claims ... of the 
class" within the meaning of Rule 23 (a) (3)? The District Court properly 
may conclude on remand that respondents, for these or other reasons, 
cannot adcquat~ly represent the class. Should intervention be proposed, 
the District Court on equitable grounds might well refuse to toll the 
statute of limitations in order to permit it. 
Nine years have passed since this action was filed and six since the 
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,And the Court's new rule will contradict Rule 23 directly in 
some cases by inviting a form of intervention that the Rule 
meant to eliminate. Seep.-, supra. 
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of 
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from 
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. Tt also creates 
unnecessarily significant problems in the administration of 
Rule 23. I would vacate the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and remal'lld' with instructions to dismiss the appeal 
as moot. 
governi'ng substantive statute was amended to authorize the challenged 
conduct. In its order denying certification on September 29, 1975, the 
District Court assigned as one of its reasons lhe possible "destruction of the 
[petitioner's] bank" by damages then alleged to total $12,000,000 and now 
potentially augmented by interest accruals. App. 47, sec ante, at 2, n. 2. 
The po~sible destruction of petitioner's bank is irrelevant to the central 
issue of mootness. But as this Court relies so heavily on practical and 
equ itable concerns for the interests of putative class members, it will hardly 
be inappropriate for the District Court on remand also to consider prac-
ticalities and equitirs on both sides. In thtl circumstances presentrcl, the 
District Court may well see no reason to exercise its equitable discretion 
in favor of putative class members who have slept on their rights these 
' many years. 
~!, 
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No. 78-904 
Deposit Guaranty National Bank, l On Writ of Certiorari to 
Jackson, Mississippi, Petitioner, the United States Court 
v. of Appeals for the Fifth 
Robert L. Roper et al. Circuit. 
[February -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that 
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the. 
National Bank Act and Mississippi law.1 They filed this . 
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty 
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and 
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf 
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggre-
gating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District 
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification. 
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the 
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and 
court costs. Over respondents' objection, the District Court 
entered final judgment in their favor. 
No one disputes that respondents themselves have received 
everything they could have recovered from petitioner in this 
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed 
the denial of class certification. This Court affirms the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals without identifying the case or 
controversy that remains to be litigated between the parties. 
The Court decides that the central issue is not mootness but 
1 Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. §§ 85, 
86, which adopts the interest limits set by state law, and 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1355. 
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appealability. But the characterization does ·not withstand 
analysis. Since respondents lack a continuing interest in the 
outcome of the litigation , the Court of Appeals was powerless 
to hear their appeal. Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
Although tlwrf' arC' some differC'nces, this casC' is similar to 
United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at -, 
in on e important r0spect: both r0quire us to decide whether 
~ ~\£ J putative class reprf'sentatives may appeal the denial of class 
~ ClS i 1\ certification after receiving everything they sought on their 
.) own behalves. Sin;~the District ~ourt ~efu~ed to certify, ~ 
~IA.i-:J> 1/"dassJ~filO one has sougnt to mtervei1C' . rC'spondents arc 
@ the only plaintiffs arguably present in court. Yet respondents 
d have no continuing interest in the injuries alleged in their 
re~~fl: Q..~"\l complaint. They sought only damages; they have received 
~ree.rvte..t'-i ~ 
+u fee.~ ) re.irdY\-
JU'\;+; ~~- f\0 
~(\ '-"V.; ~ 
,~tt..re~+. o~ 
to~~e,\ \S 
~~e,.e.,r~ wi~ 
vjW,~ .• tW.... 
~to vt.~ II 
QJ\ \o..r-~~ . 
those damages in fulP Respondents have not suggested that 
success on the certification motion would entitle them to addi-
tional relief from the petitioner.3 Indeed, their personal 
2 Although respondrnts also asked for attorney's fees, their complaint 
shows that fees werr to be granted only flam the damages ultimately 
awardrd to them or the class. App. 13-14. 
3 Respondents do a~srrt that certification would enable them to redu.ce -\ ~~~J 
tigation costs by allocating ~~illOng the mrmbrrs of a prevailing 
lass . Brief for R espondrnts 33. ith the sxccp+ion ~1atforney's fe ~ 
owevrr, ti;Yjl do not identify any costR incurred to da e that are n~~ L t')(<..e ~ 
covered by the petitioner's trnder . Although the rrcord dof'R not reveal 
the detailR of the fee nrrangrmrnt brtwcen rrspondrnts and their Ja,wyers, 
· the complaint snggrstR that the lawyrrs have agreed to accept as full com-
ensation 25% the aJUonnt recovered from the petitioner. A Jp. 13-14. 
If this is the xt r n1 of the fee rrgaraleRS of"the number o r mms recovere , 
· ·pondrnts havr no interest in "spreading" attorney's fees. Reliance 
a cost- · · · ·~js sheer p_e ulation. 
Even if one assumed that respondents' liability to their lawyers could be 
reducrcl by a class recovery, no on e has sugge~ted that petitioner is or ever 
will be liable for &ttot"lk~ feesriteshondents' jurisdictional theory 
appears to be that the mere possibility of asserting future claims for 
. 
I 
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claims to relief have been abandoned so completely that no 
appeal was taken in their own names. The notice of appeal · 
filed with the District Court recites that respondents appeal 
only "on behalf of all others similarly situated .... " App. 63. 
I believe that Art. III and the precedents of this Court 
See Geraghty, post, at 
--- (POWELL, J., dissenting . There is no suggestion 
that respondents' claims are "capable of repetition, yet evad-
ing review." Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 110-111, 
n. 11 (1975).4 And not a single one of the alleged 90,000 
class members has sought to intervene in the eight years since 
this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 
432 U. S. 385 ( 1977). Nor has anyone ever challenged the 
allegedly usurious charges by informal complaint or protest. 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certification was denied, the 
action lay dormant during the seven months in which respond-
ents sought to take an interlocutory appeal, without provok-
ing a response from anyone who previously may have thought 
that the class action would protect his rights. We are not 
told what, if anything, motivates respondents to continue this 
crusade on behalf of persons who for years have evinced no 
attorney's fees against other members of a putative class gives rise to a 
case or controversy against the class defendant. Such a theory is unpre-
cedented, and its consequences are bizarre. For example, respondents' 
theory would .Pe.'rmit a person to file a class action, even though he had 
previously accepted full settlement of his individual claim, on the ground 
tha.t the fees incurred in anticipation of the litigation might ultimately be 
shared with the class. 
-\WJ-~ 
COJ.L ~ 
d.~M\~ . . 
G..A- MOo+--. 
4 If a class-action defendant were shown to have embarked on a. course ( n 
of conduct designed to insulate the class certification[from appellate review -0\A.D.- S . (jY\ 
in order to avoid classwide liability, a court in proper circumRiances might 
find ' the Getstein test satisfied and the case not moot. See Susman v. 
Lincoln American Cotp., 587 F. 2d 866 (CA7 1978); 13 Wright , Miller & 
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 171 (Supp. 1979); 
Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following 
Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 599-600. 
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interest whatever in obtaining recovery for themselves.5 On 
its face, this appears simply to be a "lawyer's case." 
Despite long traditions to the contrary, the Court seems 
undisturbed that this federal action will be litigated on remand 
by a lawyer whose only "clients" are unidentified(illembers 
.of lil class- who have shown no desire to be represented by 
anyone.6 The Court also neglects established principles of 
Art. III jurisprudence and remands to the District Court a 
headless class action that does not meet the requirements of 
Rule 23. 
II 
The Court identifies the question for decision in this case 
as "whether respondents' individual and private case or con-
troversy became moot by reason of the entry of judgment in 
their favor." Id., at 5. Wholly ignoring the fact that 
respondents themselves elected to appeal only on behalf of 
third parties, the Court concludes that "respondents' individual 
interest in the litigation-as distinguished from whatever may 
be their representative responsibilities to the putative class-
is sufficient to permit their appeal. ... " I d., at 12. One 
might expect that the Court would reason to this conclusion 
by pinpointing the individual interest on which it purports to 
rely. But no such reasoning appears in the Court's opinion. 
Although there is some discussion of advantages that generally 
may accrue to named plaintiffs from the use of the class-action D 
device, the Court never attempts to ascertain whether these 1 +-" ---
5 The Mississippi usury statute was amended in 1974, and apparently,r-(r'\oW 
authorizes the fees charged by petitioner. 1974 Miss . Gen. La s, ch. 564, 
§7; see ·Miss . Code~§"7~17-1 (6). \ 1here is ~es 1011 of -r:;-
prospective relief. 
6 I do not suggest that respondenl\hawyer acted improperly in pursuing 
this case. Since he has prevailed Woth in this Court and in the Court 
of Appeals, the responsibility fallowing client-less litigation is that of the 
federal courts. 
• 
78-904--DISSENT 
DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK v. ROPER 5 
particular respondents can derive any such benefit from this 
action.7 
A 
The Court does not explain how it is able to find an 
"individual interest" in the litigation without identifying 
the injury in fact ~inaril:{fequired by Art. III. It simply 0 
ignores this essential inquiry and relies on the "factual con-
text" of the case: When respondents refused the proffered 
settlement, the trial court entered judgment in their favor 
over their objection. I d., at 6. The single fact of respond-
ents' refusa. 1 inspires the Court to draw a "cr~. · · · " 
bet~ H!@8t utt888 nwiil ee 1 · !!.h!!..' l~!:t~2temJj}oV 
€?Peal from a fayorablc.Wlldgmen ., at 9. The Court 
appears to hold that as an "individual interest" in 
exercising his "statutory right o appeal." /d., at 7. If the 
statutes and rules governing "federal appellate practice" confer 
such a right, the Court concludes that Art. III requires no 
more. Ibid.; see id., at 12. 
Having shifted the inquiry from Art. III mootness to the 
"formulat[ion] [of] standards ... govern [ing]the appealabil: f; bid , 
ity of procedural rulings," iii., a:t l~e Court determines thah!..,__ :> 
respondents are aggrieved by the denial of certificatio~L 
7 Any advantages that ordinarily may flow from "the use of the class 
action procedure for litigation of individual claims," ante, at 10, cannot 
accrue to these respondents who will not b2 litigating their own claims 
on remand. Nor does the Court identify nny unrecovered cost of litiga-
tion that these respondents can reduce if they obtain relief for a class. 
See id., at 10, n. 8; n. 3, supra. Indeed, the Court refers to respondents 
only to point out that their total damages were so small that they "would 
be unlikely to obtain legal redress at an acceptable cost" if they could not 
do so by means of a class action. Ante, at 10, n·. 8. We may assume 
that respondents had some interest in the class-action procedure as a means 
of interesting their lawyers in the case or d'<ibtaining a sat isfactory settle- -c-
ment. This may be an interest properly furthered by Rule 23, but once 
respondents obtained both access to court and full individual relief that 
interest disappeared. 
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1 eqttiLd: by rulQii gf }3Paetieej for two reasons. First, the cer-
tification order is a "procedural ruling, collateral to the merits 
of [the] litigation," that "stands as an adjudication of one of 
the issues litigated." I d., at 9. Second, the contrary, result 
would frustrate the goals of Rule 23. !d., at 10-12. 
The effect of the Court's analysis, if I understand it cor-
rectly, is to avoid a direct confrontation with settled princi-
ples that unambiguously dictate a finding of mootness in this 
case. But the Court cannot escape the impact of these author-
ities simply by refusing to consider the respondents' evident 
lack of interest in the outcome. The "critical distinction" by 
which it attemps to justify its failure to do so is both factually 
and legally unsound. 
B 
As a ma.tter of fact, there is substantial doubt that this case 
involves the effect of "a judgment in favor of a party at an 
intermediate stage of litigation." I d., at 9. Petitioner has 
never contended that the controversy became moot merely 
"by reason of the entry of judgment in [respondents'] favor." 
!d., at 5. Instead , petitioner argues that its tender of full 
-relief has remedied the respondents' individual injuries and 
thus eliminated their stake in the outcome. Considerable 
authority supports petitioner's contention that the tender itself 
moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. This 
Court, among others, has held that a federal court is powerless CJ""-~ 
to review the abstra.ct questions remaining in a case eRee~l 
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that 
fully satisfies his claims. California v. San Pablo & Tulare 
R. Co., 149 U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill & Thomas 
Co. v. United States, 392 F. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per curiam); 
Lamb v. Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968) (per 
curiam); A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F. 2d 
89 (CA5 1965) (per curiam).8 
8 The Court makes no effort to distinguish these cases. Yet it concedes 
that the "right to employ Rule 23" is a "procedural right only, ancillary 
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I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result 
should differ because the District Court has entered a judg-
ment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their 
lawsuit as moot.9 It is certainly true, as the Court observes, 
that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in 
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any 
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally 
favorable judgment that adversely affect him. See 15 Wright, 
Miller, and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3902 
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practice ,-r 203.06 (1975). But 
federal courts uniformly have required a showing of some 
adverse effect in order to confer "standing to appeal." Ibid.; 
see Barry v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections, - U. S. 
App. D. C.-, 580 F. 2d 695 (1978). Indeed, Art. III itself 
requires a continuing controversy between adverse parties at 
all stages of the litigation. E. g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 
402 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10 
(1974). If any statute or rule purported to authorize an 
appeal in contravention of Art. III, that rule would yield to 
the constitutional command. 
c 
The Court relies almost entirely on Electrical Fittings Corp. 
v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1939).10 But that deci-
to the litigation of substantive claims," and it admits that "the court 
retains no jurisdiction over the controversy" when the "substantive claims 
become moot in the Art. III sense." Ante, at 6. If tho 1 ender itself 
mooted the respondents' claims without regard to the entry of judgment, 
then the Court's own analysis requires it to conclude that the case is 
\~ l · moot. tg 
"'{"0 J- 9 The "statutory-;.ight" ~appeal{a:nno itsel supply a personal stake 
m the outcome, for Congress cannot abrogate Art. III limitations on the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bell-
wood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979). 
10 The only other authorities cited by the Court are United Airlines, Inc. 
v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 3 5 (1977), and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 
437 U. S. 463 (1978). Dictum in both cases stated that the denial of class 
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sion simply reaffirms our obligation not to review judgments 
by which~ is iR-8iviElwal~aggrieved. The trial court 
there had entered a decree holding a patent valid but not 
infringed. Although the alleged infringer won the case, it 
sought to appeal the finding that the patent was valid. This 
Court held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to 
consider the issue of patent validity after the trial court found 
no infringement, because "[a] party may not appeal from a 
judgment ... in his favor, for the purpose of obtaining a 
review of findings ... which are not necessary to support the 
decree." !d., at 242. But the trial court had erred by includ-
ing in the decree itself a wvng that "purport[ed] to adjudge 
the validity of [the patm1J'a" Ibid. Since that ruling "wa~ 
immaterial to the dispositiOn of the cause," the Court of 
Appeals had jurisdiction for the limited purpose of eliminating 
the extraneous ruling from the decree. Ibid. . 
The Court reads Electrical Fittings as a case that was "still 
live" in the Art. III sense "because policy considerations per-
mitted an appeal." Ante, at 8-9. But Electrical Fittings was 
a "live" controversy only because-and to the limited extent 
that-the petitioner there asserted a continuing personal stake 
in the outcome. As Judge Learned Hand explained, the peti-
tioner in Electrical Fittings was injured in fact because the 
unnecessary ruling tha.t the patent was valid could have 
created "some presumptive prejudice" against him in a future 
case. Harries v. Air King Products Co., 183 F. 2d 158, 161 
_certification is subject to appellate review after final judgment at the 
behest of the named plaintiffs. Neither case discu~sed mootness, and 
neither analyzed the proposition in any wrty. Indeed, the only authority 
cited in Coopers & Lybrand was United Airlines, see 437 U. S., at 469, and 
the only authority cited in United Airlines was a concession made by the 
defendant and a list of cases from the Courts of Appeals, none of which 
dealt with a suggestion of mootness in an analogous sit tmtion, see 432 
U. S., at 393, and n. 14. Such statements, casually enunciated without a 
word of explanation in opinions dealing with unrelated legal questions, are 
not controlling or even persuasive when they are shown on further reflec-
tion to have been inconsistent with established law. 
tf. 
I 
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(CA2 1950); see In re Trimble Co,, 479 F. 2d 103, 111 (CA3 
1973) .11 This genuine prejudice to the petitioner himself 
supplied the requisite personal stake in obtaining reformation 
of the decree. 
Thus, the Court's view of Electrical Fittings is plainly incon-
sistent with the holding of that case. The Court of Appeals 
was told to reform the decree, but expressly forbidden to 
consider the merits of the patent validity question. In other 
words, the court's appellate ,jurisdiction was only as broad as 
the petitioner's personal stake in the appeal. Just four years 
later, Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. S. 359 (1943), explained 
that the limitation was constitutionally based. Reversing 8J 
decision that had relied on Electrical Fittings in refusing to 
consider the merits of an appeal, the Court distinguished 
Electrical Fittings as a case in which the parties sought deci-
sion of "a hypothetical case." The appeal in Altvater, by 
contrast, satisfied "the requirements of case or controversy" 
because the parties continued to contest a counterclaim that 
had not been concluded by the dismissal of the orginal com-
plaint. 319 U. S., at 363-366. 
Altvater and Electrical Fittings entirely foreclose the 
Court's argument that a party who has no personal stake in 
the outcome of his appeal may invoke the jurisdiction of a 
federal court merely because policy-based "rules of practice''· 
permit him to do so. Any doubt is dispelled by Altvater's 
express reliance on Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 ( 1942), 
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943), a case in which the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed at length the 
11 Although the Court of Appeals in Electrical Fittings held that col-
lateral estop el would be no bar to relitigation of the validity question, 100 
F. 2d 403, 404 other courts had taken a different view on similar issues of 
collateral estoppel. If the validity finding were permitted to stand, the 
petitioner rould have been forced to litigate the question of its preclusive 
effect in future cases. 15 Wright, Miller, and Cooper, supra n. 4, § 3902, 
at 403 (1976); 1B Moore's Federal Practice~ 0.443 [5], at 3925 (1974); 
9 id., ~ 203.06, at 716 (1975) . 
04R:§aaNJ ) ~l lo 
U/; . 31 'Z., 31~ 
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constitutional limits on appellate jurisdiction. 319 U. S., at 
363, n. 2. Like the respondents here and the petitioner in 
Electrical Fittings, the appellant in Cover sought to appeal 
from a judgment that had eliminated his stake in the out-
come.12 ~1he Court of Appeals emphatically declined to 
assume jurisdiction over an appeal which sought "no relief 
against anybody before the court ... but ... want[ed] an 
advisory opinion that [a] patent [was] valid." 133 F. 2d, at 
544.13 Since there was no case or controversy, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that it was "without discretion" to hear the 
appeal. I d., at 545. 
These cases demonstrate that the requirements of Art. III 
do not change with the "factual context" in which a suggestion 
of mootness arises. See ante, at 5. Whatever the context, 
Art. III asks but a single question: Is there a continuing on-
trovers~ beiweeh ael (6FBe }9ar~ies-? Nothing in Electrical 'Fit-
tings suggests that a "procedural ruling, collateral to the merits 
of a litigation," may be appealed after final judgment because 
"policy considerations permi [ t] the appeal" or because the 
ruling "stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." 
12 The appellant ]n Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 (CA2 1942), cert. 
denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943), was the losing plaintiff in a patent infringe-
ment action. After the trial court found the patent invalid and not 
infringed, the plaintiff took an appeal on the validity question without 
contesting the finding of noninfringement. By accepting the judgment to 
that extent, he lost his right to recover from the defendant-and thus his 
interest in the litigation. 
13 Judge Frank wrote for the court: 
"[W]here there is no 'justiciable' dispute, there are no 'merits.' There is 
merely an unreal entity resembling that disembodied smile which Lewis 
Caroll immortalized. Many Supreme Court decisions teach us that appel-
late jurisdiction, when no justiciable dispute exists on appeal, cannot be 
rested upon the recollection that such a dispute previously existed when 
the case was in the trial court." 133 F. 2d, at 551 (footnotes omitted). 
See also Kapp v. National Football League, 586 F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9 
1978); Hall v. U. S. Fiber & Plastics Corp., 476 F. 2d 418, 420 (CA3 
1973); cf. Lewis v. United States, 216 U.S. 611 (1910) (per curiam). 
~ f~ h~ AT~. 1II . , 
111UJ1Aii'e(& 1 ~ fu p16.1 I' tt{f .t . 
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Ante, at 8-9. Such collateral rulings-like other rulings-may 
be appealed only when the litigant has a personal stake in the eN\ 
resolution of his appeal.14 In Electrical Fittings, there was A SIJ 
a stake; here there is none. Since nothing remains of the 
case or controverf:Jjin this Q8:Se, a f~€1~rlil comt can hav~ .n.o-
alhu·natjve bu.t to c]ismiss tbe Clliii .r · 
III 
It is clear from the Court's extended discussion of policy 
and practical considerations, ante, at 10-12, that these weighed 
heavily in its decision. I am not aware that such considera-
tions ever before have influenced this Court in determining 
whethe1 the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the federal t~'d U-
courts. In any event, the consequences of a finding of moot-
ness would not be as severe as the Co~rt predicts. 
A finding of mootness would have repercussions primarily 
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who 
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to -~ 
a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that~ subse- · roJf 
quent attem5Uto appeal the denial of certificationJWOuld oe - - ~ ~ 
barred by Art. III. But the consequences of applymg settled 
rules of mootness in this situation would not be unjust. If 
i.njunctive or declaratory relief wNe granted, the absent mem-
bers of the putative class would have obtained by force of 
stare decisis or the dt-cree itself most of the benefits of actual-
class membership. If, on the other hand, damages were 
awarded and an appea permitted, reversal of the certifica-
tion ruling would enable putative class members to take 
advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability 
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable 
14 The Court appears to recognize this in passing, ante, at 9, n. 7, but 
fails to apply the rule to this case. Since the Court suggests that respond-
ents' interest in the certification ruling derives from the mere fact that it 
"stands as an adjuclication of one of the issues litigated," id., at 9, Elec-
trical Fittings itself would limit us to the issuance of an order directing that 
the offensive ruling be expunged from the record. 307 U.S., at 242. 
A. 
.) 
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Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in this situa-
tion will reinstate the "one-way intervention" that the 1966 
amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate?5 
Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise 
lYh n the defendant attempts to force a settlement before 
judg~as petitioner did in this case. A defendant cer-
tainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in 
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny 
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the 
enforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney [s] 
general." Ante, at 10-11. The practical argument is not 
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns 
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the ade-
quacy of compensation and enforcement available for particu-
la.r substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best 
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be 
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim. 
Today, however, . the Court never pauses to consider the law of 
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns. the aggregation of 
usury claims,1.6 the Court's concern for compensation of puta-
15 See Comm~nt, Immediate Appea,lability. of Orders Denying Class Cer-
tification, 40 Ohio St. L. J. 441, 470-471 (1979). In actions brought under 
Rule 23 (b) (3), a class member must decide at the time of certification 
whether to "opt out" of the action under Rule 23 (c) (2). Thi provision 
was designed to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class 
member~~8: l~H!t:n permitted to intervene after a decision on the merits 
in order to secure the benefits of ~decision. Notes of the Aavisory 
'Committee on Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F. R. D. 69, 105-106 
(1966). 
10 Liddell v. Litton Systems, Inc., 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting bor-
rowers' class action); Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941). 
Petitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply with Mis-
sissippi'3 interest limits would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U. S. C. 
§ 85. But the National Bank Act cannot be read to displace state policy 
disfavoring the aggregation of usury claims, since the federal statute seeks 
chiefly to protect national banks from discriminatory treatment or undue 
penalties that may be imposed by state law. See 12 U. S. C. § 86. 
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tive class members in this case is at best misplaced and at 
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling 
Act.l7 - (vl 
The Court's concern for putative class members ruld be ----,_; 
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern o forced 
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litiga-
tion of successive suits by members of the putative class. I 
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial admin-
istration would be real. ~ 
~But these problems can and should be addressed by meas-
ures short of rewriting the law of mootness, as the Court seems '\o cw.fl...ol i "ZSl... 
to have done today. The first step should be 'ga_ 
I~ J] ...tien of interlocutory appeals from the denial o class certifica-
..:_v ..._ __ _,t,_I-OI-1:).... District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1292 (b) to certify such appeals in appropriate circum-
stances. In many cases, a class-a.ction defendant undoubtedly 
would forgo the opportunity to settle with an individual plain-
tiff in order to obtain an immediate and final determination _ 'i} 
of the class certification question on appeal. J Where a defend-
d()tS ]----a--n..,.,tl attempt,i to moot a class action by forced settlement, the 
District, Court is not powerless. In at least some cir-
cumstance~it may require that putative class members receive 
some sort of notice and an opportunity to intervene within 
the appeal period. Rule 23 (d) (2). The availability of such 
measures could be a significant deterrent to the deliberate 
mooting of class actions. Indeed, District Court management 
of the problem by measures tailored to the case at hand may 
well be preferable to the Court's open-ended approval of 
appeals in all circumstances. To the extent interlocutory 
17 The' Act provides that rules of procedure promulgfea y this Court 
"shall not .. . enlarge or modify any substantive rigrtt ." 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2072. See American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538, 
557-558 (1974); Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1318, 1358-1359 (1976) . Sec generally Landers, Of Legalized Black-
mail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-
Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974) . 
\8/f~'"' -'LR'~r#J 
,, 
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appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are lacking, it Ji/ 
is for Congress-not this Court-to correct the deficiency .... M---
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it, 
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems often 
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their 
own. Today's holding is no exception. There is no warrant 
in Rule 23 for the appointment of a "quasi-class representa-
tive" solely for the purpose of obtaining class certification. 
Since the representative can gain nothing from a certification 
order, his participation in the case can be intended only to 
benefit the class. Yet he-or most often his counsel-serves 
on his own motion. No court has examined the adequacy 
of his representation as required by Rule 23, and no personal 
stake in the outcome assures that vigorous advocacy will con-
tinue. The requirements for certification under Rule 23 are UJj 
not easily applied to a class action lacking a named plaintiff.~ 
118 Congress currently has before it a bill 1hat attempts to remedy the 
difficulties infecting this troubled area. H. R 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1979). The bill, supported by the Department of Justice, proposes to 
bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, supra, and to eliminate 
some of the problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by 
creating a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provides for 
the enforcement of this right in some instances through actions brought in 
the name of the United States. The bill also authorizes Interlocutory 
appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class cer-
tification under the proposed procedures. 
In view of the pendency of this legislation, it seems particularly unfor-
tunate that the Court today has chosen to unsettle fundamental principles 
of Art. III standing and mootncss. 
2.0 _.Are reSJlODdcnts members of the class they seek to represent? 8ee 
East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 403-404 (1977). 
Are their currently nonexistent claims "typical of the claims ... of the 
class" within the meaning of Rule 23 (a) (3)? The District Court properly 
may conclude on remand that respondents, for these or other reasons, 
cannot adequately represent the class. Should intervention be proposed, 
the District Court on equitable grounds might well refuse to toll the 
statute of limitations in order to permit it. 
Nine years have passed since this action was filed and six since the 
.. 
' 
78-904-DISSENT 
DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK v. ROPER 15 
And the Court's new rule will contradict Rule 23 directly in 
some cases by inviting a form of intervention that the Rule 
meant to eliminate. See p. f=, supra. -
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of 
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from 
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. It also creates 
~MIHUl('~ililul'i1,- significant problems in the administration of 
U Rule 23. I would vacate the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal 
as moot. 
governing substantive statute was amended to authorize the challenged 
conduct. In its order denying certification on September 29, 1975, the 
District Court assigned as one of its reasons the possible "destruction of the 
-\L__~~ [peti..!i£.ner's bank" by damages then alleged to total $12,000,000 and now 
:._(' potentially augme interest,llo881 ttetle. App. 47, see ante, at 2, n. 2. 
or The possible destruction of petitioner's bank is irrelevant to the central 
iss~e of ~ootncss. But a.s this Court reli.es so heavily onApractical and 
o--:eqwf1tble concern) for tlH1 lilt8r~"ts et putat1ve class members, 1t wlll hardly 
be inappropriate for the District Court on remand also to consider prac-
ticalities and equities on both sides. In the circumstances presented, the 
District Court may well see no reason to exercise its equitable discretion 
in favor of putative class members who have slept on their rights these 
many years. 
,. I 
.. 
- 1\-fl 
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MR. JusTlChl PowELL, dissenting. 
Respondents ar.e two credit-card holders who claim that 
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the 
National Bank Act and Mississippi 1aw.1 ·They filed this 
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty 
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of .$683.30 and 
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf 
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggre-
gating $12 million. After fonr years of litigation , the District 
Court denied · respondents' motion for class certification. 
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the 
full amount of their individual claims plus 1egal interest and 
court costs. Over respondeuts' objection, the District Court 
entered final judgment in their favor. 
No one disputes that respondents themselves have received 
everything they could have recovered from petitioner in this 
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected petitioner's suggestion 6f mootness and reversed 
the de11ial of class certification. This Court affirms the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals without identifying the case or 
controversy that remains to be litigated between the parties. 
The Court decides that the central issue is not mootness but 
1 Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. §§ 85, 
86, which adoptt' the interest, limits set by state law, :md 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1355. 
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appealability. But the characterization does not withstand 
analysis. Since respondents lack a continuing iuterest in the 
outcorne of the litigation. the Court of Appeals was powerless 
to hear their appeal. Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
Although there are some differences. this case is similar to 
United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at -. 
in one important respect: both require us to decide whether 
putative class representatives may appeal the de11ial of class 
certification aftet· receiving everything they sought on their 
own behalves. In this case. as a Geraghty, the District Court 
refused to certify a class. Since no one has sought to inter-
vene, respondents are the only plaintiffs arguably present in 
court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in the 
injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only dam-
ages; they have received those damages in fulP Respondents 
have not suggested that success 011 the certification motion 
would entitle them to additional relief from the petitioner.3 
2 Although l'l'i'liJOmlPnts also a~ked for n1iorney's frP:::, their complaint 
show~ 1 hut fep~ wrrr to br granted only hom the damage::; ultinudely 
awardrd to llwm or thP elnss. App. 13-14. 
8 Re~pondrnt" do assert that c(•rtification would rnable them to reduce 
litigal ion cosb by allocatiug cost:; among tlu• members of a pr<'vailing 
class. Brief for RPspondentH 33. ExcPpt for attorney's ft-el-i, however, 
respouc!Pn(,; do uot identif~· any costs incurred to date thai, are not 
covered b~' tlw JH'tii imwr's trnder. Although tlw rrcord doe:; not rPveal 
the dPtails of lilt' fE><' arrangemPn1 between rrspondents and tlwir lawyers, 
tlw complainl ~ugge~t~ that the lawyer:> havE> agrr!'d to arcept a~ full com-
pensation 25% of til(' amonnt rel'ovrrPd from thr prtitimwr. App. 18-14. 
If this is lhr ngrr<'mcnt. as to fres, respondents have no continuing int('rcst. 
Only roun::;pJ j,.; conrrrned whet h<'r tlw recovery is t>nlargrd. 
Even 1!' Oll(' n;;::;umed that rt>spondent~:>' liability to their lawyer~ rould be 
reduC('(} by a ria~::, rrcover~·, no onP has ~:>ugget;trd that pditioner i::; or evrr 
will be liabl<' for fpes that ult.imalely mar be owPd by rr:;pondc·nt~:>. Re-
spondent-s' juri~dictional theory appear,; to bP tha.t the mere po~ibility of 
assert.i11g futurp claim::l for altoruey's fees against olhrr membrr::; of :1 
putative da><,.; give•;> ri:;c to a cas<' or controversy again~t the class defend-. 
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Indeed, their personal claims to relief have been abaucloned 
so completely that no appeal was taken in their O'v\'11 names. 
The notice of appeal filed with the District Court recites that 
respoudents appeal only "on behalf of all others similarly 
situated . ... " App. 63. 
Since respondents have no continuing personal stake in the 
outcome of this action , I believe that Art. III and the prece-
dents of this Court require that the case be dismissed as moot. 
See Geraghty, post, at --- (PowELL, J., dissenting). 
There is no suggestion that respondents' claims arc "capable 
of repetition, yet evading review." Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 
U. S. 103, 110- 111. n. 11 (1975). 1 And not a single one of the 
l 
alleged 90.000 class members has sought to intervene in the 
f\.ii\L -::eigltifJyears since this actiou was filed. Cf. Un·ited Airlines, 
Inc. v. McDo11ald, 432 U. 8. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone 
ever challenged the allegedly usurious charges by informal 
complaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certifi-
cation was denied, the action lay dormant during the seven 
months in which respondents sought to take a11 interlocutory 
appeal, without provoking a response from anyon~ who pre-
viously may have thought that the class action would protect 
his rights. We are not told what, if anything, motivates re-
spondents to continue this crusade on behalf of persons who 
for years have evinced no interest whatever in obtaining re-
ant.. Snch n 1hrory ill unprrcedentrd, and its conSE"quencr,; are bizarre. 
For examplr, rr,;pondrnts' theory would prrmit, a person to file a cla,;s 
action, <•vrn though he had previously acce11ted full :settlemrnt of hi,; in-
dividual clahn , on t.he ground that; the f.re.-; incnrrrd in anticipation of the 
litigation mi11:ht ultimat<>ly be :sharrd with tlw cla"l:i. 
4 If a cla :;.~-action drfendant were shown to have embarketl on a cour;;c 
of conduct de>,;igned (() immla1e> thr clas.s certification is.-;ue from appellate 
review in ordPr to a.void claR..-;widP liability, n court in propf'r ('ireum~tant·rs 
might. find tlw Ge1'stein te:st "atisfird ~u1d the case not. moot. SeP Susrnan v. 
Lincoln Ammcan Co1'p. , 5157 F . 2d 1166 (CA7 197R); 1:3 Wright, l\liller & 
Cooper, FeclPral Practice and Procedure § 3533, al. 171 (Supp. 1U79); 
Comment, Continua!iou and Hf:'pre:::cntation of Cla~:>s ArtionH Following 
Dis.missal of the Clas:s Repre,.;cntative, 1974 Duke L. J . 573, 59~-600, 
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covery for themselves.5 On its face, this appears simply to 
be a "lawyer's case." 
Despite long traditions to the contrary, the Court seems 
undisturbed that this federal action will be litigated on remand 
by a lawyer whose only "clients" are unidentified class 
members who have shown no desire to be represented by 
anyone.6 The Court also neglects established principles of 
Art. III jurisprudence and remands to the District Court a. 
headless class action that does not meet the requirements of 
Rule 23. 
II 
The Court identifies the question for decision in this case 
as "whether respondents' individual and private case or con-
troversy became moot by reason of the entry of judgment in 
their favor." !d., at 5. Wholly ignoring the fact that 
respondents themselves elected to appeal only on behalf of 
third parties, the Court concludes that "respondents' individual 
interest in the litigation-as distinguished from whatever may 
be their representative responsibilities to the putative class-
is sufficient to permit their appeal. ... " I d., at 12. One 
might expect tha.t the Court would reason to this conclusion 
by pinpoiuting the individual interest on which it purports to 
rely. But no such reasoning appears in the Court's opinion. 
Although there is some discussion of advantages that generally 
may accrue to named plaintiffs from the use of the class-action 
device, the Court never attempts to ascertaiu whether these 
5 The Mis...;i::;sippi usury statut.e was amrnded in 1974, and it apparrntly 
now authorizes thr fpes charged by petitioner. 1974 Miss. Gen. Laws, ch. 
564, § 7; sro Miss. Code Ann.§ 75-17-1 (6). Thus, there i::; no question of 
prospective relief. 
6 I do not ::;uggest. that respondents' lawyer acted improperly in pur::;uing 
this ca::;e . Since he has prevailed both in this Court and in the Court 
of Appeab, the responsibility for allowing client-less litigation is that of the 
federal court~. 
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pal'ticular respondents can derive any such benefit from this 
action.7 
A 
The Court does not explain how it is able to find an 
"individual interest" in the litigation without identifying 
the injury in fact required by Art. III. It simply ignores this 
essential inquiry and relies on the "factual context" of the 
case: When respondents refused the proffered settlement, the 
trial court entered judgment in their favor over their objec-
tion. ld., at 6. The single fact of respondents' refusal in~ 
spires the Court to draw a "critica1 distinction" between 
mootness deriving from a judgment and mootness resulting 
from events extrinsic to the litigation. I d., at 9. The Court 
appears to hold that a litigant who attempts to appeal from 
a favorable judgment has an "individual interest" in exercis-
ing his "statu tory right to appeal." I d., at ·7. If the statutes 
and rules governing "federa1 appellate practice" confer such 
a right, the Court concludes that Art. III requires no more. 
Ibid.; see id., at 12. 
Having shifted the inquiry from Art. III mootuess to the 
"formulat lionl [of] standards ... govern [ing] the appealabil-
ity of procedural rulings," toid., the Court determilleS that 
respondeuts are aggrieved by the denial of certification for two 
7 Any auv:mtag<.'o; that ordinarily may flow from "the u~e of the class 
action procedn rc for litigation of individual clai111:s," ante, at 10, cannot 
accrue to the,;e re::;poncleuts who will not be litigating their own claim8 
on remand. Nor does tl1e Court identify :my unrecovered co::;t of litiga-
tion that ·the,;c l't>>:ipondents can reduce if f11ey obtain relief for a cluss. 
See id., at 10, n. 8; n. 3, supra. Inueea, tl1e Court refer:; to re,;pondents 
only to point ont tllat their total damages were ;,;o small that they "would 
be unlikely to obtain legal redre~::; at an acceptable co,;t" if they could not 
do so by mrans of a cla~;,; action. Ante, at 10, n. 8. We may as,;ume 
that re,;pondents had some intere~t in the clas~-action procedure a~ a means 
of intere:;ting their lawyers in the case or obtaining a satisfactory settle-
ment. Thi~ may be an intere~t properly furtht•red by Rnle 2J, but oncc-
rel:ipoudents obtained both accc:;:; to court and full individual relief that 
inter~t di:sappeared. 
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reasons. First, the certification order is a "procedural ruling, 
collateral to the merits of [the] litigation," that "stands ag 
an adjudication of one of the i~sues litigated." I d., at 9. 
Second, the contrary result would frustrate the goals of 
Rule 23. /d., at 10-12 . . 
The effect of the Court's analysis, if I understand it cor-
rectly, is to avoid a direct confrqutation with settled princi-
ples that unambiguously dictate a finding of mootness in this 
case. But the Court canuot escape the impact of these author-
ities simply by refusing to consider the respondeuts' evident 
lack of interest in the outcome. The "critical'distinction" by 
which it attemps to justify its failure to do so is both factually 
and legally unsound. 
B 
As a matter of fact, there is substantial doubt that this case 
involves the effect of "a judgment iu favor of a party at an 
intermediate stage of litigation." I d., at 9. Petitioner has 
never contended that the controversy became moot merely 
"by reason of the entry of judgment in [respondents'] favor." 
/d., at 5. Instead, petitioner argues that its tender of full 
relief has remedied the ·responuents' individual injuries and 
thus eliminated their stake in the outcome. Considerable 
authority supports petitioner's contention that the tender itself 
moots the case whether or not a judgmeut ·is entered. This 
Court, among others, has held that a federal court is powerless 
to review the abstract questions remaining in a case when the 
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlemeut that 
fully satisfies his claims. California v. San Pablo & 'l'ulare 
R. Co., 149 U. S. 308. 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill & 'l'homas 
Co. v. United States, 392 F. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per curiam); 
Larnb v. Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968) (per 
cur·iam); A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F. 2d 
89 (CA5 1965) (per curiam).8 
8 The Court muke:s no effort to di:stiJ1gui~h the:se ca~e::;. Yet it eoucedes 
that the ''nght to employ Rule 23" i:s u, "procedural right only, ancillary 
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I know of no authority remotely suggestiug that the result 
should differ because the District Court has entered a judg-
ment in favor of respondents instead of dis1uissing their 
lawsuit as moot.0 It is certainly true, as the Court observes, 
that the entry of judgmeut in favor of a party does llOt in 
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any 
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally 
favorable judgment that adverseiy affect him. See 15 Wright, 
Miller, and Cooper, Federai Practice a.nd Procedure ~ 3902 
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practice 1(263.06. (1975). But 
federal courts uniformly have required a showing of some 
adverse effect in ord.er to confer "stand.ing to appeal." Ibid.,· 
see Barry v . .District oj' Columbia Bd. ol Ez'ections, - U. S. 
App. D. C.-, 580 F. 2d 69-5 (1978). Indeed, Art. III itself 
requires a coHtiiJUiug controversy between adverse parties at 
ali stages of'the litigation. E. g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 
402 (1975); Steffel v. 'l'hornpson, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10' 
(1974) . If any statute or rule purported to authorize an 
appeal in contravention o{ Art·. III, that rule would yield to· 
the constitutional co1mnand: 
c 
The Court relies almost eutirely on Electrical Fittings Corp. 
v. 'l'hmnas & Betts Co., 307 U.s·. 241 (1939).10 But that deci-
to the litigation of' sul:i:stantive · daim:s," cu1d · il: admit:s that '·the court 
retain~ no jmi:;didion over the rontroven;y" wlien tlie ":sub:stantive claims 
become moot in tlic Art. III ~ensc."' At1te, at 6.· If the tt>nder itself 
mooted the respondents' claims without regard· to th.e entry of judgment, 
then the Court'::; own analy;;i::; requires it to conclude that the case is 
moot. 
0 The "statutory right" to appeal itself cannot supply a. personal stake ·' 
m the outcom<', for Congre~s cannot abrogate Art. III limitation:; on the 
juri~dir·tiou of the fpderal court::;. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bell-
wood, 441 U. S. 91, 100 (1979) . 
10 The onl~· oOwr authoritie~ rited by the Court. are United Airlilles, Inc. 
v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977), und Coopers <~ Lybrand v. Livesay, 
43.7.,;U .. S. 403 (197.8) .. Dictum in both case~ stated. that the denial of chtsff· 
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sion simply reaffirms our obligatiou not to review judgments 
by whi~h no individual aggrieved. The trial court there 
had entered a decree holding a patent valid but not infringed. 
Although the alleged infringer won the case, it sought to 
appeal the finding that the patent was valid. This Court 
held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to con-
sider the issue of patent validity after the trial court found 
no infringement, because "r a] party may not appeal from a 
judgment ... in his favor, for the purpose of obtaining a 
review of findings ... which are not necessary to support the 
decree." I d., at 242. But the trial court had erred by includ-
ing in the decree itself a ruling that "purport[ ed] to adjudge 
the validity of [the patent]." Ibid. Since that ruling "was 
immaterial to the disposition of the cause," the Court of 
Appeals had jurisdiction for the limited purpose of elimi11ating 
the extraneous ruling from the decree. 1bid. 
The Court reads Electrical Fittings as a case that was "still 
live" in the Art. III sense "because policy considerations per-
mitted a11 appeal." Ante, at 8-9. But Electrical Fitt·inys was 
a "live" controversy only because-and to the limited extent 
that-the petitioner there asserted a continuing persona] stake 
in the outcome. As Judge Learned Hand explained. the peti-
tioner in Electrical Fittings was injured in fact because the 
unnecessary ruliug that the patent was valid could have~ 
created "some presumptive prejudice" against him in a future 
case. Harries -v. Air King Products Co., 183 F. 2d 158, 161 
certificat ion il,, ;mhject to appellate review after final jndgmrnt at the 
behest of the nnmcd plaintiff:>. Neither case di~eussed mootnes~ , nnd 
neitlwr analyzed tl1e proposition iu tHI~' way. Indercl, t1w oul~· authority 
cited in Coopers (~ Lybrand was United Airlines, see 437 U. S., a.t 409, and 
the only autlwrity cited in Unite(l Airlines was a. conce~:<iou madl' b~· the 
defendant and ri Jist of cn~es from tlw Courts of Appral:<, none of which 
dealt with a ~uggt·~tion of mootness in an amdogou:> situation, see 432 
U. S., at :393, and n. 14. Sucl1 statements, casua.lly cmmcia tPd without a 
word uf explanation in opinions dealing with umelatrd legal que"tions, anJ-
not controllmg or even per~ua,;ivc when they arc ;;hown 011 further reflec-
1ion to have been incon~i:stent with e::;tabli~heu law. 
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(CA2 1950); see In 1·e Trim,ble Co., 479 F. 2d 103, 111 (CA3 
1973) .ll This genuine prejudice to the petitioner himself 
supplied the requisite personal stake in obtaining reformation 
of the decree. 
Thus, the Court's view of Electrical Fittings is plainly incon-
sistent with the holding of that case. The Court of Appeals 
was told to reform the decree, but expressly forbidde11 to 
consider the merits of the patent validity question. In other 
words, tlw court's appellate jurisdiction was only as broad as 
the petitioner's personal stake iu the appeal. Just four years 
later, Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. S. 359 (1943), explained 
that the lilllitation was constitutionally based. Reversing a 
decision that had relied on Electrical Fittings in refusing to 
consider the merits of an appeal, the Court disti11guished 
Electrical Fittings as a case in which the parties sought deci-
sion of "a hypothetical case." The appeal in Altvater, by 
contrast, satisfied "the requirements of case or coutroversy" 
because the pa.rties continued to contest a counterclaim that 
had not been concluded by the dismissal of the orginal com-
plaint. 319 U. S .. at 363-366. 
Altvater and Electrical Fittinys entirely foreclose the 
Court's argument that a party who has no personal stake in 
the ou tcomc of his appeal may iu voke the jurisdiction of a 
federa,l court merely because policy-based "rules of practice" 
permit him to do so. Any doubt is dispelled by Altvater's 
express reliance on Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 ( 1942), 
cert. denied, 319 U. S. 748 (1943), a case in which the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed at length the 
11 Although the Court of Appeal:; in Electrical Fittings held that col-
lateral e"toppel would be no bar to relitigation of the validity que:;tion, 100 
F. 2d 403, 404 (CA2 1938), othrr courts had taken a different view on 
similar is:;ur:; of collateral estoppel. If the validity finding were permitted 
to :;tand, tilP prtitioner could have been forced to litigate the que:;tion of its 
preclu~in t>ffeet in future ca;;l>s. 15 Wright, MiliPr, aud Cooper, supra 
n. 4, § :390~, at 40::! (1976); 1B Moor!''~ Fedpral Practice ,I 0.443 [5], at 
3925 (1974) ; \J id., ,r 203.06, at 716 (1975). 
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constitutional limits on appellate jurisdiction. 319 TT. S., at 
363, n. 2. Like the respondents here and the petitioner in 
Electrical Fittings, the appellant in Cover sought to appeal 
from a judgment that had · eliminated his stake in the out-
come.12 The Court of Appeals emphatically declined to as-
sume jurisdiction over an appeal which sought "no relief 
against anybody before the court ... ·but ... want[ed] an 
advisory opini011 that [al patent [was] valid." 133 F. 2d, at 
544.13 Since there was no case or controversy, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that it was "without discretion" to hear the 
appeal. J d., at 545. 
These cases demo11strate that the requirements of Art. III 
do not ehange with the "factual context" in which a suggestion 
of mootness arises. See ante, at 5. Whatever the context, 
Art. Ill asks but a single question: Is there a continuing con-
troversy between adverse parties? Nothing in Electrical Fit-
tings suggests that a "procedural ruling, collateral to the merits 
of a litigation," may be appealed after final judgment because 
"policy considerations penni [(I the appeal" or because the 
ruling "stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." 
12 The appellant in Cove1· v. Schwattz, 133 F . 2d 5-ll (CA2 19-l2), cert. 
denied, 3HJ U. S. 748 (1943), was the losing plaintiff in a patent infringe-
ment uctiou. After the trinl court found the patent invnlid and not 
infringed, the plaintiff took nn appeal on the validity qm-,;tion without 
contesting the finding of noninfringrmcnt. By accepting tlw judgment to 
that extent., he lo~t his right to recover from the defendant-and thu~ his 
interc~t in t he litigation. 
1 3 .fudge Frank wrote for thr court: 
"[Wjhere there is no '.in~tiriable ' di:;pute, there arc no 'merits.' There is 
mere!~· fill nnrt>al entit~· re~embling that di;;embodied ~mile which Lewis 
Caroll immortalized. Man~· Snpreme Court, deci;;ions teach us that appel-
late jnri~dietion, when no jn,.,tiriablc disputr existH on appeal, cannot bo 
re:;tcd upon the rrcollect ion that :;nch a dispute previously t>xi~trd when 
the ca;;r waH in the trial eourt." 133 F. 2d, at 551 (footnot<>~ omitted). 
See al:;o Kapp v. National Football League, 58() F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9 
1978) ; Ilall v. U. S. Fibe1· & Pladi1·s Corp., 476 F. 2d 418, 420 (CA3 
1973) ; cf Lewi~ v. Uuited State~, 216 U.S. 611 (1910) (per curiam). 
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Ante, at 8-9. Such collateral rulings-like other rulings-may 
be appealed only when the litigant has a personal stake in the 
resolution of his appeal.14 In Electrical Fittings, there was 
a stake; here there is uone. Since nothing remains of the 
case or controversy, the Court of Appeals should have dis-
missed this case. 
III 
It is clear from the Court's rxtended discussion of policy 
and practical considerations. ante, at 10-12, that these weighed 
heavily in its decisiou. I am not aware that such coHsidera-
tiolls P\'er before have influenced this Court in determining 
whether the Constitution confers jurisdiction 011 the federal 
courts. In any event, the co11seque11ces of a finding of moot-
ness would not be as severe as the Court predicts. 
A finding of mootuess would have repercussions primarily 
in two situatio11s. The first involves a named plaintiff who 
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to 
a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent 
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification 
generally would be barred by Art. III. But the consequences 
of applying settlrd rules of mootness in this situation would 
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were 
granted, thr absPnt members of the putative class would have 
obtained by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of 
the benefits of actual class membership. If. on the other hand, 
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of 
the certification mling would enable putative class members to 
take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability 
without assumiug the risk of being bound by an unfavorable 
14 The Conrt apprarR to recognize this in passing, ante, at. 9, 11. 7, but 
fails to apply the rule to thi;:; case. Sinee the Court :snggrHtii that m-;poud-
entK' intere"t in I he 1wtifieation ruling derive;; from the mere fael that it 
''stand~ a~ nn adjudiention of one of the i~surs litigated," id .. at 9, Elec-
t?·ical F'ittiugs it ·elf would limit llii to the i;;~uanrP of an order directing that 
the offcn~in ruling be expunged from the record. 307 U. S., at 242. 
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judgme11t. ":rhus, the Court's decision to al1ow appeals in 
this situation will reinstate t~e "one-way intervention" that 
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate.1r. 
Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise 
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before 
judgment, as petitioner did in this case. A defendant 'Cer-
tainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in 
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny 
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the 
enforcement of certa.in 'legal rights by "private attorney[s] 
general." Ante, at 10-11. The practical argument is not 
without force. 'But predicating a judgment on these concerns 
amounts to .i udicia1 policymaking with respect to the ade-
quacy of compensation and en'forcement available for particu-
lar substantive Claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best 
left to Cougress. At the very 'least, the result should be 
consistent with the substantive ·law giving rise to the claim. 
·Today, however. the Court never pauses to consider the law of 
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of 
usury claims,t0 the Court's concern for compensatiou of puta-
15 Ser Cumm(•ul, Immediate Appralability of Order~ Drnying Cla<s~ Cer-
tification, 40 Ohio St. L : J. 441, 47(}-471 (1979). In action<s brought under 
Rule 2:3 (b)(:3), a clns::~ member mw;t decide at the time of certification 
whether to "opt out" of the action under Hule 23 (c) (2). This provi<sion 
was dPsigm·d tu bring an end to the ";;purious" cla~s action in which class 
member;; wt·n' permitted to intervene aftrr a decision on the merit3 
in ordPr to st'cure th{' benefits of tluLt decision. · Notes of thH Advi;;ory 
Committee un l'ropo:;ed Amendmeut;; to Rule 23, 39 It'. R. D. 69, 105-106 
(1966). 
16 Liddell v. Ditton Systems. Inc .. 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejeeting Lor-
l'Ower"' ria~~ action); Ji'ry v. Laytun, 191 Mi;;<s : 17, 2 So. 2tl 561 (1941). 
}letitioner is a national ha'uk, and it~ alleged failurr to comply with Mis-
sis:;ippi';; int1•re,.;t limits would viohtte tl1e National Hank Act. 12 F. S. C. 
§ 85. But the National Bnnk Act cannot be read to tli;;pluce ;;tate poliey' 
disfavoring the aggregation of u~ury claims, sincr the federal :;tatute ~Seek::; 
chiefly to protect JJntional bnnk;; from di~criminatory treatment or undue"· 
tJelmltles that Ulay be imposed by ;;tate law, See 12 U. S. C. § 86. 
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tive class members in this case is at best misplaced and at 
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling 
Act.17 
The Court's concern for putative class members would be 
more telliug in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced 
settlement coul<.l indeed waste judicial resources on the litiga-
tion of succ<'ssive suits by members of the putative class. I 
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial admin-
istration would be real. But these problems can and should 
be addressed by measures short of rewriting the law of moot-
ness, as the Court seems to have done today. The first step 
should Le the authorization of iuterlocutory appeals from the 
denial of class certification. 18 District Courts already are 
empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b) to certify such appeals 
in appropriatt> circumstances. In many cases, a class-action 
defendant undoubtedly would forgo the Oj)portunity to settle 
with an i11dividual plaiutiff in order to obtain an immediate 
and final determination of the class certificatioll question on 
appeal. 
Where a clPfP11dant does attempt to moot a class action by 
forced settlemE:>nt, the District Court is not powerless. In at 
least, some circumstances, it may require that putative class 
members receive some sort of uoti,ce and an opportunity to 
intervene within the appeal period. Rule 23 (d) (2). The 
1.7 The Act proviu<':> thai rulr, of procedure promulgn.ted hr this Court 
"shall not . . . t·ulnrgP or modif~r any :mb,tanlive right." :!~ t ;. S. C. 
§ 2072 . Se<· Aml'l'ican Pipe (~ Co1t8tmction Co. v. Utah . 414 P. S. 538, 
557-55!-i ( 1!:174) ; Devrlopnwnt~ in !Iw Law-Cia~,; Action~> , SO Han:. L. 
Rev. 101S, Ia58-105~ (1976) . See generally La.nder,, Of LegalizNI Black-
ltlail and Legaliz<,d Theft: Con~llllH'r Cia~~ Act ion" und the Sub,tancc-
ProePclure DilenHna, 47 S. Cal. L. Hev. s-!2 (1!)74). 
18Jn Coopas & Lybrand v. Livl'sa.y. 4a7 U . S. 46!3 (1978), !hi,; Court 
hf•ld that. tho d<·niaJ of cia:;~ cNtification i~ noL :L "final deei~ion " appeal-
able a~ of right ttndPr 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We relied i11 ihat <':t:>C' on tho 
danger,; of "indiHrrirnina.te" interloeutory rt'\'iPw. !d., nt -ti4. Although 
Coope1'.~ & Lybrand now prC'venb review in rn,;p,; in which it , would b~ 
desirable, C'ongrr""' may rf'rnedy the proMem by appropriate lf'gislntion, 
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availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent 
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District 
Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the 
case at hand may well be preferable to tl.1~ Court's open-ended 
approval of appeals in .all circ4mstances. To the extent inter-
locutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are 
lackiug, it is for Congress-not this Court-to correct the 
deficiency.19 
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it, 
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems often 
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their 
own. Today's holding is no exception. There is llO warrant 
in Rule 23 for the appointment of a "quasi-class representa-
tive" solely for the purpose of obtaining class certification. 
Since the representative can gain 1wthing from a certification 
order, his participation in the case can be inteuded only to 
benefit the class. Yet he-or most often his counsel-serves 
on his own motion. No court has examined the adequacy 
of his representation as required by Rule 23, and no personal 
stake in the outcome assures that vigorous advocacy will con-
tinue. The requirements for certification under Rule 23 are 
not easily applied to a class action lacking a named plaintitf.20 
19 Congrf':-:s c\.uTeutly has before it a bill that ai.ternpt.-; to remf'dy the 
difficultie~ infecting this troubled area. H. lt. 5103, 96th Cong., bt S('S::;. 
(1979). The bill, supported Ly the bepattment of Ju::;tice, propo~es to 
bypass the llule" Enabling Act problem, fil'e n. 17, supr·a, and to Pliminate 
JSome of the problemJS of ch\im::; too ~inall to ju:;tify Individual law::;uit~, by 
creati11g a new fed('ral right of action for damages. The bill provide::; for 
the enforcement of thi:s right in ~ome instances through <Lction:s brought in 
the name of thP United State:;. The bill also authorizt•:s 'interlocutory 
appeals from tlw grant or denial of the ruling that will replace clas:> cer-
tification under the proposed procctlures. 
In view of tlw twndency of thi:s legislation, it ~eems particularly unfor-
. tuna.te that tlw Court toda~· hnli cho::>en to unsettle fundamental principles 
of Art . III Htauding and mootm•::;,;. 
2o Are respoudPnt::; membf'rs of the cht.~::l thr~· seek to represent? See 
Easi 'Pev:as Motor f?reight v. Rodriguez, ·!31 U. S. 395, 403-404 (Hl77). 
r 
•I 
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A.nd the Court's new rule will contradict Rule 23 directly in 
some cases by inviting a form of intervention that the Rule 
meant to eliminate. See p. 11-12, supra. 
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of 
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from 
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. It also unneces-
sarily creates significant problems in the administration of 
Rule 23. I would vacate the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals ai1d remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal 
as moot. 
Are their currently nonexi:st ent. claims "typical of the claimR ... of the 
clas:s" within the meaning of Rnlf:' 23 (a} (3)? The District Court properly 
may conclude on rf:'mand that re;;ponclents, for these or other reasons, 
cannot. adequate!~· repre::;ent the class. Should intervention be proposed, 
the District Court. on equitable grounds !night well refuse to toll the 
statute of limitationl:i in order to jJermit it. 
Nine year::; have passed since this action was filed and six since the 
governing ~uh:;tantiw sta tute was amended to authorize the challenged 
condurt. In itH onif:'r denying certification on September 29, HJ75, the 
District Court a::;:signed m; one of it:; reasom; the possible "destruction of the 
[petitioner'::;] bank" b~· damagf:'::> then alleged to total $12,000,000 and now 
potentially augmented by the accrual of interest. App. 47, see ante, a.t 2, 
n. 2. The po:ssible destruction of petitioner'::; bank is irrelevant to the cen-
tral is:sue of mootne:ss. But w; t.his Court relies so heavily on its practical 
and equitable concern for puta-tive class mmebers, it will hardly be 
inappropriate for the Dir;trict. Court on remand also to consider prac-
ticalities and equitie:s on both i:i ide:s. In the circuml:itance:; pre;;ented, the 
District Court may well see no reason to exercise its equitable di:;cretion 
in favor of putative clal:ii:l nwmbers who have slept on their rights the;;e 
many years. 
1.: 
; 
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No. 78-904 
Deposit Guaranty National Bank, l On Writ of Certiorari to 
Jacksou, Mississippi, Petitioner, the United States Court 
v. of Appeals for the Fifth 
Robert L. ·Roper et al. ' Circuit. 
[February -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICJ<.J PowELL, dissenting. 
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that 
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the 
National Bank Act and Mississippi law.1 ·They filed this 
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty 
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of .$683.30 and 
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief ou behalf 
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggre-
gating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District 
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification. 
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the 
full a:mount of their imlividual claims plus "legal interest and 
court costs. Over respondents' objection, the· District Court 
entered · final judgment in their favor. 
No one disputes that respondents themselves have received 
everythiug they could have recovered from petitioner in this 
action. Neverthe1ess, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected petitioner's suggestion Of mootness and reversed 
the denial of class certification. This Court affirms the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals without identifying the case or 
controversy that remains to be litigated between the parties. 
The Court decides that the central issue is not mootuess but / 
1 Jurisdiction wa::; premist•d on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. §§ 85, 
86, which <Hiopt:; the interest limits set by state law, and 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1355. 
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appealability. But the characterization does not withstand 
analysis. Since respondents lack a continuing interest in the 
outcome of the litigation. the Court of Appeals was powerless 
to hear their appeal. Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
Although there are some differences, this case is similar to 
United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at -, 
in one important respect: both require us to decide whether 
putative class representatives may appeal the denial of c ass 
In this case, as Geraghty, the District Cou 
refused to certify a class. ~ince no one has sought to inter-
vene, respondents are the only plaintiffs arguably present in 
court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in the 
injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only dam-
ages; tlLiy li,~J;QgaiuQQ those damaget fulP IteSporidents 
have not su ested that success on t e certification motion 
would entitle them to additional relief from the petitiouer.3 
2 Although r<'KJ)Ondeuts also a~:>ked for attorney's feE's, their complaint 
shows that fePI' Wf'l'f' to be granted only f10m the damage:; ultimately f 
aw rded to tht>m or th<• clnss. Aw. 13-14. ( ~ t¥OCl-V-\.Jl o\-
8 He:;pond<>nt:; do assert. that certification would enable them to reduce,r-L" r 
litiO', ion ~ by allocatiug costs among the members of a prevailing 
cJass. Brief for 'RP;;pondents 33. Except for attorney's fees, however, 
rrspond<·n!::; tlo not identif~· any costs incurred to date that. are not 
covered b~· thE' prtitionPr':; tE>nder. Although the record doe;; not reveal 
the detail~ of the fpp arrangement betwepn respondents and their awyers, 
tlw complaint ~ugge:;t;:; that tllP lawyers have agrPed to accept a:; full com-
pensation 25% of thr amount rrcoverrd from the:' Jletitioner. App. 13-14. 
If this i,; the agrc:'ement. as to fees, respondpnts htwe no continuing interest. 
.. Only eo1m~el i:; concPmed whether the recovery is c:'nlarged . 
Even if one a:::~mnC'd that rPo:poudent~:>' liability to their lnwyPr~ could be 
reduced by a cia;;:> recovery, llo o11e has suggested that petitio11er i~ or evc:'r 
will be li;1h1P for fel'S that uJt.imately may hP owPd by re:::pond<·nts. Re-
spondent:;' ,imi~dictional theory appear::: to be tha.t. the mere:' po!S~ibility of 
asserting future ela.im~S for attorney's fees against othc:'r membNs of a 
plltativc daH;.; givP::; ri,;c to a case or cont.rover~y against the· cla&> defend-. ~ 
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Indeed, their personal claims to relief have been abandoned 
so completely that no appeal was taken in their own names. 
The notice of appeal filed with the District Court recites that 
respoudents appeal only "on behalf of all others similarly 
situa.tecl .... " App. 63. 
SincP respondents have no continuing personal stake in the 
outcome of this action , I believe that Art. III and the prece-
dents of this Court require that the ·case be dismissed as moot. 
See Geraghty, post, at --- (PowELL, J .. dissenting). 
There is no suggestion that respondents' claims are "capable 
of repetition , yet evadillg review." Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 
U. S. 103. 110- 111. n. 11 (1975). 1 And not a single Olle of the 
alleged !)0,000 class members has sought to intervene in the 
eight years since this actiou was filed. Cf. United Airlines, 
Inc. Y. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone 
ever challenged the allegedly usurious charges by informal 
complaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even aftE-r Cf'rtifi-
cation was tlcniecl, the action lay dormant duriug the seven 
months in which respondents sought to take an interlocutory 
appeal , without provoking a response from anyone who pre-
viously may have thought that the class action would protect 
his rights. We are not told what, if anything, motivates re-
spondents to continue this crusade on behalf of persons who 
for years have evinced no interest whatever in obtaining re~ 
ant. Such a ilwory is unprrcedented, and its consequrncrs arc bizarre. 
For examplP, rP;;pondents' throry would prrmit <t person to file a class 
action, <·vrn though he had previously accepted full :;ettlemPnt. of hi;; in-
dividual claim , on the ground that. the f.pe.-; incurrPd in anticipation of the 
litigation might ultima1ely bP ~lwred with the ria~. 
4 If a cla.,~-action defendan1 wen' shown to have embn rkeJ on a cour~c 
of conduct d<·signed i.o in>'ula1e thr cla::;::; crrtlfica.tion issue from appellate 
review in order to avoid cla,.;,.~wiclf' liability, n court. in proppr eircum~1am·('S 
might find tlw Gerstein te:;t Ratisfipd and tho case not. moot. Set' Susman v. 
Lincoln American Corp., 5157 F. :2d 866 (CA7 1978); 13 Wright, l\IiliPr & 
Cooper, Fed<·ral Practice and Procedure § 3533, n.L 171 (Rupp. Hl79); 
Commeut, Coutinun1ion and Repre::;enfntion of Class Actions .Following 
Dis.mi,;sa) of the Cia:;.,; Repre:-ientative, 1974 D11ke L . J . 57a, 59\)-600. / 
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covery for themselves.5 On its face, this appears simply to 
be a "lawyer's case." 
Despite tradition~to the contrary, the Court seems 
undisturbed that this federal action will be litigated on remand 
by a lawyer whose only "clients" are unidentified class 
members who have shown no desire to be represented by 
anyone.6 The Court also neglects established principles of 
Art. III jurisprudence and remands to the District Court a 
headless class action that does not meet the requirements of 
Rule 23. 
II 
The Court identifies the question for decision in this case 
as "whether respondents' individual and private case or con-
troversy became moot by reason of the entry of judgment in 
their favor." ld., at 5. Whol1y ignoring the fact that 
respondents themselves elected to appeal only on behalf of 
third parties. the Court concludes that "respondents' individual 
interest in the litigation-as distinguished from whatever may 
be their representative responsibilities to the putative class-
is sufficient to permit their appeal. .. ·." Id., at 12. One 
might expect that the Court would reason to this conclusion 
by pinpointing the individual interest on which it purports to 
rely. But no such reasoning appears in the Court's opinion. 
Although there is some discussion of advantages that generally 
may accrue to named plaintiffs from the use of the class-action 
device, the Court never attempts to ascertain whether these~ 
5 The Mississippi usury statute was amended in 1974, and it apparently 
now authorizes the fees charged by petitioner. 1974 Mis:>. Gen . Laws, ch . 
564, § 7 ; see Miss. Code Ann.§ 75-17-1 (6). Thus, there is no que;;tion of 
prospective relief. 
6 I do not sugge;;t that re,;pondents' lawyer acted improperly in pur,;uing 
thi.:; ca;;e. Since he has prevailed both in thi;; Court and in the Court 
of Appeal;;, the responsibility for allowing client-less litigation f" the 
fede<el '""'"· / 
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particular respondents can derive any such benefit from this 
action.7 
A 
The Court does not explain how it is able to find an 
"individual interest" in the litigation without identifying 
the injury in fact required by Art. III. It simply ignores this 
essential inquiry and relies on the "factual context" of the 
case: When respondents refused the proffered settlement, the 
trial court entered judgment in their favor over their objec-
tion. I d., at 6. 'The single fact of respondents' refusal in~ 
spires the Court to draw a "critica1 distinction" between 
mootness deriving from a judgment and mootness rpsulting 
from events extrinsic to the litigation. I d., at 9. The Court 
appears to hold that a litigant who attempts to appeal from 
a favorable judgment has an "individual interest" in exercis-
ing his "statutory right to appeal." !d., at7. If the statutes 
and rules governing "federal appellate practice" confer such 
a right, the Court 'Concludes that Art. III requires no more. 
Ibid.; see id., at 12. 
Having shifted the inquiry from Art. III mootness to the 
"formulatlion l [of] standards ... govern[ing] the appealabil-
ity of procedural rulings," ibid., the Court aetermines that / 
responde11ts are aggrieved by the denial of certification for two/ 
7 Any auvunlagt>::; that ordinarily may flow from "the Utie of the class 
action procedure for litigation of individual claim,£," ante, at 10, cannot 
accrue to the:>t> respondents who will not be litigating their own claim:s 
on remand. Nor dot>~ tlw Court identify nny unrecovered cotit of litiga-
tion that ·these re:;pondentti can reduce if t11ey obtain relief for :L class. 
See id., at 10, 11. 8; n. 3, supra. Inoeed, t11e Court refers to re:spondents 
only to point ou1 that 'their total damages were so small that they "would 
be unlikely to obtain legal redre:so; at an acceptable cost" if they could not 
do so by mram; of iL cla:;t; action. Ante, at 10, n. 8. We may ao;l:iumc 
that retipondents had some intPre~t in the clasl:l-action procedure a:s a means 
of inlere,1ing thrir lawyers in the case or obtaining a satisfactory settle-
ment. This may be tlll intPre:-~t properly furthered by Rule 2:3, but oncc-
re::;poudenls obtained both accetis to court and full individuul relief that 
intere;;t di::;appeared. 
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reasons. First, the certification order is a "procedural ruling, 
collateral to the merits of [the] litigation," that "stands as 
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." !d., at 9. 
Second, the contrary result would frustrate the goals of 
Rule 23. ld., at 10-12. 
The effect of the Court's analysis, if I understand it cor-
rectly, is to avoid a direct confrqutation with settled priHci-
ples that unambiguously dictate a finding of mootness in this 
case. But the Court cannot escape the impact of these author-
ities simply by refusing to consider the responcleuts' evident 
lack of interest in the outcome. The "critical distinction" by 
w w 1t a m1 to justify its failure to do so is both factually 
and legally uusound. 
B 
As a matter of fact, there is substantial doubt that this case 
involves the effect of "a judgment iu favor of a party at an 
intermediate stage of litigation." !d., at 9. Petitioner has 
never contended that the controversy became moot merely 
"by reason of the entry of judgment in [respondents'] favor." 
!d., at 5. Instead, petitioner argues that its tender of full 
relief has remedied the responuents' individual injuries and 
thus elimwated their sta"ke in the outcome. Considerable 
authority supports petitioner's contention that the teucler itself 
moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. This 
Court, among others, has held that a federal court is powerless 
to review the abstract questions remaining in a case when the 
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settleineut that 
fully satisfies his claims. California v. San Pablo & Tulare 
R. Co .. 14!) U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill & 'l'horna8 
Co. v. United States, 392 F. 2cl 204 (CA6 1968) (per curiam); 
Lamb v. Commissioner, 390 F. 2cl 157 (CA2 1968) (per 
curiam); A. A . . Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F. 2d ~ 
89 (CA5 1965) (per curiam).8 ~ 
8 The Court lllake:; no effort to <.lbtingui:;h lhe:;c ca~es . Yet it concede$ 
that. tllc "nght tu employ Rule 23" i~ a, "procedural right only, aucilhtry 
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I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result 
should differ because the District Court has entered a judg-
ment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their 
lawsuit as moot.0 It is certainly true, as the Court observes, 
that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in 
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There 11ever has been any 
doubt that a party may a J eal those as )ects of a generally 
favorable judgment that adverse y affect bin See 15 Wright, 
Miller, and. Cooper", Fe era ractice and rocedure § 3902 
(1976); 9 M(iore's Federal Practice rr2o3.06 (1975). But 
federal comt uniformly have required a showing of some 
adverse effect in ord.er to confer "standh1g to appeal." Ibid.; 
see Barry v: District oj' Columbia Bd. a{ E(ectio?IS, - U. S. 
App. D. C. - , 580 F. 2d 695 (1978). Indeed, Art. III itself 
requires a continuing controversy between adverse parties a.t 
ali stages of'the litigation. E. g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 
402 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 4'!5 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10' 
(1974) . If any statute or rule purported to authorize an 
appeal in contravention o( Art. III, that rule would yield to· 
the constitutional command: 
c 
TJie Court relies ahno~~-E'Htir~ly on Electrical Fittings Corp. ~ 
v. 'l'hmnas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1939).10 But that deci-/ 
to the litigation of ' sub~htntivc · claim~," ant!' it: admits that "the court 
retain:; no juri~diction over tlw coutrover~y" wlien the ":;ubstautivc claims 
become moot iu tlie Art. III :;en:;c.'' A·ltte, at 6.' If the trnder it::;elf 
mooted the re:;poudeuts' claim:s without regard · to Hie entry of judgment, 
then the Court 'l:l own analy::;i:; requires it to conclude that the case is 
moot. 
9 The "statutory right" to appeal itself cannot. supply a. J>ersonal stake ·' 
m the outcome, for Congre~:; cannot abrogate Art. III limitationt; on the 
juri:sdirtiou of the federal courtt;. Gladstone, Realto1·s v. Village of Bell-
1Vood, 441 l l. S. 91, 100 (1!)79). 
10 The only other authoritie::; rited by the Court are United Airlines, Inc. 
v. McDmwld, 432 U. S. 385 (1977), and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 
43.7.,:U. S. 4ti3 (197~) ... Dictum in both cases stated . that the denial of. claslf· 
I 
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sion simply reaffit·ms our obligation not to review judgmeuts 
by whi()h no individual aggneve . 1e tna court t ero 
had entered a decree hol ing a patent valid but not infringed. 
Although the alleged infringer won the case. it sought to 
appeal the finding that the patent was valid. This Court 
held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to con-
sider the issue of patent validity after the trial court found 
no infringement, because "r a] party may not appeal from a 
judgment ... in his favor, for the purpose of obtaining a 
review of findings ... which are not necessary to support the 
decree." !d. , at 242. But the trial court had ened by includ-
ing in !the decree itself a ruling that "purport[ed] to adjudge 
the validity of [the patentl." Ibid. Since that ruling "was 
immaterial to the disposition of the cause," the Court of 
Appeals had jurisdiction for the limited purpose of eliminating 
the extraneous ruling from the decree. lbi"d. 
The Court reads Electrical Fittings as a case that was "still 
live" in the Art. III sense "because policy considerations per-
. mitted a11 appeal." Ante, at 8- 9. But Electrical Fittings was 
a "live" controversy only because-and to the limited extent 
that-the petitioner there asserted a co11tinuing personal stake \M 
in the outcome. As Judge Learned Hand exp allled. the peti-
tioner in Electrical Fittings was injured 111 fact because the 
unnecessar·y ruling tha.t the patent was valid could have 
created "some presumptive prejudice" against him in a futu:~ ~ 
case. Harries v. Air King Products Co., 183 F. 2d 158, 1y 
IS 
certification i;.. ::;ubject to appellate review aftrr final judgmrnt nL the 
behe:>t of 1 he named plaint iff':;. Neii her cnl:ic di~ru~:>t•d mootm·H~ . and 
neith{'l' nnal.\'zcd the propol"ition in :w~r way. Indcrd, t11C only authority 
cited in Coopers & Lybrawl was Uuited Airlines, see 4:37 U. S., at 4G9, nml 
the only unfhorit~· cited In Unite(? Airlines wal'i :1 concP>i:<ion made b~· the 
deft>ndant and a li:>t of cn~es from tl}(' Conrts of Apprul~ , nonr of whieh 
deali wJth a ~ugge:stion of mootnes;; in an 1malogou,; situation, st>e 432 
U. S., nL :39:~ , nnd n. 14. Sucl1 ·tatemrnls, casually Pnunriatrd without a 
word of Pxplauatiou in opinion:; c!Paling with umelat<·d le!);al qut•"tionR, are- ~ , 
nol eontrollmg or even perHua,ive whrn they are shown on further refle~ 
tion to h ttvP bt·cn incon;:;istent with e:>tubliHhctl bw. 
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(CA2 1950); see In re Trimble Co., 479 F. 2d 103, Ill (CA3 
1973) .11 This genuine prejudice to the petitioner himself 
supplied the requisite personal stake in obtaining reformation 
of the decree. 
Thus, the Court's view of Electrical Fittings is plaiuly incon-
sistent with the holding of that case. The Court of Appeals 
was told to reform the decree, but expressly forbidden to 
consider the merits of the patent validity question. In other 
words, the court's appellate jurisdiction was only as broad as 
the petitioner's persoual stake iu the appeal. Just four years 
later, Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. S. 359 (1943), explained 
that the limitation was constitutionally based. Reversing a 
decision that had relied on Electrical Fittings in refusing to 
consider the merits of an appeal, the Court distinguished 
Electrical Fittings as a case in which the parties sought deci-
sion of "a hypothetical case." The appeal in Altvater, by 
contrast, satisfied "the requirements of case or controversy" 
because the parties continued to contest a counterclaim that 
had not been concluded by the dismissal of the orginal com-
plaint. 319 U. S .. at 363-366. 
Altvater and Electrical Fittings entirely foreclose the 
Court's argument that a party who has no personal stake in 
the outcome of his appeal may invoke the jurisdiction of a 
federal court merely because policy-based "rules of practice" 
permit him to do so. Any doubt is dispelled by Altvater's 
express reliance ou Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 (1942), 
cert. denied. 319 U. S. 748 (1943), a case in which the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed at length the/ 
11 Althouglt thr Court of Appeal:> in Electrical Fittings held that col-
lateral e:,toppel would be no bar to relitigation of the validity que~;tion, 100 
F . 2d 403, 404 (CA2 1938), other courts had taken a different view on 
similar i ::;su e~:; of collateral e~;toppel. If the validity finding were pennitted 
to stand, the petitioner could have been forced to litigate the qut>:;tion of its 
preclusin• pffert in future ca,;es. 15 Wright, Miller. and Cooper, b¥Upr-a 
n. 4, § 3902, at 4Da (1976); lB Moore ':; Federal Practice ~r 0.443[5], at / 
8925 (1974); 9 id., ~[ 203.06, aL 716 (1975). ~
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constitutional limits on appellate jurisdiction. 319 U. S., at 
363, 11. 2. Like the respOI!dents here and the petitioner in 
Electrical Fittings, the appellant in Cover sought to appeal 
from a judgment that had · eliminated his stake in the out-
come.12 The Court of Appeals emphatically declined to as-
sume jurisdiction over an appeal which sought "no relief 
against anybody before the court ... but ... want[ed] an 
advisory opinion that [a] patellt [was] valid." 133 F. 2d, at 
544.13 Since there was no case or controversy, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that it was "without discretion" to hear the 
appeal. J d., at 545. 
These cases demonstrate that the requirements of Art. III 
do not ehange with the "factual context" in which a suggestion 
of mootness arises. See ante, at 5. Whatever the context, 
Art. IJ 1 asks but a single question: Is there a con tin uin cm -
rsy between adverse parties? · · · · 
suggests that a "procedura1r·u ing, collateral to the merit 
a 'tigation ," may be appealed after fi.Hal judgment because 
"policy considerations permi [ t] the appeal" or because the 
ruli11g "stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." 
12 The appellant in Cove1· v. Schwartz. 133 F. 2d 541 (CA2 1942), <:ert. 
denied , :319 U. S. 748 (1943), was the losing plaint.iff iu n patrnt infringe-
ment. act ion . After the trial conrt found thr patent. invalid and not 
infringed, the plnintiff iook an appeal on ihe validity qur~tion without 
contr::;ting the finding of noninfringrment. By accepting the judgment to 
that extent , he lo~L his right to recover from the defendant-and tim~ his 
inten·~t in the litigation. 
1a .Judge Frank wrote for the court: 
"[W]here there is 110 'ju~tiriablf'' di~pute, there are no 'mrritR.' There is 
men·!:'<· an unre<tl entit~' re~embling that di~embodied ~mile which Lewis 
Caron immortalized. Mall~' Supreme Court, decision::; teach us that appel-
late jurbdirtion, wlien no jw;tiriable dispute exist~ on appeal, cannot be 
rel'itcd upon the recollection that ::;uch a dispute previously Pxistrd when 
the ca.~e waH in the trial rourt." 13a F. 2d, at 551 (footnotr;~ omitted). 
See abo Kapp v. National Pootball League, 586 F. 2d G44, 650 (CA9 
1978) ; Ilall v. U. S. Fiber & Plastirs Corp., 476 F. 2d 418, 420 (CA3 
HJ73) ; cf. Lewis v. United States, 21G U. S. 611 (1910) (per curiam). 
~1\0 ·~ 
\~~ 
CAA.J.. 
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Ante, at 8-9. Such collateral rulings-like other rulings-may 
· be appealed only when the litigant has a personal stake iu the 
resolution of his appeaJ.14 In Electrical Fittings, there was 
a stake; here there is none. Since nothing remains of the 
case or controversy, the Court of Appeals should have dis-
missed this case. 
III 
It is clear from the Court's extended discussio11 of policy 
and practical considerations. ante, at 10-12, that these weighed 
heavily in its decision. I am not aware that such considera-
tions eyer before have influenced this Court in <letermining 
whether the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the federal 
courts. ln a11y event, the consequences of a finding of moot-
ness would not b<' as severe as the Court predicts. 
A finding of mootness would have repercussions primarily 
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who 
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to 
a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent 
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification 
generally would be barred by Art. III. But the consequences 
of applying settled rules of mootness in this situation would 
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were 
granted, the absent members of the putative class would have 
obtained by force of stare dt-cisis or the decree itself most of 
the benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand,/ 
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of 
the certification ruling would enable putative class members to 
take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability 
without assumiug the risk of being bound by an unfavorable 
H The Conr( HJlJWar;; io re>cognize thi:; in pa:ssing, ante, at 9, .n . 7, but 
fail::> to apply the rule to thi1:> CHI:>C. Since the Court ;;ugge:-;tH that n•;;pond-
entH' int(•J'P"t lll (he rPrtifiration ruling derive:; from the mere fact tha.t it 
''stand;; H" an ad]11dieation of onP of the i~sues litigated," id .. at 9, Elec-
trical Fittings it::;p]f would limit u~ to the i:;~:>uanre of an ordPr directing that 
the offcn~ive ruling be expunged from the record. 307 U.S., ut 242. 
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judgmeHt. ~"rhus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in 
this situation will reinstate t~e "one-way intervention" that 
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate?5 
Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise 
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before 
judgment, as petitioner did in this case. A defendant cer-
tainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in 
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deuy 
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the 
enforcement of certain 'legal rights by "private attorney[s] 
general." Ante, at 10-11. The practical argument is not 
without force. 'But predicating a judgment on these concerns 
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the ade~ 
quacy of compensation and en'forcement available for particu~ 
la.r substantive Claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best 
left to Cougress. At the very ·least, the result should be 
consistent with the substantive ·taw giving rise to the claim. 
·Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of 
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of ~ 
usury claims/6 the Court's concern for compensation of puta~ 
15 Sp(' Comment, Immediate Appealability of Orders Denying Clni:i:.< Cer-
tification, 40 Ohio St. L.-J. 441, 470-471 (1979). In actions brought under 
Rule 23 (b) (a), a c1n:;s uwmber must decide at the time of certification 
whether to "opt out" of the action under Rule 23 (c) (2). This provision 
was de~>igu<'d to bring an end to thP "spurious" cla:;s action in which class 
members were permitted to intervene after a decision on the merite; 
in ordt>r to secure the benefits of that decision. · Notes of the Advisory 
Commitlee on Proposed Amendment~; to Rule 23, 39 F. R. D. 69, 105-106 
(1966). 
16 Liddell v. Litton Systems. Inc .. 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting bor-
. rower:;' clm:is action) ; Pry v. Layton, 191 Miss: 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (194 . 
Petitioner i~ fl nationfll ba'nk, and its n11eged failure to comply wi 1 Iis-
sissippi'.; intl're:;t limit:; would violate the National Bank Act. 1 f. S. C. 
---- n 85. But t lC I ationul Btmk Act . H:ip nee tate po icy 
----- I disfavoring !he aggregation of usur~· claim:; siaiu th9 fedarul78htut~t iitQ]cs= 
~a_ ~ to protect nntional bnnk:; from d~'s iminatory tre!tfillent or undue· 
peualtk'ti that may be impo~ed by ~;tate Ia . See 12 U. S. C. § 86. 
~1 
~adw · 
\ 
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tive class members in this case is at best misplaced and at 
worst mconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling 
Act.17 
The Court's concern for putative class membC'rs would be 
more telling in a more appropriate case. A patteru of forced 
settlement could indeed ·waste judicial resources on the litiga-
tion of succpssive suits by members of the putative class. I 
do not doubt that the COllsequent problems of judicial admin-
istration would be real. But these problems cau and should 
be addressed by measures short of rewriting the law of moot-
ness, as the Court seems to have done today. The first step 
he authorization of interlocutory appeals from the 
denial of class certificatio1 .18 District Courts already are 
empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 12H2 (b) to certify such appeals 
· · ln many cases. a class-action 
defendant undoubtegly would forgo the OJ)portunity to settle tovt-\wl\t~ (l 
with an i11dividual plaintiff in order to obtain an immediate qlA.U.tiO~ l>\ 
and final rlctermination of the class certification question on llt.W. 
appeal. ~ 
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a class action by 
forced settlement, the District Court is not powerless. In at 
least, some circumstances, it may require that putative class 
members receive some sort of notice and an opportunity to 
intervene within the appeal period. Rule 23 (d) (2). The 
'17 Tlw Ac·t providP:; that rulr~ of proct•dnrc pt·omulg;ttrd b~· this Court 
"shall JJOt ••. enlargr or modif~' auy ;;nb~tanlive right." ~8 1". S. C. 
§ 207:2 . Sec· Anwrican Pipe & Cun~tmctiun Co. v. Utah, 414 P. S. 538, 
557-55~ (HJ74) ; Developnwnt~ iu thP Law-Cia~:; Adion~. 8!) HarY. L. 
Uev. 131K, 1:~5H-135~ (19713). See gerwrally LaJH1er~, Of Legalized Hlack-
mail and LPgalrzc•d Theft: C'on8um<•r Cia~~ Act ions and the Sub~tance-­
l)ron>dure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Re\'. 842 ( HJ7 4). 
18 In CoopN8 ce· Lybrand v. Live~ay. -!;37 U. S. 46!3 (1978), thi..: Court 
hC'ld thllt. tlw clPnia.l of cla~l:i cNtificatiou i;; nol a, '·final deri8ion" a.ppea.l-
able a~ of right undPr 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We reli(•d in that <'aHr on tho 
danger;; of "mrlil'r riminat.e" intNlocutory n·,·iew. ld .. at 47·+. Although 
Coopers & Lybrnnd uow prrvellli< rrview in <'<1~(\~ in which it. would be 
dcsirabl<·, CongrP~:> may rf'rnedy the problem by nppropriate IPgi~lation, 
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availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent 
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District 
Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the 
case at hand may well be preferable to t~~ Court's open-ended 
approval of appeals in ,all cirm.pnstances. To the extent inter-
locutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are 
lacking, it is for Congress--not this Court-to correct t_h_e _ _ , '0,• 
1 
~r A 
deficienc .19 K' OJL.. 
ince a court is limited to the decision o t e case efore it, 
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems often 
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their 
wn. Today's holding is no exception. There is no warrant 
'n Rule 23 for the appointment of a "quasi-class representa-
ive" solely for the purpose of obtaining class certification. 
ince the representative can gain 110thing from a certification 
order, his participation in the case can be intended only to 
enefit the class. Yet he-or most ofteu his counsel-serves 
on his own motion. No court has examined the adequacy 
of his represeutatio11 as required by Rule 23, and no personal 
stake in the outcome assures that vigorous advocacy will con-
tinue. The requirements for certification under Rule 23 are 
not easily applied to a dass action lacking a named plaintiff. 20 
1;'1;'88 
No. 78-904 Roper: Rider A, p. 14 
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case 
before it, iudicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems 
often are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their 
own. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respondents will 
serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for the purpose of 
obtaining class certification. Since they can gain nothing more 
from the action, their participation in the case can be intended 
only to benefit the putative class. Yet they - or their lawyers -
serve on their own motion. Since no court has certified the class, 
there has been no considered determination that respondents will 
fairly and adequately represent its members. Nothing in Rule 23 
authorizes this novel procedure, and the requirements of the Rule 
are not easily adapted to it. Are respondents members of the class 
they seek to represent? See East Texas Motor Freight v; ·Rodriquez, 
431 U.S. 395, 403-404 (1977). Are their currently nonexistent 
claims "typical of the claims ••• of the class" within the 
~11 
meaning of Rule 23(a)(3)?~/ 
The Court's holding well may prevent future "forced 
settlements," and may even foreclose all settlements, of class 
action litigation. See ante, n. 6. Thus, the difficulties faced 
by the District Court on remand in this case may not arise again in 
r···. 
2. 
precisely analogous circumstances. But today's result also 
authorizes appeals by putative class representatives who have 
prevailed on the merits of their individual claims. If the order 
denying class certification is reversed in that situation, the 
named plaintiffs on remand will have no more continuing 
relationship to the putative class than respondents have here. A 
remand for certification could also lead to "one-wav intervention" 
in direct violation of Rule 23. Seef p· 11-12 1la:Q 15, supra. 
These tensions, arising from the express terms of the Rule, 
undermine the Court's conclusion that the policies underlying Rule 
23 dictate the result reached today. 
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A.nd the Court's new rule will contradict Rule 23 directly in ~---­
some cases by inviting a form of intervention that the Rule 
nt to eliminate. See J. 11-12 ' ~ 
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of~ 
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from 
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. It also unneces-
sarily creates significant problems in the administration of 
Rule 23. I would vacate the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals ai1d remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal , 
as moot. 
r,:: 
'a!J e t eir currently nonexistent. claims "typ~ic~'LL..IU..:W£;.J:.LOIJJl~--""~~" 
s::;" within the mPan· ~The District Court properly 
may conclndP on rpmand that respondents, for these or other reasons, 
cannot adequate]~· rrpre::;ent the clal:is. Should intervention be proposed, 
the District Court, on eqt!itable grounds tJl!Fht well refuse to toll the 
statute of limitation;; in order to j1erinit it. !Q. ,._ \ 
me year::; uwe pa:ssed- since t11is action was filed and six :;ince the 
goveming f'nb.tantiw statute was amended to authorize the challenged 
conduet,. In itH order denying certification on September 2!:l, Hl75, the 
District Court a~::;igned a:; one of it:; rea::;ons the pos::;ible "df:'::;truction of the 
[petitioner'::;.! bank" b~· damages then alleged to total $12,000,000 and now 
potentially augmented by the accrual of interest. App. 47, E·ee ante, at 2, 
n. 2. The pos::;ible destruction of 1etitioner's b· nk is irrelevant to the cen-
tral issue of mootne;:;s a::; t 1i::; Court relies so heavily on its pract1ca 
an eqmta. e co . for ~mta.tive class rdi\Jbers, it will hardly be 
ina.ppropria.te for t.he istric.t Court on rem~1M ~ to consider prac-
ticalities and equitie::; on both side::;. In tho circum~nce:; pre:,;ented, the 
Di;;trict Court may well ~l'e no reason to exerci8e its equit11ble discretion 
in favor of putative cla;;s members who have slept on their rights the::;e 
many years. 
~ 
I 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 78-904 
Deposit Guaranty National Bank, I On Writ of Certiorari to 
Jackson, Mississippi, Petitioner, the United States Court 
v. of Appeals for the Fifth 
Robert L. Roper et al. Circuit. 
[February -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICB HowELL, dissenting. 
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that 
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the 
National Bank Act and Mississippi 1aw.1 They filed this 
action late in 1971 to recover those •charges plus a penalty 
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and 
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents a:lso sought relief on behalf 
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggre-
gating $12 mi1lion. After four years of 'litigation, the District 
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification. 
Seven months "later, petitioner tendered to respondents the 
full amount of their individual Claims plus 'legal interest and 
court costs. Over respondents' objection, the District Court 
entered final judgment in their favor. 
No one disputes that respondents themselves have received 
everything they could have recovered from petitioner in this 
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed 
the denial of class certification; This Court affirms the j udg-
ment of the Court of Appeals without identifying the case or 
controversy that remains to be 'litigated between the parties. 
The Court decides that the central issue is not mootness but 
t Jurisdiction was premi~ed on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. §§ 85, 
86, whicl! adopts the interest limits set by state law, and 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1355, 
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appealability. But the characterization does not withstand 
analysis. Since respondents lack a continuing interest in the 
outcome of the litigation, the Court of Appeals was powerless 
to hear their appeal. Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
Although there are some differences, this case is similar to 
United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at -, 
in one important respect: both require us to decide whether 
putative class representatives may appeal the denial of class cer-
tification when they can derive no benefit from the relief sought 
in the action. ln this case, as in Geraghty, the District Court 
refused to certify a class. Since no one has sought to inter-
vene, respoudents are the only plain tiffs arguably present in 
court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in the 
injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only dam-
ag<'s; those damages have been tendered iu fulP Respondents 
have not suggested that success on the certification motion 
would entitle them to additional relief from the petitioner.8 
2 Although r<'~:>pondents also asked for attorney's fees, their complaint 
:,~hows that fees were to be granted only f10m the damag~ ultimately 
awurded to them or the class. App. 13-14. 
n Respondrnts do assert that certification would enable them to reduce the 
CXJJensc of litigation by allocating costs among the members of a prevailing 
clar;s. Brief for Respondents 33. Except for a.ttorney's fees, however, 
respondents do not identify any costs incurred t.o date that. are not 
covf'red by the petitioner's tender. Although the record does not reveal 
the details of thr fee arrangement between respondents and their lawyers, 
thr romplaint :o:ugge:;ts tha.t the lawyer:; have agreed to accept as full com-
pcm;ation 25% of the amount recovered from the petitioner. App. 13-14. 
Tf this is the agreement as to fees, respondents have no continuing interest. 
On!~· counsf'l is concerned whether the recovery is enla.rged. 
Even if one assumed that respondents' liability to their lawyer:; could be 
reduced by a cluHs recovery, no one has suggested that petitioner i;, or ever 
will be liable for fees that ult.imately may be owed by respondents. Re-
spondents' jurisdictional theory appears to be thu.t. the mere possibility of 
asserting future claims for attorney's fees against other members of a 
putative class gives rise to a case or controver:::;y against the class defend-
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Indeed. their personal claims to relief have been abandoned 
so completely that 119 appeal was taken in their own names. 
The notice of appeal filed with the District Court recites that 
respondents appeal only "on behalf of all ·others similarly 
situated .... " App. 63. 
Since respondents have no continuing personal stake in the 
outcome of this action, I believe that Art. III and the prece-
dents of this Court require that the case be dismissed as moot. 
Sec Geraghty, post, at --- (PowELL, J., dissenting). 
There is no suggestion that respondents' claims are "capable 
of repetition, yet evading review." Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 
U.S. 103, 110-111, n. 11 (1975).4 And not a single one of the 
alleged 90,000 class members has sought to intervene in the 
f\il\t..-~ years since this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines, 
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone 
ever challenged the allegedly usurious charges by informal 
complaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certifi-
cation was denied, the action lay dormant during the seven 
months in which respondents sought to take an interlocutory 
appeal, without provoking a response from anyone who pre-
viously may have thought that the class action would protect 
his rights. We are not told what, if anything, motivates re-
spondents to continue this crusade on behalf of persons who 
for years have evinced no interest whatever in obtaining re-
ant.. Sut•h a theory i~ unprect>dented, and its conSPquences are bizarre. 
For cxrunple, respondents' theory would permit a person to file a. clas~ 
act.ion, even though he had previousl~r accepted full settlemt>nt. of his in~ 
dividual cln.i.m, on the ground that. the f·Pcs incurred in aJlticipation of the 
litigation might ultimately b€' shared with the class. 
1 If n. class-action defendant were o;hown to have embarked on a course 
of ronduct d!'signed tQ insulate the class certification is.-<ue from appellate 
review in ord!'r to avoid ch1sswide liability, a court in proper circu.m.:;tances 
might find tlw Gerstein tl':'lt <><ttisfied a.nd the case not moot. See Susman v, 
Liw·oln American Corp., 587 F. 2d Rfi6 (CA7 1978); 13 Wright , Miller & 
Coop€'r, Fedmtl Pmctire ;md Procedure § 3533, at 171 (Supp. 1979); 
Comment., Continuation and Repre::;rnfation of Cln~s Actions Following 
Djf'JUis:;;al of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke ·L, J. 573, 599-000, · 
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covery for themselves.5 On its face, this appears simply to 
be a "lawyer's case." 
Despite tradition and policy considerations to the contrary, 
the Court seems undisturbed that this federal action will be 
litigated on remand by a lawyer whose only "clients" are 
unidentified class members who have shown no desire to be 
represented by anyone.6 The Court also neglects established 
principles of Art. III jurisprudence and remands to the Dis~ 
trict Court a headless class action that does uot meet the 
requirements of Rule 23. 
II 
The Court identifies the question for decision in this case 
as "whether respoudents' individual and private case or con-
troversy became moot by reason of the entry of judgment in 
their favor." Td., at 5. Wholly ignoring the fact that 
respondents themselves elected to appeal only ou behalf of 
third parties, the Court concludes that "respondents' individual 
interest in the litigation-as distinguished from whatever may 
be their representative responsibilities to the putative class--
is sufficient to permit their appeal. ... " I d., at 12. One 
might expect tha.t the Court would reason to this conclusion 
by pinpointing the individual interest on which it purports to 
rely. But no such reasoning appears in the Court's opinion. 
Although there is some discussion of advantages that generally 
may accrue to named plaintiffs from the use of the class-action 
device, the Court never attempts to ascertain whether these 
5 Tho Missi8sippi usury statut.e was amended in 1974, and it apparently 
uow autl10rizes the fees charged by petitioner. 1974 Mi~s. Gen . Laws, ch. 
564, § 7; :,<'e l\lir;s. Code Ann. § 75-17-1 (6). Thus, there is no question of 
prospective relief. 
6 I do not ::;ugge:st that respondents' lawyer acted improperly in pursuing-
thi:; ~c. SincP he has prevailed both in this Court and m the Court 
{)f Apveab, the re::;ponsibility for allowing client-lr:;s litigation falls Oil 
the federal courtll . 
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•particular respondents can derive any such benefit from this 
·action.7 
A 
The Court does not explain how it is able to find an 
"intlividual interest" in the litigation without identifying 
the injury in fact required by Art. III. It simply ignores this 
rss{:'ntial inquiry and relies on the "factual context" of the 
case: When respondents refused the proffered settlement, the 
trial court entered judgment in their favor over their objec-
tion. I d., at 6. The single fact of respondents' refusal in-
spires the Court to draw a "critical distinction" between 
mootness deriving from a judgment and mootness resulting 
from events extrinsic to the litigation. ld., at 9. The Court 
appears to hold that a litigant who attempts to appeal from 
a favorable judgment has an "individual interest" in exercis-
ing his "statutory right to appeal." !d., at 7. If the statutes 
and rules governing "federal appellate practice" confer such 
a right, the Court ·concludes that Art. Ill requires no more. 
lb·id.; see id., at 12. 
Having shifted the inquiry from Art. III mootness to the 
11formulat[ion] [of] standards ... govern[ing] the appealabil-
ity of procedural rulings," ibid., the Court determines that 
respondents are aggrieved by the denial of certification for two 
7 Any advantage::J thaL ordinarily may flow from "the u~e of the class 
action proeedure for litigation of individual claims," ante, at 10, cannot 
n.ccrue to tlH'HC re~pondent::J who will not b3 litigaLing their own claims 
ou remand. Nor does the Court identify ~tny unrecovered cost of litiga-
tion that the:se re~:~pondents can reduce if they obtain relief for a cla::;s. 
See id., ut 10, n . 8; n. 3, sup·ra. Indeed, the Court refer:; to re::;pondentl::~ 
only to point out that their totill damages were ~o ~mall that they "would 
be uulikely to obtain legal redress at an acceptable co~;t" if they could not 
do so by meanFO of a clas::; action. Ante, at 10, n . 8. We may a~~ume 
that rt>spondrn1s had some interest in the class-action procPdure as a mean::; 
of interesting their lawyers in the case or obtaining a satisfactory settle-
ment. This may be an intere::;t properly furthered by Rule 23, but onco 
respondent,.: obtained both accc::;s to court and full individual relief that 
interest disappeared. 
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reasons. First, the certification order is a "procedural ruling, 
collat<>ral to the merits of [the] litigation," that "stands as 
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." !d., at 9. 
Second, the con~rary result would frustrate the goals of 
Rule 23. !d., at 10-12. 
The effect of the Court's analysis, if I understand it cor-
rectly, is to avoid a direct confrontation with settled princi-
ples that unambiguously dictate a nnding of mootness in this 
case. But the Court cannot escape the impact of these author-
ities ~:~imply by refusing to consider the respondents' evident 
Jack of interest in the outcome. The "critical distinction" by 
which it attempts to justify its failure to do so is both factually 
and legally unsound. 
B 
As a matter of fact, there is substantial doubt that this case 
involves the effect of "a judgment in favor of a party at an 
intet·mediate stage of litigation." ld., at 9. Petitioner has 
never contended that the controversy became moot merely 
"by reason of the entry of judgment in [respondents' ] favor." 
I d., at 5. Instead, petitioner argues that its tender of full 
t·elief has remedied the respondents' individual injuries and 
thus eliminated their stake in the outcome. Considerable 
authority supports petitioner's contention that the tender itself 
moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. This 
Court, among others, has held that a federal court is powerless 
to review the abstract questions remaining in a case when the 
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that 
fully satisfies his claims. California v. San Pablo & Tulare 
R. Co. , 149 U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill & Thomas 
Co. v. United States, 392 F. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per curiam); 
Lamb v. Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968) (per 
curiam); A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F. 2d 
89 (CA5 1965) (per curiarn) .8 
8 The Court makc:s no effort to distingui~h these ca:ses. Yet it concedes 
that the "right to employ Rule 23" i~ a "procedural right ouly, ancillary-
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I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result 
should differ because the District Court has entered a judg .. 
ment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their 
lawsuit as moot.0 It is certainly true, as the Court observes, 
that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in 
itsplf moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any 
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally 
favorable judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wright, 
Miller. and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure ~ 3902 
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practice 1T 203.06 (1975). But 
federal courts uniformly have required a showing of some 
aclvPrse effect in order to confer "standing to appeal." Ibid.; 
see Barry v. District of Columbia Bd. of Election s, - U. S. 
App. D. C.-, 580 F. 2d 695 (1978). Indeed, Art. lli itself 
requires a continuing controversy between adverse parties at 
all stages of the litigation. b'. g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 
402 0975); Steffel v. 'l'hornpson, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10 
(1974) . If allY statute or rule purported to authori:-;e an 
appeal ill coutravention of Art. III, that rule would yield to 
the coustitutional command. 
c 
The Court relies almost entirely on Electrical Fittings Corp. 
v. 'l'homas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1939).10 But that deci-
to the litigation of suu:stantive claims," and it admit:; that <;the court 
l'C'Iain~ uo jnri::;diction over t1H~ controversy" wlwn the ":sub:stautive claims 
h<•<•onw moot in the Art. III ~enHe." Ante, at 6. If the tender itl:le!f 
nwol!·d the respomlents' claim~ without regard to the entry of judgment, 
theu th(• Court's own analy:;i:s requires it to conclude that the case is 
moot . 
u The "statutory right" to appeal itself cannot SUJJply a. per8onal :sta.ke 
l1l llw oulcomt:', for Congre:s:s cannot abrogate Art. III limitutwn:s on the 
juri~tlietion of the federal court:;. Gladstone, Realtors v. Villaye of Bell-
toood. 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) . 
1" The ouly other anthoritie;; cited by the Court are United Airl!'lte~, Inc. 
v. McDonald, 4:32 U.S. 385 (1977), and Coopers & Lybraud v. Live~ay, 
43( U .. S. 4(i3 (19(8). Dlct~~m in both rases stated that the denial of class· 
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sion simply reaffirms our obligation not to review judgments 
by which no individual is aggrieved. The trial court there 
had entered a decree holding a patent valid but not infringed. 
Although the alleged infringer won the case, it sought to 
appeal the finding that the patent was valid. This Court 
held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to con-
sider the issue of patent validity after the trial court found 
no infringement, because "[a] party may not appea1 from a 
judgment . . . in his favor, for the purpose of obtaining a 
review of findings .. __ which are not necessary to support the 
rlecree." I d., at 242. But the trial court had erred by includ-
ing in the decree itself a ruling that "purport[edj to adjudge 
the validity of [the patent]." Ibid. Since that ruling "was 
immaterial to the disposition of the cause," the Court of 
Apjwa]s had jurisdiction for the limited purpose of eliminating 
the extra11eous ruling from. the decree. Ibid. 
The Court reads Electrical Fittings as a case that was "still 
live" in the Art. Til sense "because policy considerations per-
mitted an appeal." Ante, at 8-9. 'But Electrical Fittings was 
a "live" controversy only because-and to the limited extent 
that-the petitioner there asserted a continuiug personal stake 
il1 the outcome. As Judge Learned Hand later explamed, the 
p<'titioner in Electrical Fittings was injured in fact because the 
unnecessary ruling ·that the patent was valid could have 
created "some presumptive prejudice" agaiust him m a future 
case. Harries v. Air King Products Co., 183 F. 2d 158, 161 
eertific-ation i~; ~ubject to appellate review after final judgment at the 
hclwst of the named plaintiffs. Neit11er· cal:le di:,;cu~~<'d mootne~s, and 
ncitl1er analyzed the propol:lition in any -way. Indeed, the only authority 
<-it<'d in Coopers t~ Lybrand was United· Airlines, ~ee 437 U. S., at 469, and 
I h<' only authority eited in United Airlines wa~ a conc~~;ion made by the 
defPndanl !mel a 1i8t of cases from the Courts of Appeals, none of which 
UPall with a Huggestion of mootne,;s in an analogous c;ituHtion, :see 432 
F. S., at 393, nml n. 14. Such statements, casually enunciated without a 
word of PXplanation in opinion!:! dealing with unrelated legal quec;tioni:i, are 
110L eontrolling o1· even per~uasive when they are Hhown on further reflec-
tion to l1ave been .inconsistent with C::itnhliiihed law. 
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{CA2 1950); see In re Trimble Co., 479 F. 2d 103, 111 (CA3 
1973) . l 1 This genuine prejudice to the petitioner himself 
'Supplied the requisite personal stake in obtaining reformation 
of the decree. 
Thus, the Court's view of Electrical Fittings is plaiuly incon~ 
·sistent with the holding of that case. The Court of Appeals 
was told to reform the decree, but expressly forbidden to 
consider the merits of the patent va.tidity question. In other 
words, the court's appellate jurisdiction was only as broad as 
the petitioner's personal stake in the appeal. Just four years 
later, Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. S. 359 (1943), explained 
that the limitation was constitutionally based. Reversing a 
decision that had t'elied on Electrical Fittings in refusiug to 
consider thf' merits of an appeal, the Court distinguished 
Electrical Fittings as a case in which the parties sought deci. 
sion of "a hypothetical case." The appeal in Altvater, by 
eontrast, satisfied "the t'equiremeuts of case or controversy" 
because the parties continued to contest a counterclaim that 
had not been concluded by the dismissal of the orginal com· 
plaint. 319 U. S .. at 363-366. 
Altvater aud Electrical Fittings entirely foreclose the 
Court's argument that a party who has no personal stake in 
the outcome of his appeal may invoke the jurisdiction of a 
federal court merely because policy-based "rules of practice'·' 
permit him to do so. Auy doubt is dispelled by Altvater's 
express reliauce on Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 (1942), 
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943), a case in which the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed at length the 
11 Although the Court of Appeals in Electrical F'ittings lwld that col~ 
lateral e::,toppel would be no bar to relitiga.tion of the validity 4ue~;tion, 100 
F . 2d 403, 404 (CA2 19S8), other courts had taken a different view on 
similar issues of collateral estoppel. If the validity finding wen' permitted 
to stand, the petitioner could have been forced to litigate the 4Uei:ition of its 
preclu~;ive effpet. in future case::;. 15 Wright, Miller, and Cooper, supra 
n. 4, §3902, at 403 (1976); 1B Moore'~; Federal PractJce ,[0.443 [5] , at 
3925 (1974) ; 9 id., , 203.06, a.t 716. (1975}. 
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constitutional limits on appellate jurisdiction. 3Hl U. S., at 
363, n. 2. Like the respondents here and the petitioner in 
Electrical Fittings, the appellant in Cover sought to appeal 
from a judgment that had eliminated his stake in the out-
come.12 The Court of Appeals emphatically declined to as-
sume jurisdiction over an appeal which sought "no relief 
against anybody before the court ... but ... want[ed] an 
advisory opinion that [a] patent [was] valid." 133 F. 2d, at 
544.13 Since there was no case or controversy, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that it was "without discretion" to hear the 
appC'al. I d., at 545. 
ThesP cases demonstrate that the requirements of Art. III 
do not ehangl· with the "factual context" in which a suggestion 
of mootness al'is<'s. See ante, at 5. Whatever the context, 
Art. III asks but a single question: Is there a continuing con-
troversy between adverse parties'? In Electrical Fittings, the 
controversy continued with respect to the single narrow 
issue whether the District Court's ruling on patent validity 
properly was included in the decree. But nothing in that 
casf' suggests that a "procedural ruling, collateral to the merits 
12 The appt%m1 in Covel' v. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 (CA2 Hl42), cert. 
deuied, 319 t l. S. 748 (1943), was the losing plaintiff in a patent mfringe-
mcnt aetion . Aft<'r the trial court found the patent invalid and not 
infringed, the plaintifi took an appeal on the validity question without 
ronte:;t ing the fin<l'ing of noninfringement. By accepting the judgment to 
that extent, he lo~t his right to recover from the defendant-and tlm~ his 
intere:;t in 1 he litigation. 
1 a Judge Frank wrote for the court: 
"[W]here there iH no 'ju~ticiable' di~pnte, there arc no 'merits.' There is 
merPI~· an nnreal entity resembling that disembodied smile which Lewis 
Caroll immortalized. Man~· Supreme Court deci:;ions teach us that appel-
late jurbdi<"tiou, when no ju:;tiriable dispute exist:; on appeal , cannot be 
t•esl<'d upon the r<'collection that :;uch a dispute previou::;ly existed when 
the ea.~e wtt;:; in th<' trial court .. " 133 F. 2d, at 551 (footnote:; omitted) . 
See al:;o Ka11JJ v. National Fi10tball League, 586 F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9 
1978); Hall ' . U. S. Piba & PlMtics Corp., 476 F. 2d 41H, 420 (CA3: 
19i3); cf. Lewi8 v. United States, ~Hi U.S. 611 (1910) (per curiam). 
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of a litigation," may be appealed after final judgment because 
"policy considerations permi [ t] the appeal" or because the 
r•uling "stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." 
Ante, at 8-9. Such collateral rulings-like other rulings-may 
be appealed only wheu the litigant has a personal stake in the 
resolution of his appeal.14 In Electrical Fittings, there was 
a stake; here there is none. Since nothing remains of the 
case or controversy, the Court of Appeals should have dis-
h1issed this case. 
III 
It is clear from the Court's extended discussion of policy 
and practical cousiderations, ante, at 10-12, that these weighed 
]wavily in its decision. ':r am not aware that such considera-
tions ever before have infiue11ced this Court iu determining 
whether the Constitution couiers jurisdiction on the federal 
courts. In any event, the consequences of a finding of moot-
ness wouid uot be as severe as the Court predicts. 
A finding of mootness wouid have repercussions primarily 
in two situations. The flt'st involves a named plaintiff who 
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to 
a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent 
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification 
generally would be barred by Art. 'III. But the consequences 
of applying settled rules of mootness in this situation would 
not be unjust. If iuj unctive or declaratory relief were 
granted, the absent members of the putative class would have 
obtained by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of 
the benefits of actuai class membership. If, on the other hand, 
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of 
the CE'rtification ruling would enable putative class members t('). 
H The Court appea rs to recogni:te thi~ in IJas~ing, ante, at. 9, n . 7, but 
faib to apply the rule to this ca~e. Since the Court, sugge~t~ that re.~pond­
eut:;' in((•re~t in the C'ertifi('ation ruling derive:; from thr mere fact that it 
'';;Land;; HH an udjudic·ation of one of the issues litigated," id ., at 9, Elec• 
tl'ical Ji'ittiugs it;;elf would limit u~; to the i s>~uance of an order directing that 
the offen~ive ruling be expunged from the record. 307 U. S., at 242. 
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take advantage of a favorable judgment on tJ1e issue of liabillty 
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable 
judgment. Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in 
this situation will reinstat·e the "one-way intervention" that 
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate.15 
Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise 
when the defendant a.ttempts to force a settlement before 
judgment, as petitioner did in this case. A defendant ·cer-
tainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in 
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny 
compensation to putative class members a.nd jeopardize the 
enforcement of certa.in legal rights by "private attorney[s] 
general." Ante, at 10-11. The practical argument is not 
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns 
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the ade-
quacy of compensation and enforcement available for particu-
lat' substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best 
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be 
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim. 
1'oday, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of 
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of 
usury claims,16 the Courfs concern for compensation of puta" 
15 Set> Commcnf, Immediate Appealability of Order~:~ Denying Class Cer-
tification, 40 Ohio St. L. J. 441, 470-471 (1979). In action:; brought under 
Rule 23 (b) (3), a dm:i:> member must decide at the time of certification 
whelher to "opt out" of tl10 action undcr Rule 23 (c) (2). This provision 
wu . ., de,;ig:ned to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class 
members were permitted lo intervene after a decision on the merits 
in order to secure the benefits of that decision. Note>: of the Advisory 
Committee on Propo~ed Amendment:; to Rule 23, 39 F. R D . 69, 105-106 
( 1906). 
16 Liddell v. Litton Systems. Inc .. 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting bor-
rowl:'rs' elas::; netion) ; 'P1'y v. Layton, 191 Mi::;s. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941). 
Petitioner is a national bank, and i1H alleged failure to com]Jly with Mi~::~­
si::;~ippi'., interc~t limit::; would violale t1te National Bank Act. 12 U. S. C . 
§ 5. But I do not undrrstand that the National Bank Act displaces st4te 
jlOli!·y dit:~favoring the aggn•gation of usury claim~::~ . A primary purpose of 
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tive class members in thi case is at best misplaced and at 
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling 
Act.17 
The Court's concern for putative class members would be 
mor·e telliug in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced 
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litiga-
tion of successive suits by members of the putative class. I 
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial admin-
istration would be real. But these problems can and should 
be addressed by measures short of rewriting the law of moot-
ness, as the Court seems to have done today. The first step 
shoul(l be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the 
dt>nial of class certification in appropriate circumstances.15 
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. ~ 1292 
(b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain con-
trolling questions of law. In many cases. a class-action 
drfendaut undoubtedly would forgo the OJ)portunity to settle 
with an individual plaintiff in order to obtain an immediate 
and final determination of the class certification question on 
appeal. 
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a class action by 
forced settlement, the Distl'ict Court is not powerless. In at 
that· Act i:-, to proteet nRtionnl banks from discriminatory treatment or 
unduP penalties that mny be imposed by ;;tate Jaw. See 12 U. S. § 86. 
17 The Act proY:iues tha:t rules of procedure promulgated by this Court 
"shall not . . . <'nlarge or modify any substantive right." 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2072. Sec Ame1'ican Pi7Je (~ Construction Co. v. Utah~ 414 U. S. 538, 
557-558 (1974): Development::; in t1w Law-Cia~::; Actions, Sn Harv. L. 
Rev. 1:318, 1:358-1:359 (19i(i). See generally Landers, Of Legalized Black-
mail nnd Legalized Theft: Con;~umer Clas,; Actions and the Sub:stance-
Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. llev. 842 (11:174). 
18 In Coope1's & 'Ly'braru1 v. Livesay, 4:37 U. S. 463 (1978), this Court 
h~ld th<~t the denial of cia~ certification is not a "final deci8ion" appeal~ 
nhle as of right undc·r 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We relied in tha.L case on the 
dangers of "indi~crimina.te" interlocutory review. !d., a.t 474 Although 
Coopers (~ Lyln1and now prevents review in cases in which it. would be 
.d~irabie, Congre,;:l lJlay remedy the problem by appropriate legi~a.twn, 
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least, some circumstances, it may require that putative class 
members receive some sort of notice and .-an opportunity to 
intervene within the appeal period. Rule 23 (d) (2). 'The 
availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent 
to the dE-liberate mooting ·of .class actions. Indeed, District 
Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the 
case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended 
approval of appeals in all circumstances~ · To the extent inter-
locutory appeals are unavailable or mauagerial powers are 
lacking, it is for Congress-not this Court-to correct the 
deficiency .w 
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it, 
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems often 
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their 
own. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respond-
ents will serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for the 
purpose of obtaining class certification. Since they can gain 
nothing more from the action, their participation in the case 
can be intended only to benefit the putative class. 'Yet they-
or their lawyers-serve on their own motion. Since no court 
has certified the class, there has been no considered determina-
tion that respondents will fairly and adeqhately represent its 
members. Nothing in Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure, 
and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it. 
Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent? 
See East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 
1° Congress currently has before it u bill t1mt attempts to remedy the 
diflicultie~ infrcting this troubled area. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1979). The bill, supporte·d by the Department of Justice, propo::;es to 
bypass the Hule.,; l!..'nabling Act problem, ::;ee n. 17, supra, and to eliminate 
some of tl1e problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by 
creating a new federal rigbt of action for damage;,; . The bill provide,; for 
the enforcement of this right in ::;ome instance~ through actions brought in 
the name of the Unitt:>d States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory 
uppeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace clai:>s cer-
tifiration under the propo::ied proceduret:~. 
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403-404 (1977). Are their currently nonexistent claims "typi-
cal of the claims ... of the class" within the meaning of Rule 
23 (a) (3) '? 20 
Tht> Court's holding well may prevent future "forced set-
tlements," and may even foreclose all settlements of class S 
action litigation. See ante, n. Thus, the difficulties faced 
by the District Court 011 remand in this case may not arise 
again i11 precisely a11alogous circumstances. But today's result 
· also authorizes appeals by putative class representatives who 
have prevailed on the merits of their individual claims. If the 
order denying class certification is reversed in that situation, 
the umned plai11tiffs 011 remand will have no more continuing 
relationship to the put~;ttive class than respondents have 
here. A remand for certification could also lead to "one-way 
intervention" in direct violation of Rule 23. Seep. 11-12, and 
n. 15, supra. These tensions, arising from the express terms 
of the Rule, undermine the Court's conclusion that the 
policies uuderlying Rule 23 dictate the result reached today. 
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of 
20 The Di:strict Court properly may conclude on remand that respondents, 
for these or othrr real"ons, cannot adequately represent the cla~s. Should 
intervention be propo~ed, the District Court on equitable grounds mi ht 
well refu:;e to toll the statute of limitations in order to permit it. Pflne years 
have passed since thi:; action was filed and six since the governmg :;ubotan-
tive ~o;tatutP was atm•nded to authorize the challenged conduct. In it:; order 
denying certification on September 29, 1975, the District Court assigned as 
one of its rea;.;ons the possible "destruction of the [petitioner's] bank" by 
dam11ge~ then 11lleg('d to total $12,000,000 and now potentially augmented 
by the accrual of interest. App. 47, see 'lnte, at 2, n . 2. The possible 
destruction of petitioner's bank is irrelevant to the central is:;ue of moot-
ness, but ~o;enou~ indPed to depositor::;, :;tockholders, and the community 
;orrved. A,; thi:s Court relie::; so hPavily on ib practical and equitable con-
cerns for putative elass membPrs, it will hardly be inappropriate for the 
Di,trict Court on remand to eonoider practicalities and equitie:; on both 
sidP~. In the circum:;tances presented, the District Court may well oee no 
reason to exerci:se it~ equitable dil;cretion in favor of putative cla8s memben~ 
who have sleiJl on their right;; these many years. 
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forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from 
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. It also unneces-
sarily creates significant problems in the administration of 
Rule 23. I would vacate the ·judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and remand with instructions to dismiss :the appeal 
as moot. 
.I A 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART 
joins, dissenting. 
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that 
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the 
National Barik Act and Mississippi law.1 'They filed this 
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty 
equal to the same amount, for iudividua1 totals of $683.30 and 
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf 
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggre-
gating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District 
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification. 
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the 
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and 
CO\}rt costs. Over respondents' objection, the District Court 
entered final judgment in their favor. Petitioner then depos-
ited the full amount due with the clerk of the court. 
No one disputes that the petitioner has tendered every-
thing that respondents could have recovered from 'it in this 
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir- · 
cuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed 
tqe denial of class certification. This Court affirms the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals without identifying the case or 
controversy that remains to be litigated between the parties. 
1 Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U.S. C. §§ 85, 
86, which adopt the interest limits o;et by state law, and 28 ·u . S. C. 
§ 1355. 
78-904-DISSENT 
2 DEPOSIT GUARA TY NAT. BANK v. ROPER 
The Court decides that the central issue is not mootness but 
appealability. But the characterization does not withstand 
analysis. Since respondents lack a continuing interest in the 
outcome of the litigation. the Court of Appeals was powerless 
to hear their appeal. Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
Although there are some differences, this case is similar to 
Un·ited States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at -, 
in one important respect: both require us to decide whether 
putative class representatives may appeal the denial of class-cer-
tification when they can derive no benefit from the relief sought 
in the actiou. In this case, as in Gerayhty, the District Court 
refused to certify a class. Since no Olle ·has sought to inter-
vene, respondeuts are the only plaintiffs arguably present in 
court. Yet respoudents have uo continuing interest in the 
injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only dam~ 
ages; those damages have been tendered in fulP Respondents 
have not suggested that success on the certification motion 
would entitle them to additional relief from the petitioner.3 
2 Although respondrnt:; also a::;ked for attorney's fees, their complaint 
shows that feet' were to be grantrd only from the damages ultimately 
awarded to them or the elm;:;, App. 13-14. 
3 Rt·~ponJrm::; do a~:;ert that <:t•rtification would enable them to reduce the 
expenHe of litigation by allocating co;;t:; among the members of a prevailing 
clasH. Brief for Rf'SponJents ;);3 . ExPrpt for !~Horney's fees, however, 
respond€'11t~ tlo not ident if~, any co:>ts incurred· to date tlmt, are not 
covered by the petitroner's tender Although tlw record does not reveal 
the detuilt~ of the fee arrnngem('ut between respo)ulents and their l!twyers, 
the complaint :;ugg(':>ts that the lawyer:; have ugr~ed to accept as full com-
pen~ation 25% of the amount recovered from the petitioner. Apf>. 13-14. 
If this j, th<:> agreement a:; to · fees, I'('S])Olldents have no continuing interest. 
Only cotm,;d is concrrned whether the recovery is enlarged: · 
Even if one assumed that respondents' liability to their lawyers could be 
reduced by a dass recovery, no one has &·ugge:oted that petitioner is or ever 
will he liable for fre,; tha.L ult.imatrly ma~· be owed by re.;pondents: Re-
spondent,' juri::rlictioual t.heory appear::; to be tha.l the mere pos:;ibility of 
assort.ing ftttu re ela.im:-; for aJtonH• ':-; fet..>:> against ot-her membere. of .a. 
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IndE>Pd, their personal claims to relief have been abandoned 
so completely that uo appeal was taken in their own names. 
The 11otice of appeal filed with the District Court recites that 
rcsp011dents appeal only "on behalf of all others similarly 
situa.ted .... " App. 63. 
Since respondents have no continuing personal stake in the 
ou teo me of this action, I believe that Art. III and the prece-
dents of this Court require that the case be dismissed as moot. 
R<>c Geraghty, post, at --- (PowELL, J., dissenting). 
Tlwre is no suggestio11 that respondents' claims are "capable 
of repetition, yet evading review." C'f. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 
U.S. 103, 110-111, n. 11 (1975):4 And not a single one of t~e 
all<•ged 90,000 class members has sought to intervene in tpe 
11ine years since this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines, 
he. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone 
ever challenged the allegedly usurious charges by infornial 
complaint or protest. Tr. of Oral A1·g. 4. Even after certifi-
cation was denied, the action lay dormant during the seven 
months in which respondents sought to take an interlocutory 
appeal, without provoking a response from anyone who pre-
viously may have thought that the class :wtion would protect 
his rights. We are not told what, if anything, motivates re-
spondents to continue this crusade on behalf of persons who 
putnli\'(' C"la,;;; givE':' rise to a case or controversy against the class defend-
ant. Such a. theory i~ nnprecf'u~>ntcd, and its consequences are biza.rre. 
l!~or t'xampl<-\ rt>spondf'nts' theory would pcnni1, a person to file. iL class 
:wtion, C'Vf'll though he had pmvi011~ly act•rptPd full settlC'ment of his in-
dividual rl:Lim, on thf' ground that. the fees incurrf'd in anticiptLtion of the 
litiga1ion might ult.imatt'ly bt• ~hart"d with the ela>:.-;, 
4 If a class-aetion defendant W<'l'f' ,.;hown to have ~>mbarkcd on a. course 
of ('Ondurt. desiguPd Lo in~uhte 1 he da&;;; Ct'Jtifiea.tion is.'>ue from appellate 
l'C\'iew 111 ordC'r to a.void cla&;wid~> liability, n court. in proper circmnstances 
llligbt find the Gerstein tr:-;t. ~Htisfit•d tU1d th0 ea,.;e no1. moot. See Su.sman v. 
Li11coln Ametican Corp ., 587 F . 2cl R6() (CA7 1978); 1:3 Wright, Miller & 
Cooper, Federal Practice nnd Procedure § 35:~3, a.t 171 (Supp. 1979); 
Comment. Co1i1 inuation and Hf'pr!',;eHfation of Class Action:; Following 
Dismis;;al of the Class EeJlresentat.ive, 1974 .Du~e L . J . 573, 59~600, . 
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for years have evinced no interest whatever in obtaining ra .. 
covery for themselves! On its face, this appears simply to 
be a "lawyer's case." 
Despite traditio11 and policy considerations to the contrary, 
the C'ourt seems undisturbed that this federal action will be 
'• 
litigated on remand by a lawyer ·whose only "clients" are 
uuidentifieq class members who have shown no desire to be 
represented by anyone.6 ·'rhe Court also neglects established 
priHciples of Art. III 'jurisprudence, and remands to the Dis-
trict Court a headless c1ass action that does not meet the 
requirements of Rule 23. 
II 
The Court identifies the question for decision in this case 
as "whether respondents' individual and private case or con .. 
troversy became moot· by reason of the entry of judgment in 
their favor." Id., at 5. Wholly ignoring the fact that 
respondents themselves elected to appeal only on behalf of 
third parties, the Court concludes that "respondents' individual 
interest in the litigation-as distinguished from whatever may 
be their representative respo11sibilities to the putative class-
is sufficient to permit their appeal. ... " !d., at 12. One 
might expect that the Court would reason to this conclusion 
by pinpointing the individual interest on which it purports to 
rely. But no such reasoning appears in the Court's opinion. 
Although there is some discussion of advantages that generally 
may accrue to named plaintiffs from the use of the class-action. 
device, the Court never attempts to ascertain whether these 
5 Tl1e Mi:s.-;issippi usury statute was amended in 1974, and it apparently 
now authorizes the fee:-; charged by pPtitioner. 1974 Miss. Gen. Laws, ch. 
5u4J § 1: see Yliss. Code Ann.§ 75-17-1 (6). Thus, there is no question of 
prospective relief. 
0 I do not sugge-:t that. respondPnts' lawyer acted improperly in pursuing 
lhb clllie. Since he has prevailed both in thii:i Cou·rt and in the Court 
of Appeals, the rP:sponsibility for allowing client-less litigation .fa-lls ton 
'the fetle'hll cotltttl, 
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particular respondents can derive any such benefit from this 
action.' 
A 
The Court does not explain how it is able to find an 
"individual interest" in the litigation without identifying 
the injury in fact required by Art. III. It simply ignores this 
essential inquiry and relies on the "factual context" of the 
case: When respoudents refused the proffered settlement, the 
trial court entered judgment in their favor over their objec. 
tion. I d., at 6. The single fact of respondents' refusal in· 
spires the Court to draw a "critical distinction'~ between 
mootness deriving from a judgment and mootness resulting 
from events extriusic to the litigation. ld., at 9. The Court 
appears to hold that a litigant who attempts to appeal from 
a favorable judgment has an "individual interest" in exercis· 
ing his "statutory right to appeal." !d., at 7. If the statutes 
and rules governing "federal appellate practice" confer such 
a right, the Court concludes that Art. III requires no more. 
Ibid.; see id., at 12. 
Having shifted the inquiry from Art. III mootness to the 
"formulat[ion] [of] standards ... govern[ing] the appealabil· 
ity of procedural rulings," ibid., the Court determines that 
respondents are aggrieved by the denial of certification for two 
1 Any advantage;; that ordinarily may flow from " the use of the class 
action procedure for litigation of individual cl{lims," ante, at 10, cannot 
accrue to these respondents who will not be litigating their own claims 
on remand. Nor does the Court iqentify any unrecovered cost of litiga-
tion that these m;vondents can reduce if they obtain relief for a class. 
See id., at 10, n . 8: n . 3, supra. Indeed, the Court refer:;) to respondents 
only to point, out that their total damages wpre so small that they ''would 
be unlikely to obtain legal redre~s at an acceptable cost" if they could not 
do so by means of a clai3s action. Ante, !\t 10, n. 8. We may assume 
that rf0Spondents had ~orne intere:>t iu the class-action procedure as a me!}ns 
of interesting their lawyers in the c~e or obtaining a sat.isfactory settle-
ment. This may be a:n intere~t properly furthered by Hule .23, but once 
respondept~ obtained both acee;:;s to court and full individual relief that 
interest disappeared. 
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l'Ol:tsous. }1irst, the certification order is a "procedural ruling1 
collateral to the merits of [the] litigation ," th.at "stands as 
an adjudicatioll of one of the issues litigated." !d., at 9. 
Second, the contrary result would frustrate the goals of 
Rule 28. ld., at 10-12. 
· The effect of the ,Court's analysis, if I understand it cor. 
rectly, is to avoid a direct confrontation with settled priuci .. 
ples that unambiguously dictate a finding of mootness in this 
case. But the Court cannot escape the impact of these author-
ities simply by refusing to consider the respondents' evident 
lack of interest in the outcome. The "critical distinction" by 
which lt atten1pts to justify its failure to do so is both factually 
t:\llU legally UHSOund. 
B 
A:s a matter of fact, there is substantial doubt that this case 
involves the effect of "a JUdgment in favor of a party at an 
intermediate stage of litigation.'; l d., at 9. Petitioner has 
nevet• contended that the controversy became moot merely 
1'by reason of the entry of judgment in [respondents'] favor.'1 
i d., at 5. Instead, petitionei· argues that its tender of fuli 
relief has remedied the respondents' individual injuries and 
thus eliminated their stake in the outcome. Considerable 
authority supports petitioner;s contention that the tender itself 
moots thP case whether or not a judgment is entered. This 
Court, among others, has held that a federal court is powerless 
to review the abstract questions remaining in a case when the 
plaintiff' has refused to accept a proffered settlement that 
fully satisfies his claims. California v. San Pablo & Tulare 
R. Co .. 149 U! S. 3o8, 313- 314 (1898); Drs. Hill"& Thomas 
Co. . United States, 392 F. 2d 204; (CA6 1968) (per curiam); 
Lamb v. Commis_sioner, 390 F . 2d 157 (CA2 1968) (per 
curiam); A .. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F. 2d 
89 (CA5 1965) (per curiam).8 
!i The Court make:, no effort Lo di~tiuguh;h these ca~eo:.. Yet it cm1cedes 
'that tfte "tight to employ Rule 23" ib a. "procedural· right only, ancillary 
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I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result 
should differ because the District Court has entered a j udg-
ment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their 
lawsuit as moot.9 It is certainly true, as the Court observes, 
tha.t the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in 
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any 
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally 
favorable judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wright, 
Miller, and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3902 
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practice 1T 203.06 (1975). But 
federal courts uniformly have required a showing of some 
adverse effect in order to confer "standing to appeal." Ibid.; 
see Barry v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections, - U. S. 
App. D. C.-. 580 F. 2d 695 (1978). Indeed, Art. III itself 
requires a continuing controversy between adverse parties at 
aU stages of the htigation . E. g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 
402 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10 
(1974) . If any statute or rule purported to authorize an 
appeal in contravention of Art. III, that rule would yield to 
the constitutional command. 
c 
The Court relies almost entirely on Electrical Fittings Corp. 
v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1939).10 But that deci-
to tlw litigation of sub~tantivc claim:s," ami it admits that "the court 
retains no jurisdiction over the controY<'r,.;y" when the "substantive claims 
bceon1e moot iu the Art. III sense." Ante, at 6. If tho tender itself 
mooted the respondent~' claim:; without regard to the entry of judgment, 
thl'll the Court':; owu analy:si:s requires it to conclude that the case is 
moot. 
u Tho ":stu.tutor) right" to a.ppeal it<>elf cannot supply a. personal stake 
Jn tlu~ outcome, for Cougre:s~ cannot abrogate Art. III limitations on the 
juri:;dietion of the federal court::> Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bell-
wood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) 
10 The only other authoritie:; cJted by the Court are United Airlines, Inc. 
v. McDvuald, 4a2 U. S 385 '(1977), and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 
437 U S. 463 (1978). Dictum in both case~ stated that the denial of class 
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sion simply reaffirms our obligation not to review judgments 
by which no individual is aggrieved. The trial court there 
·had entered a decree holding a patent valid but not infringed. 
Although the alleged infringer won the case, it sought to 
appeal the finding that the patent was valid. This Court 
held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to con-
sider the issue of patent validity after the trial court found 
no infringement, because "[a] party may not appeal from a 
judgment ... in his favor, for the purpose of obtaining a 
review of findings ... whicb are not necessary to support the 
decree." I d., at 242. But the trial court had erred by includ-
ing in the decree itse1f a .ruling that "purport[ed] to adjudge 
tho validity of [the patent]." lbid. Bince that ruling "was 
immaterial to the disposition of the cause," the Court of 
Appeals had jurisdiction for the limited purpose of eliminating 
the extraneous ruling from the decree. Ibid. 
The Court reads Electrical Fittings as a case that was "still 
live" in the Art. III sense "because policy considerations per-
mitted an appeal." Ante, at 8...:9. But Electrica1 Fittings was 
a "Jive" controversy only beeause-aud to the limited extent 
that-the petitioner there asserted a continuing personal sta.ke 
in the outcome. As Judge Learued. Hand later explained, the 
petitioner in Electrical Fittings was injured in fact because the 
unnecessary ruling that the patent was valid could have 
created "some presumptive prejudice" against him in a futu.te 
c·asc. Harries v. Ait King Products Co., 183 F. 2d 158, 161 
certification is subjeet lo appellate review after final judgment at the 
belw~t of the named plaintiffs. Neither rn~e di~cn~:;ed mootne~~, and 
neither analyzed th(· propo~ition m any way. Incl('ed, the only authority 
<'itecl in Coopers & Ly'bmrul wa~:> lhiited Airli:tli'N, ~(·p 437 U. S., at 4()9, and 
thr only authority rited in United Airlines wa:; a emweH~iou madr by the 
defenclaut aud a li:,t of raReH from the Courts of Ap]wals, none of which 
dealt. with a sugge;;tion of mootne~s in an analogou:< ::<it uai ion, .,;re 432 
U. S., at ~9:3, and n. 14. Surh ;:;tatem(•nts, ca~ually enUIH·tatNI wilhuut a 
word of exp!ana.tion in opinion~ dealing with unrelated legal CJlll'~t iono, aro 
not eonlrolhng or even per::nta:;Jve when they are shown on further rc!le(,"' 
tion to have been incou~i;;;tellt with C~StahliHhed law. 
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(CA2 1950); see In re Trimble Co., 479 F. 2d 103, 111 (CA3 
U>73) .11 This genuine prejudice to the petitioner himself 
supplied the requisite personal stake in obtaining reformation 
of the dPcree. 
Thus, the Court's view of Electrical Fittings is plainly incon-
sistent with the holding of that case. The Court of Appeals 
was told to reform the decree, but expressly forbidden to 
consider the merits of the patent validity question. In other 
words, the court's appellate jurisdiction was only as broad as 
the petitioner's personal stake iu the appeal. Just four years 
la!Rr. Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. S. 359 (1943), explained 
that the limitation was constitutionally based. Reversing a 
deci!>ion that had relied on Electrical Fittings in refusing to 
consider the merits of an appeal, the Court distinguished 
Electrical Fittings as a case in which the parties sought deci-
sion of "a hypothetical case." The appeal in Altvater, by 
eontrast, satisfied "the requirements of case or controversy" 
heqause the parties continued to contest a counterclaim that 
hacl not been concluded by the dismissal of the orginal com-
plaiut. 319 U. S .. at '363-366. 
Altvater and Electrical Fittinys entirely foreclose the 
Court's argument that a party who has no personal stake in 
the outcome of his appeal may invoke the jurisdiction of a 
federal court merely because policy-based "rules of practice" 
permit him to do so. Any doubt is dispelled by Altvater's 
express reliance on Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 (1942), 
cert. denied, 319 U. S. 74S (1943), a case in which the Court 
of Appeals' for the Second Circ4it discussed at length the 
11 Although the Court of Appeals in Electrical 1-'ittings held that col-
lateral e~:>toppel would be no bar to relit igntion of the validity que~;tion, 100 
F. 2cl 403, 404 (CA2 1938), other court.-; had taken a d1fferent view o11 
, imilar i:osues of collateral estoppel. If the validity finding wert> permitted 
to stm1d, the petitioner could havr been forced to litigate the 4uestion of its 
preclusive rffect. in futurf' ca:,;e::; 15 Wright, Miller, and Cooper, supra 
n. 4, § 3902, at 403 (1976), lB :\Ioore '~:~ Federal Practice ,f 0.443 [5], at 
3925 (1974) ; 9 id., ,120a .06, at 7L6 (1975), 
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constitutional limits on appellate jurisdiction. 319 U. S., at 
363, n. 2. Like the respondents here and the petitioner in 
Electrical Fittings, the appellant in Cover sought to appeal 
from a judgment that had eliminated his stake in the out-
conw.12 ThP C'ourt of Appeals emphatically declined to as-
sumP jurisdiction over an appeal which sought "no relief 
against anybody before the court ... but ... want[ed] an 
advisory opinion that [a] patent [was] valid." 133 F. 2d, at 
544.18 Since there was no case or controversy, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that it was "without discretion" to hear the 
appPal. 1 d., at 545. 
These cases demonstrate that the requirements of Art. III 
do not change with the "factual context'' in which a suggestion 
of mootness arises. See ante, at 5. Whatever the context, 
Art. liT asks but a single question: Is there a continuing con-
trowrsy between adverse parties'? In Electrica7 Fittings, the 
controversy conti11Ued with respect to the single narrow 
issue whethet the District Court's ruling on patent validity 
properly was included in the decree. But nothing in that 
case suggests that a "procedural ruling, collatera.l to the merits 
1 ~ The appellant in Cover v. Schwa1·tz. 133 F . 2d 541 (CA2 1942), <:ert. 
de11ied, 319 lJ. S. -.,48 (1943), wa:> tht' lo~ing plaintiff in a patent infringe· 
ttwnt action. After tho trial c·()t1rt found the patent invalid and not 
infriug(•d, the plmt1tiff took an appeal on tho validity qu~tion without 
cout(•;:tmg the finding of nouinfringemcut. By accepting the judgment to 
lhut extent, he lost hi:; tight to recover from the defendant-and thus his 
in lerc~t in the htigatio11. 
1 3 Judge Frank wrote tor ihe court: 
"[W J here tlwre i~:: no 'ju~tieiable' di~>]Hite, there are no 'merits.' There is 
mC:'rely au \lmeal entity re~embling that di~embodied ~mile which Lewis 
Catoll immortalized. Many SnprC:'me Court deci~ion8 teach u~ that appel-
late jurh.dictwn, when no ju~ticiable dispute exi~t8 on appeal, cannot be 
te~<ied upon tllf' recollection tlmt ::;ueh a d1~pute previou~ly exit;ted when 
the ea~e wu~ in th(· trial court." 13:3 F . 2d, at 551 (footnotes omitted). 
See abo Kapp v. National Football League, 586 F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9 
1978) , Hall v. C S. fiber & Plastic.~ Corp., 476 .F. 2cl 418, 420 (CA3 
1973); d . Lewis v. United States, 21U U. S. IHl (1\HO) (per curiam). 
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()f a litigation ," may be appealed after final judgment because 
"policy considerations permi [ t] the appeal" or because the 
ruhug "stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated.') 
Ante, at 8-9. Such collateral rulings-like other rulings-may 
be appealed only when the litigant has a personal stake in the 
resolution of his appeal.14 In Electrical Fittings, there was 
a stake; hete there is none. Since nothing remains of the 
ea8e or controversy, the Court of Appeals should have dis-
mi8sed this case. 
III 
It is clear from the Court's extended discussion of policy 
and practical consitlerations. ante, at 10-12, that these weighed 
heavily in its decision. I am uot aware that such considera-· 
Lions evet' betore have infiueuced this Court in determining 
whether the ('onstitut'ion confers jutisdiction on the federal 
comts. In any event, the consequences of a findiug of moot-
ness Wt1uld not be lls severe as the Court predicts. 
A finding of' mootness would have repet·cussions primarily 
in two situations. the fi"rst involves a named plaintiff who 
fails to obtain class certification aud then pursues his case to 
a successful, iitigated j udgmeut. t believe that a subsequent 
attempt by that plaintiff to apj'>eal the denial of certification 
generally would. be barred by Art. IlL But the consequences 
of applying settled rules of mootness in this situation would 
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were 
granted, the absent members of the putative class would have 
obtained by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of 
the beuefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand, 
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of 
the certification ruling would euable putative class members to 
11 The C'ourt appean, to recognize thj,., in Jll:l::>sing, ante, at 9, n. 7, but 
faib to apply the rule to tlu~ ca::;e. Since the Court 1:1Ugg~t1:1 that re::;pond-
eul:s' intert'l'it in the C(•rtifi<'ation ruling derive:> from the mere fact that it 
";,;land:; aH an adjudication uf one of the iHstH•::. litigated," id., at 9, Elec-
tl'ical Fittinyii It :;elf would limit u::> to the io::smuwe of an order directing that 
the olf~n::iivc ruuull: he expuuged fro111 the recorq! 307 U.S., at, 242. 
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take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability 
without assuming the risk of being bound by ' an unfavorable 
judgment. Thus, the Court's decision to ~llow appeals in 
this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" that 
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate.13 
Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise 
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before 
judgment, as petitioner did in this <lase. A defendant cer-
tainly will have a sqbstanti'al incentive to use this tactic in 
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny 
compensation to putative · class members and jeopardize the 
t>nforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney[s] 
general." Ante, at 10-11. The practical argument is not 
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns 
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the ade~ 
quacy of compensation and enforcement available for particu~ 
la1· substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best 
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be 
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim. 
Today, howev~r, the Court never pauses to consider the law of 
usury. Since'l Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of 
usury claims,ill the Court's concern for compensation of puta-
1 
1~ See Comment, Immediate At>peulability of Orderti Denying Class Cer~ 
tification , 40 Ohio St. L. J . 441, 470-471 0979) . In actions brought un.der 
Rule 23 (b) (3), ~ class member mu. t derid<> at the time of certification 
whether to ·'opt put" of the action under Rule 2J (c)(2). This provision 
wns dPl::iigncd to !;>ring an end to the "l::ipurious" class action in which class 
members W((re permitted to intervene after a decision on the merits 
in order to secure the bPnefit:; of that decision . Notes of the Advisory 
Committee on PiiOposed Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F . R. D. 69, 105-106 
(1966) . 
16 Liddell v. Litton Systems, luc ., 300 So. 2cl 455 (1974) (rejecting bor~ 
rower::;' cla:;s action); Fry v. Layton, 191 Mi::;::;, 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941). 
Petitioner is a national bank, and it~ alleged failure to comply with Mis-
sis::;ippi';o interest limitl::i would violate the Nationa l Bank Act. 12 U. S.C. 
§ 85. But I do not under~<tand that tlw National Bank Act displaces state 
}JOJlcy dh;f!worin~ the aggrega.tion of UHUI')' el<~ims. A primary J)Urpose ()f 
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tivc class members in this case is at best misplaced and at 
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling 
Act.17 
The Court's concern for putative class members would be 
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced 
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litiga-
tion of successive suits by members of the putative class. I 
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial admin-
istration would be real. But these -problems can and should 
be addressed by measl.tres short of rewriting the law of moot-
ness, as the Court seems to have done today. The first step 
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the 
denial of class certification in appropriate circumstances.18 
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292 
(h) to certify such appeals when they involve certain con-
trolling questions of law. In many cases, a class-action 
uefendant undoubtedly would forgo the opportunity to settle 
with an individual plaintiff in order to obtain an immediate 
and final determination of the class certification question on 
appeal. 
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a class action by 
forced settlement, the District. Court is not powerless. In at 
thtLt Acl is to protect national bank~ from di~crimina.tory treatment or 
undue penaltir;:, that may fJp impo:sro b~· state law. See 12 U. S. § 86. 
17 The Act provide~ tha.t· rul~ of procedure promulga.ted by this Court 
":;hall not ... enlarge or modify any sub:stantive right." 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2072. See American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538, 
557-558 (1974); Developmentk in the Law-Cia:ss Actions, 89 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1318, 1358-la59 (1976). See generally Lander:;, Of Legalized Black-
mail and LegalizPd Theft: Com;umer Clas~:; Actions and the Sub:stance-
Procedure Dilemma,, 47 S. Cui. L. Rev . ~42 (l!J74) . 
1 In Coupers (~ Lybt·and v. Livesay. 4:37 U. S. 463 (1978), this Court 
lwlcl that, the denial of cla:ss certification i:s not !L "final decision" appeal-
able as of right undrr 2~ U. S. C. § 1291. We relied in that ca:;e on the 
rlanger,; of "indi~crimumle" mtrrlocutory review /d ., at 474. Although 
Cuo]Jers & Lyb,.and 110\\ prPveut" revit>w in cast>$ in which it would be 
.d~infble, Congrc::;~:> may remedy thf• problem by appropriate legislation, 
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least, some circumstances, · it may require .that putative class 
members receive some sort of notice and\ an opportun.ity to 
intervene .within the appeal r)eriod. Rule 23 (d)(2). The 
availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent 
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District 
I . 
Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the 
case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended 
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent inter-
locutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers -are 
lacking, it is for · Congress-not this Court-to correct the 
dPficien cy.19 
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it, 
judicially fashioned "solutions'' to legislative· problems often 
are attended by unfortuuate practical consequences of their 
owu. 'l'oday's holding is no exception. On remand, respond-
ents will serve as "quasi-class representatives'' solely for- the 
purpose of obtaining c1ass cert!fication. · Since they cal'l. gain 
nothing more from the action, their participation in the case 
cau be intended ouly to oenefit the putative class. Yet they-
or their lawyers-serve on their own motion. Since no court 
has certified the class. there has been no cousidered determina-
tion that respondents will fairly ana adequately represent its 
members. Nothing iii Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure, 
aud the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it. 
Are respondents men:ibers of the class they seek to represeut'? 
See East Texas Motor Freight v Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 
111 Congress currently has before iL a bill that attempts to remedy .t11e 
difilcultie::; infecting this troubled area. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1979) . The bill, supported by the Departmrnt of .fu::;tice, proposes to 
bypa::;:; 1he Rules Enabling Act problem, ::;ee n. 17, supra. and to eliminate 
some of the problems of claims too small to justify mdividuallawsuits, by 
ereatiug a ne~ federal right of action for damages. The bill provides .for 
the enforcement of thi:s right in some instances through actions brought in 
the namC> of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory 
nppcals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class cer-. 
tifkation undPr the proposed procedures. 
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408-404 ( 1977). Are their currently nonexistent claims "typi .. 
cal of the claims ... of the class" within the meaning of Rule 
23 (a) (3) '? 20 
The Court's holding well may prevent future "forced set-
tlements," and may even foreclose all settlements, of class 
action litigation. See ante, u. 5. Thus, the difficulties faced 
by thE' District Court on remand iu this case may not arise 
agaill in precisely analogous circumstances. But today's result 
also authorizes appeals by putative class representatives who 
have prevailed on the merits of their individual claims. If the 
order denying class certification is reversed in that situation, 
the named plaintiffs on remand will have no more continuing 
relationship to the putative class than respondents have 
here. A remand for certification could also lead to "oue-way 
intervention" in direct violation of Rule 23. Seep. 11-12, and 
n. 15, supra. These tensions. arising· from the express terms 
of th<:' Rule, undermine the Court's conclusion that the 
policic·s underlying Rulr 23 dictate the result reached today. 
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of 
~0 The District Court proprrly may conclude on remand that respondents, 
f'or llw~r or otht>r rPa~olh>, cannot adrquatrly repre~ent the clat::s. Should 
intervrntion b(• propo~rd. tflr Di~trict Court on rquitable grounds might well 
rcfll:<(• to toll tlw Htatute or limitations in ordPr to permit. it. Nearly nine 
~·t·Hr;o; have pa:;:>Pd :;ince thi::; action was filE-d and six since the govrrning-
. ·ub~tuntive ~tal utn wa"" amPndPd to authorize thr challrngrd conduct. In 
it:; ordPr denying certineation on Srptembrr 29, 1975, the District, Court 
a~,.;ignpJ as one of it~ rrasonH I hr poHsiblr ''de~truction of the [petitioner's] 
bank" by damage~ then allrgPd to tot<d §12,000,000 and now poteut,ially 
au~mented by the accrual of intrrt>HI. App. 47, SPP ante. at 2, n. 2. The 
po~:<~ible drstruction of prt.itioner',._ bank is irrelevant to the cent.ral i~~ue of 
mootne,.;~, but s~rious indred to t!rpositor,.;, stockholder~, a,nd the community 
served . A~ thi:; Court rPlirs so heavily on it~ practical and equitable con-
ePrm: for putative cia:;~ mrmbrrs, it will hardly be inappropriate for the 
pi:;trict Court 011 remand to con~1drr practicalities and equities on both 
side~ . In the circum~tances pre:seutrd, tlw District Court may well see no 
rra~on to exercisr its rquitablr discrrtion in favor of putative class mem&eT:;;; 
~',llo have ..,[el_Jt on their right:; the::;c 1111111Y ycarr:, .. 
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forced settlements in consumer cla~s actions departs from 
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence . . It also mmeces-
sarily creates significant problems in the administration of 
Rule 23. I would vacate the judgment of the Court of 
,AP,peals and remand with instru'ct,ions to dismiss the appea.l 
'as 'moot. 
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MH. JosTIC.l!: PoWJ,;LL, with whom MR. Jus'l'ICE STEWART 
joins, dissPntiug. 
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that 
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the 
National Bank Act and Mississippi law.1 They filed this 
action lat-e in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty 
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and 
$322.70. App. 59 Respondents also sought relief on behalf 
of a class allPgcd to include 90.000 persons with claims aggre-
gating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District 
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification. 
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the 
full an10U1J t of their individual claims plus legal interest and 
court costs. Over respo11dents' objection, the District Court 
entered final judgment in their favor. Petitioner then depos-
ited the full amount du<-• with t.he clerk of the ·court. 
No one disputes that the petitioner has tendered every-
thing that respondents could have recovered from it in this 
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed 
the denial of class certification. This Court affirms the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals without identifying the case or 
controversy that remains to be litigated between the parties. 
1 Jurisdietwn was premisl'd on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S.C. §§ 85, 
86, which adopb; the mtere~t. limits set by state law, and 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1355. 
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''!'he Court decides that the central issue is not mootuess but 
appealability. But the characterization does not withstand 
analysis. Since respondents lack a continuing interest in the 
outcome of the litigation, the Court of Appeals was powerless 
to hear their appeal. Accordingly, I clissent. 
I 
Although there are some differences, this case is similar to 
U'nited States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at -, 
in one important respect: both require us to decide whether 
putative class re1Jresentatives may appeal the denial of class cer-
tificatiou when they can derive no benefit from the relief sought 
in the actwu. In this case, as in Geraghty, the District Court 
refused to certify a class. Since no one has sought to inter-
vene, respoudents are the only plaintiffs arguably present in 
court.~ Yrt rPspondents have no continuing interest in the 
l! 1\fH JusTICb Sn,:\~CN:-; ,;titles, in hi,; c•ommring opinion, that all1~rrsons 
ulleg<'d to be• mPml)('r;< of a putativP elm;:; ''automnt.trally b<>rome part.i(•.,; to 
the c·a~e or c·ontrovpr,;~· for lhe purpost>R" of Art. Ill, and that they 
"rrmain partiC'i'i until a final delt•rmiwtltOJl ha,.; been madP tha.t thr action 
mn~· not. ])(' mamtainPd a~ a l'la"" artiou " Ante, at - . Thj;; uovc•l 
viPw, for which no authorit~ J:,< c1ted, rannot be reconeiled with hulian-
apolis Schoof ('umm ' r~> v. Jacobs, 420 ( l. S. 128 (1975), 1vherr an oral 
eerti.fil'ation order wa, hl'ld m;;ttfh('ic•nt to identify the interests of absc>nt 
cla;;s nwmb<·r·s for Art III [ltlrpo;;r,; . Thf' r<·~t!lt harJl~· eould be different 
wllf'n t hr C"la~" ha~ not bern tdent.ifi.Pd at. all. See also M ern phis Light, 
Oas & Water Dw v. Cmjl. ~;{() 0 . S. I, 8 (Hl78): Baxte1' v. Palrm'giano, 
42:3 U. 8. ;{(JK, 310, 11 . 1 (HJ7fi), Weiu.~tein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 
(1975) ; PaMrii'IIO City Huard of FJducation v Spunyle1', 427 U. 8. 424,430 
{lH71l). 
Tlw propo,.,pJ rule· of nutomatte party ~tatu,;-in ihi:; cas<' for !:lO,OOO. 
nnidPnttfied pNson,.._ha" frouble:,;ome and far-reaching implications t.hat 
could preJudice· the lmnging of cla~s action". Pm:;umabl~· a ]Htrpose of 
sul'h a rul<• II'OUld he to a>'~'Un· that 1:\atisfactwn of the chim::; of named 
partiP" would nol 1Prmin;ttt· tlw httgation . :"\or· rould thr rights of 
unnauwd p<trtil'" hr l'Xtingui,..hrd by thr failure of the named partjes to 
npp('al. Tbtt,.., 1! the rul<' l)l'O[lOS<'d by :\Ju .• Jt:I:\'J' J('g STEVf~Nt:i is to bo 
tne:-tumg;t'nl, f 't tppo"<' that a fidtt<·wry duty must b(' imposed upon namtltl 
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injuries alleged in their complaiut. They sought only dam-
ages; those damages have been tendered in full.U Respondents 
have not suggested that success on the eertification motion 
would entitle them to additional relief from the petitioner.4 
Indeed, their personal claims to relief have been abandoned 
so completely that no appeal was taken in their own names. 
The notice of appeal filed with the District Court recites that 
parties fo <'on1inne 1lw litigation wlwre-as here-the wmamed parties 
remain ttmdrntifiNI and fail to intervene. As fiduciarif';;, would the re-
spondent"' not only h<· rPquirect to continue t.o litigate, but to assume per-
Ronal rrsponstbdity for eost;; and attorn<"y's ff't's if thr case ultimately is 
lost? Wonlcl re:spoll>Hble litigants be willing to .filf' class actions if they 
"thrreb)' u~nmed stH'h long-term fiduciary obligations? Thf'se qn~tions are 
substantial They an· no1 resolved by Rule 23, and I believe they merit 
careful ,;tudy by CongrP:;..,; before this Court~perhaps unwittingly-creates 
a major catPgory of l'liPntless littgatJOn unique in our system. 
3 Although r!'lipondt>nt."' also n~<ked for attorney's fees, their complaint 
shows that fees were lo be granted only from the damages ultimately 
awarded fo them or the class. App. 1:1-H. 
"'Hesponch·nts do a:s~ert that c<•rtification would t>nable them to reduce the 
expense of httgat1on by allocatmg costs among the members of a prevailing 
class. BriC'f for Re,.:pondt·ut:,; aa Except for attorney's fees, however, 
respondent::! do not tdC'ntJfy any cost::! incurred to date t.lmt are not 
covered by the pet 1 t ioner';s tender Although the record does not reveal 
the detail:s of the fep arrangemt>nt between respondents and their lawyers, 
the com]llaint :sugge:st~ that the lawyers have agreed to accept as full com-
pensation 25% of the amonnt recovert>d from the petitioner. App. 13-14. 
If this it, tht> agret-menL a~-; to f0eb, respomients have no continuing interest. 
Only connsel is COIH:emcd whether the recovery is enlurged 
Even if on~ as:smm.J that respondents' liability to their lawyers could be 
reduced by a clas:s re('OVNy, 110 one has suggestPd that. petitioner is or ever 
will be liable for fP<':< that uJt.im;l rely may be owt>d by respondents. Re-
spondents' Jtlflsdtct wmtl theory appeu.rs to be that the mere possibihty of 
asserting future chumb for at.tomey':; ft>e~:~ against, other members of a 
pnt!Ltive cia.~~:> givt'ti ri"'<' to a case or cont.roversy against the class defend-
ant. Such a. thro1~ i, tmprert>dented, and its conSt>quenres are bizarre. 
For ex1unplP, n~ponc!Pnts' theory would penni1, a person to file a class 
action, ~wf'n though h<· had previously accrpted full se1tlement of his in-
dividual rla.im on the !!;!'OUnd thnt. the fe<\" incurr(:'(] in antiript~tion of the' 
}ltig-Jtiou tni11;ht ult.mw t~ly he shart><l wirh thr ria&. 
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respondents appeal only "on behalf of all others similarly 
situated ... .'' App. 63. 
Since respondents have uo continuing personal stake in the 
ou teo me of this action, 1 believe that Art. III and the prece-
dents of this Court require that the case be dismissed as moot. 
See Oeraghty, posi , at --- (PowELL, J., dissenting). 
Therf' is no suggestion that respondents' claims are "capable 
of repetition, yet evading review." Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 
U.S. 103, 110- 111, 11. 11 (1975)." And not a single one of the 
alleged HO.OOO class members has sought to intervene in the 
nine years swee this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines, 
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 F . 8. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone 
ever challenged the a1legedly usurious charges by informal 
complawt or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certifi-
catiou '"'as demed, thP action lay dormaut during the seven 
months tn which respondents sought to take an interlocutory 
appeal, without provoking a response fr01n anyone who pre-
viously may have thought that the class action would protect 
his rights. We arc not told what, if anything, motivates re-
spondents to continue this crusadE' on behalf of persons who 
for years have evinceJ no interest whatever in obtaining re-
covery for- themselves.'' On its face . this appears simply to 
be a "lawyer's cas<> " 
Despite tradition and policy considerations to the contrary, 
the Court st>ems undisturbed that this federal action will be 
0 If a da~-aetion defmdant were ,;howu t.o have embarked on a course 
of conduct. d<'stgned t.o in~ula,te thr rlal:>S ccrtifica.tion is,;uc from t~ppellate 
review 111 order io avOid r[a,.,~widt> lmbility, a <'Ourt. in proper circumstances 
might. find the Orr~trin test :>attsfied and tho case not. moot.. See Susrnan v. 
Lincoln American Corp .. 587 F. 2d 81)6 (CA7 1978) ; 13 Wright, Miller & 
Coopt>r, Federal Practiee and Procedure § 35:33, at 171 (Supp. 1979); 
CommPni., ContinuatiOn and HepreRentation of Class Actions Following 
Dismi~~al of the Class Repre:;eutatiVe, 1!:174 Duke L. J. 573, 599-600. 
"Tlw \li;;:-;J~~ippl u;;ur~· ~tattttP wa:; amended in 1974, and it apparently 
11ow aurhonz<':l the f('~ rhargt>d by ]JPiltJoner. 1974 Miss. Gen. Laws, ch. 
5!:>4, ~ 7· H't' .\li"~ · ( 'odP Ann.§ 7.'1-17-1 (6). Thus, there is no question of 
prospcet1vr rrl!ef. 
78-904-DISSENT 
DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK v. ROPER 5 
litigated on r('mand by a lawyer whose only uclients" are 
unidentified class members who have shown no desire to be 
represented by anyone.7 The Court ·also neglects established 
principles of Art. III jurisprudence, and remancjs to the Dis-
trict C'ourt a headless class action that does not meet the 
requirements of Rule 23. 
II 
The Court identifies the question for decision in this case 
as "whether· respoudents' individual and private case or con-
troversy became moot by reason of the entry of judgment in 
their favor.' I d., at 5. \Vholly ignoring the fact that 
responcle11ts themselves elPcted to appeal only on behalf of 
third parties. the Court concludes that "respondents' individual 
interest in tlw litigation-as distinguished from whatever may 
be their representative responsibilities to the putative class-
is sufficient to permit their appeal. ... " I d., at 12. One 
might expect that the Court would reason to this conclusion 
by pinpointing the individual interest on which it purports to 
rely. But no such reasoning appears in the Court's opinion. 
Although the!'(' is some discussion of advantages that generally 
may accrue to named plaintiffs from the use of the class-action 
device, th<' Court never attempts to ascertain whether these 
particular respondents can derive any such benefit from this 
action. 
7 I do not sngJ!:t'Nf t.hnt. re,;pondenb,' lawyer ad(•u improperly in pursuing 
this c<tSt> SincP he has prevailed both in thiR Court and in the Court 
of App('al;;, the re:;pousihiJity for allowing client-less litigation fall:; ou 
the f<>rlPral eourt8. 
~All~' advanhtJ!:€'" that ordinarily may flow from ''the use of the class 
action !Hor·<-'<iure for litigation of individual claims,'' ante, at 10, cannot 
!~crru<' to tlw~e m.;pondent~; who will not br litigating their own claims 
on remand ~or doe~ the Comt identify ttny unreroverf'd cost of litiga-
tion thnt the~c n•spondents eau reduce if they obtain relief for a class. 
Sec ul., at LO, n. ~, n. 3, ljupm Indeed, the Court r€'fers to rf'spondents 
only to pomi out that their total damages were so Nmall that thry ·'would 
be unlikely to obtaul legal redn·~~ ttt. un acr·cphlble ro.~t" if they eould not 
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The Court does not explain how it is able to find all 
"individual interest" in the litigation without identifying 
the iuj ury in fact required by Art. III. lt simply ignores this 
essential inquiry and relies on the "factual context" of the 
case: Wheu respondents refused the proffered settlement, the 
trial court entered judgment in their favor over their objec-
tion. ld., at 6. The single fact of respondents' refusal in-
spires the Court to draw a "critical distinction" between 
mootness deriving from a judgment and mootness resulting 
from events extrinsic to the litigation. I d., at 9. The Court 
appears to hold that a litigant who attempts to appeal from 
a favorable judgment has an "mdividual interest" in exercis-
ing his "statutory right to appeal." ld., at 7. If the statutes 
and rule~ gowming "federal appellate practice" confer such 
a right, the <'ourt concludes that Art. III requires no more. 
Ibid. ; see id., at 12. 
Having shifted the inquiry from Art. III mootness to the 
"formulatlionj [of] standards ... govern[iug] the appealabil-
ity of procedural rulings," ibid., the Court determines that 
respondents an' aggrieved by the denial of certification for two 
reasons. First, the certification order is a "procedural ruling, 
collateral to the merits of [the] litigation,'' that "stands as 
an adj udicatim1 of one of the issues litigated." 1 d., at 9. 
Second, the contrary result would frustrate the goals of 
Rule 23. Td., at 10-12. 
The effect of the Court's analysis. if 1 understand it cor-
rectly, is to avoid a direct confrontation with settled princi-
ples that unambiguously dictate a finding of mootness in this 
do ~ by mpau:; of a elass action . AntP. at 10, n. . We may assume 
that rPspondrnts had ~;ome interest in the class-action procedure as a means 
of intPn·~<tiug tlwir law~·er~ m the case or obtaining a sat.isf<tetory settle-
ment.. This ma~ be au intrre:<t propPrly furthered by Rule 23, but once 
respondent~:~ ubtamccl bot.h acres~:> to court, aiJd full individual relief that 
intf're:;i rh:>appeared 
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case. But the Court cannot escape the impact of these author-
ities simply by refusing to consider the respondents' evident 
lack of interest in the outcome. The "critical distinction" by 
which 1t attempts to justify its failure to do so is botfl factually 
and legally unsound. 
B 
As a matter of fact, there is substantial doubt that this case 
involves the effect of "a judgment in favor of a party at an 
intermediate stage of litigation." I d., at 9. Petitioner has 
never contended that the controversy became moot merely 
"by reason of the entry of judgment in [respondents'] favor." 
1d. , at .5 Instead, petitioner argues that its tender of full 
relief has reineched the respondents' individual injuries and 
thus elimmated their stake in the outcome. Considerable 
authority supports petltionefs contention that the tender itself 
moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. This 
Court, among others, has held that a federal court is powerless 
to review the abstract questions remaiuing in a case when the 
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that 
fully satisfies his claims. California v. San Pablo & Tulare 
R. Co .. 149 U. S. 308, 313- 314 ( 1893); Drs. Hill & Thomas 
Co. v. United States, 392 F. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per curiam); 
Lamb v Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968) (per 
cu1'iam), A .. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v Campbell, 353 F. 2d 
89 (CA519o5) (per curiam).11 
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result 
should differ because the District Court has entered a judg-
ment in favor of respondents iustead of dismissing their 
9 Tlw Court makp,; no effort to di~tinguish tht~P ca:;<.-.;. Yet it concedes 
that the "righL to employ Rule 23" IH a "procedural right only, ancillary 
to the litJgatwn of sub.;tantivt• claims,'' and it admits that "the court 
retain::, no JUI'illdietwn over tlw controverHy" wh<'n the ":;ubstantive claims 
beconw moot m the Art. lli ~cnl'le." Ante, at 6 If the tender it elf 
nwotrd the re:;pomlents' clann::o without rrgard to the entry of judgment, 
then the Court\ own aualy~1" req!Iirl':; tt to conclu.de that the case i$ 
moot 
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lawsuit as moot.10 It is certainly true, as the Court observes, 
that the entry of judgment iu favor of a party does not in 
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any 
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally 
favorable judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wright, 
Miller, and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure ~ 3902 
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practice n- 203.06 (1975). But 
federal courts uniformly have requir(;ld a showing of some 
adverse effect in order to confer "standing to appeal." Ibid.; 
see Barry v. D·istrict of Columbia Bd. of Elections, - U. S. 
App. D. C. --, SRO F. 2d 695 (1978). Indeed, Art. III itself 
requires a eontinuing controversy between adverse parties at 
all stages of the litigation. E. g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 
40~ (1975); Steffel \'. ThornpsOit, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10 
(1974) . If any statute or rule purported to authorize an 
appeal in eontrave11tiou of Art. lTI, that rule would yield to 
the constit,utional comtnand. 
c 
The Court relies almost entirely on Electrical Fittings Corp. 
v. 'l'homas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1939) .'1 But the deci-
10 Tlw "~tat11tor~· right! ' to aJlpeal ikielf cannot supply n personnl stnke 
m the outeome, for Congre~~ cannot abrogate Art. III limitations on the 
juri~diction of the· fl'drral eourt:>. Uladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bell-
wood, 441 U. R. 91, 100 (1979) . 
11 Thr ouly othrr anthoritiP~ eiiNI by t.lw Court arp United Airlines, lnc . 
v. M cDunald, 4:~2 l l. S. 3~5 (1977). and Coopers & Lybmnd v. Livesay, 
437 U.S. 463 (1978). Dictum in both ca:;es stated that the denial of class 
certification is ~nbjert to appPllate review after final judgment at the 
behr:;t, of the namPd plaintiffs, Neither case di:;cussed mootness, and 
nPithPr analyzed thP propoHition in auy way. lndred, the on!~· authority 
ritrd in CoupP1'8 & Lybrand waF> United Airlines, see 437 U. S., n.t 469, and 
the only anthorit~ · cited in Cmted Airlines was (~ concPssion made by the 
defendant and a l1~t ol' cases from the Comts of Appeals, none of which 
dealt w1th a ~nggr:;twn of mootne~>s in an analogous situation, see 432 
U. l::l., nt :19:3, and n. 14, Such ~tatement:s, rmmally ennneiatPd without a, 
word of <··xplanation lll opi.mons dealing witb unrelated legal quest10ns, are 
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sion simply reaffirms our obligation not to review judgments 
by which no individual is aggrieved. The trial court there 
had entered a decree holding a patent valid but not infringed. 
Although the alleged infringer won the case, it sought to 
appeal the finding that th~ patent was valid. This Court 
held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to con-
sider the issue of patent validity after the trial court found 
no infringement, because "r a l party may not appeal from a 
judgment .. . in his favor, for the purpose of obtaining a 
review of findings . .. which are not necessary to support the 
decree." l d, at 24:2. But the trial court had erred by includ-
ing in the decree itself a ruliug that "purport[ed] to adjudge 
tho vali<.!Jty of l the pat~nt] " lbid. Since that ruling "was 
immaterial to the disposition of the cause," the Court of 
Appeals had j urisdiCtwn for the limited purpose of eliminating 
the extraneous ruling from the decree. Ibid. 
The Court reads Electrical Fittings as a case that was "still 
live" in the Art. III sense "because policy considerations per-
mitted an appeaL ~' Ante, at 8-9. But Electrical Fittings was 
a "live" controversy only because-and to the limited extent 
that--the petitioner there asserted a continuing personal stake 
in the outcome A8 Judge Learned Hand later explained, the 
petitioner in Electrical Fittings was injured iu fact because the 
unnecessary ruling that the patent was valid could have 
created "some presumptive prejudice" against him in a future 
case. Harries v. Air King Products Co., 183 F. 2d 158, 161 
(CA2 1950); see In re Trimble Co., 479 F. 2d 103, 111 (CA3 
1973).1 ~ This genuine prejudice to the petitioner himself 
not controlling or even pC:'r:masivt- wlwn th<'y are shown on further reflec-
tion to have been incon::nstent With e:ltabli:shed law 
12 Althou~~:h the Court of Appl'ab iu Elect11cal FLttings lwld 1hat col-
lateral e!>topp<'l wonlcl bC:' no bar to relitiga.t10n of the validity ques1ion, 100 
.F. 2d 40;3 , 404 ( CA2 1938), othrr c:ourt,~o; had t.aken a diffen•nt view on 
similar ~~,;uet-~ of collatt•ral rstoppel. If thf' v<~lldity finding W<'re permitted 
to sttUld, the pf'tJtwnrr could have bt>eu forced to litigate the question of Its 
prerluHive effPI't, Ill future ras<--'l> . l 1  WriF;ht., Miller, and Cooper, 8Upra 
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suppli<>d the requisite personal stake h1 obtaining r·eformation 
of the decree. 
Thus, the C'oUl't's view of Electrical Fittings is plainly incon-
sisteut with the holding of that case. The Court of Appeals 
was told to rcfonn the decree, but expressly forbidden to 
considm· the merits of the patent validity question. In other 
words, the court's appellate jurisdiction was only as broad as 
the petitioller's personal stake in the appeal. Just four years 
later. Altvater v. F1·eernan, 319 U. S. 359 (1943), explained 
that the limitation was constitutionally based. Reversing a 
decision that had relied on Electrical Fittings in refusing to 
consider tlw merits of au appeal. the Court distinguished 
Electrical Fittin(Js as a case in which the parties sought deci-
sion of "a hypothetical case:" The appeal in Altvater, by 
contrast, satisfied "the requirements of case or controversy" 
because the parties contilmed to contest a cou11terclaim that 
had not been coucluded by the dismissal of the orginal com-
plaiut. 3H) r. S., at 363-366. 
Altvater and Electrical Fittings entirely foreclose the 
Court's argument that a party who has no personal stake in 
the outcome of his appeal may invoke the jurisdiction of a 
federa.I court merely because policy-based "rules of practice't 
permit him to do so. Any doubt is dispelled by Altvater's 
express reliance ou Cover , .. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 (1942), 
cert. denied, 319 F. S. 748 (1943), a case in which the Court 
of Appeals for· the Second Circuit discussed at length the 
constitutional limits on appellate jurisdiction. 319 U. S., at 
363, n. 2. Like the respondents here and the petitioner in 
Electrical Fitt·inys, the appellant in Cover sought to appeal 
from a judgment that had eliminated his stake in the out-
conw.13 ThE> Court of Appeals emphatically declined to as-
n. 4, § :mo:l, a.L 40;3 (1\rifi): lB :\Ioorr\ Federal Practice ~0.443 [5], a.t 
3925 0974) ; 9 id., ,120B.()(i, ai, 7ll) (1975). 
1 ~ Tlw apprllaul, Ill ('uue1· \'. Sthwartz, 1:~3 F. 2<1 541 (CA2 1942), ccrt. 
denied, 31!.! ( . S. 7-!.S (Hl-!3), was the loHing plaintiff in a patent mfriuge-. 
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sume jurisdiction over an appeal which soug-ht 11no relief 
against anybody before the court ... but ... want[ed] an 
advisory opinion that [a] patent [was] va.Jid." 133 F. 2d, at 
544.11 Since there was no case or controversy, the Court. of 
Appeals concluded that it was "without discretion" to hear the 
appeal. l d., at 545. 
These cases demonstrate that the requirements of Art. III 
do not ehange with the "factual conte~t" in which a suggestion 
of mootness arises. See a:nte, at 5. Whatever the context, 
Art. III asks but a single question: ls there a continuing con-
troversy between adverse parties? In Electrical Fittings, the 
controversy continued with respect to the single narrow 
issue whethf.:'r the District Court's ruling on patent validity 
properly was included in the decree. But nothing in that 
case suggests that a "procedura1 ruling, collateral to the merits 
of a litigatiou,'' may be appealed after fina.l judpment because 
"policy considerations permi [t] the appeal'' or because the 
ruling "stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." 
Ante, at 8-9. Such collateral rulings-like other rulings-may 
be appealed only when the litigant has a personal stake in the 
resolution of his appeal,I" In Electrical Fittings, there was 
menL a.ciion. After the trial c·ourt found the pa.tent invalid and not 
infringed, the plaintiff' took an appeal on the validity question without 
cont.esting the finding of noninfringement. By a.ccepting the judgment to 
that extent , he lo;:;t his right to recover from the defendant-~;md thus his 
interest in the litigation. 
J< Judge• Frank wrote for the court.: 
"fW.Ihere there i::; no 'justiciable' diRpute, there arc no 'merits.' There is 
merely Hil 1mreal entity resembling that disembodied smile which Lewis 
Caroll immortalized. Many Supreme CourL decisions teach us that appel-
late juri;,diction, when no justiciable dispute exists on appeal, cat~not be 
rested upon the recollection that such a dispute previously existed when 
the rasr was in t.lw trial court.." 133 F. 2d, at 551 (foot.notes omitted). 
See also Kapp v. National J?ootball League. 586 F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9 
1978); Hall v. lJ . S. Piber & Plastics Corp., 476 F. 2d 418, 420 (CA3 
1973) ; cf. Lewis v. United States, 216 U.S. 611 (1910) (per curiam). 
15 The Court. appear>' to re<·ognize this in pct~sing, ante, at 9, n . 7, but 
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a stake; here there is none. Since nothi11g remains of the 
case or controversy, the Court of Appeals should have tlis-
rnis..c;;ec l til1is case. · .... 
III 
It is clear from the Court's extended discussion of policy 
and practical considerations, ante, at 10-12, that these weighed 
heavily in its decision. I am not aware that such considera-
tions ever before have influenced this Court in determining 
whether the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the federal 
courts. I11 auy event, the consequences of a finding of moot-
ness would not be as sevel'e as the Court predicts. 
A fiuding of mootuess would have repel'cussions primarily 
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who 
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to 
a successful, litigated judgment. 1 believe that a subsequent 
attetnpt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification 
generally would be barred by Art. III. But the consequences 
of applyiug settled rules of mootness in this situation would 
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were 
grautcd. the absent members of thC' putative class would have 
obtained by force of stare decis-is or the decree itself most of 
the benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand, 
damages were awarded awl an appeal permitted, reversal of 
the certification ruling would enable putative class members to 
take advautage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability 
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable 
judgment. Thus. the Court's decision to allow appeals in 
this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" that 
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to elimiuate.10 
fail,; to appl) tlw rule to thi~ ca.~e . Since the Court sugge:;ts that respond-
ents' intere:;t. in the certification ruling dt>rive~ from the mere fact that it 
";-;tand,; a;, an adjudication of onP of the io;sue:; litigated, ' ' id., at 9, Elec-
t1'ical l~'iltings ittwlf would lin11t u~ to the i~~uance of an order directing that 
the offensive ruling be expunged from the record. 307 U. S., at 242. 
J.l> ...t'<' ( 'ommf'lll, lnunPruate AppealalHhly of OrdPr~ Denying Clas:; C<·r~ 
tifir.atwn, 40 Ohio St. L. J . 4-!1 , 470-471 (1979) . In actionH brought under· 
9'8-904-DISSENT 
DEPORIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK v. ROPER 13 
Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise 
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before 
.Judgment, as petitioner did in this case. A defendant ·cer-
tainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in 
some cast>s. The Court argues that the result will be to deny 
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the 
enforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney[s] 
general. '' Ante, at 10-11. The practical argument is not 
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns 
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the ade-
quacy of comp<'nsation and enforcement available for particu-
lar substautive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best 
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be 
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim. 
Today, however, the Court uever pauses to consider the law of 
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of 
usury claims, 1' the Court's concer·n for compensation of puta-
tive class membt>rs in this case is at best misplaced and at 
worst mconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling 
Act.1s 
Rnle 23 (b) (3), a clas~ member must decide at the time of certification 
wlwt.Jwr tn ''opt out" of the action under Rule 23 (c) (2). This provision 
was designed to bring an end to the "spuriou~" cla!:>S action in which class 
mmnb<'r,.; wen• JWI111lt!ed. to int<'rvene n.fter tt derision on the merits 
in ordt>r Co ,penn' thP beJJdit:-: of th~Lt· dPrision. Notes of the Advisory 
Committe<' on Propo~ed Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F. R. D . 69, 105-106 
(1966) . 
17 Liddell 1. Litlun Systnns, lnc., 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rrjeeting hor-
rowerH' cla~~ action); F'ry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941). 
Petitioner iH n national bank, and it:; alleged failure to comply with Mis-
si~sippi'3 mterest limits would v10late t.he National Bank Art. 12 U. S.C. 
§ 85. But I do not undPr:;tand that the National Bank Act displaces stale 
polic) dikhvoring the aggregn,t 1011 of usury rlaim~. A primary purpose of 
lha t Act. i:- to prott•C't n;t tiona] bank;; from di:-;rriminatory treatment, or 
uudut· pennltJet> that nw~· bP impo~ed by ~ta.te law. See 12 lJ. S. § 8fi. 
lo Tlw Aet provide" that ruk•::- of proc'PClurc promulgated by this Court 
"E<ht~H .nol ••. enlarge IH' mod1fy any subtltantive right " 28 U. S. C. 
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The Court's concern for puta.tivc class members would be 
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced 
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litiga~ 
tion of successiw suits by members of the putative class. I 
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial admin-
istration would be real. But these problems can and should 
be addressed by measures short of rewriting the law of moot-
tless, as the Court seems to have done t.oday. · 'The first step 
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the 
dPnial of class certification in appropriate cireumstance_s.w 
District Courts already arc empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292 
(b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain con-
trolling questio11s of law. ln many cases, a class-action 
defenda11t undoubte>dly would forgo the opportuuity to settle 
with an individual plaintiff iu order to obtain an immediate 
and final determination of the class certification question on 
appeal. 
When' a defendant does attempt to moot a class action by 
forced settleme11t, the District Court is not powerless. In at 
least, some circumstances, it may require that putative class 
members receive some sort of notice and an opportunity to 
intervene withi11 the appeal period. Rule 23 (d)(2). 'The 
availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent 
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District 
Court mauagemeut of the problem by measures tailored to the 
§ 2072. See Amuimn Pipe & C'on~truction C'o. v. Utah, 414 U. 8. 538,. 
557-558 (1974): Devf'lopments in the Law-Class Actions, 8!-l Harv. L. 
H,ev . J 318, 1358-1;{50 (1976) , See generally Lander:;, Of Legalized Black-
mail and Legalized The-ft: Comnnner Cia"" Actions and the Sub:stnncc-
Pn>cf'dure Dilemma, -!7 S. CaL L. H.eY. 842 ( Hl7 4) . 
10 ln C'oovms & Lybrand '. Live8ay, 4:37 U, S. 463 (1978), this Court 
held that thfl denial of cla88 eeri ification is not. a "final derision" appeal-
able 3S of right under 2R U. 8 C. § 1291. We relied iu that ca8e on the 
danger::; of "wdi~rrimiua.te" iuterlocutory review. ld., at 474. Although 
Coopel's & Lyb11and now prevent;; review in cases in which it would be 
n{-sirahle, Congre:;~-> mar remedy the problem by appropriate le~islation .. 
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case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended 
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent inter-
locutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are 
lacking, it is for Congress-not this Court-to correct the 
defici«:>ncy. 20 
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it, 
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems ofteu 
are atteuded by unfortuuate practical consequences of their 
OWll. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respond-
(•nts will serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for the 
}mrpose of obtaining class certification. t)ince they can gain 
nothing more from the action. their participation in the case 
can be intended only to benefit the putative class. Yet they-
or their lawyers-serve 011 their ow11 motion. Siuce no court 
has certified the class. there has been no cousidered determina-
'tion that respondents will fairly and adequately represent its 
members. ~othing in Rule 23 a.uthorizes this novel procedure, 
and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it. 
Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent? 
See East 'l'exas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 
403-404 (1977). Are their currently nouexisten t claims "typi-
cal of the claims ... of the class" within the meaning of Rule 
23 (a)(3)? 21 
2° Congm-s currently ha-" before it a bill that. attempts to rem<'dy the 
difficultie:; infecting this troubled area. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1979) . The bill, supported by the Department of .Justice, proposes to 
bypass thr Rnles Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, supra, and to eliminate 
some of the problem:s of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by 
creating a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provides for 
lhe enforeement of this right in ~ome instances through actions brought in 
the n11111e of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory 
appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class cer-
fifiration under thE> proposed procedures. 
21 ThA Distriet Court properly may conclude on rcmanu that re~pondents, 
for theo;e or ot lwr rPa,:on~>, cannot adequately rrpresenl the clast;. Should 
intervention lw propo~<·d . the Di:;tncl Court on equitable grounds might well 
rduse to toll the Hlatnle of limitations in order to pennit it. ~early nine 
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The Court's holding well may prevent future "forced set-
tlements." and may even foreclose all settlements, of class 
action litigation. See ante, n. 5. Thus, the difficulties faced 
by the District Court on remand in this case may uot arise 
again in precis<>ly analogous circumstances. But today's result 
also authoriz:es appeals by putative class representatives who 
have prevailed on the merits of their individual claims. If the 
order denying class certification is reversed in that situation, 
the named plaintiffs on remand will have no more continuing 
relationship to the putative class than respondents have 
here. A remand for certification could also lead to "one-way 
intervention" in direct violation of Rule 23. Seep. 11-12, and 
n. 15, supra. These tensions, arisiug from the express terms 
of the Rule, undermine the Court's conclusion that the 
policies underlying Rule 23 dictate the result reached today. 
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of 
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from 
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. It also unneces-
sarily creates significant problems in the administration of 
Rule 23. I would vacate the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and remand with instructions to dism:iss the appeal 
as moot. 
years have pas~:<ed ::;ince this artion was filed and six Rinre the governing 
,:uhs!imtivf> "tatuto wa.- anwnded to authorize the challengrd conduct. In 
it.~ order dt>n~·iug rertificat ion on September 29, 1975, the Di:strict. Court 
:t><:<igur<l as one of it~ ren,:on::; tlu• pm-;,:ible "de:stntction of thC' [petitioner';;] 
bank" hy dmHagC's th('Jl allegt>d to total §12,000,000 nnd now potent,ially 
augrtwntf'd by thC' aC'crual of interest. App. 47, sN• anti'. at 2, u. 2. The 
]>O~siblC' de:struction of J>E't.itioner's bank is irrl:'levaut to thC' cent.ral i:s..~uc of 
nwotnl':-<:', bnt, :serious indPecl to dt>po . .-.;itor;:;, l::ltockholder:s, and t.be eommunit.y 
~;erwd . A;; thi<' Court reliP:s :,;o heavily on its practical and equitable con-
cern,.; for putativr ria~<,.; mrmbt>r,.;, it will hardly be inappropriate for the 
])i,.:triet Court ou rl'mand to eon:.;idl•r pmcticalitie:-; and C'quitie:s on both 
side,.:. ln the eircumiitan<:Ps pi'C'iiC'Utl'd, thC' District Court may well see no 
rrm-on to exC'rri:,:l• it~ Pquitahlr di~C'retiou in favor of putHiivc cla;;s members 
who ha\'(' sh·pt on their r·ight,; thc•se mn,ny year:;. 
;) .... {3 .. ~0 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT:Im 
No. 78-904 
Deposit Guaranty National Bank, l On Writ of Certiorari to 
Jackson, Mississippi, Petitioner, the United States Court 
v. of Appeals for the Fifth 
Robert L, Roper et al. Circuit. 
\ [February -, 1980] 
MH. Ju::sTIC.I!l PoWELL, with whom MR. Jus'l.'ICE STEWAR'l' 
joins, dissenting. 
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that 
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the 
National Bank Act and Mississippi law.1 'They filed this 
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty 
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and 
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf 
of a class aJleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggre-
gating $12 milliou. After four years of litigation, the District 
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification. 
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the 
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and 
court costs. Over respondents' objection, the District Court 
entered final judgment in their favor. Petitioner theu depos-
ited tlw full amount due with the clerk of the ,court. 
No one disputPs that the petitioner has tendered every-
thing that rPspouclcllts could have recovered from it in this 
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected petitiOner's suggestion of mootness and reversed 
the dcuial of class certification. This Court affirms the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals without identifying the case or 
controversy that remains to be litigated between the parties. 
1 Juri~di ction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. §§ 85, 
86, which adopts the iutere:;t limits set by state law, and 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1355. 
t. 1: (/ 
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'l'he Court decides that the central issue is not mootness but 
appealability. But the characterization does not withstand 
analysis. Since respondents lack a continuing interest in the 
outcome of the litigation, the Court of Appeals was powerless 
to hear their appeal. Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
Although there are some differences, this case is similar to 
U·nited States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at -, 
in one important respect: both require us to decide whether 
putative class representatives may appeal the denial of class cer-
tificatiou wheu they can derive no benefit from the relief sought 
in the actio11. In this case, as in Geraghty, the District Court 
refw:;<:>d to certify a class. Since no one has sought to inter-
_yene,.;espondents are the ouly plaintiffs arguably present in 
~ court.' Yet rt>spondents have no continuing interest in the 
\\o 
2 MR. Ju~TICE S•rEVI,NH :4ale;;:, in hi~ eonrurring opinion, that all pE>rsons 
aiiE>gNl to he mPmbrr~ of a putative cia~,; ''automat.Jcally becomE> part.iPs to 
tlw ca::;e or eontrovensy for .uw- lJUrJlOt>es" of Art .. Ill, and that they 
"n•main partir~ nnt1! a final dE>termination haH been madl' that thE> actiou 
may not, he maintainPd a:,; a ela::;::; action" Ante, at --. Thj" uovel 
vi('W. for whieh n;, authority iH riled, c·annot bE> recon('ilecl with hulian-
apoli.~ School Comm'1'~ v. Jacvb8, 420 U. S. l28 (1975), where an oral 
certifi<'atwn onl<•r wa" lwld in~ufticient to idE>Jltify thP intere::;b of abo;eut. 
claRH meml)('r,; for A rf IH pmpo:<<':< . Thf' n·::;nlt hardly ('OU!d bE> different, 
when thr cia"" lw" not I)P!'ll Iclent.ified nt all. See abo Memphis Light, 
Ga.~ & Water Dw v. Cm/l. ~;{(i 0. S. 1, 8 (Hl78): Ba:cte1' v. Palndgiano, 
42:{ 1'. S. ;~o~, 310, n. 1 (197H) : Weinstein v. Bmdford. 423 U. S. 147 
( 1975) ; J>aswleno City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 (J. S. 424, 430 
(lH7(i) . 
ThP propo::,ell rule of :1utornatw pnrty status-in thi::; cnsP for 90,000 
unidentified J>er:::ons--ha"' frouble"'ome and far-reaching impliratiom; that 
could prP.]nclir(:' the lmnging of elasH a chon::;. Prr:;tmlabl)' a purpo:;E> of 
Bneh a rul<' \\'OI!Id h1· to a~"un· that suti~faction of the claim;:; of muned 
partiPH \\'Ould not tPrmin:ll!' the ht1gation. Nor eonld 1he right;.; of 
appeal. Till!,;, 11' tlw rulP propoH<·d by MH . .Tu~·rrcg STJWEN~ is to ~ ~ 
nnnnnwd parti<•,.. hr !'Xtingtn"'hrcl b.1· thE> failure of thE> named partie::; to ~ 
·· ~ · , I ~nppo:<e that n fidtH'IH ry duty InU>it be impo::;efl upon nam~:,'\.1 ;;z.,. ~,) 
'78-904-DISSJ<JNT 
DEPOSIT GUARANTY NA'r. BANK ·v. ROFE:R, $ 
InJuries alleged in their complaint. They sou on dru}k - ]:_} 
ages; those damages have been tendered in full Respondents I 
have not suggested that success Oll the certi cation motion :1J 
would entitle them to addition11l relief from the petitioner:::---= 
Indeed, their personal claims to relief have been abandoned 
so complet.ely that no appeal was taken in their own names. 
The notice of appeal filed with the District Court recites that 
parties ~~-rontitme ihe lit.igation where-as here-thfl Ut~named parties ~ 
retmtin llllidentifiN.! nnd fail to intervene. As fiduciaries, would the ~/ ·r~-~~ 
~~~~mo.;· not. only h<· required to continue t,o litigate, but to assum£> per- ~ 
sonal m>]Jon.;tbility l'or eost« and attorney's fees if t.he case ultima,tely is _ 
lc~t? Would t·e~pon,;ible litigants be willir1g to file class actions if they ~ ~ 
thereb~· n::-::nnnrd such long-term .fiduciary obligations? These f!!t¥letiMts~ 
suhshmtinL They are not. resolved by Rule 23., ~ I believe they merit 
careful ::;tully by Congrr"S before this Court~perhaps unwittingly-creates 
It major category of <"lientle~s litigation uniqur in our system. 
"tAlth<Htgh rc•::;p<mdPnt.~ also asked for attomey's fees, their complaint 
s o s that fees were to be granted only f<om the damages ultimately 
awarded to them or the cla;;s. App. 18-H. 
3 He;,pondvnt,; do assert that cHrtification wo~rld <>nable them to reduce the 
expen~P of litig;ttron by allocating costs among the members of a prevailing 
clas,;. Brief for Hc:>pondt>uts 8:3 . Except for attorney's fees, however, 
responclen.ts do not ident.rfy any eosts incurred to date t.hat. are not 
covered by the petitioner's tender. Although the record does not reveal 
the details of t·he fee nrrangcment between rt>spondents and their lawyers, 
the complaint sugge;;tR that the lawyers have agreed to accept as full com-
pensation 25% of the amount recovered from thr petitioner. App. 13-14. 
If t.his il:l the agrcrment as to fees, responqen(s have no continuing interest. 
Only counsel is concerned whether the recovery is enlarged. 
Even if one as::mmcd thai respondenLs' liability to their lawyers could be 
reduced by a cla::~s recovery, no one has suggel:lted that petitioner is or ever 
will be liable for fer:; tha.t uJt.irrwtely may be owed by respondents. Re-
spondents' JUrifldwtional Utcory appears to be tha.t. the mere possibility of 
assertin)r future claims .for a.t.tomey'~:> fres against ot.her members of a--
putative cla.':i~:> gives rii'P to a ease or controversy aga.inst the class defend-
ant. Snell a th<eory i::~ unprecedented, and its conser)uences are bizarre. 
}'or ex~J.mple , rto:spondent~' theory would IWrmit, a prrson to file a class 
action, twen though he had previou~:>ly ;tccept.ed full settlement of his in-
dividnaJ ela.im on the ground tha.i, the fees incurred in a.nticipa.tion of the• 
lit.iga.tion might, 1dtm1a t~ly b~} shal'eti with the cla88. 
~-
'18-904-DISSENT 
4 DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK 1J. ROPER 
respotHlents appeal only "on behalf of all others similarly 
situated ... .'' App. 63. 
Since respondents have no continuing personal stake in the 
outcome of this action, 1 believe that Art. III and the prece-
dents of this Court require that the ·case be dismissed as moot. 
Sec Gerayhty, post, at - -- (PowELL, J., dissenting). 
There is no suggestio11 that respondents' claims are "capable H I 
of repetition, yet evading review.'' C · . , 0 .!:}_j 
U. S. 103, 110-111, 11. 11 (1975). And not a single one of the 
alleged 90,000 class members has sought to intervene in the 
nine years smcc this a:ction was filed. Cf. United Airlines, 
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 F. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone 
ever challenged the allegedly usurious charges by informal 
complaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certifi-
cation was demed, the action lay clorma11t during the seven 
months m which respondents sought to take an interlocutory 
appeal, without provoking a response fron~ anyone who pre-
viously may have thought that the class action would protect 
his rights. v\7'e are 110t told what. if anythiug, motivates re----spondents to contiu ue this crusade on behalf of persons who 
for years have evinced no interest whatever in obtaining re-
C0"9F)' fm themselv~ On its face. this appears simply ~ 
be a ''lawyer's cas<>.'' 
DespitP tradition and policy considerations to the contrary, 
the Court seems undisturbed that this federal action will be 
tf; If a cla:;,;-ne1 ion dt>fPIHhmt were ,;howu t.o have embarked on a course 
of conclurt. clr,;igned to inHul<tte tlw cla,;s ccrtlfi<'ation issue from appellate 
review 111 order to <~VOJd elm.:,.:widc ha.bility, a, court in proper eircumstances 
might. find the Oer:;tein tr,;t ~atisfird and thfl case not moot . See Susman v. 
Lincoln America11 Co?'p .. 587 F . :2d 866 (CA7 1978); 13 Wright, Miller & 
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procrdure § 3533, at 171 (Supp. 1979); 
Comment, Coutinuatwn and Representation of Class Actions Following 
Dismi:;sal of the Cia:;::; HepreHentative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 599-600. 
_5'Tlw :\li~~~~~ippi u~ur~· statute wa::; amended in 1974, and it apparently 
uow authonzr,; the fl'PS charged by petitioner. 1974 Mis::;. Gen. Laws, ch. 
564, § 7: ,.,<'<' }.liH~ . Code Ann. § 7 .~17-1 (6). Thus, tht>re is no question of 
prospcet1ve Jehel. 
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A 
The Court does not explain how it is able to find an 
"individual interest" in the litigation without identifying 
the iuj ury in fact required by Art. III. It simply ignores this 
<•ssentlal inquir-y and relies on the "factual context" of the 
case: When respondents refused the proffered settlement, the 
trial court entered judgment in their favor over their objec-
tion. ld., at 6. The single fact of respondents' refusal in-
spires the Court to draw a "critical distinction" between 
mootness dPriving from a judgment and mootness resulting 
from events extrinsic to the litigation. ld., at 9. The Court 
appears to hold that a litigant who attempts to appeal from 
a favorable judgment has an '!mdividual interest" in exercis-
ing his "statutory right to appeal." !d., at 7. If the statutes 
and rules goveming "federal appellate practice" confer such 
a right, the ( 'ourt 'Coucludes that Art. III requires no more. 
Ibid. ; St' f' id., at 12. 
Having shifted the inquiry from Art. III mootness to t~ 
"formulat[wn l [of] standards ... govern[ing] the appealabil-
ity of procedural rulings," ibid., the Court determines that 
respondeuts are aggrieve<.! by the uenial of certification for two 
reasons. First. the certification order is a "procedural ruling, 
collateral to the merits of [the] litigation·,'' that "stands as 
an aujudicatio11 of one of the issues litigated.' ' !d., at 9. 
Second, the contrary result would frustrate the goals of 
Rule 23. ld., at 10-12. 
The effect of the Court's analysis, if I understand it cor-
rectly, IS to avoid a direct confrontation with settled princi-
ples that unambiguously dictate a finding of mootness in this 
do so by lllt'an::; oi a rlas;;, action . Ante. at 10, n. 8. We may assume 
that rl.'.:;pondl'nts bad ~oml.' intnrl.'8t. in th<' class-action procedure as a means 
uf intPre:-tmg tht>Ir law~·er:-; m the case or obtaining a. satisfactory settle-
ment . Tlu~ ma~· bt• an interl.'::~t propl.'rly furthered by Rule 23, but once 
rr~pondent ::; obtamPd both ac<'e~;:; to court and full indiv1dnal relief that 
intf'r~1 fh::;appeared. 
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case. But the Court cannot escape the impact of these author-
ities simply by refusing to consider the respondents' evident 
lack of interest in the outcome. The "critical distinction'1 by 
which it attempts to justify its failure to do so is both factually 
and legally unsound. 
B 
As a matter of fact, there is substantial doubt that this case 
involves the effect of "a judgment in favor of a party at an 
intermediate stage of litigation." I d., at 9. Petitioner has 
never contended that the controversy became moot merely 
"by reason of the entry of judgment in [respondents'] favor." 
ld., at 5. Instead, petitioner argues that its tender of full 
relief has relnedied the respondents' individual injuries and 
thus eliminated their stake in the outcome. Considerable 
authorjty supports petitioner's contention that the tender itself 
moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. This 
Court, among others, has held that a federal court is powerless 
to review the a.bst.ract questions remaining in a case when the 
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that 
fully satisfies his claims. California v. San Pablo & Tulare 
R. Co., 149 U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill & Thomas 
Co. v. United States, 392 F. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per curiam); 
Lamb v. Comm·issioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968) (per il l 
curiam) ; A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F. 2 ,91 
89 ( CA5 1965) (per curiam) ·t" 
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result 
should differ because the District Court has entered a judg-
ment in favor of respondents iustead of dismissing their 
fJ The Court. makf'~ no effort to dio;t.iugui,;h thest• cases. Yet it concedes 
that the "righL to employ Rule 23" is a "procedural right only, ancillary 
to the litigation of sub"tantive claims,'' and it admits that "the court 
retain~ no juri~diction over the controwrsy" when the "substantive claims 
become moot in the Art. III sense." Ante, at 6. If the tender itself 
mooted the re~pondents' claim~ without rPgard to the entry of judgment, 
then t.he Court'~ own analysis reqpire:; ii to. concll.l£l.e that the case is , 
moot. 
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awsmt as moot. 1 It, is certainly true, as ' the Court observes, 
that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in 
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7. 9. There never has been any 
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally 
favorable judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wright, 
Miller, and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure ~ 3902 
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practice 1T 203.06 (1975). But 
federal courts uniformly have required a showing of some 
adverse effect in order to confer "standiug to appeal." Ibid.; 
see Barry v. District of Columbia Bd. of Electio·ns,- U. S. 
App. D. C.-- , 580 F. 2d 695 (H)78). Indeed, Art. III itself 
requires a continuing controversy between adverse parties at 
all stages of the litigation. E. g., Sosna v.Iowa, 419 U.S. 393. 
402 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 'G. S. 452, 459, n. 10 
(1974) . 1f any statute or rule purported to authorize an 
appeal in contraveutiou of Art. III, that rule would yield to 
the constit.utional command. 
c 
The Court relies almost entirely on Electrical Fittings Corp. .JJ 
v. 'L'hornas & Betts Co. , 307 U.S. 241 (19:39).) But the deci-
~The "~tat11for~ · right.'' fo appeal it<ielf (·Hnnot. ~nppl~· a prrsonal stake 
m ihe outcome, for Congre:-;.: cannot. abrogate Art. III limitations on the 
juri~diction of thl' frderal court::> . Gladstone, Healtors v. Village of Bell-
wood, 441 U. S. Pl, 100 (1979) . 
If) Thr only ot lwr authoritiP:< cited hy t.]w Court are United Ai1'line11. Inc. 
v. McDouald, 4:rz 11 . S. 31)5 (1977), and Cooper~ &· Lybrand v. Livesay, 
437 U. S. 463 (1978). D1ctnm in both ca~es :stated that the denial of class 
certification i:; ;mbjf•et t.o appellate review after final judgment a.t the 
behl'~t. of the named plaintiffs. Neither ca::;P di:seus::>ed mootnPst>, and 
neitfwr anal~· zetl the propo~itwn in any wn~· . lnc!Pecl, the on!~· authority 
citrd Ill C'ooper8 c(: Dybrand war; United Airlines. Hec 437 U.S., a.t 469, and 
the only a11thont~· cited in C ruiPd Airlines was a conct'RHiou made br the 
defendant aud a [J:-;t of ca:-;f•,-< from tlw Courts of Appeals, none of which 
dealt wi1 h <t ~nggetition of mootnl':s~ m an analogous :situation, see 432 
U. S., at :{g ;~ . and n . 14-. Rnch :sf a tcment~:>, C'a:sually enunl'iated without a 
word of explanation in opmion::; rlralmg with 1mrelatPd legal qne:stions, are 
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litigated on remand by a lawyer whose only "clients" are 
unidentified class members who have shown no desire to be • I 
represente(l by anyone.r The Court ·also neglects establist1ea -..!J 
principles of Art. III ,itrisprudence, and remands to the Dis-
trict Court a headless class action that does not meet the 
requirements of Rule 23. 
II 
The Court identifies the question for decision in this case 
as "whether respoudents' individual and private case or con-
troversy became moot by reason of the entry of .i udgment in 
their favor." ld., at 5. Wholly ignoring the fact that 
respondents themselves elected to appeal only on behalf of 
third parties, the Court concludes that "respondents' individual 
interest in the litigation-as distinguished from whatever may 
be their !'<'presentative responsibilities to the putative class-
is sufficient to permit their appeal. . . . " I d., at 12. One 
might expect tha.t the Court would reason to this conclusion 
by pinpointing the individual interest on which it purports to 
rely. But no such reasoning appears in the Court's opinion. 
Although there is some discussion of advantages that generally 
may accrue to named plaintiffs from the use of the class-action 
device, the Court never attempts to ascertain whether these -
particular respondents can derive any such benefit from this 
action:r-lJ 
I do no! ~<ng;gr~t t.hat. rrspondcnt~;' lawyer actof'd improperly in pursuing 
thi. casf' Since he has prevailed both in this Court and in the Court 
of Appeals, the responsibility for allowing client-less litigation fall8 ou 
tl.u:i federal eourtti . 
'"fAn~· advantages that ordinarily may flow from "the use of the class 
actim1 JHO<'Pdnre for litip;ation of individual elaims," ante, at 10, cannot 
acrrur lo tlw~P rrHpondrnt:, who will not be litigating their own clnims 
on remand Nor doe~ the Court identify any unrecovered cost of litiga-
tion that these re~pondent:s can reduce if they obtain r('lief for a class. 
See id., at 10. n. 8 ; n. :{, ~;upra. Indeed, the Court refers to respondents 
only to pomt out that their total damages were so ~mall that they "would 
be unltkcly to obtain legal redrP::l:; a1 an aeceptable ro.~t" if they could not 
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sion simply reaffirms our obligation not to review judgments 
by which no individual is aggrieved. The trial court there 
had entered a decree holding a patent valid but not i1~fringed. 
Although the alleged infringer wo11 the case, it sought to 
appeal the finding that the patent was valid. This Court 
held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to con-
sider the issue of patent validity after the trial court found 
no infringement, because "[a] party may not appeal from a 
judgment . . . in his favor, for the purpose of obtaining a 
review of findings . .. which are not necessary to support the 
decree." I d., at 242. But the trial court had erred by includ-
ing in the decree itself a ruliug that "purport[ed] to adjudge 
the validity of l the patent] .'' Ibid. Since that ruling "was 
immaterial to the disposition of the cause," the Court of 
Appeals had jurisdiction for the limited purpose of eliminating 
the extran0ous ruling from the decree. Ibid. 
The Court reads Electrical Fittings as a case that was "still 
live" in the Art. III sense "because policy considerations per-
mitted an appeal. '' Ante, at 8- 9. But Electrical Fittings was 
a "live" controversy only because-aud to the limited extent 
that-the petitwne1· there asserted a continuing personal stake 
ill the outcome. As Judge Learned Hand later explained, the 
petitioner in Elect1'1,cal Fittings was iHjurecl in fact because tM--
unnecessary ruling that the patent was valid could have 
created "some presumptive prejudice" against him in a future 
case. Harries v. Air King Products Co., 183 F. 2d 158, 161 
l f I (CA2 1950); sec In re Tn:rnble Co. , 479 F. 2d 103, 111 (CA3 
__ ,_ __ """'1"9""7"'3rt)-,.:J This g('uuine prejudice to the petitioner himself 
not controlling or even prrt'ua:sive when thry nrc shown on further reflec-
tion to have been incons1"trnt w1th e:stabhshfd law 
IJ Although thP Court of Aptwal~ in Electl'i,caL F1ttings held that col-
lateral e:,topprl would be no bar 10 rrlitigatlon of the validity question, 100 
F. 2d 40:~, 404 ( CA2 1938), other l'CHlli.~ had takrn a diff<'rent. view on 
~;imilar ii:iiSUP::; of collatPral r;;t-oppeL If the validity finding werr permitted 
to :;;tand, t h<> twhtwnPJ' could have bt>eu forced to litigate the question of 1ts 
predusivn effpc•J iu future' ras%. Jfl Wright, Miller, and Cooper, supra 
• 
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supplied Lhe requisite persottal stake in obtaining reformation 
of the decree. 
Thus, the Comt's view of Electrical Fittings is plainly incon-
sistent with the holding of that case. The Court of Appeals 
wn.s told to reform the decree, but expressly forbidden to 
consider the merits of the patent validity question. In other 
words, the court's appellate jurisdiction was only as broad as 
the petitioner's personal stake in the appeal. Just four years 
latet·, Altvater v. F1·eeman, 319 U. S. 359 (1943), explained 
that the limitation was constitutionally based. Reversing a 
clecisioJt that had relird on Electrical Fittings in refusing to 
consider the merits of an app~al. the Court distinguished 
Electrical Fitti.nys as a case iu which the parties sought deci-
sion of ''a hypothetical case:' ' The appE>al in Altvater, by 
contrast, satisfied "the requirements of case Ot' controversy" 
becautse the parties contiuued to contest a couuterclaim that 
had not beett collcluded by the dismissal of the orginal com-
plaint. 319 ("'". S., at 363- a66. 
Altvater and l!}lectrical Fittings entirely foreclose the 
Court's argument that a party who has no personal stake in 
the outcome of his appeal may invoke the jurisdiction of a 
federal court merely because policy-based "rules of practic~ 
permit him to do so. Any doubt is dispelled by Altvater's 
express reliance on Cover Y. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 ( 1942), 
cert. denied , 319 U. S. 74~ ( 1943) , a case in which the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed at length the 
constitutional limits on appellate jurisdiction. 319 U. S., at 
363, n. 2. Like the respondents here and the petitioner in 
Electrical Fittings, the appellant in Cover sought to appeal 
from a judgment that had eliminated his stake in the out-
~ The ( 'ourt. of Appeals emphatically declined to as-
n. 4, §:{902, a.t 4(H (Hii6); lB -:\loon• '::. FPdernl Pmct.ice ~0.443 [5], a.t 
3925 tl974J; ~ id., ~ ~ 203.0(-i, at ilo (1975) . 
fJ..Tlw <IJI]Jf'lliiul, Ill CoUI:'l \ . Srhwartz, J:~ ;l F. 2<1 541 (CA2 1942), ccrt. 
denied, 3Hl (' . S. 7-!S (1943) , wu;, the lo~mg l>laintiff in a patent mfriuge-
/ 
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sunte jurisdiction over an appeal which sought 11no relief 
f against anybody before the court ... but .•. want[ed] an 
'1. \ advisory opinion that [a] patent [was] valid." 133 F. 2d, at 
~ ~ Since there was no case or controversy, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that it was "without discretion" to hear the 
appeal. 1 d., at 545. 
These cases demonstrate that the requirements of Art. III 
do not ehange with the "factual conte~t" in which a suggestion 
of mootness arises. See .ante, at 5. Whatever the context, 
Art. III asks but a si11gle question: ls there a continuing con-
troversy between adverse parties? In Electrical Fittings, thj:},__.. 
coutroversy continued with respect to the single narrow 
issue whether the District Court's ruling on patent validity 
properiy was included in the decree. But nothing in that 
case suggests that a "procedural ruling, collateral to the merits 
of a litigatiou," may be appealed after finaJ judgment because 
"policy considerations permi [ t_l the appeal" or because the 
ruling "stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." 
Ante, at 8-9. Such collateral rulings-like other rulings-may 
I~ be app(~aled only when the litigant has a personal stake in the 
.,_ ___ r-:-:e-solution of Tiis appea:t.::t In Electrical Fittings, there was 
meut a.ction. After the trial eour! fonnd the patent invalid and not 
infringed, the plaintifi" took an appeal on the validity question without 
contesting the finding of noninfringemenL. By accepting the ,judgment to 
that extent,, he lo~t his right to recover from the defendant-and thus his 
interest in the litigation. 
lJ.rudgP Fnmk wrote for the court.: 
"[WI here there i:-l no 'justiciable' dispute, there are no 1merits.' There is 
merely an unreal entity resembling that di~embodied smile which Lewis 
Caroll immortalized. Many Supreme Court decision~; teach us that appel-
late jurisdiction , when no justiciable dispute exists on appeal, cannot be 
rested upon the recollection that such a dispute previously existed when 
the rase was in the trial court .'' 1Ba F . 2d, at 551 (footnotes omitted). 
See also Kapp v. National F'ootball League, 585 F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9 
1978); Hall v. U. S. Fiber & Plastics Corp., 476 F. 2d 418, 420 (CA3 
1973) ; cf. T.;~• wis v. United States, 216 U. S. 611 (1910) (per oul'iam) . 
~The Conl't appearti to rec·ognize thi:; in passing, ante, at 9, n. 7, bnt 
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a stake; here there is Jlolle. Since nothing remains of the 
case or controversy, the Court of Appeals should have dis-
missed this case. 
III 
H is clear from the Court's extended discussion of policy 
and practical considerations, ante, at 10-12, that these weighed 
heavily in its decision. I am not aware that such considera-
tions ever before have influenced this Court in determining 
whether the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the federal 
courts. Iu any event, the consequences of a finding of moot-
ness woulrl uot be as severe as the Court predicts. 
A findmg of mootiJess would have repercussions primarily 
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who 
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to 
a successful, litigated judgment. 1 bf'lieve that a subsequent 
attempL by thaL plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification 
generally would be barred by Art. III. But the consequences 
of applying settled rules of moot11ess in this situation would 
not be uuj ust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were -granted. the absent members of tho putative class would have 
obtaiued by force of stare deciS'is or the decree itself most of 
the benefits of actual class membership. If, on tho other hand, 
damages were awarded and an appeal pennittf'd, reversal of 
the certification ruling would enable putative class members to 
take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability 
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable 
judgment. Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in 
this situation will reinstat·e the "one-way intervention" that !S} 
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminatey--: 
fail:< to appl) tlw rule to thi:; case. Since the Court suggest:; that respond-
ents' int<'re:;t in the certification ruling d<'rivc~ from the mere fact that it 
",.;tandl' a" an ;~djudicntion of one of the issm•s litigated, '' id., at 9, Elec-
fl·ical Fittings 1t::wlf would limit u~ to the i:;:;uance of an order directing that 
thlffens.ive ruling be expunged from the record. 307 U. S., at 242. 
' l'l' < 'omuwnt . lnunrdwte AppealabJhty of Order:> D0nying Clas.; Crr-
ti <ttJOn , 40 Ohio St L. J. 441 , 4/(J.-.!71 ( 1979) . In actionH brought under· 
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Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise 
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before 
j-udgment, as petitioner uid in this case. A defendant cer-
tainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in 
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny 
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the 
enforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney[s] 
general.'' Ante, at 10-11. The practical argument is not 
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns 
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the ade-
quacy of comprnsation and enforcement available for particu-
lar substalltivc elaims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best 
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be 
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim. 
Today, howcvrr. the Court llever pauses to consider the law of 
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of __ 
, 1ry c auns. · the Court's concern for compensation of puta-
tive class membt>rs in this case is at best misplaced and at 
worst mconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling 
"----=---" Act. 
/ Rule 23 (b) (3), n rlas~ member must deride at the time of certification 
whether to "opt ont" of the aetion under Rule 23 (c) (2) . This provision 
ww; df'si!!ned to bring an end to thn "spuriou::;" elm;::; action in which class 
mPmber,.; werE" wnmtlrd to lllt<'rvenr after a dceision on the merits 
in ordf'r w ,;pcun• t.hr be!J(•fit.~ of t.h:Lt· deciswn. Notes of the Advisory 
Committer on Propo::;ed Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F. R.. D. 69, 105-106 
(1996). 
1 t>Liddell 1 . Utlu11 Systems, hu·., 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (n'jr<'ling bor-
rower;-;' ela:;;, action); Pry v. Layton. 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2cl 561 (1941). 
Petitioner is a national bauk, and its alleged failure to comply with Mis-
sissippi'::; mten':->t limits would vwlate the Kationall3ank Art. 12 U.S. C. 
§ 85. Hut I uo not under~taud that the Narional Bank Act di;;place::; sta-te 
policy diHfavoring the ap;grPgnt ion of usury rlaim:s. A primary purpose of 
that Act. j,. to prott'c1 national banks from di~rriminatory treatment or 
unclut' penaltll'~> that 1w1~· O<' impo~ed by ~ta.tr law. See 12 ll. S. § 86. 
llf'J'he Act provtd!'>-~ tba1 rule~ of proredure p1·omulgated hy this Court 
"~b~.Jl .nol . •. cula.rge ot· ntOlhfy any sub~tant.iw right." 28 U. S. C. 
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Tlw. Court's concern for putat.ivc class members would be 
more telling in a. more appropriate case. A pattern of forced 
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litiga-
tion of successive suits by members of the putative class. I 
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial admin-
istratioll would be real. But these problems can and should 
be addresseu by measures short of rewriting the law of moot-
ness, as the Court seems to have done today. · The first ste~) 
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the 1~ 
d<•nial of class certification in appropriate circumstances. 
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292 
(b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain con-
trolling questions of law. In many cases, a class-action 
defendant undoubtedly would forgo the opportunity to setne---
with an individual plaintiff in order to obtain an immediate 
aml fiual determination of the class certification question on 
appeal. 
Where a defendant does attPmpt to 1noot a class action by 
forced settleme11t, the District Court is not powerless. In at 
least, some circumstances, it rnay require that putative class 
members receive some sort of notice and an opportunity to 
intervene within the appeal period. Rule 23 (d) (2). The 
availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent 
tD the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District 
Court managemeut of the problem by measures tailored to the 
§ 2072. S<'l' Ameril:an Pipe &: Cou~truction C'o. Y. Utah, 414 U. S. 538,. 
557-551\ (1974); DrvrloprrwntH in the L<~w-Cla,.;s Actions, 89 Harv. L. 
ltev. I iHH, 1358-135(! ( J97U). See gmerally Lewder;;, Of LegaJizrd Black-
mail and LegalizPd Theft: ConHHmer ClHHH Actions and the Substance-
Prot(>dure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. HeY. 842 (Hl74) . 
"ln C'oopen; & Lybrund \'. Live8ay, 4:37 lT. S. 463 (197c ), thi::; Court 
hPid that the deuml of clasH certification is not a ''final decision" appeal-
able u" of right under 2H P. S.C. § 12!H. We relied in thaL case on the 
daugers of "mdiscrimi11ate'' intf'rlocutory rev1ew. hl., a.t 474. Although 
C'oopen; & Lybmnd now prevents l'f'Vll'W in cases in which it would be 
Ut"Sirahlr, Congre~~ mar remPdy the prohll'm by appropriate ](>~islation .. 
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case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended 
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent inter-
locutory appeals arc unavailable or managerial powers are 
lacking, it is for Congress-uot this Court-to correct the 
y. 
Since a court is limited to the decision. of the case before it, 
.iudicially fashioned "solutions'' to legislative problems ofteu 
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their 
owtl. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respond-
Pnts will serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for the 
purpose of obtaining class certification. Since they cau gain 
nothing more from the action. their participation iu the case 
can be intended only to benefit the putative class. Yet they-
or· their lawyers-serve on their own motion. Since no court ... 
has certified the class. there has been no considered determina-
tion that respondents will fairly and adequately represent its 
members. Xothillg in Rule 23 a.uthori~es this novel procedure, 
and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it. 
Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent? 
See East Texas Motor Freiyht v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 
403-404 (1977). Are their currently nonexistent claims "typi-
cal .of the clait~ ... of the class" within the meaning of Rule 
23 ( a)(3) ?3?/ 
fi ~Congrr~s rurrmt ly ha,; bt'forc it a bill that. attempts to remrdy the 
difficulties infecting this troubled area.. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1979) . The bill, supported by the Department of .Justice, proposes to 
bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, supra, and to eliminate 
some of the problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by 
creating a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provides for 
the enforcement of this right in some instances through actions brought in 
the namr of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory 
appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class cer-
tifirntion under thr proposed procedures. 
'lAJ ,.trThr Dist'rit·t Court propPrly may conclude on remauclthat re~pondents, 
f'or tlw~e or othPr rea~on:; , cannot adequately represent the cia~~:>. Should 
intervention br Jlropmwd, the D1stnct Court, on equitable grounds might well 
rd\115(' to toll the Ht<~tntt> of limitatwns in order to pt'rmit it. Nearly nine 
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rrhe Comt's holding well may prevent futurf' "forced set· 
tlemen ts," ami may Pven foreclose all settlemeuts, of class 
action litigation. See ante, n. 5. Thus, the difficulties faced• 
by the District Court on remand in this case may 110t arise 
again in precisPly analogous circumstances. But today's result 
also authorizes appeals by putative class representatives who 
have prevailed on the merits of their individual claims. If the 
order cleuying class certification is reversed in that situation, 
tlw named plain tiffs on remand will have no more continuing 
relationship to the putative class than respondents have 
here. A remand for C£'rtification could also lead tO "one-wal---
interveution" in direct violation of Rule 23. Seep. 11-12, and 
n. 15, supra. These tensions, arising from the express terms 
of the Rule, undermiue the Court's conclusion that the 
policies uuderlyiug Rule 23 dictate the result reached today. 
In sum. the Court's attempted solution to the problem of 
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from 
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. It also unneces-
sarily creates significant problems in the administration of 
Rule 23. I would vacate the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals ~~1<j remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal 
as moot.~ 
yem~ havl' JXIS<:Pd ,.ince this nrtion was filrd ru1cl six f'inre the governing 
~uh><tant.ivf• statute wa;; anwnded to authorizr thr challengrd conduct. In 
it..; ordt•r denying rrrtification on September 29, 1975, the Di~trict. Court 
a;;~;ignrd ns one of it~ reason:; ill(• poH><ible ''dt>titruction of the Lpetitioner'~] 
bank" by damagrK thrn allegPd io iota! §12,000,000 and now potent.ially 
uug;mentt'u by tlw aeC'rual of int<•rp~t. App. 47, fW<' antP. at 2, u. Z. The 
po;;:;ihl<• t!e~lructiun of pet.itioner':; bank io; irrelevant to the eent.ral i;;..-mc of 
moot 11<'1'><, but. :>Priou" ind!;'Pcllo dPpo.~itors , ;,;lockholclers, and thr community 
served . A;; thiF< Court n•lic·~ o<o hPavily on its practiral and equitable con-
rer·n" for putatin• ria;;~ nwmlwr~, it will hnrdly be inappropriate for the 
Dif'trid Court ou I'Pll1H1Hl to eonsid<·r practicalitie>< and rquitie~ ou both 
sidP~. Jn tht' eirf'um~tan<:P>' pn•srntl:'d, tlw Distrirt C'ourt may well :see uo 
l'Pa~on ro exPrri"t' it:; <•quitablP di~cretion in favor of putative cia~~ members 
who ha,·c .sl<·pt ou their righl.s the"e many yean;. 
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MR. JusTrcr~ PowJ<~LL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART I 
joins, disse11ting. 
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that 
petitioner chargt>d them usurious interest in violation of the. 
National Bank Act and Mississippi law.1 They fi-led this. 
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty 
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and 
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf 
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggre-
gating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District 
Court de11ied respondents' motion for class certification. 
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the 
full amount of their iudividual claims plus legal interest and 
court costs. Over respondents' objection, the District Court 
entered final judgment in their favor. Petitioner then depos-
ited the full amount due with the clerk of the ·court. 
No Olle disputc•t~ that the petitioner has tendered every-
thing that respondents could have recovered from it in this 
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit rej ected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed 
the de11ial of class certification. This Court affirms the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals without identifying the case or 
controversy that remains to be litigated between the parties. 
1 Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. §§ 85, 
86, which adopts the interest limits set by state law, and 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1355, 
. ( 
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The Court decides that the central issue is not mootness but 
appealability. But the characterization does not withstand 
analysis. Since respondents lack a continuing interest in the 
outcome of the litigation, the Court of Appeals was powerless 
to hear their appeal. Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
Although there are some differences, this case is similar to 
United States Parole Cornrniss·ion v. Geraghty, post, at -, 
in one important respect: both require us to decide whether 
putative class representatives may appeal the de11ial of class cer-
tification when they can derive no benefit from the relief sought 
in the action. In this case. as in Geraghty, the District Court 
refused to certify a class. Since no one has sought to inter-
vene, respoude11ts ar·e the only plaintiffs arguably present in 
court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in the 
injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only dam-
ages; those damages have been tendered iu fulP Respondents 
have not suggested that success on the certification motion 
would entitle them to additional relief from the petitioner.3 
·2 Althou!!:h l'<'~pomh•nt;.; also n~ked for attorney',; feeti, their compla.ini 
shows that fees were to be granted only fwm the damages ultimately 
awarded to them or the class. App. 13-14. 
3 Hri:'pontlt•nts do fi8~Prt that crrtifirntion would enable them to reduce the 
expen::;e of litigation by a.Jioca.t i.ng costs among the members of a prevailing 
class. Bri<>f For Het<pondent~ 8:·!. Except for attorney's fet•s, however, 
rrspondents do not 1dcnt if~ · mw t·osts incurred t.o daJf~ tha.t are not 
covPred by thP petitioner's tender. Although the record docs not reveal 
the details of the fee arrangement between respondents and their lawyers, 
the complaint sugge~ts that the lawyers have agreed to accept as full com-
pen~ation 25% of the amount l'PCovered from thE' petitiom'r. App. 13-14. 
If thi;; is t.br agrrement as to fee:::, respondents have no continuing interest. 
On!,,· counsel i;; coneprned whPthrr the recovery is enla.rgrd. 
Even if one as~umed that rrspondmts' liability to their law~·ers could be 
reduced by t~ elass recovt>ry, no one has suggcstrd tha.t. petitioner is or ever 
will be liable for fee" that ult.imatt'l~r may bE' owE'd by respondents. Re-
spondents' jurii:\dietional t.heory appetLrs t.o be tha.L the mere po~ibility of 
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Indeed. their personal claims to relief have been abandoned 
so completely that no appeal was take11 in their own names. 
The notice of appeal filed with the District Court recites that 
respotH.ieHts appeal only "on behalf of all others similarly 
sitm~ted .... " App. 63. 
Since respondents have no continuing personal stake in the 
outcome of this action, I believe that Art. III and the prece-
dents of this Court require that the case be dismissed as moot. 
See Geraghty, post, at --- (POWI<:LL, J., dissenting). 
There is no suggC'stion that respo11dents' claims are "capable 
of repf'ti tiotl. yet evading review." ('f. Gerstein v. Puyh, 420 
U.S. 103, 110-111, 11. 11 (1975).' And not a single one of the 
alleged HO,OOO class nwmbers has sought to iut<orvene in the 
nine years since this action was filed. Cf. Cnited A1:rtines, 
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 r:. S. 385 (1977). ~or has anyone 
ever challengt•d the allegedly usurious charges by informal 
complaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certifi-
cation was denied, the action lay dormant during the seven 
months in which respondents sought to take an interlocutory 
appeal, without provoking a response from anyone who pre-
viously may havp thought that the class action would protect 
his rights. vVe arl-' not told what, if anything, motivates re-
assert.ing fufltrP !'!aim:-; fot nttornry'::; feeH agnin:'lt otlwr members of a 
puta,til'0 C'la.~t- gin~ rt::<e to a ca~e or controven;y aga.inst the cln&'l defend-
aut. SlH·h a thror~· i,;; unpreet'dc·ulcd, u.nd it~ cou::;equrncc·~ are biza.rre. 
For cxmnpll'. rr::;pond('nts' theory would permit, a person to file ;t class 
aetion, l'l'eH though he had previOusly accpptrd full ,.;f'ttlement of hiK in-
dividual claim, ou tlw ground that. thE:> f<'es incurred m anticipation of the 
litigatJOll might ult.imntPly lie t:<hared wit.h the ela,;.~ 
1 If a C'la~~-al't iou ddPndant werr F<hown to hav<' cmbnrkrd on a cour~ 
of conduct de::>igurd. to in;-;ula.tr the class crrtificatiou is.~ue from <tpprllate 
l'Pview in or<kr to avoid !'laR~wide linbility, a court in proper eircun~tances 
might find the Oerstrin tr,;t. ,;;ttisfied and the rH>'l' not moot . Se--e Su..smJJn v. 
Lincoln American Corp., 587 F. 2d 866 (CAl 1978) : 13 Wright, .\Jiller & 
Coop<'r, Federal Prartice and Procrdure § 35:3:3, ;tt. 171 (Supp. 1979) ; 
Comment, f'ont inun t ion and Hepre»entation of Class Aetions ~~ollowing 
Dismissal of the Cia~::; ReprP,;entativc, 1074 Duke L. J . .57:3, 599-600. 
'1~904-DISSENT 
4 DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK v. ROPER 
spoudents to continuo this crusade on behalf of persons who 
for yeat·s have evinced uo interest whatever in obtaining re-
covery for themsclves.G On its face, this appears simply to 
be a "la\\'Yer's case." 
Despite tradition and policy considerations to the contrary, 
the Court seems undisturbed that this federal action will be 
litigated on remand by a lawyer whose only "clients" are 
unidentified class members who have shown no desire to be 
represented by anyone.n The Court also neglects established 
principles of Art. III jurisprudence, and remands to the Dis-
trict Court a headless class action that does 11ot meet the 
requirements of Rule 23. 
II 
The Court identifies the question fot· decision in this case 
as "whether respondents' individual and private case or con-
troversy became moot by reason of the entry of judgment in 
their favor. " I d., at 5. Wholly ignoring the fact that 
respondents themselves elected to appeal only on behalf of 
third parties. the Court concludes that "respondents' individual 
interest in the litigation-as distinguished from whatever may 
be their representative responsibilities to the putative class-
is sufficient to permit their appeal. ... " I d., at 12. One 
might expect that the Court would reason to this conclusion 
by pinpointing the individual interest on which it purports to 
rely. But no such reasoning appears in the Court's opinion. 
Although there is some discussion of advantages that generally 
may accrue to named plaintiffs from the use of the class-action 
"The :\Iio,;i.-sippi u~my statute wa>: umenclrd l1l 1974, and it apparently 
now auth01izr::; the fee:-; charged by prtitioner. 1974 Mi~s. Gen . Laws, ch. 
564, § 7; ::;reMiss. Co<le Ann. § 75- 17-1 (G) . Thus, there i~ no que::;twn of 
prosprctive relief. 
6 I do not r-;ugg<>:.;L that n'sponclPnt::; ' lawyrr ac1<•d Jill]HOperly in punming 
this rase. Sinee be has prevuilf'd Loth in this Court and m the Court 
of A Jlpeal~, t hl' re:;puusibility for a I lowing rlieut -le:;:; litigation fall::> on 
the federal court~:~. 
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device, the Court never attempts to ascertain whether these 
particular respondents can derive any such benefit from this 
action.7 
A 
The Court does not explain how it is able to find all 
"individual iuterest" in the litigation without identifying 
the iuj ury in fact required by Art. III. It simply ignores this 
essential inquiry and relies on the "factual context" of the 
case: When respondents refused the proffered settlement, the 
trial court e11tered judgment in their favor over their objec-
tiOJI. I d., at 6. The single fact of respondents' refusal in-
spires the Court to draw a "critical distinctiou" between 
mootness deriving froin a judgment aud mootuess resulting 
from events extrinsic to the litigation. ld., at 9. 'l'he Court 
appears to hold that a litigant who attempts to appeal from 
a favorable judgment has an "individual interest" in exercis-
illg his "statutory right to appeal." I d., at 7. If the statutes 
aud rules governing "federal appellate practice" confer such 
a right, the Court concludes that Art. lii requires no more. 
Ibid.; see 'id., at 12. 
Having shifted the inquiry from Art. III mootness to the 
7 Auy advnntagt•o: tha1 ordinarily may flow from "the u,.;t> of the class 
artion proct>dure for litiga.tion of individual claimH," ante, at 10, cannot 
accrue to lhes<' re::>pondcnts who will not b~ litigating their own claims 
on remancl. Nor does the Court identify any unrecovered cost of litiga-
tion that these respondents can reduce if they obtain relief for a class. 
S1'e id., at 10, n . 8; n. 3, supra. Indeed, the Court refer:; to re:>pondents 
only to point out that their total damage;.; were ~;o small that they "would 
be unlikely to obtain l!>gal redress at an aceeptable cost" if they could not 
do so by nwans ol' a class action . Ante, at 10, n. 8. We may a::;sume 
that respondents had some interest in the class-action procedure as a means 
of interrc;ting their lawyerl'! in the ca.~e or obtaining a. &~tisfactory settle-
ment, This may bn an interest properly furthered by Rule 23, but once 
respondents obtained both access to eourt aud full individual relief that 
interest disappeared. 
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"'formu]at[ion] [of] standards ... gqvern[ing] tlie appealabil-
ity of procedural rulings," ibid., the Court deter~nines that 
respondents arc aggrieved by the denial of certification for twq 
reasons. First, the certification order is a "procedural ruling, 
collateral to the merits of [the] litigation," that "stands as 
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." ld., at 9. 
Second, the contrary result would frustrate the goals of 
Rule 23. ld., at 10-i2. 
The effect of the Court's analysis, if I understand it cor-
rectly, is to avoid a direct confrontation with settled princi-
ples that unambiguously dictate a finding of mootness in this 
case. But the Court cannot escape the impact of these author-
ities simply by refusing to consider the respondents' evident 
lack of interest in the outcome. The "critical distinction" by 
which it attempts to justify its failure to do so is both factually 
and legally unsound. 
B 
As a matter of fact, there is substantial doubt that this case 
involves the effect of "a judgment in favor of a party at a11: 
intermediate stage of litigation," I d., at 9. Petitioner has 
i10ver contended that the controversy became moot merely 
"by reason of the entry of judgment in [respondents'] favor . " 
l d., at 5. Instead, petitioner argues that its tender of full 
relief has remedied the respondents' individual injuries anq 
thus eliminated their stake in the outcome. Considerable 
authority supports petitioner's contention that the tender itself 
moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. This 
Court, among others, has held that a federal court is powerless 
to review the abstract questions remaining in a case when the 
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that 
fully satisfies his claims. California v. Scm Pablo & Tulare 
_R. Co., 149 'C. S. 308, 313-314 ( 1893); Drs. Hill & Thomas 
Co. v. United States, 392 F. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per curiam); 
Lamb v. Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968) (pef 
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curiam); A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F. 2d 
89 (CA5 1965) (per c·uriam).8 
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result 
should differ because the District Court has entered a judg-
ment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their 
lawsuit as moot.9 lt is certainly true, as the Court observes, 
that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in 
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any 
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally 
favorable judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wright, 
Miller, and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3902 
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practice 1T 203.06 (1975). But 
federal courts uniformly have required a showing of some 
adverse effect iu order to confer "standing to appeal." Ibid.; 
see Barry . District of Colurnbia Bd. of Elections, - U. S. 
App. D. C. -, 580 F. 2d 695 ( 1978). Indeed, Art. III itself 
requires a coutin uing controversy between adverse parties at 
all stages of the litigation. E. g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 
402 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10 
(1974) . If any statute or rule purported to authorize an 
appeal in contravention of Art. III, that rule would yield to 
the constitutional command. 
c 
The Court relies almost entirely on Electrical Fittings Corp. 
8 The Court makPH no pffort to distingui::;h the::;r eases. Yet it concedes 
that the '·right to employ Rule 2:3" is a "procedural right only, ancillary 
to the litigation of substantive claims," and it admits that "the court 
retains no jurisdictwn over the controversy" when the "substantive claims 
become moot in the Art.. III sense." Ante. at 6. If the tender itself 
mooted the respondents' claimR without regard to the entry of judgment, 
then the Conrt's own analysis require:! it to conclude that the case is 
moot. 
o The "~tatutory right'' to appeal it::<df cannot supply a pen;onal ;;take 
m tht> out l'Ome, for Congre:;;s cannot abrogate Art. III limitations on the 
jnri::;dietion of the federal courts. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bell-
wood, 441 U.S. !H, 100 (1979), 
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v. Thonw,s & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1939). 10 But the deci-
sion simply reaffirms our obligation not to review judgments 
by which no individual is aggrieved. The trial court there 
had entPred a decree holding a pateut valid but not infringed. 
Although the alleged infringer won the case, it sought to 
appral the finding that the patent was valid. This Court 
held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to con-
sider the issue of patent validity after the trial court found 
no infringement, because "[a] party may not appeal from a 
judgment ... in his favor, for the purpose of obtaining a 
review of findings ... which are not necessary to support the 
decree." !d., at 242. But the trial court had erred by includ-
ing in the decree itself a ruling that "purport[ed] to adjudge 
the validity of [the patent]." Ibid. Since that ruling "was 
immaterial to th<' disposition of the cause," the Court of 
Appeals had jurisdiction for the limitf'd purpose of eliminating 
the extraneous ruling from thf' decree. Ibid. 
The Court reads Electrical Fittings as a case that was "still 
live" in the Art. III sense "because policy considerations per-
mitted an appeal." Ante, at 8-9. But Electrical Fittings was 
a "live" controversy only because-and to the limited extent 
that-the pE>titioner there asserted a continuing personal sta.ke 
in the outcome. As Judge Learned Hand later explained, the 
10 The on!~· otht•r· authorilirs ritetl hy the Courf 11re United Airliue11, Inc. 
v. McDonald. 4a:Z F. S. 385 ( 1977), and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 
437 U.S. 463 (1978). Dictum in both ca~€'R stated that the denial oJ class 
C€'rtificaf ion 1:,; fntbjrrt. to appellate review aff er final judgment :Lt the 
behe~t. of ihe named plaintiffs. Neither ease disc·us~ed mootnesR, and 
neithrr analyzed thr proposition in any way. Indeed, the only authority 
cited in Coopers & Lybrand was United Airlines, see 437 U. S., at 469, a.nd 
i he on!~· authority rited in United Airlines was a concession made b~' the 
defendant and a list of case;; from thr Courts of Appeal~, none of which 
dealt with a. :suggestion of mootness in an analogou~ Rituat10n, see 432 
U. S., at 393, ami n. 14. Such statemrnti", casually enunciated without a. 
word of rxplanation m opi11ions deahng with um·€'laird le!!;al questions, are 
not controllin!!: or even persnasJve when they are shown on further reftec- · 
tion to have bern inconsisLent with el'tnblished law. 
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petitioner in Electrical Fittings was injured in fact because the 
unnecessary ruling that the patent was valid could have 
created "some presumptive prejudice" against him in a future 
case. Harries v. Air King Products Co., 183 F. 2d 158, 161 
(CA2 1950); see In re Trimble Co., 479 F. 2d 103, 111 (CA3 
Hl73).11 This genuine prejudice to the petitioner himself 
supplied the requisite personal stake in obtaining reformation 
of the drcree. 
Thus, the Court's view of Electrical Fittings is plainly incon-
sistent with the holding of that case. The Court of Appeals 
was told to reform the decree. but expressly forbidden to 
considet' the merits of the patent validity question. In other 
words, the court's appellate jurisdiction was only as broad as 
t,l1c petitioner's personal stake in the appeal. Just four years 
later, Altvater v. Free'man, 319 U. S. 359 (1943), explained 
that the limitation was constitutionally based. Reversing a 
decision that had relied on Electrical Fittings in refusing to 
considE'r the merits of an appeal, the Court distinguished 
Electrical Ji'itt'i?tgs as a case in which the parties sougqt deci-
sion of "a hypothetical case." The appeal in Altvater, by 
contrast, satisfied "the requirements of case or controversy" 
because the parties coutinued to contest a counterclaim that 
had not been concluded by the dismissal of the orginal com-
plaint. 319 U. S .. at 363-366. 
Altvater and Electrical Fittings entirely foreclose the 
Court's argument that a party who has no personal stake in 
the outcome of his appeal may invoke the jurisdiction of a 
federal court merely because policy-based "rules of practice" 
11 Altho11gh the Cour1. of AppealH in Electr-ical F!ttings hrld ihat col-
lateral estoppel would be no bar to relitigation of the validity question, 100 
F. 2d ·!03, 404 (CA2 19:38), other courts had taken a different view on 
similar issue;; of collateral estoppel. If the validity fiuding were permitted 
to stand, the petitioner could have beeu forced to litigate the 4uestion of its 
preclusive effecL ii1 future cases. 15 Wright, Miller, and Cooper, supra 
n. 4, § 3902, llt· 40:l (19i6); lB Moore'::; FE>deral Practice ,ro.4.43 L5], at 
3925 (19i4); 9 id ., ft 203.06, at 716 (1975), 
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permit him to do so. Any doubt is dispelled by Altvater's 
express reliance on Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 ( 1942), 
cert. denied. 319 U. S. 748 ( 1943), a case in whiph the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed at length the 
constitutional limits on appe1late jurisdiction. 319 U. S., at 
363, n. 2. Like the respondents here and the petitioner in 
Electrical Fittings, the appellant in Cover sought to appeal 
from a judgment that had eliminated his stake in the out-
comc.12 TIH' Court of Appeals emphatically declined to as-
sume jurisdiction over an appeal which sought "no relief 
against anybody before the court ... but ... want[ed] an 
advisory opinion that [a] patent [was] valid." 133 F. 2d, at 
554.13 Sine<' there was no case or controversy, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that it was 11without discretion" to hear the 
appeal. /d., at 545. 
These cases clemonstrate that the requirements of Art. III 
do not change with the "fn.c(,ual cont-ext" in which a suggestion 
of mootness arises. See a.nte, at 5. v\lhatever the context, 
Art. TIT asks but a single question: Is thet·c a continuing con-
troversy betwcPn adverse parties? In Electrical Fittings, the 
1 ~ Tlw apJwllant in rover \'. 8d11cartz, 133 F. 2d .54J (CA2 1942), <'!'rt. 
denied, 3Hl 1'. S. 'i4.R (l94:l), wa:; the loHing plaintiff in a pateni infringe-
ment arfion. Aflpr the trial conrt found the patent. ir1valid and not 
infringed, the plaintJir took an appeal on the validity que:;tion without 
contesting the fiudinp: of nouinfrinp:ement. B)· accepting the judgment to 
thaL extent, ht> lo>;t hi" right to recover from the defendant-and thus his 
intere;t in the litigation. 
l3 Judg!' Frnnk wrotr for the court: 
"[vYlhere there iH no '.iu~tiriable' dispute, t.here are no 'merits.' There is 
mere!~· raJ unrral entity re~embling thai di~ernbodied smile which Lewis 
Ca.roll immnrtaliz!'d. :\(nn~· SuprPme Comt derisions teach us that appel-
late juri~diction, whrn no jtllstiriable di;;putl' exi~ts on appeal, cannot be 
rested 11pon the rrrollection that such a dispute previously existed when 
the C!\.'5<.' was in the tnal r·ourt." 133 F. 2d, nt 551 (footnotPS mmttecl). 
See also Kapp v. National Football League. 586 F. 2cl 644, 650 (CA9 
1978); Hall v. U. 8. Piber & Plastics ro1·p., 476 F . 2d 418, 420 (CA3. 
197-3); cf. Lewis v. Cnited States, 216 U. S 6ll (19W) (per cunam} . 
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controvrrsy coJJtinued with respect to the single narrow 
issue whether the District Court's ruling on patent validity 
properly was included iu the decree. But nothing in that 
case suggests that a "procedural ruling, collateral to the merits 
of a litigation," may be appealed after final judgment because 
"policy considerations permi [t] the appeal" or because the 
ruling "stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." 
.Ante, at 8-9. Such collateral rulings-like other rulings-may 
be appealed only when the litigant has a personal stake in the 
resolution of his appeal.U Iu Electrical Fittings, there was 
a stake; here there is 11011e. Since nothing remains of the 
case or controversy, the Court of Appeals should have dis-
missed this case. 
III 
It is cleal' from the Court's extended discussion of policy 
and practical considerations, ante, at 10-12, that these weighed 
heavily in its decision. I am not aware that such considera-
tions evet· before have influenced this Court in determining 
whether the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the federal 
courts. [n any event. the consequences of a finding of moot-
ness would not be as severe as the Court predicts. 
A finding of mootness would have repercussions primarily 
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who 
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to 
a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent 
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification 
generally would be barred by Art. III. But the consequences 
of applying settled rules of mootness i11 this situatiou would 
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were 
11 TIH' Comt appraro< to rrrogniz<' thi~ in pa,.'Sing, ante. at 9, n. 7, but 
fails to apply the rule to thi,; casr. Sinre the Court :mggl:'::lts that respond-
ents' intere::~t in the rertification ruling dt>rives from thr mPre fact that 1t 
":-;tands as an adjudieation of one of the i::;sues litigt~ted," id., at 9, Elec-
trical Fittings it~elf would limit us to the isi:iuancc of an order directing that 
lhe offensive ntling be expunged from the record. 307 U. S., at 242. 
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granteu, the absent members of the putative class woukl hay~ 
obtainl."d by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of 
tht: benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand, 
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of 
the certification ruling would enable putative class member§l to 
take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability 
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable 
judgment. Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in 
this situation will reinstate the ''one-way intervention" that 
the 1966 anwndments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate.15 
Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise 
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before 
judg111ent, as petitioner did in this ·case. A defendant cer-
tainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic il). 
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny 
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the 
enforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney[s] 
general." Ante, at 10-11. The practical argument is not 
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns 
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the ade= 
quacy of compensation and enforcement available for particu-
lar substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best 
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be 
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim, 
Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of 
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of 
1 " See Commvut, Immediate Ap,walability of Order~ Denying Class Cer-
tification, 40 Ohio St. L. J . 441, 470-471 (1979). In actions brought under 
Rnle 23 (b) (:3) , a class member must decide at the time of certification 
whether to "opt out" of the action under Rule 23 (c) (2) . This provision 
was designed to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class 
members were permitted to inU>rvene after a decision on the inerits 
in order to secure the benefits of that decision. Kotes of the Advisory 
C,ommittee on Proposed Anlendments to Rule 23, 39 F. R. D. 69, 1os-:1m"i 
('19~6). 
', . 
. ' 
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usury claims/0 the Court's concern for compensation of puta-
tive class members in this case is at best misplaced and at 
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling 
Act.17 
The Court's concern for putative class members would be 
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced 
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litiga-
tion of successive suits by members of the putative class. I 
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial admin-
istration would be real. But these problems can and should 
be addressed by measures short of rewriting the law of moot-
ness, as the Court seellls to have done today. The first step 
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the 
dPnial of class certification in appropriate circumstances.18 
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. ~ 1292 
(b) to certify such appeals when they iuvolve certain con-
trolling questions of law. In many cases, a class-action 
IG Liddell v. Litton Systems, Tnc., 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting bor-
rower;;' class adion); Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941). 
Petitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply with Mis-
sissippi'3 interest limit d would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U. S.C. 
§ 85. But I do uot uttdenstand that the National Bank Act di,;places state 
polil'y rlisfavoring the nggrrgrltion of u~ury claim::;. A primary purpose of 
that Act i >~ lo protrct 11ational banks from di,;criminatory trt•atment or 
undue pcmdtic~ that may be imposl'<i by ;;tate law. See 12 U. S. § 86. 
17 Thr Acl provide,; that rules of procedure promulgated by 1 his Court 
"shall not .. . enlarge or modify any substantive right ." 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2072. See American Pipe & Coustruction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538, 
557-558 (1974): Developmrnts in the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1318, 1358-1359 (1976). See generally Landeril, Of Legalized Black-
mail and Legalizrd Theft: Consumer Clas~ Actions and the Substance--
Procedure Dilemmrt, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974). 
1 8Jn Coo pets & Lybrand ' . Livesay, 437 U. S. 463 (1978), t hi,; Court 
held th<tt tho dPnial of clnss certification is noL a "final decision" appeal-
able as of right under 28 F . S. C. § 1291. We relied in that CilSe on the 
dangers of "indi~crimimtte" interlocutory review. !d., at 474. Although 
Coopers & Lyb1Jand now prevents review in cases in which it would be 
desirable, Congress may remedy the problem by appropriate legislation .. 
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defendant undoubtedly would forgo the opportunity to settle 
with an individual plaiutiff in order to obtain an immediate 
and final determination of the class certification questiori' on 
appeal. 
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a class action by 
forced settlement, the District Court is not powerless. In at 
least, some circumstances, it may require that putative class 
members receive some sort of notice and an opportunity to 
intervene within the appeal period. Rule 23 (d)(2). The 
availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent 
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District 
Court managemellt of the problem by measures tailored to the 
case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended 
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent inter-
locutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are 
lacking, it is for Congress--not this Court--to correct the 
deficiellCy.1n 
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it, 
judicially fashioned "solutions" "to legislative problems often 
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their 
own. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respond-
ents will serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for the 
purpose of obtaining class certification. Since they can gain 
nothing more from the action, their participation in the case 
can be intended only to benefit the putative class. Yet they-
or their lawyers-serve on their own motion. Since no court 
1° Congress rnrrently has before it a bill tha1·. attempts to remedy the 
difficulties infecting this troubled area. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1979). The bill, supported by the Department of Justice, proposes to 
bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, supra. and to eliminate 
some of the problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by 
creating a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provides for 
the enforcement of this right in some instances through actions brought in 
the name of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory 
appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace claes . cer~ 
· tification under the proposed :procedures, 
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has certified the class, there has been no considered determina-
tion that respoudents will fairly and adeq~ately represent its 
members. N' othing in Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure, 
and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it. 
Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent? 
See East Te·:ras Motor Freight Y. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 
403-404 (1977). Arc their currently nonexistent claims "typi-
cal of the claims ... of the class'' within the meaning of Rule 
23 (a) (3) '? 20 
The Court's holding well may prevent future "forced set-
tlements." ano may even foreclose all settlements, of class 
action litigatio11. See ante, n. 5. Thus, the difficulties faced 
by the District Court on remand in this case may not arise 
again in precisely analogous circumstaiJees. But today's result 
also authorizes appeals by putative class representatives who 
have prevailed on the merits of their individual claims. If the 
order denying class certificatiou is reversecl in that situation, 
the named plaiHtiffs on remand will have no more conti1ming 
relationship to the putative class than responclents have 
here. A remand for certification could also lead to "one-way 
20 The District Court proper!~· ma~· concludr ou remand that rc::;pondents, 
for theo:f' or otht•J' rea~ons, cannot adf'quately represent the elasH. Should 
intervention be propo~ed . the District Court on equitable ground::; might. well 
rpfu:se to toll tlH• Hhllutc of limitations in order to pE'rmit it . Nearl~· nine 
yenrs have p:.t~:;sed since> t.hi1> action was filed and :,;ix since the governing 
substantive Htatute was amended to authorize the challenged conduct. In 
it<> order denying Cl•rtifira.tion on Sc•ptember 29, 1975, the Di::;trict. Court 
a.~:signed as one of it>< rea><on,.; tl1e possible '·destruction of the Lpetitioner':;,] 
bank" by damages then alleged to tot<d §12,000,000 unu llOW potentially 
augmented by the uecrual of inten'St. App. 47, see ante, at 2, n. 2 .' The 
pos,.ible dE-struction of petitioner's bank is irreleva,nt to the CE'nt.ral i,;.sue of 
mootness, but. seriou:s ind('eu to depositors, ::;tocklwlder:s, and t.he community 
served. As thi:s Court reli<':s ::;o heavily on its practical and equitable con-
cern,; for putative cia~~ member~<, it will hardly be inappropriate for the 
District Court on rPmand to eon:sidcr pmcticalitie::; and equitieH on both 
sidr~ . In the rircmnstancr,- prP:<Pnted, the District Court lll<~Y well ~ee no 
reason to exercise it~ equitable di,.;cretion iu favor of putative da;,;:s members· 
wlio· have slept ou their right::; th(':sc many years. 
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intervention" in direct violation of Rule 23. Seep. 11-12, and 
n. 15, supra. These tensions, arising from the express terms 
of the Rule, undermine the Court's conclusion that the 
policies underlying Rule 23 dictate the result reached today. 
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of 
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from 
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. It also unneces-
sarily creates significant problems in the administration of 
Rule 23. I would vacate the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal 
as moot.21 
~1 "\frt . .Tlffi'l'lCE Sn:n:NR Rtatrs, in his eonrurring opinion, tha.t all pf'rsons 
nliP~tNI to lH' nwmiJ<·r~ of a putative <·la~~ "antomatie;tll~· be<·unt<' parties 
to thl' ea:'<' or c·ontron•r:-;~· for pnrpo~e"" of Art. 111 , and that llwy 
"rrmniu partir:< until a final dPtrrmination ha" bE•Pn made that the action 
may not. bP mnintaim·cl as a clus" adion." Ante, at -. Thi~ novel 
viPw, for which no authority i::; cited, cannot be rf'ronciled with Indian-
apolis School C'omm'11s v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 12R (1975), where an oral 
certifieation oniPr wa" hrld insufficiPnt to idrntify the intere::;t,; of absent 
clasK nwmbf'r,; for Art. III purpo:-;e". Thr result. hardly could be difff'rent 
when th<• cia"" lw;; not. bern idPnt.ifi<>d at. all. Ser al><o Memp!ti~ Light, 
Gas & WatPr Dill . \'. Craft. 426 U. S. I, 8 (1078) ; Baxter v. Pahnigia:no, 
4~2 F. S. :30R, ;no, n. 1 (19i6): Weinstein v. Bradford. 42:{ U. S. 147 
(19i5); Pa~>adeno, City Board of Bducation v. Spangler, 4::!7 U.S. 424, 430 
(19i6). 
The propn~<<>d rulr of automatic pa.rty Rtatu"-in this case for 90,000 
unidPntifiNl per~on,;--ha~ troubl<:>::;ouw and far-reaching implications tl1at 
could prejuclire t hr bringing of clas::; action:;. Pre,;umably H purpo~e of 
such a rulfl wonlcl be to a:<surc that satisfaction of the claim::; of named 
partie;; would noL t.Prrninntr the litigation . Nor could the rights of 
unn:.uned parties br Pxtingui~hed by the failun' of the named parties to 
ilpJwal. Thu:s, if tlw rnlr proposed by :VIJt. ,lliH'l'lCI" Sn~mN<~ i:s to aeeom-
pli~h its pnq>o"<··, 1 "uppo:-;P that a fiduciary duty mu::;t be impo;;ed upon 
namrd p:trtie,.; 10 <·ontinm' the litigation wlwre--a~ lwrr--th<· tuuwmed 
pnrti<•,- l'<'lllHin unidPntifir<l nnd fail to int<•rvrue. As fidu<'iari<•o;, would the 
nanwd JlHrtiP>< not onl~· br required to contillU<' to litigate, but to a;;sumc 
]>N:sonal n'i<JHmsibility for eo,:ts an<l attorney';; fee:-; if the ca~<e ultimnlt'ly is 
lost? Would rri<pon:,;iblP litigants be willing to file rla::;.~ action,; if they 
ther!'l>y a~~umcd :-;uch lollg-tC'rm fiduciary obligation~? Tht\,;c aud like 
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quc•:stion:;: are flubstantial. They arc not resolved by Rule 23. I bdieve I 
thPy m!:'rit, c-arrfnl stndy by Congres-; before this Court-jwrhaps unwit-
tingl~·-l'reatc. · a major category of clientless litigation unique in our 
sytlt.cm. 
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No. 78-904 
Deposit Guaranty National Bank, I On Writ of Certiorari to 
Jackson, Mississippi, Petitioner, the United States Court 
v. of Appeals for the Fifth 
Hobert L. Roper et al. Circuit. 
[February 7 , 1980] 
Mn. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART l 
joins, dissenting. 
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that 
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the, 
National Bank Act and Mississippi law.1 They filed this. 
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty 
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and 
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf 
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggre-
gating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District 
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification. 
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the 
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and 
court costs. Over respondents' objection, the District Court 
entered final judgment in their favor. Petitioner then depos-
ited the full amount due with the clerk of the ·court. 
No one disputes that the petitioner has tendered every-
thing that respomlents could have recovered from it in this 
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed 
the denial of class certification._ jMi1s CZU · a rmS1'!lej 
:merit of thyCourt of Appea1s without · entifying the e or 
controve~ that remains to be liti eel between th parties. 
1 Jurisdictiou was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. §§ 85, 
86, which adopts the interest limits set by state lawl and 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1355. 
78-904-DISSENT 
2 DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK v. ROPER 
The Court decldes tfia:t the central issue 1s 
appealability. But the characterization does 
analysis. Since respondents lack a continuing 
outcome of the litigation, the Court of Appea 
to hear their appeal. Accordingly, I dissen 
I . 
moutness but 
ot withstand 
nterest in the 
was powerless 
Although there are some differences, is case is -similar to 
United States Parole Cornrnission v. eraghty, post, at - , 
in one important respect: both reqr.;i us to decide whether 
putative class representatives may ap al the denial of class cer-
tification when they can derive no be efit fror_n the relief sought 
in the action. In this case, as in G rayhty, the District Court 
refused to certify a class. Since 10 one has sought to inter-
vene, respondents are the only aintiffs arguably present in 
court. Yet respondents have o continuing interest in the 
injuries alleged in their comp int. They sought only dam-
ages; those damages have bee1 tendered in fuiP Respondents 
have not suggested that su cess on the certification motion 
would entitle them to add'f'tional relief from ihe petitioner.3 
2 Although rPSpondPnl.~ al8oh ;;kf.d for ''t1oruey's fee~ . their comJJbint 
shows that fees were to be ,franted only fwm the damages ultimately 
awarded to them or tlw clas App. 13-14. 
8 HE',;pondPnt:; do assert tl at certification would enable them lo reduce the 
expem;e of litigation by aJ eating co:>ts among the members of a prevailing 
class. Brif'f for Re.,.pon ent;; 33. Except for attorney's fePs, however, 
resf>ondents do not. id tify any costs incurred to date that, are not 
f!Overed by the petiti er's tender. Although the record does not reveal 
the details of the fee rrangernent bet ween respondents and their lawyers, 
the complaim sugg ts that the lawyers have agreed to accept as full com-
pensation 25% of e amount, recovered from the petitioner. App. 13-14. 
If thit> is thr agr emE>nt as to fees, respondents have no continuing interest. 
Onl~' coun;;el i. · coneemed whrthf'r thE> recovery is enlarged . 
Even if or as;;umed that rrspondents' liability to their lawyers could be 
reduced by class recovf'ry, no one has suggested that petitioner is or ever 
will be · lr for fees that ult.imatdy may be owed by respondent<;. Re-
spond ts' juri . ,dictiomtl theory itfJpea,rs to be thnL the mere po!:>Sibility of 
,- ==~~ 
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In'tleeci. their personal claims to relief have been ~b cloned 
so complet-ely that no appeal was takeil in their ow ames. 
The notice of appeal filed with the District Court cites that 
respondents appeal ouly "on behalf of all others similarly 
situated ... . " App. 63. 
Since respondents have no continuing pe onal stake in the 
outcome of this action , I believe that Ar . III ancj. the prece-
dents of this Court require that the 'C e dismissed as moot. 
See Geraghty, post, at --- OWELL, J ... disseuting). 
There is no suggestion that respo Bents' claims are "capable 
of repetition. yet evading revie . ' Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 
U.S. 103, 110- 111, n. 11 (197 And not a single one of the 
alleged 90.000 class memb s has sought to intervene in the 
nine years since this a;c · n was filed. Cf. United Airlines, 
Inc. v . . ilfcDonald, 43 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone 
ever challenged the llegedly usurious charges by infonnal 
complaiut or prote . Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certifi-
eation was deni~ , the action lay dormant during the seven 
months in whtef1 respondents sought to take au interlocutory 
appeal, with ut provoking a response from anyone who pre-
viously ma,y have thought that the class action would protect 
his right . We are not told what, if anything, motivates re-
assert.iu future <'laims for attorney's fees against other members of a 
pu!;atf e cia.~::; gives rise to a case or cont,roversy (lgainst the class defend-
aut. Such a theory is tt1111reredented, and it~ consequences a,re bizarre. 
Ff. example, respondents' theory would pennit. a person to file a class 
·tion, oven t.hough he had previously accepted full settlement of hiH in-
i:lividuaJ claim. on the ground Jll.<tt..tbe. fet~S in&wred in n:nttr-ipa:tion of the 
· · · · ~tld'ed ~i"" the-e 
4 If a class-ac·tion defendant were shown to have embarked on a course j 
of conduct designrd to int>ulato the class certification is.··me from appellate / 
review iu order ({> 'woid ela,<.;::;wide liability, a court in proper cirClmllitances 
might .. find the Gerstein test ~;~at isfied and the ca::;e not. moot. See S'U...sman v. 
Lincoln American Corp. , 581 F . 2d 866 (CA7 1978) ; 13 Wright, Miller & ~ 
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3.533, at 171 (Supp. 1979) ; 
Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions .Following 
Dismissal of the Clas~; Repmsentativc, 1974 Duke L. J . . 57:3, 599-600. 
M.w (1. 
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spoodentS' to continue this crusade on behalf of persons who 
for years have evinced no interest whatever in obtaining re-
covery for themselves.ij On its face, this appears simply ) 
be a "lawyer's case." 
Despite tradition and policy considerations to the coutrary, 
the Court seems u11disturbed that this federal actio will be 
litigated on remand by a lawyer whose only "clients" are 
unidentified class members who have shown. n · esire to be 
represented by anyone.0 The Court also negl ts established 
principles of Art. III jurisprudence, and rer nds to the Dis-
trict Court a headless class action that oes not meet the 
requirements of Rule 23. 
II 
The Court identifies the questio for decision in this case 
as "whether respondents' indivi<j,wal and pri~ate case or con-
troversy became moot by reason' of the entry of judgment in 
their favor." ld., at 5. .:Wholly ignoring the fact that 
res1londeuts themselves elected to appeal only on behalf of 
thircl parties. the Court c6ucludes that "respondents' individual 
interest in the litigation-as distinguished from whatever may 
be their representj.a{ive responsibilities to the putative class-
is sufficient to (errnit their appeal. ... '' ld., at 12. One 
might expec~ hat the Court would reason to this conclusion 
by pinpoi mg the individual interest on which 1t purports to 
rely. .:Silt no such reasouing appears in the Court's opinion. 
Altb<iugh there is some discussion of advantages that generally 
y accrue toJla.roed plaintiff&. from the use df t'h~ class-action 
't; 1 hf:' SII~:iiO:><ljl]li mmry statl'i't'e wa" anwnClecf IU 191{, an<Tit !LJ1pare~ 
now authorize::; the f~ charged by pPtitioner. 1974 Mist>. Ge11. Laws, ch. 
564, § 7 ; ~ 1\Ji::;s. Code Ann § 75-17-1 (6 . 'fh 1s, there IS no question of 
prospective rehef. 
6 I clo not ~:mgg(•,;t rha.i ~-cWnts~ .. htw~ actl.'t!Jmproperly in pursuing 
t.his cru;e. S.in<'t" l1 t ha~· prevailed both in this Court and m the Court 
of Appca1~, tlw re:;pousibility for allowing client-le::;R litigation falll:l ou 
the federal collrto. 
--------~------~ 
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de~ice, the Court never attempts to ascertain whether these 
particular respondents can derive any such benefit f7. o this 
M~~ . . 
A 
The Court does not explain how it is able to find an. 
"individual interest" in the litigatiori with ~t identifying 
the injury in fact required by Art. III. It imply ignores this 
essential inquiry and relies on the "fac al context" of the 
case: When respondents refused the pf(>ft'ered settlement, the 
tr-ial court e11tered judgment in thei favor over their objec-
tiou. ld., at 6. The single fact . f respondents' refusal in-
spires the Court to draw a " itical distinction" between 
m.ootness deriving from a ju nent and mootness resulting 
from events extrinsic to the . igation. ld., at 9. rrhe Court 
appears to hold that a liti nt who attempts to appeal from 
a favorable judgment h an "individual interest" in exercis-
illg his "statutory right appeal." ld., at 7. If the statutes 
and rules governing "f tleral appellate practice" confer such 
a right, the Court co ludes that Art. III requires no more. 
Ibid.; see id., at 12. 
Having shifted tl6'e inquiry from Art. III mootness to the 
7 Auy advantage'S hat. ordinarily may flow from "the uo>e of the class 
artion procedure flj litigation of individual claims," ante, at 10, cannot 
accrue to these r ::;pondents who will not b3 litigating their own claims 
on remand. Nq~ does the Court identify any unrecovered cost of ljtiga-
l;ion that thes respondents can reduce if they obtain relief for a class. 
Sre id., at IQj n . 8; n . 3, supra. Indeed, the Court refers to respondents 
only to poipl; out that their total damages were so small that they "would 
be unlikeJ.t to obtain legal redress at an acceptable cost" if they could not 
flo so b ' means of a class action. Ante, at 10, n . 8. We may assume 
that re$}>ondents had some interest. in the class-action procedure as a means 
of int rc::;ting their lawyers in the case or obtaining a t'a.t.isfactory settle-
ment,. This may br. an interest properly furthered by Rule 23, but once 
respon '" obtained both accesr; to eom:t a~1d full 'n · ·e.iief thilt.. 
interest disappea· 
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;'formu]atlion J [of] standards . . ~oyeru [ing1toa.a.ppealabil... 
ity of procedural rulings," ibid., the Court deteqnines that 7 
respondents are aggrieved by the denial of certification for twq 
reasons. First, t~e certification order is a "procedural rul' 
collateral to the merits of [the] litigation," that "stal)ili! as 
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." I ., at 9. 
Second, the contrary result would frustrate th goals of 
Rule 23. Id., at 10-i2. 
The effect of the Court's analysis, if I und 
rectly, is to avoid a direct confrontation wit settled princi-
ples that unambiguously dictate a finding o mootness in this 
case. But the Court cannot escape the imr, ct of these author-
ities simply by refusing to consider the espondents' evident 
lack of interest in the outcome. The " ritical distinction" by 
which it attempts to justify its failure o do so is both factually 
and legally unsound. 
As a matter of fact, there is s st~ntial doubt that this case 
involves the effect of "a judg1 ent in favor of a party at a~ 
intermediate stage of litigat' n," I d., at 9. Petitioner has 
i10ver conteuded that the ontroversy became moot merely 
"by reason of the entry o judgment in [respondents'] favor . " 
l d. , at 5. Instead, p tioner argues that its tender of full 
relief has remedied 1e respondents' individual injuries anq 
thus eliminated t ir stake in the outcome. Considerable 
authority suppor petitioner's contention that the tender itself 
moots the case hether or not a judgment is entered. This 
Court, amon others, has held that a federal court is powerless 
to review · e abstract questions remaining in a case when the 
plaintiff as refused to accept a proffered settlement that 
fully satisfies his claims. California v. San Pablo & Tulare 
R . C . U. S. 308, 313- 314 ( 1893) ; Drs. Hill & 'IiLD·~!I---
Co. v. United States, 392 F . 2d 204 ( A~ 968) ( per curiam) ; 
Lamb v. Commissioner, 390 F . 2d 157 (CA2 1968) (per 
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trt; ""''"~ ~ f4.<. • lflten Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 . 2d 
89 (CA5 1965) (per curiarn).8 
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result 
should differ because the District Court has ellltered a judg-
ment in favor of respondents instead of ~ismissing their 
lawsuit as moot.0 It is certainly true, as tJ._e Court observes, 
that the entry of judgment in favor of party does not in 
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. Ther never has been any 
doubt that a party may appeal those spects of a generally 
favorable judgment that affect him ad rsely. See 15 Wright, 
Miller, and Cooper, Federal Practi and Procedure § 3902 
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Pract" e ~· 203.06 (1975). But 
federal courts uniformly have r uired a showing of some 
adverse effect in order to confer' standing to appeal. '' Ibid.; 
see Barry v. District of Colurn a Bd. of Elections, - U. S. 
App. D. C.-·-, 580 F. 2d 695 (1978). Indeed, Art. III itself 
requires a continuing contra ersy between adverse parties at 
all stages of the litigation. . g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 
402 (1975); Steffel v. T rnpson, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10 
(1974) . If any statute or rule purported to authorize an 
appeal in contraventio of Art. III, that rule would yield to 
the constitutional co and. 
c 
almost entirely on Electrical Fittings Corp. 
8 The Court ma no pffort to dii:itinguish the::;e easelS. Yet it concedes 
that the "right t employ Rule 23" is a "procedural right only, ancillary 
to the litigatio of substantive claims," and it admits that "the court 
retains no juri iction over the controversy" when the "substantive claims 
become moo in the Art. III sense." Ante, at 6. If the tender itself 
mooted the espondents' claims without regard to the entry of judgment, 
then the ourt's own analysis requires it to conclude that the case is 
"::;tatutory right '' to appeal itself cannot supply a personal stake 
m t outcome, for Congress cannot abrogate Art. III limitations on the 
jn sdiction of the federal courts. Gladstone, Realt01'1$ v. Village o B(Lffe, 
ood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) 
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. 'l'homa~ &Betts Co., 307 U. 8: .. 241 (1939).10 · But· the deci-
sion simply reaffirms our obligation not to review JU gments } 
by which no individual is aggrieved. The triaJ court there / 
had entered a decree holding a patent valid but not infringed. 
Although the alleged infringer won the case, it sought 
appeal the finding that the patent was valid. This Court 
held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to,lcon-
sider the issue of patent validity after the t.rial court found 
no infringement, because "[a] party may not appea) from a 
judgment ... in his favor, for the purpose of oblaining a 
review of findings . . . which are not necessary ~o pport the 
decree." I d., at 242. But the trial court had err by inch.Jd-
ing in the decree itself a ruling that "purport[ e to adjudge 
the validity of [the patent]." Ibid. Since t t ruling "was 
immaterial to the disposition of the cause the Court of 
Appeals had jurisdiction for the limited pur se of eliminating 
the extraneous ruling from the decree. I fl. 
The Court reads Electrical Fitt·ings as case that was "still 
live" in the Art. III sense "because po · y considerations per-
mitted an appeal." Ante, at 8-9. B Electrical Fittings was 
a "live" controversy only because d to the limited extent 
that-the petitioner there asserte continuing personal stake 
in the outcome. As Judge Lear d Hand later explained, the 
Hl The only othrr authorities cite y the Court are United Ai1·lines, Inc. 
v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (19zf), and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 
437 U.S. 463 (1978). Dictum both cases stated that the denial of class 
certification . is subject to. a~llate ~eview after . final judgment at the 
behest of t.he named plar ·tiffs. Neither case cbscussed mootness, and 
neither nnalyzed the prol ·ition in any way. Indeed, the only authority 
cited in Coopers & Ly~ljind was United Airlines, see 437 U. S., at 469, and 
the only authority cit ([ in United Airlines was tt concession made by the 
defendant and a lis 1of cases from the Courts of Appeals, none of which 
dealt with a suggestion of mootness in an ana.logous situation, see 432 
U. S., at 393, alfd n. 14. Such statements, casually enunciated without, a 
word of expla,llation in opinions dealing with unrelated legal questions, are 
not controlling or even persuasive when they are shown on further .x.efiec· 
tion to have been ineMsist,eilt w'ith estltblished. law. 
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petlttmm1"1Trlmfctrz.caT F£'ttings was mjured in fact because he 
unnecessary ruling that the patent was valid could have 
created "some presumptive prejudice" against him in a future 
case. Harries v. Air King Products Co., 183 F . 2cl 158, 161 
(CA2 1950); see In re Trimble Co., 479 F. 2d 10 , 111 (CA3 
1973) . 11 This genuine prejudice to the peti · ner himself 
supplied the requisite personal stake in obtain" g reformation 
of the decree. 
Thus, the Court's view of Electrical Fittin sis plainly incon-
sistent with the holding of that case. T Court of Appeals 
was told to reform the decree. but ex ressly forbidden to 
considN the merits of the patent validi question. In other 
words, the court's appellate jurisdictio was only as broad as 
the petitioner's personal stake in the ppeal. Just four years 
later, Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. . 359 (1943), explained 
that the limitation was constituti ally based. Reversing a 
decision that had relied on Elec ·cal Fittings in refusing to 
consider the merits of an ap . al, the Court distinguished 
Electrical Fittings as a case in hich the parties sougqt deci-
sion of "a hypothetical cas The appeal in Altvater, by 
contrast, satisfied "the req ements of case or controversy" 
because the parties contin ed to contest a counterclaim that 
had not been concluded y the dismissal of the orginal com-
plaint. 319 U. S., at 3-366. 
Altvater and Ele rical Fittings entirely foreclose the 
Court's argument t t a party who has no personal stake in 
the outcome of hi appeal may invoke the jurisdiction of a 
federal court mer y because policy-based "rules of practice' ~ 
11 Alt.hough the ourt of Appeal~ in Electrical Fittings held that col-
latC'ral estoppel w Id bt> no bar to relitigation of tpe validity question, 100 
F . 2d 403, 404 CA2 1938), other courts had taken a different view on 
similar issues collateral estoppt>l. If the validity finding were permitted 
to stand, the petitioner could have beeu forced to litigate the question of its 
preclusive Hect lll future cases . 15 Wright, Miller, and Cooper, supra 
n. 4, § 3 2, at. 40a (1976); 1B Moore's Federal Practice ,f 0.443 [5], at 
3,925 (1~4) ; 9 id., , 203.06 at 716 (197,5}. 
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perm1 m "lfo -so. 1hry dtmbt is' dmt'retlect by Alt-Nter.' 
express reliance on Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 (1942 , 
cert. denied, 319 U. S. 748 (1943), a case in whi~h the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed at lengtn the 
constitutional limits on appellate jurisdiction. 319 11. S., at 
363, n. 2. Like the respondents here and the p tioner in 
Electrical Fittings, the appellant in Cover sou to appeal 
from a judgment that had eliminated his st e in the out-
come.12 The Court of Appeals emphaticall declined to as-
sume jurisdiction ovet· an appeal which ught "no relief 
against anybody before the court ... b ... want[ed] an 
advisory opinion that [a] patent [was] alid." 133 F. 2d, at 
554.13 Sincf' there was no case or co1 roversy, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that it was "witho discretion" to hear the 
appeal. Id., at 545. 
These cases demonstrate that t requirements of Art. III 
do not change with the "factual c text" in which a suggestion 
of mootness arises. See ante, 5. Whatever the context, 
Art. III asks but a siugle ques n: Is there a continuing con-
troversy between adverse par es? Iu Electrical Fittings, the 
1 2 Thr appellant in C'over v. S <wartz, 133 F. 2d 541 (CA2 1942), cert. 
denied, 319 U. S. 748 (194:3), r; the losing plaintiff in a patent infringe~ 
ment action. After the l ria eourt found the patent invalid and not 
infringed, the plaintiff took n appeal on the validity question without 
contesting the finding of n infringement. By accepting the judgment to 
that extent, he lost. his ri t to recover from the defendant-and thus his 
interest in t.he litigation. 
1 ~ Judge Frank wrot() or the court: 
"[W]here there is no ju:sticiable' dispute, there are no 'merits.' There is 
merely an unreal e ity resembling that disembodied smile which Lewis 
Caroll immortalize . Many Supreme Court, decisions teach us that appel-
late jurisdirtion , hen no justieiable dispute exists on app<'al, cannot be 
rested upon th rrrollertion that such a dispute previously existed when 
the case was iu the irial court." 133 F. 2d, at 551 (footnotes omitted) . 
See also Kapp v. National J?ootball League, 586 F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9 
1978) ; Hq/1 v. U. 8. Piber & Plastics Corp., 476 F . 2d 418, 420 (CA3, 
197..3) ; <;f. Lewis v. United States, 216 U. S 611 (19W) (tpl!l' curiam}. 
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c versy continued with respect to the single nar 
'ssue whether the District Court's ruling on patent v dit 
1roperly was included in the decree. But nothin n tha 
ase suggests that a "procedural ruling, collateral t e merits 
fa litigation," may be appealed after .final jud · ent because 
' olicy considerations penni [ t] the appeal" or because the 
rIling "stands as an adjudication of one of e issues litigated." 
nte, at 8--9. Such collateral rulings- · e other rulings-may 
e appealed only when the litigant . s a personal stake in the 
esolution of his appeal.H In ctrica.l Fittings, there was 
stake ; here there is uoue. .. ince nothing remains of the 
case or controversy, the urt of Appeals should have dis-
missed t,his case. 
III 
Court's extended discussion of policy 
and practical onsiderations, ante, at 10- 12, that these weighed 
heavily i1 · s decision. I am not aware that such considera-
tions e r before have influenced this Court in determining 
whe · er the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the federal 
c rts. In any event, the consequences of a finding of moot':" A 
' ' d not be as severe - - p - · .,.. f1 ~,X finding oL ';t'lnoea wo I have repercussions primarily 
in two situation . The first involves a named plaintiff who 
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to 
a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent 
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification 
generally would be barred by Art. III. But the consequences _ ~ 
of applying settled rules of mootness in th,ig~situatio"n would 
not be unjust. lf injunctive or declaratory relief were 
-'f'he Cout t, appf'ars t6 r: t'Ognh tlris in-pruosin.,, ante;l!l:'fli.~ !; bn~ 
fa s to apply the rule to thi~ case. Since the Court suggests that respond- ) 
e ts' interest in the certification ruling derjves from the mere fact tha.t it 
' ·tands as an adjudication of one of the i~sues litigated," id., at 9, Elec-
t ·ical fi'i tt inys itself 1\'0\tld limit us to the issuance of an order directing that 
t ~e offensive rulin ~ ~;:~v.l.mged.ftou:ulle.~ 3QIJL . at 242. 
'•. 
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granteu, ~he absent members of the putative class would ha:v~ 
obtained by force of stare decis·is or tho decree itself most of 
the.: benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand, 
damages 'were awarded and an appe11l permitted, reversal of 
the certification ruling would enable putative class membe~ to 
take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability 
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable 
judgment. Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in 
this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" that _ 1 
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate.~~ 
Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise 
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement befot:e 
judgment, as petitioner did in this case. A defendant cer-
tainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic iQ. 
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny 
pompensation to putative class members and jeopardize the 
enforcement of certain legal ri ts by "private attorney [s] 
general." Ante, at -+e-1C1 he practical argument is not 
without force. But predi ating a judgment on these concerns 
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the ade, 
quacy of compensation and enforcement available for particu-
lar substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best 
left to Congress. At the v~ry least, the result should be 
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim, 
Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of 
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of 
.iJ .JI!' Sec CommC'nt, lmmedia.te Appealability of Order::; De1iying Class Cer-
tifiration, 40 Ohio St. L. J. 441, 470-471 (1979). In actions brought under 
Rule 23 (b) ( :3), a class member must decide at the time of certification 
whether to "opt out" of the action under Rl!le 23 (c) (2). This provision 
was de.signed to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class 
members were permitted to intervene after a decision on the inerits 
in order to &'cure the benefits of that decision. Kotes of the Advisory 
qonunittee or1 Proposed An1endments to Rule 23, 39 F . R. D. 69, 105-106 
,('19~6). 
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" usury claims,ttt the Court's concern for compensation of puta. 
tive class members in this case is at best misplaced and at 
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling 
Act.l'f ''-; --------------------· ;B 
The Court's concern for pJtative class members would be 
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced 
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litiga-
tion of successive suits by members of the putative class. I 
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial admin-
istration would be real. But these problems can and should 
be addressed by measures short of Pe?;·Pitifl~the law of moot-
ness, as the Court seems to have done today. The first step 
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the 
denial of class certification in appropriate circumstances.u; 
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292 
(b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain con-
trolling questions of law. In many cases, a class-action 
lTw Liddell v. Litton Systems, Inc ., 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting bor-
rowers' class action) ; Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss . 17, 2 So. ~d 561 (1941) . 
Petitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply with Mis-
sissippi'3 interest limits would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U. S. C. 
§ 85. But I do not understand that the National Bank Act displaces state 
policy disfavoring the aggregntion of usury claims. A primary purpose of 
that Act is to protect 11ational banks from discriminatory treatment or 
undue penalties that may be imposed by st~tte law. See 12 U. S. § 86. 
1~The Act provides that rules of procedure promulgated by this Court 
"shall not .. . enlarge or modify any substantive right ." 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2072. See Ametican Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538, 
557-558 (1974); Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1318, 1358-1359 (1976). See generally Landers, Of Legalized Black-
mail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Subetance-
Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974) . 
18 In Coo1>ers c~ Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463 (1978), this Court 
held that the denial of class certification is not a "final decision" appeal-
able as of right tmder 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We relied in that case on the 
dangers of "indi;;criminate" interlocutory review. Jd., at 474. Although 
Coopers & Lyb11and now prevents review in case..'! in which it would be 
desirable, Congress may remedy the problem by appropriate legislation •. 
---------- -
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defendant undoubte would forgo the opportunity to settle 
with an individual pl 'ntiff in order to obtain an immediate 
and final detennination of the class certification question· on 
appeal. 
Where a defendant does ttempt to moot a class action by 
forced settlement, the Distri t Court is not powerless. In at 
r--.. ~some circumstances, it 1 ay require thl:tt putative class a--- members receive some sort of oHce and an opportunity to 
intervene within the appeal pe 'od. Rule 23 (d) (2). The 
availability of such measures coul be a significant deterrent 
to the deliberate mooting of class ctions. Indeed, District 
Court management of the problem b measures tailored to the 
case at hand may well be preferable t the Court's open-ended 
approval of appeals in all circumstanc . To the extent inter-
locutory appeals are unavailable or anagerial powers are 
lacking,_ it i.~ /or Congress-not this ourt-to correct the 
deficiency.~ !}j 
Since a court is limited to the decision f the case before it, 
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legisla iv~ problems often 
are attended by unfortunate practical cm sequences of their' 
own. Today's holding is no exception. Or remand, respond-
~ " ents will serve as "quasi-class representativ s" solely for the \tl l purpose of obtaining class certification. Sin e they can gain 
· I ~:!h~:lfn'::;e!'~~Y~ b':~~~'i ~:e~ui'.be:'~ =:.u 111e~e~se ~ Q;{ 
):r-t>r ·theil'-la.wy:e~serve on th:ir own motim Since no cou~ ~ ) e 5 jr 
tl 
~M>Congress currently has before it a bill that attempts to remedy the 
difficulties infecting this troubled area. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1979). The bill, supported by the Department of ·Justice, proposes to 
bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, supm, and to eliminate 
some of the problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by 
creating a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provides for 
~, the enforcement of this right in some instances through actions brought in 
the name of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory 
appeals from the gmnt or denial of the ruling that will replace cla~s . cer-
· tification under the proposed procedures, 
.;.c « a 1- L I ; 1~, th.... ~ ~~ ~ J-: __ 
~~~~~~~· 
~~~d{~~e2e.f...  
~ ~ &, ~ .A • .t_. 12-{, 
_,~~,J:..,./- - _ .... 4AA (. y 
4C~&c~~CA~~~ a;' @!~ 
,...., .. .,. ....... _., •• ~b?"..~~..-.cepJ• a Eil---<....... 
1 
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has certified the class, there has been no considered determina..; 
tion that respondents will fairly and adeqtiately represent its 
members. Nothing in Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure, 
and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it. 
Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent? 
See East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 
403-404 (1977). Are their currently nonexistent claims "typi-
cal of t.he clair.~~ ... of the class" within the meaning of Rule 
23 (a)(3)? ~.!!!J 
The Court's holding well may prevent future "forced set-
erne~' ~veJF f'oreclose--a-l~el~ of class 
action litigation. &e ante, 11. 6.( Thus, the difficulties faced 
by the District Court on remand in this case may not arise 
again in precisely analogous circumsta.nces. But today's result 
------ also authorizes appeals by putative class representatives who 
ave revailed on the merits of their individual claims. If the 
order denying class certification is reversed in that situation, 
the named plaintiffs on remand will have no more continuing 
relationship to the putative class than respondents have 
here. A remand for certification could also lead to "one-way 
I -
!J)The District Court properly may conclude on remand that respondents, 
for these or other reasons, cannot. adequately repre ou 
intervention be proposed, the District Cou quitable grounds might well 
refuse to toll the statute of limit.a · in order to }:>t'rmit it.pearly mne 
years have passed since th' · ction was filed and six since the governing 
substant,ive statute w , mended to authorize the cha.Uenged conduct. In 
its order denyin •rtifica.tion on September 29, 1975, the District Court 
assigned as o of its reasons the possible "destruction of the [petitioner's] 
bank" by amages then alleged to total §12,000,000 and now potept.ially 
a.ugmet d by the accrual of interest. App. 47, see ante, at 2, n. 2. The 
possi e destruction of petitioner's bank·is irrelevant to the ~Ji~ue Of 
m tness, but sE>riou:; indeed to depositors, stockholders, and the community 
rved. As this Court relie::; so heavily on its practical and equitable con-
cerns for putative elass members, it will hardly be inappropriate for the 
District Court on remand to con!:!ider pmcticalitie:; and e4uities ori both 
side~<. In the circumstance-S prPSented, the District Court may well see no 
reason to exercise its equitable dbcretion in favor of putative rlass me~pbers· 
who· have slcvt on their rights the!:!e many years, 
,. 
'•' 
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intervention" in direct violation of Rule 23. Seep. 11- 12, and 
n. 15, supra. These tensions. arising from the express terms 
of the Rule, undermine the Court's conclusion that the 
policies underlying Rule 23 dictate the result reached' today. 
~-In sum, the Court's attempted sofution to the problem of 
f ed settlements in consumer class actions departs from 
principles of Art. III jurisprudence:flt afso unnece5:. 
---~~~~tes significant problems in the administration of 
I would vacate the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals *emand with instructions to dismiss the appeal 
as moot.' -
11. -':iJ ~f1~ . .TusncE ST~WENR :statt>s, in hi:; concnrring opinion, lha.t all persons 
allc•gpd to be· mPmbPrs of a put~ttive elal'i:s "automatically be<;ome parties 
to the ca:sP or <'ontmvcrsy for purposes" of Art. lll , and that they 
"remain parties unW a final determination has been made that. the action 
ma.y not. be maintained as n. class action." Ante, at -. This novel 
view, for which no authority is cited, ca.nnot. be reconciled with lrulian-
apolis School r'omm'11s v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975), where an oral 
certification order waH ht>ld insufficient to identify the interest.; of absent 
clasH members for Art. III purpose:;. The re:;ult. hardly could be different 
when the chts,: has 11ot been ideut.ified at. all. See also Memphis Light, 
Gas & Water Div. v. Cmft. 436 U.S. 1, 8 (1978); Baxte1· v. Palmigiano, 
423 U. S. 308, 310, n. 1 (1976) ; Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 H. S. 147 
(1975); Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430 
-
1976). 
The proposed rule of u.utomalie party st<1tus-in this case for 90,000 
unidentified person::;--has troublesome and far-reaching implications that 
could prejudiee the bringing of class actions. Preswnably a purpose of 
such a rule wonld be to a:;sure that satisfaction of the claim:; of named 
partie,; wouhl not terminate the litigation. Nor could the rights of 
unnamed parties be Pxtiuguished by the failure of t.he named parties to 
appeal. Thus, if thP rule proposed by MR. Jusnc:E S'l'EVENS is to accom-
plish it,; pnrpo:;e, I suppose that a. fidueia.ry duty must be impoticd upon 
named partie:; io continue the litigation where--as hen'-the tmnamcd 
partie" r<'main 11nident.ified and fail to intervene. As fiduciaries, wou.ld t.he 
uanwd partie;; not only be requirf'd to continuf' ·to litigate, but to a;:;sume 
pertlonal re:;ponsibility for cost.~ ;lnd att.orney's fees if the ca..,;e ultirmttely is 
lost? Would t•espon:<ible litigants be willing to file clal:'.'i a.ctions if they 
thereby tt..~~ttmed iStH'h long-term fiduciary obligation::;? These aud like 
18.) 
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quP.;tions are substantial. They are not resolved by Rule 23. I believe 
thry merit cardnl study by Congress before tJ1is Court-perhaps unwit-
tingly-ereatcs a major category of clientles:; litigation unique in our 
syst.cm. 
3-5-80 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATF! 
No. 78-904 
Deposit Guaranty National Bank, I On Writ of Certiorari to 
Jackson, ~fississippi, Petitioner, the United States Court 
v. of Appeals for the Fifth 
Robert L . Roper et al. 'Circuit. 
[February -, 1980] 
MR. Jvs'ricE PowELL, with whom MR. JuSTICE Sn.:WART 
joins, dissenting. 
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that 
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the 
National Bank Act and Mississippi law.1 ·They filed this 
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty 
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 a.nd 
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf 
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggre-
gating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District 
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification. 
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the 
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and 
· court rosts. Over respondents' objection, the District Court 
entered final judgment in their favor. Petitioner then depos-
. ited the full amount due with the clerk of the court. 
No one disputes that the petitioner has tendered every-
thing that respondents could have recovered from it in this 
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit reiected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed 
the denial of class certification. 'This Court affirms the judg- \ 
ment of the Court of Appeals. after finding that respondents 
retain a personal stake in sharing the expense of litigation 
1 Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U.S. C. §§ 85, 
86, which adopts the interest limits set by state law, and 28 U. S. ;C. 
§ 1355. 
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with members of the putative class. Ante, at 7. n. 6. This l 
speculative interest simply will not sustain the jurisdiction 
of an Art. III court under established and controlling prece-
dents. Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
Although there are differences, this case is similar to United 
States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at --, in one 
important respect: both require us to decide whether puta-
tive class representatives may appeal the denial of class cer-
tification whC'n they can derive no benefit whatever from 
the relief sought in the action. Here, as in Geraghty, the 
District Court refused to certify a class. In this case, how-
ever, the Court n'cognizes established Art. III doctrine. It 
states that the " right to employ Rule 23" is a "procedural 
right only, ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." 
Ante, at 6. Tt also agrees that a federal court "retains no 
jurisdiction over the controversy" when the partie.s' "sub-
stantive claims bC'come moot in the Art. III sense." Ibid. 
Moreover, the Court ackuowledges the familiar principle that 
a party who has no pC'rsonal stake in the outcome of an action 
presents no case or controversy cognizable in a federal court of 
appeals. !d., at 7, 10. These are indeed the dispositive 
principles. My disagreement is with the way in which the 
Court applies them in this case. In my view, these principles 
unambiguously require a finding of mootness. 
A 
Since no class has been certified and no one has sought to 
intervene, respondents are the only plaintiffs arguably present 
in court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in the 
injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only dam-
ages; those damages have been tendered in full.~ Respond-
2 Although rr::>pondenls nl::;o a::;ked for attorney's fees, their complaint 
iihows that fee;; were lo be grnnted only from the damage;; ultimately 
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ents make no claim that success on the certification motion~ 
would entitle them to additional relief of any kind from the 
petitioner.M Their persoual claims to relief have been aban-
doned so completely that no appeal was taken in their own 
names. Tho notice of appeal filed with the District Court 
recites that respondents appeal only "on behalf of all others 
similarly situated .... " App. 63. 
This in itself is compelling evidence that respondents have 
no interest in the "individual and private case or controversy" 
relied on hy the Court today. Ante, at 5. But even withou 
such evidene<'. this and other courts routinely have held that 
a tender of full relief remedies a plaintiff's injuries and elimi-
nates his stak<' in the outcome. California v. San Pablo & 
'Pula1·e R. eo., 1M) U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill & 
'l'homas Co. v. l'nded States, 392 F. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per 
curiam); Lamb v. Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968) 
(per cun:am) ; A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F. 
2d 89 ( CA5 1965) (per curiam). It is the te11der itself that 
moots tlw case whether or not a judgment is entered. Ibid. 
Thus, the law is clear that a federal court is powerless to re-
view the ab~tract questions remaining in a case when the 
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that fully 
satisfies his claims. 
I know of 110 authority remotely suggesting that the result 
should differ because the District Court has. entered a judg-
ment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their law-
suit as moot.4 It is certainly true, as the Court observes, 
awardNl tu them or the clm.;s. App. 13-14. There is no pos:<ibility of 
pro:spcctivr n•liPf b('(·au,.:r the :\1i,.:::;iH,.:ippi m;ury sta.tute was amrnded in 
1974 to authumr, inter alia, tlw charge< at. i:<.~ue in this ca:;e. 197-1 1\Iiss. 
Gen. Law:-:, ch. ,1)04, § 7; :;ee 1\Ii~"- Code Ann.§ 75-17-1 (6). 
8 NPithPt' thr Cou rt nor the rc~:~ponclrnt~:~ have aHSertcd that the prti-
tioner'~ tcndr·r fail~ to include all co~:~t,~ and fcc~:~ for which it could be held 
liable. SrP Pari ri-B, infra. 
4 he "statutory rig;ht.'' to appral, ante. :tt 7, it:sclf cannot supply a 
per~:~onnl ~:~take in the outcome, for CongreSi:i cannot abrognle Art. III 
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that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in< 
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any 
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally 
favorable judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wright. 
Miller and Cooper. Federal Practice and Procedure § 3902 
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practice 1f 203.06 (1975). But 
the requiremf'nt of adverse effect is more than a rule "of 
federal appellate practice." Ante, at 7. As we have held 
repeatedly, and as the Court concedes, ante, at 10, Art. III 
itself requires a live controversy in which a personal stake is 
at issuf' " throughout the entirety of the litigation." Sosna 
v. Iowa, 419 ( T. S. 393. 402 (1975). See, e. g., Preiser v. 
Newk·irk, 422 U.S. 395, 401-401 (1975). 
It is this constitutional limitation, and not any rule of prac-
tice, that ha:s impelled feclf'ral courts uniformly to require a 
showing of continuing adverse effect in order to confer "stand-
ing to appeal." 15 Wright, Miller and Cooper, supra, ~ 3902. 
Barry v. District of Colurnbia Bd. of Elections, - U. S. 
App. D. C'. - . 580 F. 2d 6D5 (1978); see Altvater v. Free-
man, 3HJ U. S. 359 (1943); Electrical Fittings v. 'l'homas & 
Betts Co., 307 U. S. 241 (1939); Kapp v. National Football 
League, 586 F . 2cl 644. 650 (CA9 1978); Cover v. Schwartz, 
133 F . 2d 541 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U. S. 748 (1943).5 
limitationK ou the juri ~>dirtion of the federal rourts. Gladstone, Realto1·s 
v. Village of /3 e/lu•ood, 441 F. S. 91 , 100 (1979). 
~ 5 United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 4;32 U.S. 385 (1977), and Coopm·s 
((; Lybmnd v. Li11esay 437 U. S. 4()3 (1978), are not to thr cout.rary., 
Incidt>ntal dictum iu both casr~ stated that. thr denial of cla,:;s certification 
is subjPrt to appellate review after final judgment at the behest of the 
named pbiutiff,;. Nrither cn~e <li~rHRHrd mootneR">, nod neither anal~·zed 
the propositio11 in an~· way. Indeed, the only authority cited in Coopers 
& Lybrand was United Airlines. see 437 U. S., at 469, and the only 
authorit~· cited i11 [; nited Airlines Wil~> a. conce~!:iion made by the defendant 
and a. Ji:;t oJ ca<'e~ from the Court ::; of Appeal~, not one of which dealt 
with a suggestion of mootness iu an analogous situation, see 432 U. 8., at 
393, and n. H . ~uch i'tatrmrnts, casually enunciated without a word of 
explaJJa Lion in opinions dealing with unrelated legal questions, are not 
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As these cases show, the requirements of Art. III are n()t 
affected by the "factual ·context" in which a suggestion of 
mootness arises. See ante, at 6. Whatever the context, 
Art. III asks but a single question: Is there a continuing 
controversy between adverse parties who retain the requisite 
stake in the outcome of the action? 
Electrical Fittings v. Thomas & Betts Co., supra, is the case 
primarily relied upon by the Court. It provides little or uo 
support for today's ruling. In Electrical Fittings, a limited 
appeal was allowed because the petitioner himself was prej-
udiced by the inclusion of an mmecessary and adverse finding 
in a generally favorable decree. See ante, at 10. Here, the 
existence of the District Court's order denying certification 
has no effPct whatever on the respondents. Thus, the per-
sonal stake that justified the Electrical Fittings appeal is not 
prese11t in this case. Absent such a stake, it is simply irrele-
vant that "policy considerations" sometimes may favor an 
appeal from "a procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of 
a litigation." 1 Tor is it significant that the ruling "stands as 
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." Id., at 9-10. 
Collateral rulings-like other rulings-may be appealed only 
when the requirements of Art. III are satisfied. 
B 
After recognizing that the right to appeal is subject to the 
"jurisdictional limitations of Art. III." the Court agrees that 
only a "party [who] retains a stake in the appeal [can sat-
isfy] the requirements of Art. III." Ante, at 7; see id., at 
10. The' Court also agrees that respondents have remaining 
stake in "the merits of the substantive controversy." ld., at 
controlling or even prr;:;ua<iivc whrn they are shown on further reflection 
to have bern iiH'OIJHi~tent with Hettlrd law. As the Court agrees today,' 
neither CH:,;() rrmtr~ an exception to the fundamental rule thai "federal 
appellatt1 jmi~dietion i::; limited by tho appdlant':; personal stake in the 
appeal." Ante, a.t 10. 
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~-10. Nevertheless. it holds that respondents retain a per. 
sonal stake in this appeal because they "desire to shift to 
successful class litigants a portion of those fees and expenses 
that have been incurred in this litigation and for which they 
assert a continuing obligation." !d., at 7, n. 6; see id., at 10.0 
This conclusion is neither legally sound nor supported by the 
record. 
The Court fails to identify a single item of expense, charge- (\, p~'k.... 
able to the petitioner. that was incurred_\before the petitioner's [d' teJ: \ 
tender. Similarly, the respondents have been conspicuously 
vague in identifying the "fees and expenses" relied upon as 
supplying the adverse interest essential to a live controversy.7 
The only expensE' mentioned by respondents, apart from court 
costs iucluded iu the pctitiouer's tender, is not a present obli-
gation at all. It is an offer to provide security for costs in 
the event a class ultimately is certified. Brief for Respond-
ents 33; App. 78. Nor does the attorney's fee arrangement 
in this case create any obligation, present or future, that can 
@'he Court also mrntions that "rtJhe use of the class action procedure I 
for litigation of indi\'idual claim:; may off!'r sub:;tantial advantages for 
named plaintiff~ . . . . " Ante, at 11, n. 9. But any such advantages 
cannot aer·n1r to thesr rr,;pondc·nt:;, who will not. be litigating their own 
claims on n•m.md. Indeed, thr Court. rE-fer::; to respondE-nts in this context 1 
only to point out that tlwir total damage::! were ~o small that they "would 
be unlikrly to ohtam legal rE>drE''~ at an a.ccrptable em;t" if they could not 
do so b~· mran" of a cal"" action. We may a:;:;ume that. re::<pondrnts had 
some interest. in t lw cla:<::;-act.ion procedure as a means of interesting their 
lawyer~ in tho ca,.;c• or obt.a.ining a sati:;factory ;.;ettlement. Thi,.; may be 
an intere;;t. proprrly fmthrred by Rule 23, but once rPspondents obtained 
both acrPHK to comt and full individual relief that interr~;t disappeared. 
7 Per hap" the stronge::;t of rt'::<pondent.~' statements is: 
"Of com::'r, till' interrst of the [rE-spondents] in asRertion of the right to 
proceed on behalf of the clas.~ includes such matters as thr pro,;prct for 
spreading attoi'IH>y':,; Ire:; and PxpenPes among more claimants and thus 
reducing the p<·rcpntage that. would otherwi:;e bP payable by them." 
Plaintiffs-Appellant.~' Brirf in Oppo:;ition to Motion to Di,mi"'·" Appral and 
Reply Brief, filed in Roper v. Cansurve (CA5, No. 76-3600), Jan. 10, 
1977. 
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be affected by the certification of a class. Respondents' com-
plaint identifies the fee to be paid, subject to court approval, 
as "twenty-five percent (25% )" of the amount of the final 
judgment. App. 14, 16.8 No arrangement other than this 
customary A contingent fee is identified in the record or the 
briefs. Yet, no one has explained how respondents' obliga-
tion to pay 25/'r of their 1·ecovery to counsel ·could be reduced 
if a class is certified and its members become similarly obli-
gated to pay 25% of their recovery. Thus, the asserted in-
terest in "spreading [of] attorney's fees and expenses" 0 re-
lates to no presf'nt obligation. It is at most an expectation-
of the respondents' and particularly of their counsel-that cer-
tain fees and expenses may become payable in the event a 
class is certified. That expectation is wholly irrelevant to 
the existence of a present co11troversy between petitioner and 
respondents. 
The Court's reliance on unidentified fees and expenses can-
not be recoJJciled with the repeated admonition that "un-
adorned speculation will not suffice to invoke the federal 
judicial power.'' E. g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights 
Org., 426 U. S. 26, 44 (1976). Such speculation is particu-
larly inappropriate in this case, since neither the Court nor 
~ 8 Rrspondrnt,;' " Drmand for Judgmrnt!' Hf'k~ the court to award t.he 
"rcJo:;t. of ihis action a,; wrll a::; attornry fres in thr amount of 25% as 
hereinabovE~ alh·grd, or Huch othrr amount as may br deemed M and 
propE'r by tlw Court." App. 16. The reque:;t, for feE':< wa;,: ela;i~cd in 
Paragraph VI ol' t.llf' ameudrd eomplaint, which rrad:; as follows: 
"Plaintiff ullrgrs that, the Clrrk of this Court. br dr:siguated cuotodian 
of the funds and judgmpnt. to be paid Pla.intiff and other prr:<ons similarly 
situated, b~· Drfendants and the Clerk deposit said fund:; in a. suitable 
depository and, upon proprr ordrr of this Court, di:sbur,;p said funds 
aftrr dPductio11 of nere.,:;ary rxpenses and attorney fee:,; to Plaintiff's 
at.tornry~ hNein of twPnt~·-fivr per cent, (25% ) of t hr amount so paid, 
the same being r<'HI"Onnhlr by all st~mda.rds, including that alleged and 
utilized h)· D<>f.rndants in Ruing rrrtain mrmbrrs in of [sic] the class in 
St.ate Court:; for unpaid accounts." App. 13-14. 
o See n. 7, supra, 
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respondents have suggested that the petitioner is or ever will 
be liable for the fees or expenses relied upon. Indeed, the 
American Rule would bar an award of attorney's fees against 
this petitioner. Thus, respondents' "injury"-if any exists-
is not one that "fairly can be traced" to the petitioner. Id., 
at 41-42; see Gladstone, Realtors v. Vinaye of Bellwood, 441 
U. S. 91, 99 (1979.10 Whatever may be the basis for the 
respoudents' asserted desire to share fees and expenses with 
unnamed members of a class, the petitioner is merely a by~ 
stauder. "LF] ederal courts are without power to decide ques-
tions that cannot afi'ect the rights of litigants in the case 
before them." lVorth Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 
(1971). This elementary principle should dispose of the case, 
c 
Since respondellts have no continuing personal stake in the 
outcome of this action, Art. III and the precedents of this 
Court require that the case be dismissed as moot. E. g., 
Ashcroftv. Matt?:s , 431 U.S.171, 172-173 (1977) (per curiam); 
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1976) (per curiam); 
Preiser v. 1\'ewkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-404 (1975); Indian-
apolis School Comrn'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975); De-
Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, 316-320 (1974) (per 
curiam); North Carol-ina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971) 
(per curiam); SEC v. Medical Cornm. for Human Rights, 
404 u. s. 403, 407 (1972).11 
1° Far-reaching consequrnces could flow from a rule that fees recoverable 
from putative cla:ss mrmbers.(Cillim)be '' traced" to the class delendm\t 
for purpo:;e;; of the ca,.;e or controver~y requirement. At the least, this 
['4 
rule would :support a claim that a per~on who )r im.JSJ.~ ..l..·~·~M...~:.;.w.oiOlJ--f--1 
full settlrrrH•n1. of his individual claim - entitled to file suit on behalf of 
an unrecom1wnsed rla~s. Apparently, the put.ntivc plaintiff need only 
"a.sser[t]," ante, at 7, n. 6, tha.t f<'e:s incurred in anticipation of the litiga-
tion ultima1el)' might br ~hared with a prevailing class. 
11 These c·ase;,; arc di~:;cus:sed more fully in United States Pamle CIYm~ 
mission v. Geraghty, post, at--- (PowELL, J., clis:;euting), 
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Respondents do not suggest that their claims are 11Capable 
of repetition, yet evading review." Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 
U. S. 103, 110-111, n. 11 (1975).1~ Not a single one of the 
alleged 90,000 class members has sought to intervene in the 
nine years since this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines, 
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone 
challenged the allegedly usurious charges by informal com-
plaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certifica-
tion was deJlied, the action lay dormant during the seven 
months in which respondents sought to take an interlocutory 
appeal, without provoking a response from anyQ11e who previ-
ously may have thought that the class action would protect 
his rights. Apart from the persistence of the lawyers, this 
has been a noi')fase since the petitioner tendered full satisfac-
tion of the n~pondents' individual claims. To be sure, re-
spondents' counsel may have the same interest in an enlarged 
recovery that is inherent in any contingent fee arrangement. 
But I know of no decision by any court that holds that a 
lawyer's interest in a larger fee, to be paid by third persons 
not present in court. creates the personal stake in the outcome 
required by Art. III. 
II 
Despite the absence of an Art. III controversy, the Court 
directs a remand in which this federal action will be litigated 
by lawyers whose only "clients" are unidentified class mem-
bers who have shown no desire to be represented by anyone.13 
@u a cla:s:;-action defendant. were shown to have embarked on a course 
of conduct designed to insulate the class certification issue from appellate 
review in order to avoid classwide liability, a court in proper circumstances 
might find the Gerstein test satisfied and the case not moot. See Susman v. 
Lincoln American Corp., 587 F. 2d 866 (CA7 1978); 13 Wright, Miller & 
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 171 (Supp. 1979); 
Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following 
Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 599-600. 
3 I do not KHgge:;t that. coun;,;el acted improperly in pur:;uing this case, 
Since thry have prevailed both in this Court and in the Court of Appeals, 
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The Court appears to endorse this fonn of litigation for rea· 
11ons of policy and practice. It is said to be an effective 
uresponse to the existence of injuries unremedied by the 
regulatory action of government." Ante, at 12. I am not 
aware that such a consideration ever before has influenced this 
Court in determining whether the Constitution confers juris-
diction on the federal courts. In any event, the consequences 
of a finding of mootness are not likely to be as restrictive as 
the Court seems to fear. And the Court fails ~to recog-
nize that allowing this action to proceed without an interested 
plaintiff will itself generate practical difficulties of some 
magnitud . 
A 
A finding of mootness would have repercussions primarily 
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who 
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to 
a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent 
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification 
generally would be barred by Art: III. But the consequences 
of applying settled rules of mootness in that situation would 
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were 
granted, the absent members of the putative class would have 
obtained by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of 
the benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand, 
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of 
the certification ruling would enable putative class members to 
take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability 
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable 
judgment. Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in 
this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" that 
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate.14 
the responsibility for allowing client-less litigations fall on the federal 
eo)ll;ts. 
~ee CommC'nL, Immediate Appealability of Orders Denying Class Cer-
tification, 40 Ohio St. L. J. 441, 470-471 (1979). In actions brought under 
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Pet'ha.ps more commonly, the mootness question will arise 
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before 
judgment, as petitioner did in this case. A defendant cer-
tainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in 
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny 
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the 
enforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney[s] 
general." Ante, at 11-12. The practical argument is not 1 
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns 
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the ade-
quacy of compensation and enforcement available for particu-
lar substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best 
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be 
consistent with the substantive 'law giving rise to the claim. 
Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of 
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of 
usuary claims.1 ;; the Court's concern for compensation of puta-
tive class members in this case is at best misplaced and at 
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling 
Act.16 
Rule 23 (b) (3), a class member must, decide at the time of certification 
whether to "opt out" of the action under Rule 23 (c) (2). This provision 
was designed to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class 
members were permitted to intervene after a decision on the merits 
in order to secure the benefits of that decision. Notes of the Advisory 
Committee on Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F. R. D. 69, 105-106 
(J-9~6). 
\.:2Liddell v. Litton Systems, Inc., 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting bor-
rowers' class action); Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17,2 So. 2d 561 (1941). 
Petitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply with Mis-
sissippi'3' interest limits would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U. S. C. 
§ 85. But I do not understand that. the National Bank Act disphwes state 
policy disfavoring the aggregation of usury claims. A primary purpose of 
that Act is to protect national banks from discriminatory treatment or 
u¢~e penalties that may be imposed by state Jaw. See 12 U. S. § 86. 
~rho Act providt>s tha.t rules of procedure promulgated by this Court 
· "llhall not • • • enlarge or modify at'Y substantive right." 28 U. s, ·C. 
.. 
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The Court's concern for putative class members would be 
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced 
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litiga-
tion of successive suits by members of the putative class. I 
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial admin-
istration would be real. But these problems can and should be 
addressed by measures short of undercutting the law of moot- l 
ness, as the Court seems to have done today. ·The first step 
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the 
denial of class certification · in appropriate circumstances.17 
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292 
(b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain con-
trolling questions of law. In many cases, a class-action 
defendant undoubtedly would forgo the opportunity to settle 
with an individual plaintiff in order to obtain an · immediate 
and final determination of the class certification question on 
appeal. 
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a class action by 
forced settlement, the District Court is not powerless. In at 
least some circumstances, it may require that putative class 
members receive some sort of notice and an opportunity to 
intervene within the appeal period. Rule 23 (d) (2). The 
availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent 
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District 
§ 2072. See American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538, 
11:17-558 (1974); Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1318, 1358-1359 (1976). See generally Landers, Of Legalized Black-
mail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-
p ~edure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974) . 
17 tn C'oopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463 (1978), this Court 
held that the denial of class certification is not a "final decision" appeal-
able as of right under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We relied in that case on· the 
dangers of "indiscriminate" interlocutory review. ld., at -474. Although 
Coopers & Lybrand now prevents review in cases in which it would, be 
-desirable, Congress may remedy the problem by appropriate legislation~ 
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Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the 
case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended 
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent inter-
locutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are 
lacking, it is for Congress-not this Court-to correct the 
deficiency .18 
B 
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it, 
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems often 
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their 
own. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respond-
ents will serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for the 
purpose of obtaining class certification. Since they can gain 
nothing more from the action, their participation in the case 
can be intended only to benefit ~f'JMdentsVcounsel and thel 
members of a _putative class who have indicated no interest 
in the claims asserted ill)~ case~erve on their own mo-l 
tion-if indf'<>d they serve at all.10 Since no court has cer-
tified the class. there has been no considered detennination 
that rcspondf'nts will fairly and adequately represent its 
members. Nothing in Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure, 
and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it. 
ongrr;;:'i rurrrntly has before it 11 bill that attempt" to remedy the 
difficulties infecting this troubled area. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1979). The bill, supported by the Department of Justice, proposes to 
bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, supra, and to eliminate 
some of the problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by 
creating a new federal right of action for damagee. The bill provides for 
the enforcement of this right in some instances through actions brought in 
the name of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory 
appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class cer-
ion under the proposed procedures. 
s noted abovr, p . .3._, supra, respondents took no appeal in their 
o name"'. One would 1hink that this candid di~clnirner of r)(-'n;onall 
intE>rr:;j, would di><troy jhe foundation upon which the Court predicates 
Art. III jurisdi<>1ion. Ante, at 7; seep. -, supra, 
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Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent? 
See East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 
403-404 ( 1977). Are their currently nonexistent claims "typi-
cal of the claims ... of the class" within the meaning of Rule 
23 (a)(3)? 20 
The Court's holding well may prevent future "forced set- ( 
tlements" of class action litigation. Thus. the difficulties 
faced by the District Court 0.11 remand in this case may not 
arise again in precisely analogous circumstances. But today's 
result also authorizes appeals by putative class representatives 
who have litigated and prevailed on the merits of their in-
dividual claims. If the order denying class certification is 
reversed in that situation, the named plaintiffs on remand 
will have 110 more co11tinuiug relationship to the putative 
class than respondents have here. A remand for certification 
could also lead to "one-way intervention" in direct violation 
of Rule 23. See p. 12.., and n. !~sUpra. These tensions, 
arising from the express terms of the Rule, undermine the 
Court's conclusion that the policies underlying Rule 23 dic-
tate the result reached today. 
IV 
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of 
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from 
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence.21 It unneces-
2" The District Court. properly may conclude on remand that rr:;pontlents, 
Ior these or other reasons, cannot adequately represent the claEs. <,. 
21 Mn . .JusTICE STEVtmH state::;, in hi::; concurring opinion, that a.li]H'ri:\On.· 
alleged to be membPrs of a putative clw;i:l "automatically becomr parties 
tq the case or controversy for pnrposes" of Art. III , and that they 
"remain parties until a final determination has been made that the action 
may not be maintained as a. class action." Ante, at -. This novel 
view, for which no authority is cited, cannot be reconciled with Indian-
apolis School C'omm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975), where an oral 
certification order wa,. held insufficient to identify the interests of absent 
class members for Art. III purposes. The result hardly could be different 
when the cia ·s has not been identified at all. See also Memphis Light, 
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sarily creates significant problems in the administration of 
Rule 23. And it may work a serious injustice in this case.22 
Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 8 (1978); Ba:xte1· v. Palmigiano, 
423 U. S. 308, 310, n. 1 (1976); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 
(1975); Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430 
(1976). 
The proposed rule of automatic party status-in this case for 90,000 
unidentified persons-has troublesome and far-reaching implications that 
could prejudice the bringing of class actions. Presumably a purpose of 
such a rule would be to assure that satisfaction of the claims of named 
parties would not trrminate the litigation. Nor could the rights of 
unnamed parties he extinguished by the failure of the named partjes to 
appeal. Thu~, if the rnlr proposed by MR. JusTICE Sn~VENS is to accom-
plish it::; pmpo,.;P, I :;;uppoSf' that a fiduciary duty mu:;t be imposed upon 
named partie:,; to continue the litigation where-as here-the unnamed 
partie:; remain unidrnt ifiPd and fail to intervene. As fiduciaries, would the 
named partir:-: not only br requirrd to continue to litigate, but to a:;sume 
personal responsibility for costR and attorney's fees if the case ultimately is 
lost? Would re.sponsible litigants be willing to file class actions if they 
thereby assmnrd :;uch long-term fiduciary obligations? These and like 
questions arc substantial. They are not resolved by Rule 23. I believe 
they merit rarpful :;tud,v by Congress before this Court-perhaps unwit-
tingly-creatP:; a major category of clientles:; litigation unique in our 
sy~m. 
\e}rhe Court's rP~urreetiou of this dead cont.rover::;y may result ill I 
irreparable injury to innocent Jl<lrtie:;, a.':l wt'll as to the petitioner bank. 
When the Di~trict . Court. denird cetiifieation on September 29, 1975, it 
as:;igned as one of its reasons the 1w::;:;ible "destruction of the Lpetitioner] 
bank" by clamagr,.; then alleg<'d to total 12,000,000 and now JWtentially 
augmented by thr accrual of intE'rest. App. 47, see ante, at 2, n. 2. The 
pos:;ible destruct ion of the bank is irrelevant to the jurisdictional i:;:;ue, 
but. seriotl::i inderd to depo::;itor::;, stockholder::;, and the community served. 
It is said that thi:s is nec('>;.,;ary to redre:;::; injurirt> pm;sibl~· suffered by\ 
members of th<' putative class. Yet, no such per:;on ha,.; come forward 
in the nearly ninr yrars that, have pa:;sed since this action was filed. 
Indeed, the challenged conduct wa:; authorized by sta.tute ulmo:;t. :six year::; I 
ago. As the District Court may be called upon to determine whether the 
equitable doctrint' of "rrlation back" permit.':l it to toll the statute of 
limitation:; on rrmancl, ante, at 3, n. 3, it will h~trdly be inappropriate for 
that court to consider the equities on both sides. In the circumstances 
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I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and: 
remand with instructions to dismiss ~he ap}Jeal as JJlOO/t., 
presented, the District Court ma.y well see no reason to exercise its equi-
table di:;c•rption in favor of putative clu&; members who have slept on their 
rights these many years. 
.. '.l'o: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Juatice Brennan 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART 
joins, dissenting. 
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that 
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the 
National Bank Act and Mississippi law.1 ·They filed this 
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty 
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and 
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf 
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggre-
gating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District 
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification. 
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the 
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and 
· court costs. Over respondents' objection, the 'District Court 
entered final judgment in their favor. Petitioner then depos-
. ited the full amount due with the clerk of the court. 
No one disputes that the petitioner has tendered every-
thing that respondents could have recovered from it in this 
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed 
the denial of class certification. This Court affirms the judg- ' 
ment of the Court of Appeals. after finding that respondents 
retain a personal stake in sharing the expense of litigation 
1 Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U.S. C. §§ 85, 
86, which adopts the interest limits set by state law, and 28 U. S. :C. 
§ 1355. 
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with members of the putative class. Ante, at 7. n. 6. This \ 
speculative interest simply will not sustain the jurisdiction 
of an Art. UI court under established and controlling prece-
dents. Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
Although there are differences. this case is similar to United 
States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at --, in one 
important respect: both require us to decide whether puta-
tive class represc•ntatives may appeal the denial of class cer-
tification whrn they can cl~:>rive no benefit whatever from 
the relief sought iu the action. Here, as in Geraghty, the 
District Court refused to certify a class. In this case. how-
ever, the Court rrcognizPs established Art. III doctrine. It 
states that tlw " right to employ Rule 23" is a "procedural 
right only, ancillary to thP litigation of substantive claims." 
Ante, at 6. It also agrees that a federal court "retains no 
jurisdiction over the controversy" when the pa.rties' "sub-
stantive claims bPeome moot in the Art. III sense." Ibid. 
Moreover, the Court acknowledges the familiar principle that 
a party \\"ho has uo personal stake in the outcome of an action 
presents no ease or controversy cognizable in a federal court of 
appeals. I d., at 7, 10. ThesP are inch•ecl the dispositive 
principlrs. My disagreement is with the way in which the 
Court applies them in this case. In my view, these principles 
unambiguously require a finding of mootness. 
A 
Since no class has been certified and no one has sought to 
intervene, respondents are the only plaintiffs arguably present 
in court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in the 
injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only dam-
ages; those damages have been tendered in fulP Respond-
2 Although re,-pondent.-; al:;o a~ked for attorney's fees, their complaint 
ihows LhaL fee:; were to be granted only from the damag~ ultimately 
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ents make no claim that success on the certification motion \ 
would entitle them to additional relief of any kind from the 
petitioncr.a Their personal claims to relief have been aban-
doned so completely that no appeal was taken in their own 
names. Tho notice of appeal filed with the District Court 
recites that respondents appeal only "on behalf of all others 
similarly situated .... " App. 63. 
This in itself is compelling evidence that respondents have 
no interest in the "individual and private case or coutroversy" 
relied on by the Court today. Ante, at 5. But even without 
such evideiH'<'. this and other courts routinely have held that 
a tender of full relief remedies a plaintiff's iujuries a11d elimi-
nates his stak<> in tlw outcome. California v. San Pablo & 
'Tulare R. ('o., 149 U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill & 
Thomas Co. v. [;'nited States, 392 F. 2d 204 (C'A6 1968) (per 
curiam ); La111b , .• Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968) 
(per curiam); A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F. 
2d 89 (C'At) 1965) (per curiam). It is the tender itself that 
mootR the ease whether or not a judgment is entered. Ibid. 
Thus, the law is clear that a federal court is powerless tore-
view the abstract questions remaining in a case when the 
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that fully 
satisfies his claims. 
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result 
should differ because the District Court has entered a judg-
ment in favol' of respondents instead of dismissing their law-
suit as moot.1 It is certainly true, as the Court. observes, 
~twarded 1o th(•m or tlw cla~:,1. App. 13-14. There is no pos.~ibility of 
pro~pedi\'c n•lid brenu:-<e t.he ~1i,.:;iRsippi wsury sta.tutc wa.~ am(•nded in 
1974 to authorizr, 111ter alia, Ow eharge;< at. il".~IIC in this ca;;c. 1974 l\Iiss. 
Gen. Law~, rh. 5H4, § 7; "rc 1\[i,;,;. Code Ann. § 75-17-1 (6). 
3 N<'itiH'l' tlw Comt nor tlw re:::pondent;,; have H~>F<ertcd that the peti-
tioner'.~ t<·ndrr l":tils to include all co~ts and fees for which it could be held 
liable. SC'<' Part TI-B, infra. 
@The ··,tatutory right.'' to appml, ante, n.t . 7, it~elf cannot. supply a 
personal stnkc in the outcome, for Cm1gress cwmot abrogate Art. III 
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that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not i~ 
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any 
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally 
favorable judgment that affect him adversely. Ree 15 Wright, 
Miller and Cooper. Federal Practice and Procedure § 3902 
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practice 1T 203.06 (1975). But 
the requirenwnt of adverse effect is more than a rule "of 
federal appellate practice." Ante, at 7. As we have held 
repeatedly, and as the Court concedes, ante, at 10, Art. III 
itself requires a live controversy in which a personal stake is 
at issuf' "throughout the entirety of the litigation." Sosna 
v. Iowa , 4H) F . S. 393. 402 (1975). See, e. g., Preiser v. 
Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401-401 (1975). 
It is this eonstitutionallimitation, and not any rule of prac-
tice, that has i111pelled federal courts uniformly to require a 
showing of eontinuiug adverse effect in order to confer "stand-
ing to appeal. '' 15 Wright. Miller and Cooper, supra, § 3902. 
Barry v. D·istrict of Columbia Bd. of Elections, - U. S. 
App. D. C'. - . 580 F. 2d 695 (1978); see Altvater v. Free-
man, 319 U. S. 359 (1943); Electrical Fittings v. 'l'homas & 
Betts Co ., 307 r. S. 241 (1939); Kapp v. National Football 
League, 58() F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9 1978); Cover v. Schwartz, 
133 F . 2d 541 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U. S. 748 (1943)." 
limitntions on I hr juri:<di<'tion of the federal <'Ourts. Gladstone, Realtors 
v.,.l(illage of BelltCood. 441 l ' . ' · 91,100 (1979). 
f..!)Jnited Airlines, Inc . v. Mr:Donald, 4:32 U.S. 385 (1977), and Coope1·s I 
L(; Lyb1'and '"· Livesay 437 U. S. 463 (1978), nre not to thr cont.rary. 
Incidental didum in both cnse:; stated that. tlw denial of <'la.s certification 
is subject. to appellaiE· review aftrr final judgment. at. the behest of the 
named plaintiff~ . Neither <'H~<e di~<'llil>'Pd mootnes.-:, nnd ueithrr anal~·zed 
the propo:;ition in Hu~· way. lndred, thr only authority cited in Coopers 
L~ Lybrand wa~< United Ai1'li111-'S. fief' 437 U. S., at 469, and the only 
authorit~' cited in L'nited Airlines wa:; :t conces:;ion made by the defendm1t 
and a li~t of ra,.;c•" from the Courts of Appeal:;, not one of whi<'h dealt 
with a. ><ugge:stion of mootne~'i'i in an analogous situation, see 432 U. 8., at 
393, and n. 1-!. ' uch statrments, casually enuncinted without a word of 
explanation in opinions dealing with unrelated legal quei:itions, are not 
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As these cases show, the requirements of Art. III are n()t 
affected by the "factual context" in which a suggestion of 
mootness arises. See ante, at 6. Whatever the context, 
Art. III asks but a single question: Is there a continuing 
controversy between adverse parties who retain the requisite 
stake in the outcome of the action'? 
Electrical Fittings v. 1'homas & Betts Co., supra, is the case 
primarily relied upon by the Court. It provides little or uo 
support for today's ruling. In Electrical Fittings, a limited 
appeal was allowed because the petitioner himself was prej-
udiced by the inclusion of an unnecessary and adverse finding 
in a generally favorable decree. See ante, at 10. Here, the 
existence of the District Court's order denying certification 
has no effect whatever 011 the respondents. Thus, the per-
sonal stake that justified the Electrical Fittings appeal is not 
present in this case. Abse11t such a stake, it is simply irrele-
vant that "policy considerations" sometimes may favor an 
appeal from "a procedural ruling, co11ateral to the merits of 
a litigation." Nor is it significant that the ruling "stands as 
an adjudicatio11 of Oil<' of the issues litigated." !d., at 9-10. 
Collateral rulings--like other rulings-may be appealed only 
when the requirements of Art. III are satisfied. 
B 
After recognizing that the right to appeal is subject to the 
"jurisdictional limitations of Art. III," the Court agrees that 
only a "party [who] retains a stake in the appeal [can sat-
isfy] the requirements of Art. III." Ante, at 7; see id., at 
tJO 10. The Court also agrees that respondents have\remaining 
stake in "the merits of the substantive controvers5l." I d., at 
controlling or eV('n prrsua~ivc when they are shown Qn further reflection 
to have bPrn inc·on~i~tent with :set t!Pd law. As the Court agreei:i today, I 
neither c:tHo rrPatr,.; :tn c·xccptiun to the fundamrntal rulr t.hat "fcdrral 
appellate· jmi~diction i::; limited by tho appellant's per,;onal stake in the 
appeal." Ante, at 10. 
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~-10. Nevertheless. it holds that respondents retain a per~ 
sona] stake in this appeal because they "desire to shift to 
successful class litigaHts a portion of those fees and expenses 
that have been incurred in this litigation and for which they 
assert a continuing obligation." !d., at 7, n. 6; see id., at 10.0 
This conclusion is neither legally sound nor supported by the 
record. 
& -~fs The Court fails to identify a single item of expense, charge-Bv 'Rc~po ~ able to the petitioner. that was incurred\before the petitioner's 
/ tender. Similarly, the respondents h~e been conspicuously 
vague in identifying the "fees and expenses" relied upon as 
supplying the adverse interest essential to a live controversy. 7 
The ollly exp<'tlse mrntioned by respondents, apart from court 
costs includrd in the petitioner's tender, is not a present obli-
gation at all. Tt is an offer to provide security for costs in 
the event a class ultimatf'ly is certified. Brief for Respond-
ents 33; App. 78. Nor does the attorney's fee arrangement 
in this case create any obligation, present or future, that can 
WI'hf' C'omt nl~o mrnt ion,.; that. "r t] ht> US(' of the rla~s action procedure l 
for Jitiga.t i<~n . o.f indi';:dual rlnim,; may offt>r 1;ub~tant ial ndvantages for 
named phlll!Jff ><. . . . Ante, at 11, n. 9. But. any such advantages 
cannot a<·c·nw to thcsr rr~pondPnt~, who will not be litigating their own 
claims on r·emand. Indeed, thr Court refer;; to respondents in thi8 context \ 
only to point ont that t.hrir total damage:; were ~:;o ;;mall that thf'y "would 
be unlikPI~· to obtain l<'gal redre~~ n.t nn a.rceptable ro;,;t" if they could not 
do so b~· llll'Hil.-< of a cal"" ac·tion. We may as;;ume that re:;pond<'nt;,; had 
some interest. in thn cln~~-nction procedure as a mean~ of intt>rcsting their 
la.wyer~ in tho en~r or obt.n.ining a ,.:at.isfactory settlement. This may be 
an inteJ'rst. propPrl)· furthrred by RulP 23, but oncf' respoudrnts obt.ained 
both acrPss to court nnd full individunl relief that intere:;t disappeared. 
7 Perhaps thr strouge:::t of re::-:pondcnhi' sta.tt>rnents is: 
"Of course, the intf'rP,:t of th!:l [rrHrwndents] in a~srrtion of the right to 
proceed on bc•half of thf• cla:;s includes such matters ns the prO::']JPct. for 
spreading attonH'y's fpe;; and f'xpen,.:e.-; among more claimant,-< and thus 
reducing tho ]Jercrntago that. would otherwi;:;e be payablf' by them." 
Pla.intiff:o-Apprllants' Bri<•f in Oppo:sition to Motion to DiHmi~<:; Appeal and 
Reply Brief, filed in Roper v. C:ansurve (CA5, No. ·76-3600), Jan. 10, 
1977. 
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be affected by the certification of a class. Respondents' com-
plaint identifies the fee to be paid, subject to court approval, 
as "twenty-five percent (25o/n )" of the amount of the final 
judgment. App. 14, 16.8 No arrangement other than this 
customary)contingent fee is identified in the record or the 
briefs. Yet, no one has explained how respondents' obliga-
tion to pay 25Ya of their recovery to counsel could be reduced 
if a class is certified and its members become similarly obli-
gated to pay 25/{- of their recovery. Thus, the asserted in-
terest in "spreading [of] attorney's fees and expenses" 0 re-
lates to no prPSPnt obligation. It is at most an expectation-
of the respondents' and particularly of their counsel-that cer-
tain fees aud expenses may become payable in the event a 
class is certified. That expectation is wholly irrelevant to 
the existencp of a present controversy between petitioner and 
respondents. 
The Court's reliance on unidentified fees and expeuses can-
not be reconcilPd with the repeated admonition that "un-
adorned speculation will not suffice to invoke the federal 
judicial power.' ' E. g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights 
Org., 426 U. S. 26, 44 (1976). Such speculation is particu-
larly inappropriate in this case, since neither the Court nor 
8 R e,.;pondt•nt,.;' "Dt•mand for Judgment.'' aRk~ the court to :.twarJ the 
"rcJo~t. or 1hi~ <tr'l 1on a,.: wrll n~ attomr~' fe~ in the amount or 25% as 
hereinabov<> aJit•ged, or ~uch other amount a:; rna~· be deemed~· and 
proper by tlw C'onrt." App. Hi. The request for fee,; was rlarificd in 
Paragraph VI of thr amPudrd eomplaint, whirh readl:i as follow:-;: 
"Plaintiff allf'gt>;; thai. the Clerk of thi~ Court. be de~ignated custodian 
of the fundK and judgmeut. to be paid Pla,intifl' and other JWr,.,ons similarly 
situated, b~· Drfrnchmts and the Clerk depo ·it said fund~ in a l:lUitable 
depm•itory nne!, upon proper order of thi:; Court, disbur"'<' said funds 
after dPduriioa of nere.s..;ary f•xpenses and attorney fee~; to Plaintiff'~; 
at.tomey:; herein of twE'nty-fivt• JlPr crnt, (25% ) of the amount so paid, 
the ,;arne bf'ing rPa:<ona Lie b~· all stmtda.rds, including that alleged nnd 
utilized h~· DrfPndantH in :<uing certain members in of [sic] the rlass in 
State Court. · for unpaid aecounts." App. 13-14. 
9 See n. 7, suwa, 
I~ 
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respondents have suggested that the petitioner is or ever will 
be liable for the fees or expeuses relied upon. Indeed, the 
American Rule would bar an award of attorney's fees against 
this petitioner. Thus, respondents' "injury"-if any exists-
is not one that "fairly can be traced" to the petitioner. !d., 
at 41-42; sec Gladstone, Realtors v. Vitla(!e of Bellwood, 441 
U. S. 91 , 99 (1979.10 Whatever may be the basis for the 
respondents' asserted desire to share fees and expenses with 
unnamed members of a class, the petitioner is merely a by~ 
stander. "[F]edcral courts are without power to decide ques-
tions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case 
before them." Korth Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244. 246· 
(1971). This elementary principle should dispose of the case, 
c 
Since respondents have no continuing personal stake in the 
outcome of this action, Art. III and the precedents of this 
Court. require that the case be dismissed as moot. E. g., 
Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U. R. 171, 172-173 ( 1977) (per curiam); 
Weinstein v. Bradford, 4:23 U. S. 147 (1976) (per curiam); 
Preiser v. 1Vewkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-404 (1975); Indian-
apolis School Cmnm'rs v. Ja,cobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975); De-
Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, 316-320 (1974) (per 
curiam); j\:orth Carol·ina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971) 
(per curiam); SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights, 
404 u. s. 403, 407 (1972),11 
1° Fn.r-renching con:;rqufnces could flow from a rule that fees mcoverable 
from putative cla::;s mrmber:J~ be "traced" to the clas:s dE-fendant 
for puq1o::~rs of the case or cont.rover;;y requirement.. At thr lea;;t, this 
rule would ~Support n rlaim that a pcr~on who prcviou:sly had a.cecpted 
full scttlemrnt. of hi::; individual claim ~Jentitled to file suit on bPhalf of 
an ltnrrcompf'll~Nl rla~s. Apparently, the put~1tive plaintiff need only 
"a:sser[t]," ante. at 7, n. 6, that. frr~; incurred in anticipation of the litiga-
tion ultima! ely might br ;;han•d with a prevailing cln:o, ·. 
11 The:se ca~·c,.: nrc di~cu:;.-;ed more fully in United States Parole CcYYY~r­
mission v. Geraghty, post, iLt --- (PowELL, J., dis~enting), 
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Respondents do not suggest that their 'Claims are "capable 
of repetition. yet evading review." C'f. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 
U. S. 103, 110-111, n. 11 (1975).r:! Not a single one of the 
alleged 90,000 class members has sought to intervene in the 
nine years since this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines, 
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone 
challenged the allegedly usurious charges by informal com-
plaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certifica-
tion was deni€'d, the action lay dormant during the seven 
months in \Yhich respondents sought to take an interlocutory 
appeal, " ·ithout provoking a response from anyone who previ-
ously may hav<' thought that the class action would protect 
his rights. Apart from the persistence of the lawyers, this 
has been a noncase since the petitioner tendered full satisfac-
tion of the respondents' individual claims. To be sure, re-
spondents' counsel may have the same interest in an enlarged 
recovery that is inherent in any contingent fee arrangement. 
But I know of no decision by any court that holds that a 
lawyer's interest in a larger fee, to be paid by third persons 
not preseHt in court, creates the personal stake in the outcome 
required by Art. III. 
II 
Despite the absence of an Art. III controversy, the Court 
directs a remand in which this federal action will be litigated 
by lawyers whose only "clients" are unidentified class mem-
bers who have shown no desire to be represented by anyone.13 
®If a elas,;-artion defendant. were shown t~ have embarked on a cour~e 
of conduct designed to insulate the class certification issue from appellate 
review in order to avoid classwide liability, a court in proper circumstances 
might find the Gerstein test satisfied and the case not moot. See Susman v. 
Lincoln American Corp., 587 F. 2d 866 (CA7 1978); 13 Wright, Miller & 
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 171 (Supp. 1979); 
Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following 
D~issal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 599-600. 
~ do uot ~uggr,;t that. coun~el acted improperly in pur::;uing this case, 
Since they have prevailed both in thi:; Court and in the Court of Appeals, 
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The Court appears to endorse this form of litigation for rea,. 
sons of policy and practice. It is said to be an effective 
f'response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the 
regulatory action of government." Ante, at 12. I am not 
aware that such a consideration ever before has influenced this 
Court in determining whether the Constitution confers juris-
diction on the federal courts. In any event, the consequences 
of a finding of mootness are not likely to be as restrictive as 
the Court seems to fear. And the Court fails e¥el'r to recog-
nize that allowing this action to proceed without an interested 
plaintiff will itself generate practical difficulties of some 
magnitud . 
A 
A finding of mootness would have repercussions primarily 
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who 
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to 
a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent 
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification 
generally would be barred by Art: III. But the consequences 
of applying settled rules of mootness in that situation would 
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were 
granted, the absent members of the putative class would have 
obtained by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of 
the benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand, 
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of 
the certification ruling would enable putative class members to 
take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability 
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable 
judgment. Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in 
this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" that 
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate.14 
the responsibility for allowing client-less litigations fall on the federal 
80)I...rtS. 
(!;JISee Commmt, Immeclia.te Appea.lability of Orders Denying Class Cer-
tification, 40 Ohio St. L. J. 441, 470-471 (1979). In actions brought under 
18-904-DISSENT 
DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. EANK v. ROPER 11 
P&ha.ps more commonly, the mootness question will arise 
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before 
judgment, as petitioner did in this case. A defendant cer-
tainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in 
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny 
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the 
enforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney[s] 
general." Ante, at 11-12. The pra:ctical argument is not I 
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns 
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the ade-
quacy of compensation and enforcement available for particu-
lar substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best 
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be 
consistent with the substantive "law giving rise to the claim. 
Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of 
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of 
usuary claims.1 :; the Court's concern for compensation of puta-
tive class members in this case is at best misplaced and at 
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling 
Act.16 
Rule 23 (b) (3) , a class member must decide at the time of certification 
whether to "opt out" of the action under Rule 23 (c)(2). This provision 
was designed to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class 
members were pennitted to intervene after a decision on the merits 
in order to secure the benefits of that decision. Notes of the Advisory 
Committee on Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F. R. D. 69, 105-106 
(1966). 
Hi Liddell v. Litton Sustems, Inc., 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting bor-
rowers' class action); Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941). 
Petitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply with Mis-
sissippi'J interest limits would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U. S.C. 
§ 85. But I do not understand that. the National Bank Act displaces state 
policy disfavoring the aggregation of usury claims. A primary purpose of 
that Act is to protect national banks from discriminatory treatment or 
undue penalties that may be imposed by state law. See 12 U. S. § 86. 
10 The AeL provich-'~ th~~t rules of procedure promulgated by thii'( Court 
· "shall not ... enlarge or modify ru'y substantive right." 28 U. 8; ·C. 
.· 
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The Court's concern for putative class members would be 
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced 
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litiga-
tion of successive suits by members of the putative class. I 
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial admin-
istration would be real. But these problems can and should be 
addressed by measures short of undercutting the law of moot- J 
ness, as the Court seems to have done today. ·The first step 
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the 
denial of class certification in appropriate circumstances.11 
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292 
(b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain con-
trolling questions of law. In many cases, a class-action 
defendant undoubtedly would forgo the opportunity to settle 
with an individual plaintiff in order to obtain an · immediate 
and final determination of the class certification question on 
appeal. 
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a class action by 
forced settlement, the District Court is not powerless. In at 
least so1ue circumstances, it may require that putative class 
members receive some sort of notice and an opportunity to 
intervene within the appeal period. Rule 23 (d) (2). The 
availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent 
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District 
§ 2072. See American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538, 
M'i-558 (1974); Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1318, 1358-1359 (1976). See generally Landers, Of Legalized Black-
mail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-
P~edure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974). 
~In C"oopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463 (1978), thio; Court 
held that the denial of class certification is not a "final decision" appeal-
able as of right under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We relied in that case on- the 
dangers of "indiscriminate" interlocutory review. ld., at "474. Although 
Coopers & Lybrand now prevents review in cases in which it would, be 
- da<~irable, Congress may remedy the problem by appropriate legislationL 
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Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the 
case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended 
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent inter-
locutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are 
lacking, it is for Congress-not this Court-to oorrect the 
deficiency.18 
B 
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it, 
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems often 
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their 
own. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respond-
ents will serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for the · 
purpose of obtaining class certification. Since they can gain 
nothing more from the action, their participation in the case 
can be intciHl<>d only to bPnefit r@ili)9Pd9!l~' counsel and the I 
members of a putative class who have indicated no interest 
in the claims asserted in ~ case)serve on their own mo-
tion-if indPed they serve at alJ.19 Since no court has cer-
tified the class. there has been no consiclered determination 
that respondents will fairly and adequately represent its 
members. Nothing in Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure, 
and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it. 
<Wcon~rrR~ rurrrntlr ha~ bdorr it a bill that nttrmptF< to remedy the 
difficulties infecting this troubled area. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1979) . The bill, supported by the Department of Justice, proposes to 
bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, supra, and to eliminate 
some of the problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by 
creating a new federal right of action for damagee. The bill provides for 
the enforcement of this right in some instances through actions brought in 
the name of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory 
appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class cer-
ti~ation under the proposed procedures. 
(!;>As noted ahovr, p . -, s·upra, respondrnts took no nppral in their I 
own nnmP>'. On<' would think thnt this candid disclaimPr of rwr:oonal 
intt're::;t. would di><troy the foundation upon which the Court predic;1.to.r; 
Art. III juri~dirtion . Ante, at 7; sec p. -, supm. 
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Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent? 
See East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 
403-404 ( 1977). Are their currently nonexistent claims "typi-
cal of the claims ... of the class" within the meaning of Rule 
23 (a) (3)? 20 
The Court's holding well may prevent future "forced set- ' 
tlements" of class action litigation. Thus, the difficulties 
faced by the District Court on remand in this case may not 
arise again in precisely analogous circumstances. But touay's 
result also authorizes appeals by putative class representatives 
who have litigated and prevailed on the merits of their in- I 
dividual claims. If the order denying class certification is 
reversed in that situation, the named plaintiffs on remand 
will have no more continuiug relationship to the putative 
class than respondents have here. A remand for certification 
could also lead to "one-way intervention" in direct violation 
4 of Rule 23. See p. -, and n. 1~ supra. These tensions, 
arising from the express terms of the Rule, undermiue the 
Court's conclusion that the policies underlying Rule 23 dic-
tate the result reached today . 
.w~ 
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of 
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from 
settled priuciples of Art. III jurispruclence.21 It unneces-
20 The District Court propf'rly may conclude on remand that. rf'spondents, 
for these or other reasons, cannot adequately represent the class. L-
'21 MR. Jus·rrcB STBVImH statE's, in his concurring opinion, that all persons 
allf'ged to bf' mPmb!.'rs of a putat.ive class "automatically become parties 
to the case or contmversy for purposf's" of Art. III , and that they 
"remain parties until a final determination has been made that the action 
may not be maint<.tined as a class action." Ante, at -. This novel 
view, for which no authority is cited, cannot be reconciled with Indian-
apolis School C'omm'1's v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975), where an oral 
certification order was hf'ld insufficient to identify the interests of absent 
class members for Art. III purposes. The result hardly could be different 
when the class has not been identified at. all. See also Memphis Light, 
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sarily creates significant problems in the administration of 
Rule 23. Aud it may work a serious injustice in this case.22 1 
Ga~ & Wate1· Div . v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 8 (1978); Baxte1· v. Palmigiarw, 
423 U. S. 308, 310, n. 1 (1976); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 
(1975); Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430 
(1976) . 
The proposed rule of automatic party status-in this case for 90,000 
unidentified persons--has troublesome and far-reaching implications that 
could prejudice t.he bringing of class actions. Presumably a purpose of 
such a rule would be to assure that satisfaction of the claims of named 
parties would not. trrminate the litigation. Nor could the rights of 
unnamed parties be extinguished by the failure of the named partjes to 
appeal. Tim~, if the mle proposed by MJ{. Jm;TICE STBVENS is to accom-
plish it;; purpo,;P, I ~up pose that :t fiduciary duty must. be imposed upon 
named partie .... to continur thP litigation where-as here-thP unnamed 
part iPs remain unidt'nt ified and fail to intervene. As fiduciaries, would the 
named pnrtir.• not only be required to continue to litigate, but to a<>Sume 
personal n':'>ponsibility for costR and attorney's fees if the case ultimately is 
lost? Would re:sponsiblc litigants be willing to file class actions if they' 
thereby assumrd such long-tPrm fiducia.ry obligations? These and like 
questions arr ,;ubstantial. ThPy are not resolved by Rule 23. I believe 
they merit. car<'ful stud~· by Congreb"l before t.his Court-perhaps unwit-
tingly-cre1Ltc::; :t major category of clientless litigation unique in our 
syj.tem. 
(;9The Court 's rc~uneetiou of this dead controver::;y may rPsult "in l 
irrep<trable injury to innocent P<lrtics, as well as to the petitioner bank. 
WhE'n the Di,.;trict. CourL dPnied certification on SPptember 29, 1975, it 
assigned a.s one of its reason;; the possible "destruction of the [petitioner] 
bank" by dama~e,; then alleged to total 12,000,000 and now potentially 
augmented by thP accrual of intE'rC'8t. App. 47, see ante, at. 2, n. 2. The 
po:ssible dt>strurtion of the bank is irrelevant to the juri~dictional is.~ue, 
but, serious indcrcl to depo:siton;, stockholders, and the community served. 
It is Mid thnt this i:;; . JH~<·e:-;.-;ar~' to redre;;::; injurir;.: pos:-;ibl~· :<utf~red by\ 
members of tlw putative class. Yet, no such per,.;on ha.~ tomr forward 
in the nearly nine .war/'i that. haw pa;;::;ed since this act.ion was filed. 
Inde!'d, the challrngPd conduct. was authorized by statute almost six years I 
~o. As the District Court rna~· be called upon to determine whether the 
equitable doetrinr of "rehttion back" permits it to toll the Htatute of 
limitations on rrmancl , ante, at 3, n. 3, it. will hardly be inappropriate for 
that court to consider the equities on both sides. In the circumstances 
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I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and:. 
remand with instructions to dismiss ~he ap}Jeal as 1~1oot., 
presented, the District Court may well see no reason t<> exercise its equi-
table di~rretion in favor of putative cla.ss members who have slept on their 
rights the:;e many years. 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART 
joins, dissenting. 
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that 
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the 
National Bank Act and Mississippi law.1 They filed this 
·action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty 
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and 
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on· behalf 
of a class ruleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggre-
gating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District 
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification. 
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the 
full amount of their individual claims plus'legal interest and 
· court costs. Over respondents' objection, the 'District Court 
entered final judgment in their favor. Petitioner then depos-
. ited the full amount due with the clerk of the court. 
No one disputes that the petitioner has tendered every-
thing that respondents could have recovered from it in this 
· action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed 
the denial of class certification. 'This Court affirms the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals, after finding that respondents 
retain a personal stake in sharing the expense of litigation 
1 Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S.C. §§ 85, 
86, which adopts the interest limits set by state Jaw, and 28 U. S. rC. 
§Ias5. ~ 
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with members of the putative class. Ante, at 7, n. 6. This 1 
speculative interest simply will not sustain the jurisdiction 
of an Art. III court under established and controlling prece-
dents. Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
Although there are differences. this case is similar to United 
States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at --. in one 
important respect: both require us to decide whether puta-
tive class representatives may appeal the denial of class cer-
tification when they can derive no benefit whatever from 
the relief sought in the aetion. Here, as in Geraghty, the 
Distriet Court, refused to certify a class. In this case. how-
ever, the ("ourt recognizes established Art. III uoctrine. It 
states that the " right to employ Rule 23" is a "procedural 
right only, ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." 
Ante, at 6. J t also agrees that a federal court "retains no 
jurisdiction over the controversy" when the parties' "sub-
stantive elaims b<>come moot in the Art. III sense." Ibid. 
Moreover, the Court acknowledges the familiar principle that 
a party who has 110 personal stake in the outcome of an action 
presents no case or controversy cognizable in a federal court of 
appeals. /d. , at 7, 10. These are indeed the dispositive 
principles. My disagreement is with the way in which the 
Court applies them in this case. In my view, these principles 
unambiguously require a finding of mootness. 
A 
Since no class has been certified and no one has sought to 
intervene. respondents are the only plaintiffs arguably present 
in court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in the 
injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only dam-
ages; those damages have been tendered in fulJ.2 Respond-
2 Although re;;pondent.o;; al:>o a,;ked for nHorney's fees, theit· coll)plaint 
~hows that fee:; were io be granted only from the damage:; ultinmtely 
78-904-DISSENT 
DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK v. ROPER 3 
ents make 110 claim that success on the certification motion \ 
would entitle them to additional relief of any kind from the 
petitiouer.a Their persollal claims to relief have been aban-
doned so completely that no appeal was taken in their own 
names. Tho 'notice of appeal filed with the District Court 
recites that respondents appeal only "on behalf of all others 
similarly situated .... " App. 63. 
This in itself is compelling evidence that respondents have 
no interest in the "individual and private case or coutroversy" 
relied 011 by the Court today. Ante, at 5. But even without 
such evid<'IH'<'. this and other courts routinely have held that 
a tender of full relief remedies a pla.in tiff's injuries and elimi-
nates his stak<' in tlw outcome. California v. San Pablo & 
Tulare R . C'o., 14D U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill & 
'l'homas Co. v. United States, 392 F . 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per 
curiam) ; Lamb \' , Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968) 
(per curiam) ; A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Carnpbell, 353 F. 
2d 89 (CAS 1965) (per curiam). It is the tender itself that 
mootR the case "vhether or not a judgment is entered. Ibid. 
Thus, the law is clear that a federal court is powerless to re-
view the abstract questions remaining in a case when the 
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that fully 
satisfies his ·claims. 
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result 
should differ because the District Court has entered a judg-
ment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their law-
suit as moot.1 It is certainly true, as the Court. observes, 
awardPd lo 1ht'm or the clal'f!l. App. 13-14. ThPre is no poR.~ibility of 
prol'pcrtivo reliPf bPeau"e thr Mi~:;iH:sippi u,.;ury sta.tutc wal" amPnded in 
1974 to authorizr, inter alia, the rhargel' n.t. i"'~uc in this ca:;e. Hl74 l\Iiss. 
Gen. Law~, rh .. 5M, § 7; ::;ec l\li,.;~. Code Ann. § 75-17-1 (6). 
3 Nrithpr· the Comt nor the n':::pondrnt:,; have a:;serted that the prti-
tioncr '~ ((•ndrr· fails to include all co:st::> and fee:; for which it could be held 
liable. Set' Part 11- B, infra. 
(Yrhe '',.;1atutor.v right.'' 1o nppral, ante. n.l. 7, ibrlf cannot. supply a 
l)ersonal ::>take in the outcome, Jor Congre;;s canuot abrogate Art. III 
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that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in.C:::. 
itself m.oot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any 
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally 
favorable judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wright, 
Miller and Cooper. Federal Practice and Procedure § 3902 
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practice ~ 203.06 (1975). But 
the requir·cnwnt of adverso efl'ect is more than a rule "of 
federal appellate practice." Ante, at 7. As we have held 
repeatedly, and as the Court concedes, ante, at 10, Art. III 
itself requires a live controversy in which a personal stake is 
at iss uP "throughout the entirety of the litigation." Sos-na 
v. Iowa , 419 r. S. 393. 402 (1975). Sec, e. g., Preiser v. 
Newk·irk, 422 r. S. 395, 401- 401 (1975). 
It is this constitutional limitation , and not any rule of prac-
tice, that has in1pelled federal courts uniformly to require a 
showing of continuing adversr effect in order to confer "stand-
ing to appeal." 15 Wright, Millrr and Cooper, supra, ~ 3902. 
Barry v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections, - U. S. 
App. D. C. -. 580 F. 2d 6!)5 (1978); see Altvater v. Free-
man, 319 U. S. 359 (1943); Electrical Fittings v. Thomas & 
Betts Co., 307 G. S. 241 (1939); Kapp v. National Football 
League, 586 F. 2d 644. 650 (CA9 1978); Cover v. Schwartz, 
133 F. 2d 541 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U. S. 748 (1943).fi 
limitation,; on the j11risdietion of tlw federal courts. Gladstone, Realtors 
v. Village of Be/IIL'ood. 4-1:1 ll. S. 91. 100 (1979). 
0;nited Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977), and Coopenr \ 
((; Lybrand r . Livesay 437 U. S. 4()3 (1978), are not to the cout.rary. 
Incideutal cli!'tum in both cnsr:,; ~:;tu ted that. th<> denial of class certification 
is subject to nppdlate review after final judgment at. the behest of the 
named ]Jiaint iff,.;. Neither ra;;e di:-;ruH:-;rd mootnes;-<, and neither nnal~·zed 
the pro posit ion in an~· way. Indeed, th<> only authority cited in Coopers 
& Lybrand wa;.: United Airliues. Ree 4:37 U. S., flt 460, and the only 
authority cited in Cnited Airlines wa:; a conc<>:;:;ion made by the defendaJ1t 
and a list of ca"('~ from the Court::~ of Appeals, not one of which dealt 
with a. suggestion of mootne:<rs in an aualogou:; :;ituation, see 4:32 U. S., at 
393, and n. 1-!. Su<"h statements, casually enunciated without a. word of 
explunut-ion in opinion~ dealing with unrelated legal que~:>tions, are 1/ 
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As these cases show, the requirements of Art. III are n()t 
affected by the "factual context" in which a suggestion of 
mootness arises. See ante, at 6. Whatever the co11text, 
Art. III asks but a single question: Is there a continuing 
controversy between adverse parties who retain the requisite 
stake in the outcome of the action'? 
Electrical Fittings v. 'l'homas & Betts Co., supra, is the case 
primarily relied upon by the Court. It provides little or uo 
support for today's ruling. In Electrical Fittings, a limited 
appeal was allowed because the petitioner himself was prej-
udiced by the inclusion of an unnecessary and adverse finding 
in a generally favorable decree. See ante, at 10. Here, the 
existence of the District Court's order deuying certification 
has no pffect whatever Oll the respondents. Thus, the per-
sonal stake that justified the Electrical Fittings appeal is not 
present in this case. Absent such a stake, it is simply irrele-
vant that "policy considerations" sometimes may favor an 
appeal from "a procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of 
a litigation." Xor is it significant that the ruling "stands as 
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." !d., at 9-10. 
Collateral rulings-like other rulings-may be appealed only 
when the requirements of Art. Ill are satisfied. 
B 
After recognizing that the right to appeal is subject to the 
"jurisdictioual limitations of Art. III." the Court agrees that 
only a "party [who] retains a stake in the appeal [can sat-
isfy] the requirements of Art. III." Ante, at 7; see id., at 
10. The Court also agrees that respondents have~emaining I ~ 
stake in "the merits of th<' substantive controversy." I d., at/ 
controlling or cwn Jl<'r,;ua<;ive whPn they are shown on furthPr reflection 
to have brrn in('on~i:<tcnt with ~cttled law. As the Court. a~rree~ toda 
neither cHI'O crratrs an rxcrption to the fundamental rule Umt ' edrraJ 
appcllat<' Jtll'i~<di c t ion i,.; limited by tho appel.lant',; per~onal stake in the 
appeal." Ante, at 10. 
[f] 
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~-10. Nevertheless. it holds that respondents retain a per~ 
sonal stake in this appeal because they "desire to shift to 
successful class litigants a portion of those fees and expenses 
that have been incurred in this litigation and for which they 
assert a continuing obligation." /d., at 7, n. 6; see id., at 10.6 
This couclusion is neither legally sound nor supported by the 
record. 
The Court fails to identify a single item of expense, charge-
abe to the petitioner. that was incurredkbefore the petitioner's 
tender. Similarly, 4tyrespondents have been conspicuously 
vague in identifying the "fees and expenses" relied upon as 
supplying the adverse interest essential to a live controversy. 7 
The ouly expPllSe mentioned by respondents, apart from court 
costs included in the petitioner's tender, is not a present obli-
gation at all. Tt is an offer to provide security for co_sts in 
the event a class ultimately is certified. Brief for ftespond-
ents 33; App. 78. Nor does the attorney's ~arrangement 
in this case create any obligation, present or future, that can 
€)rhf' Court also mrntion>< that " rtJlw us<> of the cla~f; action procedure I 
for Jitiga.tion of individual claims may offrr ~ubstantia.J advantages for 
named plaintiff>~. ." Ante. nt 11, n. 9. But. any such advantages 
cannot :L<'<'I'Il<' to thrRr rr~pondrnt~, who will not. be litigating tlwir own 
claims 011 t'l'lll<!tld. Indeed, t hr Court refers to respondents in thi~ context I 
only to point out that Owir total damagP;; were so ;,mall that thf'y "would 
be unlikPI~· to obtain l<•gal rf'dre~,; at nn a.ccrptable eost" if tht>y eould not 
do so b~· mPan>< of u. cal,;,; actiou . We may assumr that rP><pondrnts had 
some interest. in the ela.-s-:1ction proeedure as a means of interesting their 
lawyer~ in the ea~<' or obtaining a satisfactory Hettlement. This may be 
an inte1•est. tJropPrly furthered by HuiP 23, but oncP respondent:< oLtained 
both acrrsx to comt and full individual relief that interPst disappeared. 
7 Perh:tp,.: the st ronge::<t of re:;pondcnt.~' statements i~: 
"Of couw', the intPrr:-:t. of thfl [respondents] in a~~Prtion of thr right to 
proceed ou behalf of the cla::>'3 include:; ~uch matter.,; as the pro:>pPct for 
spreading attorney's f<'es and <'xpen~es among more claimant>< and thus 
reducing the ]Wrcentage that would oth<>rwise be payable by them." 
Plaintiff~-AppPilant"' Brid in Oppo,;ition to Motion to DiHmi><s Appeal and 
Reply Brief, filed in Roper v. Cansurve (CA5, No. ·76-3600), Jan. 10, 
1977. 
/ 
./ 
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be affected by the certification of a class. Respondents' com-
plaint identifies the fee to be paid, subject to court approval, 
as "twenty-five percent (25% )" of the amount of the final 
judgment. App. 14, 16.8 No arrangement other than this 
customary_.l contingent fee is identified in the record or the 
briefs. y' et, no one has explained how responclen ts' obliga-
tion to pay 25y-'o of their recovery to counsel could be !'educed 
if a class is certified and its members become similarly obli-
gated to pay 25% of their recovery. Thus. the asserted in-
terest in "spreading [of] attorney's fees and expenses" 0 re-
lates to no prPsPnt obligation. It is at most an expectation-
of the respondents' and particularly of their counsel-that cer-
tain fees and expenses may become payable in the event a 
class is certified. That expectation is wholly irrelevant to 
the existencp of a present controversy between petitioner and 
respondents. 
The Court's reliance on u11identified fees and expeuses can-
not be reconciled with the repeated admonition that "un-
adorned speculation will not suffice to invoke the federal 
judicial power." E. g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare.Rights 
Org., 426 U. R. 26. 44 (H)76). Such speculation is particu-
larly inappropriate in this case, since neither the Court nor 
8 Responr!Pnts' "DPmand for Judgnwnt.'' ai<kt tlw court to award the 
"r c]o:;t. of 1 hit< af't ion a;~ wrll as attorney fe~ m the amount of 25% as 
hereinabovfl all<'grd, or ,.;uch otlwr amount as ma~· be deemed fV£ and 
proprr by the Court." App. Hi. The reque:;t for fer:< \\·a:; clarified in 
Pa.ragraph VI of thr ameudt>d C'Omplaint, whieh read;; as follow~: 
"Plaintiff allrgP>< that the Clerk of thi;; Courl be deo~iguatcd custodian 
of the fund,.; and judgment to lw paid Pla.intiff and other Jlf'r~on::; similarly 
situnted, b~· Ddrndants and the Clerk depo;;it ~;aid fund,; in a suitable 
depo;.;itory and, upon proper order of thi::; Court, rusbur,'{' said funds 
after d('duction or m'C'el:'>it\1')' expenses and attorney fpe::; to Plaintiff';; 
at.tomey,.; hrreiu of twenty-fiw per cent (25%) of the amount f<O paid, 
the :;a me bt>iug I'Pal"onable by all Hl<tndards, including 1 hat alleged and 
utilized hy Df'f<'nrlants in ,.;uing certain memben; in of [sic] the clnss in 
State Courts for unpaid account:;." App. 13-14. 
0 See n. 7, supra, 
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respondents have suggested that the petitioner is or ever will 
be liable for the fees or expenses relied upon. Indeed, the 
American Rule would bar an award of attorney's fees against 
this petitioner. Thus, respondents' "injury"-if any exists-
is not one that "fairly can be traced" to the petitioner. !d., 
at 41-42; sec Gladstone, Realtors Y. ViUaye of Bellwood, 441 
U. S. 91, 99 (1979.10 Whatever may be the basis for the 
respoudents' asserted desire to share fees and expenses with 
unnamed members of a class, the petitioner is merely a by .. 
stander. "[F J ecleral courts are without power to decide ques-
tions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case 
before them." Xorth Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 
(1971). This elementary principle should dispose of the case, 
c 
Since respondents have no continuing personal stake in the 
outcome of this action, Art. III and the precedents of this 
Court require that the case be dismissed as moot. E. g., 
Ashcroftv. Mattis, 431 U. R. 171, 172- 173 (1977) (per curiam); 
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1976) (per curiam); 
Preiser Y. Xewkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-404 (1975); Indian-
apolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975); De-
Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, 316-320 (1974) (per 
curiam); North Carol-ina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971) 
(per curiam); SEC v. M edical Comm. for Human Rights, 
404 U.S. 403, 407 (1972).11 
1° F~tr-reaehing ron~equrnce. could flow from a rule that fees recoverable 
from putative cia:,;,; member1~ be '·traced" to the clas,; dPfendant 
for purpo~<'~ of the ca;;e or controver,:y requirement.. At th<> lea::.1, this 
rule would support n claim tha.t a pcr,;on who ~t!""l i8~~~~ ha¢ Jwct>ptcd 
full sett1rmrn1 of his individual claim ~ntitled to fil<> suit on bt>half of 
n \UHC'comprn,;pd cla::>s. Apparently, tho put~ttivc plaintiff need only 
"m,;ser[t]," ante, at 7, n. 6, that fr<>s incurrt>d in anticipation of thP litiga-
tion ultimately might br ~hared with a prcntiling clas:;. 
11 The,;r ea:-K':-: arc cli~cw;sro more fully in United States Parole C01rt--
mission v. Geraghty, JJOst, at --- (PowELL, J., dissenting). 
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Respondents do not suggest that their ·claims are "capable 
of repetition. yet evading review." C'f. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 
U. S. 103, 110-111, n. 11 (1975).r.! Not a single one of the 
alleged 90,000 class members has sought to intervene in the 
nine years since this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines, 
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone 
challenged the allegedly usurious charges by informal com-
plaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certifica-
tion 'vas denied, the action lay dormant duriug the seven 
months in which respondents sought to take an interlocutory 
appeal, " ·ithout provoking a response from anyone who previ-
ously may have thought that the class action would protect 
his rights. Apart from the persistence of the lawyers, this 
has been a noncase since the petitioner tendered full satisfac-
tion of the respondents' individual claims. To be sure, re-
spondents' counsel may have the same interest in an enlarged 
recovery that is inherent in any contingent fee arrangement. 
But I know of no decision by any court that holds that a 
lawyer's interest in a larger fee, to be paid by third persons 
not present in court, creates the personal stake in the outcome 
required by Art. III. 
II 
Despite the absence of an Art. III controversy, the Court 
directs a remand in which this federal action will be litigated 
by lawyers whose only "clients" are unidentified class mem-
bers who have shown no desire to be represented by anyone.13 
@r a cla,;,;-action defendant were shown to htwe embarked on a cour~e 
of conduct designed to insulate the class certification issue from appellate 
review in order to avoid classwide liability, a court in proper circmru;tances 
might find the Gerstein test satisfied and the case not, moot. See Susman v. 
Lincoln American Corp., 587 F. 2d 866 (CA7 1978); 13 Wright, Miller & 
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 171 (Supp. 1979); 
Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following 
Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 599-600. 
€>1 do not ~uggr~t that counsel acted improperly in pursuing this case, 
s;noo thoy hove pn>v,;lod both ;n tb;, Court •nd ;n tbe Cou..t of Appe/ 
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The Court appears to endorse this fom1 of litigation for rea· 
sons of policy and practice. It is said to be an effective 
Hresponse to the existence of injuries unremedied by the 
regulatory action of government." Ante, at 12. I am not 
aware that such a consideration ever before has influenced this 
Court in determining whether the Constitution confers juris-
diction on the federal courts. In any event, the consequences 
of a finding of mootness are not likely to be as restrictive as 
(1l the Court seems to fear. And the Court fails ~to recog-
nize that allowing this action to proceed without an interested 
plaintiff will itself generate practical difficulties of some 
magnitud . 
A 
A finding of mootness would have repercussions primarily 
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who 
fails to obtaiu class certification and then pursues his case to 
a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent 
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification 
generally would be barred by Art. III. But the consequences 
of applying settled rules of mootness in that situation would 
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were 
granted, the absent members of the putative class would have 
obtained by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of 
the benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand, 
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of 
the certification ruling would enable putative class members to 
take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability 
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable 
judgment. Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in 
this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" that ~ 
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate.~ 
the responsil>ility for allowing client-less litigations fall on the federal 
iOJl(tS. 
'WSee Comment, Immediate Appealability of Orders Denying Class Cer-
t;fioaHon, 40 Oh;o St. L. J. 441, 47()-471 (1979). In aot;on' brough/ 
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Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise 
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before 
judgment, as petitioner did in this case. A defendant cer-
tainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in 
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny 
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the 
enforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney[s] 
general." Ante, at 11-12. The pra:ctical argument is not J 
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns 
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the ade-
quacy of compensation and enforcement available for particu-
lar substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best 
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be 
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim. 
Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of 
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of 
usuary claims.1 " the Court's concern for compensation of puta-
tive class members in this case is at best misplaced and at/ 
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling 
Act.16 
Rule 23 (b )(3) , a class member must decide at the time of certification 
whether to "opt out" of the action under Ru1e 23 (c) (2). This provision 
was designed to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class 
members were pennitted to intervene after a decision on the merits 
in order to !'ecure tl1e benefits of that decision. Notes of the Advisory 
Committee on Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F. R. D. 69, 105-106 
(1966) 0 
Cf!)Liddell v. Litton Systems, Inc ., 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting bor-
rowers' class action); Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941). 
Petitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure 'to comply with Mis-
sissippi'3 interest limits would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U. S. C. 
§ 85. But I do not understand that. the National Bank Act displaces state 
policy disfavoring the aggregation of usury claims. A primary purpose of 
that Act is to protect national banks from discriminatory treatment or 
un~e penalties that may be imposed by state law. See 12 U. S. § 86. 
(!!:)Tho Ad proviJPs tlmt rules of procedme promulgated by thi,.; Court 
· "sl><ll not ••• onla<go oc modify """ substantive •igbt." 28 U. s, / 
.. 
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The Court's concern for putative class members would be 
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced 
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litiga-
tion of successive suits by members of the putative class. I 
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial admin-
istration would be real. But these problems can and should be 
addressed by measures short of undercutting the law of moot- I 
ness, as the Court seems to have done today. The first step 
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the 
denial of class certification · in appropriate circumstances.17 
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292 
(b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain con-
trolling questions of law. In many cases, a class-action 
defendant undoubtedly would forgo the opportunity to settle 
with an individual plaintiff in order to obtain an immediate 
and final determination of the class certification question on 
appeal. 
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a class action by 
forced settlement, the District Court is not powerless. In at 
least some circumstances, it may require that putative class 
members receive some sort of notice and an opportunity to 
intervene within the appeal period. Rule 23 (d)(2). The 
availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent 
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District~ 
§ 2072. See American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538, 
M7-558 (1974); Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1318, 1358-1359 (1976). See generally Landers, Of Legalized Black-
mail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-
P~edure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974). 
(!.9In Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463 (1978), thi:; Court 
held that the denial of class certification is not a "final decision" appeal-
able as of right under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We relied in that case on· the 
dangers of "indiscriminate" interlocutory review. ld., at ·-474. Although 
Coopers & Lybrand now prevents review in cases in which it w<mld. be 
' d<oirnblo, Cong''" may '""'ody tho pmblem by appmpriate Iegi.rati/ 
3 
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Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the 
case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended 
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent inter-
locutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are 
lacking, it is for Congress-not this Court-to correct the 
deficiency.18 
B l 
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it, 
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems often 
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their 
own. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respond-
ents will serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for the 
purpose of obtaining class certification. Since they can gain 
nothing more from the action, their participation in the case 
can be intemled only to benefit PestnmlentJs' counsel and thel 
members of a putative class who have indicated no interest 
i the claims asserted in ~case) serve on their own mo-
tion-if indPPcl they serve at alJ.l0 Since no court has cer-
tified the class. there has been no considered determination 
that respondt'nts will fairly and adequately represent its 
members. Nothing in Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure, ~ 
and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to iV 
€t:onp;rr:::,< rurrrntl? haR beforr it. a bill that nttemptF; to remedy the 
difficulties infecting this troubled area.. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1979) . The bill, supported by the Department of Justice, proposes to 
bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, supra, and to eliminate 
some of the problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by 
creating a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provides for 
the enforcement of this right in some instances through actions brought in 
the name of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory 
appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class cer-
ti~tion under the proposed procedures. \ 
CllJIA ~> noted abovr, p. , supra, rrspondrnts took no appeal in 1heir 
own nnmrs. Onr would~ink that this candid disclaimrr of J>Prsonal 
intNr,;t. would distroy the foundation upon which the CourL predica.tos 
A<t. III jmisdiMion. A•te, at 7; ""'p. -;\• •up>"a, / 
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Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent? 
See East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 
403-404 ( 1977). Are their currently nonexistent claims "typi-
cal of the claims ... of the class" within the meaning of Rule 
23 (a) (3)? 20 
The Court's holding well may prevent future "forced set- \ 
tlements" of class action litigation. Thus, the difficulties 
faced by the District Court on remand in this case may not 
arise again in precisely analogous circumstances. But today's 
result also authorizes appea.Js by putative class representatives 
who have litigated and prevailed on the merits of their in- f 
dividual claims. If the order denying class certification · is 
reversed in that situation, the named plaintiffs on remand 
will have no more continuiug relationship to the putative 
class thau respondents have here. A remand for certification 
could also lead to "one-way intervention" in direct violation 
of Rule 23. See p. -;t--, and n. 1f..,.. supra. These tensions, 
arising from the express terms of the Rule, undermiue the 
Court's conclusion that the policies underlying Rule 23 dic-
tate the result reached today. 
wrn:. 
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of 
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from 
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence.21 It unnece~/ 
20 The District Court. propPrly ma.y conclude on remand that respondents, 
for these or other reasons, cannot adequately represent the class. L_ . __ 1 
21 MR. Ju::;ncB STEvJmti stH.teii, in his concurring opinion, that all persons S ~t1 1.t\ d ~C-oV\S tderea 
I /~
.Ueged to bP membf'rs of a putative class "~tsmt1tisr:lly became parties 
o..t l~c::.t fkt \ 1 ·M ;~ to the case or controver~yA for; purposE>~" of Art. III , and that they 
"remain pa.rties until a. fina.l determination has been made tha.t. the action 
may not be mnint~tined as a class action." Ante, at -. This novel 
view, for which no authority is cited, cannot be reconciled with Indian-
apolis School C'omm'1's v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975), where a.n oral 
certifica.tion order was held insufficient to identify the interests of absent 
class membf'fs for Art. III purposes. The result hardly could be different 
when the class has not been identified at .. all. See also Memphis Light, / 
4\ 1~ J- ,·s avt~~t,.~ 
W\of'e_ ~ 
(}_ t; 'c. h (jY\, 
JJ.;'~~~ 
.1-t> s&tpo~ c;'f 
~~~ CJJAR ') 
/Jbtt 
1-
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sarily creates significant problems in the administration 
Rule 23. Aud it may work a serious injustice in this case.2~ 
Gas L~ Water Div . v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 8 (1978); Baxte1· v. Palmigiano, 
423 U. S. 308, 310, n. 1 (1976); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 
(1975); Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430 ~ 
1976) . 
~roposed rule of . a.~:~tem!tti( party status iR t:l1iii 8Mt:rif_o_r_9_0-,000---1 WQ..; 
u 11dentified persons--has troublesome and far-reaching implications that 
could prejudice the ·bringing of class actions. Presumably 1t purpose of 
such a rule would be to assure tha.t satisfaction of the claims of named 
parties would not. terminate the litigation. Nor could the rights of 
unnamed par! ie:;; be extinguished by the failure of the named partjes to 
appeal. Thu~, if the rule proposed by MH. Jus'l'ICE STEVENS is to accom-
plish its pmpo,;p, 1 suppose that a fiduciary duty must. be imposed upon 
named part iP,; to continue tlw litigation where--a;; here--the unnamed 
p~Lrties remain unid(•nt ified and fnil to intervene. As fiduciaries, would the 
named partir;; not onl~· be required to continue to litigate, but to a;;:;ume 
personal re:;ponsibility for costi-1 and attorney's fees if the case ultimately is 
lost? Would re.,;ponsible litigants be willing to file class actions if they 
thereby nssum<'d >;uch long-term fiduciary obligations? These and like 
questions nre fl.ub~tantial. Tlwy nre not. resolved by Rule 23. I believe 
they merit. rardul stud~· by Congrer,." before this Court-perhaps unwit-
tingly-create~ a major category of clientless litigation unique in our 
sy:>1:em. 
2 ~ The Court's rr~urreetion of this dead controversy may r~ult In 
irreparable injnr.r to innocent parties, as well as to the petitioner bank. 
When the Di::-:trict. Court drnird certification on September 29, 1975, it 
assigned a.s one of itil reasons the possible "destruction of the [petitioner] 
bank" by damng(•,.; then allegrd to total 12,000,000 and now potentially 
augmented by the accrual of intrrrst. App. 47, see ante, at. 2, n. 2. The 
possible destruction of the bank is irrelevant to the jurisdictional is:;ue, 
but. serious indt•rd to depositor:,; , stockholders, and the community served. 
It is Raid that this il'i ne(•rs.,;ary t() redres,.: injuriP:,: pos~ibl~· ,:ufferecl by ( 
member ' of tlw putative class. Yet, no such per~on ha.-; eomr forward 
in the nearly nin <> years that. have passed sinc-e this nction was filed. 
Indred, the challPng<'d conduct. was authorized by statute almost six years 
ago. A,; the District Court rna~· he called upon to determine whether the 
equitable cloctrinr of "relation back" permit>~ it to toll the statute of 
limitations on rrmand , ante, at 3, n. 3, it will hardly be inappropriate for 
that court to con~ider the equities on both sides. In the circumstances 
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I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and: 
remand with instructions to dismiss the a~peal as moot .. ~ 
presented, the District Court may wf:'ll see no reason to exercise its equi-
table di~:;cretion in favor of putative clttl;IS members who have slept on their 
rights these many years. 
I ~1 w- LS 'l'u : :~ 
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joins, dissenting. 
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that 
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the 
National Bank Act and Mississippi law.1 They filed this 
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty 
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and 
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf 
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggre-
gating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District 
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification. 
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the 
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and 
court costs. Over respondents' objection, the District Court 
entered final judgment in their favor. Petitioner then depos-
ited the full amount due with the clerk of the court. 
No one disputes that the petitioner has tendered every-
thing that respondents could have recovered from it in this 
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed 
the denial of class certification. This Court affirms the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals, after finding that respondents 
retain a personal stake in sharing the expense of litigation 
1 Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U.S. C. §§ 85, 
86, which adopts the interest limits set by state law, and 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1355. 
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with members of the putative class. Ante, at 7, n. 6. This 
speculative interest simply will not sustain the jurisdiction 
of an Art. III court under established and controlling prece-
dents. Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
Although there are differences, this case is similar to United 
States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at -, in one 
important respect: both require us to decide whether puta-
tive class representatives may appeal the denial of class cer-
tification when they can derive no benefit whatever from 
the relief sought in the action. Here, as in Geraghty, the 
District Court refused to certify a class. In this case, how-
ever, the Court recognizes established Art. III doctrine. It 
states that the "right to employ Rule 23" is a "procedural 
right only, ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." 
Ante, at 6. It also agrees that a federal court "retains no 
jurisdiction over the controversy" when the parties' "sub-
stantive claims become moot in the Art. III sense." Ibid. 
Moreover, the Court acknowledges the familiar principle that 
a party who has no personal stake in the outcome of an action 
presents no case or controversy cognizable in a federal court of 
appeals. !d., at 7, 10. These are indeed the dispositive 
principles. My disagreement is with the way in which the 
Court applies them in this case. In my view, these principles 
unambiguously require a finding of mootness. 
A 
Since no class has been certified and no one has sought to 
intervene, respondents are the only plaintiffs arguably present 
in court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in the 
injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only dam-
ages; those damages have been tendered in fulP Respond-
2 Although rc;;pondcnt.~ al:oo aRkcd for attorney's fees, their complaint 
shows lhat fee:; were to be granted only from the damages ultimately 
. I, : ;· 
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ents make no claim that success on the certification motion 
would entitl<' them to additional relief of any kind from the 
petitioner.:! Their personal claims to relief have been aban-
doned so completely that no appeal was taken in their own 
names. The 11otice of appeal filed with the District Court 
recites that respondents appeal only "on behalf of all others 
similarly situated .... " App. 63. 
This in itself is compelling evidence that respondents have 
no interest in thr "individual and private case or controversy" 
relied on by the Court today. Ante, at 5. But even without 
such eviclcnc<'. this and other courts routinely have held that 
a tender of full relief remedies a plaintiff's injuries and elimi-
nates his stake in the outcome. California v. San Pablo & 
'Pulare R. Co., 149 U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill & 
'Phomas Co. v. Um:ted States, 392 F. 2d 204 (C'A6 1968) (per 
curiam); Lamb v. Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968) 
(per curiam); A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F. 
2d 89 (CAS 1965) (per curictm). It is the tender itself that 
moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. Ibid. 
Thus, the law is clear that a federal court is powerless to re-
view the abstract questions remaining in a case when the 
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that fully 
satisfies his claims. 
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result 
should differ because the District Court has entered a judg-
ment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their law-
suit as moot.4 It is certainly true, as the Court observes, 
awarc!Pcl to tlwm or the rial's. App. 13-14. There is no possibility of 
pro~prrtivc relid lH·c·au,.:e the ~li,;,.:i;o;:::ippi u;o;ury Rta.tutE' was amE'nded in 
1!)74 to authorizr, inlC'I' alia. tllC' <'harg;r>< at i:<.~He in this ca::>e. 1974 Miss. 
GE'n. Law,;, rh. 5t)-l., § 7; ,.;pr ~Ii""· Cock Ann.§ 75-17-1 (G). 
8 Neither the Court nor tlw rc'spomlent,.; havr a:,;.~E'rtecl that the peti-
tioner',; trnder fail,; to ineludo all eo:,;b and fpe,; for which it could be held 
liable. See P:ut IT-B, infra. 
1 The "~tntutory right" to appc:.d, ante, at 7, ilRelf cannot. supply a. 
per:;onal stake in the outcome, Jor Congress cannot abrogate Art. III 
' > - . 
'I 
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that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in 
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any 
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally 
favorahle judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wright, 
Miller and Cooper. Federal Practice and Procedure ~ 3902 
(Hl7f:i); ~) Moore's Federal Practice ~ 203.06 (1975). But 
the requirement of adverse effect is more than a rule "of 
federal appellate practice." Ante, at 7. As we have held 
repeatc:dly. and as the Court concedes. a11te, at 10, Art. III 
itself requires a live controversy in which a personal stake is 
at issue "throughout the c:ntirety of the litigation." Sosna 
v. loll'a, 419 LT. f-1. 393, 402 (1975). Sec, e. g., Preiser v. 
Xewk·irk, 422 lT. A. :395, 401-401 (1975). 
[t. is this constitutional limitation, and not any rule of prac-
tiee, that has iu1pellcd fPderal courts uniformly to require a 
showing of continui11g adverse effect in order to confer "stand-
ing to appeal.'' 15 vVright, Miller and Cooper, supra, § 3902. 
Barry v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections, - U. S. 
App. D. C. -· . 580 F. 2cl 695 (1978); see Altvater v. Free-
mall, 319 C S. :359 (1943); Electrical Fittinys v. Thomas & 
Betts Co., 307 P. S. 241 (1939); Kapp Y. National Football 
Leayue, 58G F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9 HJ78); Cover v. Schwartz, 
1:3;~ F. 2d 541 ( 1042) , ccrt. cl<'niPd. 319 U. S. 748 (1943).5 
linll( <i( IOII;o; Oil thP juri:<lllrtion or tlw frd<•ral C'Oilrt~::~ . Gladstone, Realtors 
v. l'tllage of Belltcood. 4·l:l (T. S. 91, 100 (1970). 
['ntted Airlines, Inc. Y. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977), and Coopers 
ct: ],ybrand Y. fMesay ,1,;~7 tT. ~. 46;3 (107~), arc• not fo the contrary. 
lnri(knt;tl d1c·tum in both t':l~'<'" ;-;tatPd that the Jpnial of dass certification 
i:-; "uiJ.iP<'f to appPll;il<' revirw aftl'l' final jud~ment at. the belw~t of the 
nanwd pLnnt d'f~ . :\ <'11 hrr ca~c· di:-;<'11:-;;;rd moolltP,.;.~, and neither nnalyzrd 
tht• propo~ition m an~· 1\'a~ ·. [ndrrd, thr onl~· authonty cited in Coopers 
& Lybmntl wa:-: (' nited Airlines. ~re 4;~7 l' . S., at 4(i9, aml the only 
nuthorit.1· r1t<•d Ill Cnited Airlines wa:,; a romp;-;;;iou madr by thP def.rndant 
:llld a h;;t of <·n;;p~ from thr Court:-; of Appc•ab, not one or which dealt 
w1th a :-;n~gp;-;twn of mootnr:s,; in an analogou;; ,;ituation, ,;pc 4;32 U.S., at 
;~g:{, and n 14 Hul'h ;-;tatemrntH, ea:sunlly c·mmriatNl without a word of 
<·xplanatiOll m opminu,.; dealing with unrelated lrgul que:>tiom;, are not 
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As these cases show, the requirements of Art. III are not 
affected by the "factual context" in which a suggestion of 
mootness arises. See ante, at 6. Whatever the context, 
Art. III asks but a single question: Is there a continuing 
controversy between adverse parties who retain the requisite 
stake in the outcome of the action? 
Electrical Fittings v. Thomas & Betts Co., supra, is the case 
primarily relied upon by the Court. It provides little or no 
support for today's ruling. In Electrical Fittings, a limited 
appeal was a1lowed because the petitioner himself was prej-
udict>d by tlw inclusion of an unnecessary and adverse findiug 
i11 a generally favorable decree. See ante, at 10. Here, the 
existc~ncc of the District Court's order denying certification 
has 110 cffc•ct whatever on the respondents. Thus, the per-
folonal stake that justified the Electrical Fitt?:ngs appeal is not 
present in this case. Absent such a stake, it is simply irrele-
vant that "policy considerations" sometimes may favor an 
appeal from "a procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of 
a litigation." Nor is it significant that the ruling "stands as 
an adjudication of Otlc of the issues litigated." !d., at 9-10. 
Collateral rulings-like other rulings-may be appealed only 
when the requirements of Art. III are satisfied. 
B 
After recognizing that the right to appeal is subject to the 
"j urisdictional limitations of Art. III," the Court agrees that 
only a "party I who I retains a stake in the appeal l can sat-
isfy] the requirements of Art. III." Ante, at 7; see id., at 
10. The Court also agrees that respondents have no remaining 
stake in "the m0rits of the substantive controversy." !d., at 
eoutrollin!! or cn•n pcr,.;ual'IVC' whrn ihey arr Jwwn on further reflection 
to han' bc·rn ineon~i~tPJJt with ~<"ttlPd law. A~; the Court agrees today, 
Jl(•Jthri r-a~c· c·n•:tic>~ an PWPption to the fundamental ruiC' thai '• [fJrderal 
ap])('IIHH' juri~diet 10n i:-; limited l.Jy tho appcllaut'~ per:-;onal stake in the 
appPal." Ante, aL 10. 
• 
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9-10. NevPrthelcss, it holds that respondents retain a per-
sonal stake in this appeal because they "desire to shift to 
successful class litigants a portion of those fees and expenses 
that havC' beC'n incurred in this litigation and for which they 
assert a continuing obligatiou." ld., at 7, n. 6; see id., at 10.0 
This conclu::~iOll is neither legally sound nor supported by the 
record. 
Tlw Court fails to identify a single item of expense, charge-
able to the petitioner, that was incurred by respondents before 
tlw petitioner's tender. Similarly, respondents have been 
con f' picuou!Sly vaguP in iclen tifying the "fees allCl expenses" 
r<'li<·d upon as i'Ul>plying the adverse interest essential to a live 
cutttrovPrsy.7 The only expense mentioned by respondents. 
ap:ut fron1 court costs included in the pditioner's tender, is 
noL a pn•st'tlt obligation at all. It is an offer to provide secu-
rity for costs ill the event a class ultimately is certified. Brief 
for Respondents :33; App. 78. ~or does the attorney's fee 
arratlgt•nJent in this case create any obligation, present or 
" Tlw Court nl,;o nwntion" tlwt " lt]h<• u,;p of tlw rhtss aetion prorrdurc 
for lttigation or imli1·idual elaim~ ma~· offrr "ubstantial advantagrs for 
!lanH•d plamtiiT~ ... . " Ante, at 11, n. 9. But any "uch advantages 
cannot a<'<'nte to th<'"<' n•:;polldt•llt:; , who will not be litigating thrir own 
elatm,; on rmwlHI. llld<·Pd, tlw Court refrr:s to rP:spondrnts in thi~ context 
onl~ to point out that their total dama!);E'::' wen· ,;o ,;mall that thr~· "would 
bt· uuhkd~· to obtain legal rPdrt·~:; at an arrpptable cost" if thp~· eonld not. 
do ~o IJ~· mt•aJJ :; of a <·a!"~ action. ·we may a:;,;tmH' that rP~pondent:< had 
~OllH ' illt<•rp:<t in t hp r•la""-aet ion pro<·Pdurc a~ a nwan:s of inter<•:;ting the1r 
l11w~·<·r~ in thP r·a,;<' or obtaini1tg: a :satisfactory ,;pttlcmcnt. Thi,; may be 
an tnterP:;t. prop<•rl.1· furthPrl'd b~- Hull' :.l:l, but. on<·P rPspondrnt~ obtained 
hot h a<· t· <·:;~ to <·omt i!!ld full individual rPiid that inten•,;t di:<appt•i!rcd. 
~ l't•rh:t p,. tlw ,;1 rongr~t of rp,;pondent ,-' Ht at <'InPut" i~: 
'·OJ t·om"<', th<· ntt<·n·"'· of tltt• I rP"pondPIIt :;J in i!:<:it-"rtion of thP right to 
pro<·P<·d on lwhitlf of t hr ela~:; inelndr::; :such mat tl'r:< a,; thr pro:<]Wct. for 
:;prpadinp: attonH·<~ fN·~ and <'XJWII~(':; among mort' daimant,; and thus 
rt•du('ill!!, tlw p<'rcentag<' that. would otiH'rwi,;p bt• payabk b~ · th<•m." 
l'l:tiutitl'"-Appell;lltt:;' Brid in Oppo,;ition to :\Iotio11 to Di:<mi":; Appeal and 
Hrply 13rid, fikd in Iloper v. C'Uitliurvc (CA5, Xo. 76-3li00), Jan. 10, 
HJ77. 
78-904-DISSENT 
DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK v. ROPER 7 
future•. that can b0 aff0cted by tho certification of a class. 
Respondents' complaint idc•ntifies the fee to be paid, subject 
to court approval. as "twenty-five percent (25'/r )" of the 
anwunt of t11<' final judgment. App. 14, 16.H No arrange-
meiit other than this customary type contingent fee is identi-
fiE'd in tlw record or the briefs. Yet, no on<' has explained how 
rcspondrn t;:;' obligation to pay 25'/r of their recovery to coun-
sC'l could be reduced if a class is certified and its members 
h<>COJIIC' si1nilarly obligated to pay 25'/r of their recovery. 
Thus. Uw assert('d interest i11 "spn'ading I of I attorney's fees 
a11d c>xpc•nsC's'' 1' rdates to no present obligation. It is at 
most an c•xtwctatioll-of thE' respondPnts' and particularly of 
tlwu· eoull~C'l-that certain fc•0s and ('Xpenses lllay become 
payahl<' i11 thC' C'vrnt. a class is certified. That expectation is 
" ·holly irrp]c'vallt to the existence of a present controversy 
hPhH'<' 11 peti tionrr and rrsponde11 ts. 
The Court's reliance on unidentified fees and expenses can-
not be rrCOIIC'i!Pd with tlw repeated admonition that "un-
adol'llrd spt'culation will not suffice to i11voke the federal 
JUdicial powN." E. g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare R ·ights 
Org. , 42() li. S. 26. 44 (1D76). Such sp0culation is particu-
larly inappropriate in this case, since neither the Court nor 
' H(·~poJHlt·nt~ "DPmand for JudgmPJit " asb t]l(' l'Ourt to award the 
"It lo~t . of !hi~ ;tC'tiOu a>' wPil ;t~ attor·np~· fr('s in thr amount of 25% as 
lwrPinahovP ;tih•gPd, or ~\ll'h ot IH•r amottnt a,; rna~· bP d<•rnlrd tit <IJHl 
propPr h~· t IH• C'ourt ." App. W. TIH' I'<'(! II<'"'· for fP<·~ wa,; rlaritird in 
Pantg;raph \'1 ol th(· auH·ndPd <·omplaint, which rrnd~ a;; follow:;: 
" Plaintiff allP!-(<'s that. thP Cl(']'k of thi;; C'ottrt br dP:;ignated cu::;todian 
of thl' fund,; and j11dgrnPJJt to hl' paid Plaintiti and otlwr JH:'r::;ons ::;irnilarly 
:-;ituatPd, h~· DdPrtd;tnt:; and thl' Clt•rk dcpo;;i1 ~aid fuJJd;; in a. :<uitable 
<kpo;;rtor~· and. 11pon prop<'r' onler of thi:; Court . cli,.;btrr·,;e ;;aiel funds 
:tft!'f d(•dll<'tron of rH'<·<•,;,;ar~· <'XP<'Il:i<'>' alld attonH'Y frr:; to Plaintiff's 
altorrw~·· lwn·nt of twPnt~· -tin· per <'Put. (25% ) of thr amount :,;o paid, 
tlw ~anw IH'irtl! J'(•a . :ouahlP b~ · all ~tamlarcls, mrl11ding that allegrd and 
utiltzPd h~ · DPI'Pndant,; 111 oumg ('Prtain rn<·mbpr:; in of l8ic] the da::;s in 
Stat(' Court :; for unpaid aceount,;." App. 1:~-1·1. 
'J B P( ' n. 7. sup m. 
J'· 
'-' •. ·, h 
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respondents have suggested that the petitioner is or ever will 
be liable for the fees or expenses relied upon. Indeed, the 
American Rule would bar an award of attorney's fees against 
this petitioner. Thus, respondents' "injury"-if any exists-
is not one that "fairly can be traced" to the petitioner. I d., 
at 41- 42; see Gladsto11e, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 
U. R. fll, D0 (1D79.'" Whatever ma.y be the basis for the 
rrspondents' asserted desire to share fees ancl expenses with 
unnamed rnemb0rs of a class. the petitioner is merely a by-
stander. "IF I ederal courts ar<> without power to decide ques-
tions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case 
hefore tlwm. ' ' lYorth Carolina Y. Rice, 404 U. S. 244. 246 
( Hl71). This elementary principle should dispose of the case. 
c 
, inee respondents have no continuing personal stake in the 
outcome of this action, Art. liT and the precedents of this 
Court requirP that the case be dismissed as moot. E. g., 
.lshcroft v. Afattis, 431 U.S. 171,172-173 (1077) (per curinm.); 
We·i11stei11 v. Bradford, 4~3 U. S. 147 (1976) (per curiam); 
Preiser Y. 1\'ewkirk, 422 F. S. 305. 401-404 (1975); Indian-
apolis Sehoul Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975); De-
Funis \'. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, 316- 320 (1974) (per 
c·uriam); iYorth Carol·i11a v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971) 
(per curiam); SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights, 
404 F. S. 403, 407 (1972).11 
1° Far-r('<tthin):( con~l'qm·ner,.: eould flow from a rnlr that fer,:; rrcoverable 
from )lllt<t t ivP rl<t,.:~ lll<'ntlwr~ ma~· hr '· t raerd '' to t IH• ('la,;s 1l<'f'Pn1la.nt 
for ]llll']>O:i<'" or the (';)/"((' or eont.rovrr,;~' l'l'C(Uin•mpnt, At thr lra . .,·t., this 
rul<' would Htpport a elaim t h;t! a [l<'r~on who ha:,; iii'CPpted f111l ~Pi tlPment 
of hi ~ indinduaJ t·Jaim j~ Pill it.Jrd to fi)<o ~uit Oil brhnJ!' 0!' :1\l llllrt't'011liJL'lL"Pd 
(']:'~" · Appan•ntl.\·, tlw putativr plaintiff llt'Pd on]~· "a~:;nj t]," ante, at. 7, 
n. ti, th:t! fpp:; iiH'ttrn·d. in anti<"ipation of tlw litil-(atinn ultimatPly 1rtight be 
::;h:tr<'d with :t ])('(' \·a iling <"i:t."ti. 
1t Th<'~t· <·a:;l·~ an· di~cw<,.:rcl more fully in United State~ Parole Cmn-
?nt~~W/1 v. Oemght!f, pu:;t, ai --- (.PowELL, J ., dis8cnting). 
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Respondents do not suggest that their daims are "capably 
of reprtition. yet evading rPview." Cf. Gerstein v. P'ugh, 420 
t. R. 103. 110-111, n. 11 (1975).12 ~ot a single one of the 
allPged 90.000 class members has sought to intervene in the 
ninP yPars since this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines, 
Inc. v . .McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyoqe 
chalkuged the allegedly usurious charges by informal com-
plaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certifica:-
tion was dC'11ied. the action lay dormant during the seven 
months in which respondC'ttts sought to take all interlocutory 
app<'a1. without provoking a response from attyone who previ-
ously may haw thought that thC' class action would protect 
his rights. .\part from the persistence of the lawy('[·s. this 
has bPen a noncase · since the petitioner tendered full satisfac-
tioll of thP n'spondPnts' individual claims. To be sure, re-
spondents' counsel may have the same intC'rest in an enlarged 
rreovNy that is inhNen t iu any con ti ngen t fee arrangement. 
Bnt { know of no decision by any court that holds that a 
lawyer's interest in a larger fee, to bC' paid by third persons 
not present itl court. creates the personal stake in the outcome 
required by Art. III. 
II 
DC'spite the absencp of an Art. III controversy. the Court 
directs a remand in \vhich this federal action will be litigated 
by lawyers whose only "clients" arp unidentified class mem-
bers who have shown no desire to be rcpresellted by anyone.13 
1 ~ lf :t ela~,.,-adion defPnclmt!. wc·rr ~how11 In IHtYr embarked on a ('OUr~c 
of conduct designed to insulate the class rrrLifiration is:;ue from appellate 
review in order to avoid classwide liability, a court in proper circumstances 
m1ght find the Gerstein te~t satisfied and the ca~e not moot. See Susman v. 
Linroln Ameriran Corp., 587 F. 2d 866 (CA7 1978) ; 13 Wright, Miller & 
Cooper, Frderal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 171 (Supp. 1979); 
C'ommrnt , Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following 
Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 599-600. 
1a I do not ~ng:gP~t that eom1~el aetpd improper!~· in pm~ning thiH ea e. 
,' inee t lwy have pn·vailed both in thi~ Court and 111 tlw Court of Appeals, 
·. 
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The Court appears to endorse this form of litigation for rea-
sons of policy and practice. It is said to be an 0ffective 
"response to the exist0nc0 of injuri0s unremedied hy the 
r0gulatory action of gov0rnm0nt." Ante, at 12. I am not 
a'>\'UI'<' that sueh a consideration ever h0for0 has inflm'necd this 
Court in detenni11ing \\'hether the Constitution confers juris-
dietion on the fc<kral courts. In any Pvent, tlw consequences 
of a finding of mootness are not likely to be as restrietive as 
th<' Court sePillS to f<>ar. And the Court fails to recognize 
that allowing this action to proCP('d without an int<'rcsted 
plaintiff \\'ill itself generate practiea.l difficulti0s of some 
magnitude. 
A 
A finding of mootness would have repercussions primarily 
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who 
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to 
a succ0ssful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent 
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification 
g<'n<•rally would be barred by Art. Ill. But the consequences 
of applying s<•t tled rules of mootnPss in that situation would 
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were 
grant('cl, the absent members of the putative class would have 
obtained by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of 
the benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand, 
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of 
the certification ruling would enable putative class members to 
take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability 
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable 
judgment. ,.rhus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in 
this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" that 
the HH5G allH'nclin<'nts to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate.11 
tlw n·:<pOll:<ihilit~ · for allowing i'licnt-b, litigation~ fall on the federal 
tomt ~. 
J 1 f'1'f\ Comnwnt, Jmnwdinte App,·nlahility of Order~ Dc·nying- Clas,.; Cer-
hfieation , 40 Ohio St. L. J. 441, 470-471 (1979). In actions brought under 
·. 
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Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise 
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before 
judgment, as petitioner did in this case. A defendant cer-
tainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in 
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny 
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the 
enforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney[s] 
general." i1 ·nte, at 11-12. The pra;ctical argument is not 
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns 
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the ade-
quacy of compensation and enforcement available for particu-
lar substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best 
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be 
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim. 
Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of 
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of 
usuary claims,1 " th0 Coures concern for compensation of puta-
tive class members in this case is at best misplaced and at 
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling 
Act.16 
Rule 2:3 (b) (3), a class member must decide at the time of certification 
whPther to "opt out" of the action under Rule 23 (c) (2). This provision 
was designed to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class 
members werr permitted to intervene after a decision on the merits 
in ordrr to srcure the benefits of that drcision. Notes of the Advisory 
Committee on Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F. R. D. 69, 105-106 
(1966). 
1 ' ' Liddell\'. Litlno Sust!'m,s. lnr .. ~00 So. 2d 455 (197-f) (n•jeeting bor-
rowers' class action); Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941). 
Petitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply with Mis-
si -sippi '3 interest limits would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U. S. C. 
s 5. But T do not uutlerlitand that the National Bank Art tliHplaces state 
policy disfavoring the aggregation of usury elaim>l. A primary purpose of 
that Act i~ to protect national banks from di::;criminatory treatment or 
undur prnaltir~ that may be imposed by Htate law. See 12 U. S. § 86. 
10 The Act JH'o\·id<'s that rul<':-< of procrdurf' promulgatPd !J~, this Court 
" hail not ... enlarge or modify any substantive right ."' 28 U. S. C. 
.. 
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The Court's concern for putative class members would be 
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced 
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litiga-
tion of successive suits by members of the putative class. I 
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial admin-
istration would be real. But these problems can and should be 
addressed by measures short of undercutting the law of moot-
ness, as the Court seems to have done today. The first step 
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the 
denial of class certification in appropriate circumstances.17 
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292 
(b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain con-
trolling questions of law. In many cases, a class-action 
defendant undoubtedly would forgo the opportunity to settle 
with an individual plaintiff in order to obtain an immediate 
and final determination of the class certification question on 
appeal. 
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a class action by 
forced settlement, the District Court is not powerless. In at 
least some circumstances, it may require that putative class 
members receive some sort of notice and an opportunity to 
intervene within the appeal period. Rule 23 (d) (2). The 
availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent 
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District 
§ 2072. See American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538, 
557-558 (1974); Dev<.>lopments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1318, 1358-1359 (1976) . See generally Landers, Of Legalized Black-
mail and Legaliz<.>d Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance--
Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974). 
'' 7 In ('oopers <~ Lybmnd v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463 (Hl78), 1hiR Court 
held that 1he denial of class certification is noL a "final decision" appeal-
able as of right under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We relied in that case on the 
dangers of "indiscrimmatc" interlocutory review. !d., at 474. Although 
Coopers (~ Lyb11a11d now prevents review in cases in which it would be 
·destrable, Congress may remedy the problem by appropriate legislation. 
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Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the 
case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended 
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent inter-
locutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are 
lacking, it is for Congress--not this Court-to correct the 
dcficiency.1e 
B 
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it, 
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems often 
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their 
own. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respond-
ents will serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for the 
purpose of obtaining class certification. Since they can gain 
nothing more from the action, their participation in the case 
can lw intended only to benefit counsel and the members of a 
putative class who have indicated no interest in the claims 
asserted in this case. Respondents serve ou their own mo-
tion-if indeed they serve at all. 10 Since no court has cer-
tified the class. there has been no considered determination 
that respondents will fairly and adequately rcpreseut its 
members. Nothing in Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure, 
and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it. 
10 C'ongrp,.:s c·mTPntly h;\s hrforc if. a bill !hat. attempt" to rrmedy the 
difficulties infecting this troubled area. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1979) . The bill, supported by the Department of Justice, proposes to 
bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, supra, and to eliminate 
some of the problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by 
creating a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provides for 
the enforcement of this right in some instances through actions brought in 
the name of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory 
appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class cer-
tification under the proposed procedures. 
1 1' A~ notc>cl nbo1·C', Jl. :3. supm. responclc>nt:- look no appeal in ilwir 
own nnml's. One would think that !his candid di~claimPr ol' JWrsonal 
iiJtc•rt•st. would di:<f.roy the foundation upon wh1ch the Court. prl'dicates 
Art. ]]J jurisd}('tion . Antt', al7 ; ,;pep. 6, ~11]1/'u . 
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Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent? 
See East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 
403-404 ( 1977). Are their currently nonexistent claims "typi-
cal of the claims ... of the class" within the meaning of Rule 
23 (a) (3)? 20 
The Court's holding well may prevent future "forced set-
tlPmPnts" of class action litigation. Thus. the difficulties 
faced by the District Court on remand in this case may not 
arise again in precisely analogous circumstances. But today's 
result also authorizes appeals by putative class representatives 
who have litigated and prevailed on the merits of their in-
dividual claims. If the order denying class certification is 
rE'versed in that situation, the named plain tiffs on remand 
\rill have no more continuing relationship to the putative 
class than respondents have here. A remand for certification 
could also lead to "onr-way intervention'' in direct violation 
of R ul<' 2:3. ~ce p. 10. and 11. 14, supra. These tensions, 
arisi11g from tlH' express terms of the Rule. undermine the 
Court's conclusion that the policies underlying Rule 23 dic-
tate the result rf'ached today, 
III 
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of 
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from 
settled principles of Art. lli jurisprudence.2' It unneces-
20 The Di:strict Court proper!~· may conclude on remand that re:spondents, 
for the:;e or othf'r rea:;on:s, canuot adrquately represent the class. 
21 Mu .. JUK'I'ICB STBVBNK .~talc>,;, iu hi,; COIH'urriug O]>inion, that a.ll pen;ons 
aliPg<>d to lw mc·mllc·r" of a putatiw eta~::; "should be eou t;iderrd partir~ I 
to thP ra~c· or c·ontrov<·r:,:y at l<>a~t for the limited purpo,:e" of Art. III , and 
that. thp~· "rpmain partie~ nntil :t final drtPrmination ha,; br<>n made that the 
a<·tion m:t~ · not IH· m<tint<tiiH'd :tH :tria~:; action." A11t1'. ;~t -. Thit-< novel 
view, for which no authority i::; cited, caunot br reconciled with Judwn-
apolis School r'omm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975), where an oral 
certification order wa;; held in~uflicient to identify the interests of absent 
class membpr:; for Art. III purpo;;e;;. The result hardly could be different 
whe11 the cia::;:; ha" not bren identified at all. See <dso Memphis Light, 
' I I 
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sarily creates significant problems in the administration of 
Rule 23. And it may work a serious injustice in this case.22 
Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 8 (1978); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 
423 U. S. 308, 310, n. 1 (1976); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 
(1975); Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430 
(1976). 
If it is anything more than a fiction designed solely to dispose of this 
case, MR. JusTICE STEVENS' pro11osed rule of party status-here for 90,000 
unidentified persons-has troublesome and far-reaching implications that 
could prejudice the bringing of class actions. Presumably a purpose of 
such a rule would be to assure that satisfaction of the claims of named 
parties would not terminate the litigation. Nor could the rights of 
unnamed parties be extinguished by the failure of the named parties to 
appeal. Thus, if the rule proposed by MR. JusTICE S·rEvENS is to accom-
plish its purpose, I suppose that a fiduciary duty must be imposed upon 
named parties to continue the litigation where-as here-the unnamed 
parties remain unidentified and fail to intervene. As fiduciaries, would the 
named parties not only be required to continue to litigate, but to assume 
personal responsibility for costs and attorney's fees if the case ultimately is 
lost? Would responsible litigants be willing to file class actions if they 
thereby assumed such long-term fiduciary obligations? These and like 
questions are substantial. They are not resolved by Rule 23. I believe 
they merit careful study by Congress before this Court-perhaps unwit-
tingly-creates a major category of clientless litigation unique in our 
system. 
22 The Court's resurrection of this dead controversy may result in 
irreparab!e injury to innocent parties, as well as to the petitioner bank. 
When the District Court denied certification on September 29, 1975, it 
assigned as one of its reasons the possible "destruction of the [petitioner] 
bank" by damages then alleged to total 12,000,000 and now potentially 
augmented by the accrual of interest. App. 47, see ante, at 2, n. 2. The 
possible destruction of the bank is irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue, 
but serious indeed to depositors, stockholders, and the community served. 
It is said that this is necessary to redress injuries possibly suffered by 
members of the putative class. Yet, no such person has come forward 
in the nearly nine years that have passed since this action was filed. 
Indeed, the challenged conduct was authorized by statute almost six years 
ago. As the District Court may be called upon to determine whether the 
equitable doctrine of "relation back" permits it to toll the statute of 
limitations on remand, ante, at 3, n. 3, it will hardly be inappropriate for 
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I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot. 
that court to consider the equities on both sides. In the circumstances 
presented, the District Court may well see no reason to exercise its equi-
table discretion in favor of putative class members who have slept on their 
rights these many years. 
-z,_3ol3 ~ 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART 
joins, dissenting. 
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that 
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the 
National Bank Act and Mississippi law.1 They filed this 
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty 
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and 
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf 
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggre-
gating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District 
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification. 
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the 
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and 
court costs. Over respondents' objection, the District Court 
entered final judgment in their favor. Petitioner then depos-
ited the full amount due with the clerk of the court. 
No one disputes that the petitioner has tendered every-
thing that respondents could have recovered from it in this 
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed 
the denial of class certification. This Court affirms the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals, after finding that respondents 
retain a personal stake in sharing the expense of litigation 
1 Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U.S. C. §§ 85, 
86, which adopts the interest limits set by state law, and 28 U. S. C. 
§1355. / 
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with members of the putative class. Ante, at 7, n. 6. This 
speculative interest simply will not sustain the jurisdiction 
of an Art. III court under established and controlling prece-
dents. Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
Although there are differences, this case is similar to United 
States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at -, in one 
important respect: both require us to decide whether puta-
tive class repres<'ntatives may appeal the denial of class cer-
tification when they can derive no benefit whatever from 
the relief sought in the action. Here, as in Geraghty, the 
District Court refused to certify a class. In this case, how-
ever. the Court recognizes established Art. III doctrine. It 
states that the "right to employ Rule 23" is a "procedural 
right only, ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." 
Ante, at 6. It also agrees that a federal court "retains no 
jurisdiction over the controversy" when the parties' "sub-
stantive claims become moot in the Art. III sense." Ibid. 
Moreover, the Court acknowledges the familiar principle that 
a party who has no personal stake in the outcome of an action 
presents no case or controversy cognizable in a federal court of 
appeals. ld., at 7, 10. These are indeed the dispositive 
principles. My disagreement is with the way in which the 
Court applies them in this case. In my view, these principles 
unambiguously require a finding of mootness. 
A 
Since no class has been certified and no one has sought to 
intervene, respondents are tho only plaintiffs arguably present 
in court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in the 
injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only dam-
ages; those damages have been tendered in fulP Respond-
2 Although respondent<:: al~o asked for attorney's fees, their complaint 
shows that fcc:, were to be granted only from the damages ultimately 
. ''· ... ,, 
' . . . 
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ents make no claim that success on the certification motion 
would entitk them to additional relief of any kind from the 
petitioner.~ Their personal claims to relief have been aban-
doned so completely that no appeal was taken in their own 
names. The notice of appeal filed with the District Court 
recites that r<:>spondents appeal only "on behalf of all others 
similarly situated .... " App. 63. 
This in itself is compelling evidence that respondents have 
no interest in thr "individual and private case or controversy'' 
relied on by the Court today. Ante, at 5. But even without 
such eviclrnCf'. this and other courts routinely have held that 
a trndrr of full n'Iirf remedies a plaintiff's injuries and elimi-
nates his stakP i11 the outcome. California v. San Pablo & 
Tulare R. Co., 149 U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill & 
Thomas Co. V. um:ted States, 392 F. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per 
curiam); Lamb \'. Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968) 
(per curiam); A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F. 
2d 89 (CA5 1965) (per curiam). It is the tender itself that 
moots the casr whctlwr or not a judgment is entered. Ibid. 
Thus, the law is clear that a federal court is powerless to re-
virw the abstract question remaining in a case when the· 
plaintiff has rpfused to accept a proffered settlement that fully 
satisfies his daims. 
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result 
should diffrr brcause the District Court has entered a judg-
I'nen t in favor of rcsponden ts instead of dismissing their law-
suit as moot.' It is certainly true, as the Court observes, 
awarclrd to thrm or thr rt1~s. App. 18-14. There is no possibility of 
pro~prctivr relief bt·<·ntt.~r tltr \li,;~i~:.;ippi Hi'lll'~' statutP was am('nded in 
1974 to aut!toriz<', intrr alia. thP chargp~ at i::;:;ue in this case. 1974 Miss. 
G('n. Law,;, elt. 51i-!, § 7: :.;p(• :.ri~~. CoclP Ann.§ 75-17-1 (6). 
8 Krithrr tlH· Court nor tlw rP~punci<>nt~ havr a:;...;erted that the peti-
tioner'~ tpnder fnil,; to indudo all <"O~t,; and fees for which it could be held 
liable. S('r Par1 ll-H, infra. 
1 The "~tatutury right " to appeal, ante. a.t 7, itRr!f cannot. supply a 
per~onal f'takc in the ott!(•omc, fur Congrc~;;.~ cannot al.JrogaLc Art. III 
i)~ . 
. ·. 
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that the en try of j udgmcn t in favor of a party does not in 
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any 
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally 
favorable judgment that affect him adversely. Ree 15 Wright, 
Miller and Cooper. Federal Practice and Procedure ~ 3902 
(H)76); ~) Moore's Federal Practice 1T 203.06 (1975). But 
the req uirrmen t of adverse eft'ect is more than a rule "of 
federal appellate practice." Ante, at 7. As we have held 
repeatedly, and as the Court concedes, a11te, at 10, Art. III 
itself r0quirPs a live controversy in which a personal stake is 
at issue "throughout the entirety of the litigation ." Sosna 
\'. lou•a , 41D P. ~- 393. 402 (1975). See, e. g., Preiser v. 
Xf'u•kirk, 4:2:2 lT. R. :395,401-401 (H)75). 
[l ts this constitutional limitation, and uot any rule of prac-
tiee, that has impelleJ fedPral courts uniformly to require a 
showing of cun tin uing adverse effect in order to confer "stand-
ing to appeal.'' 15 \Vright, Miller and Cooper, supra, § 3902. 
Barry v. /Jistrict of Columbia Bd. of Blections, - U. S. 
App. D. C'. - . 380 F. 2cl 695 (1978); see Altvater v. Free-
Ill a II. a 19 l'. N. :359 ( 194:3) ; E lettr·ical Fittiny s v. 1' hom as & 
BetLs Co., :307 1'. S. 241 (1939); Kapp v. Natio11al Football 
£eayue. 58() F. 2d 644, 6i)0 (CA9 1078); Cover v. Schwartz, 
1;~;~ .F. :2d 541 ( 194:2) , cert. denied, 319 U. S. 748 (1943).5 
linlll<iiJOll:< 011 th<' juri:,;Lhction of th<' frderal eourts . Gladstone, Realto1·s 
\'. 1' /l/age of BeliiCOOd. 4-U (T, S. m, 100 (1979). 
l"111ted Airli11es. lm:. ' . AhDo11ald, -±:32 0. S. :385 (1977), :wei Coopers 
ce· L!fbrand "· J,u•e~ay -1-:37 t:. R. -±();3 (Hl7?-l), are not to the co11trary. 
liH'IdPIII:d di('tlllll in both c·a~r~ :<t:tt('(] that the t!Pni:tl of !']ass certification 
is ~ul>.wet to app<'ll:ill' r(•view after final judgtrH'llt at the belw~t of the 
ll :tlll('d pl:un t liT~ . :\('it her <":1~<' di:<<'tJs~<·d moot II('~,.;, ami n<:'it her a.nnlyzrd 
I he propo:<it ion in an~· 1\'a~· . Indeed, tlw on!~· authonty cited in Coopers 
cC· L!f/muuf wa:-: ( 'niled Airlines. :-:rr 4:37 r. S., :t t 4!19, am! the only 
authorit~ <· J((•ci Ill C11ited Airlilll'li wa:; :1 ronr<'"'~ion madr by the drf.rndant 
Hnd :> h:-:t of ('a;-;c•;-; from tlw Court:-; of Appt•ab, not one of which dealt 
with a ~uggl':<tio n ol' mootne::;s in an analogou:-< situation, ser 4:32 U. S., at 
:l9:l, and 11 l.f . :'\ul'h :<tatements, easuall~· PllllllC'iatNl without it word of 
t•xplnna(JOII m O]Hniom; dealing with unrdatccl legal que~tion~, are not 
l,.tl 
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As these cases show, the requirements of Art. III are not 
affected by the "factual ·context" in which a suggestion of 
mootness arises. See ante, at 6. Whatever the context, 
Art. III asks but a single question: Is there a continuing 
controversy between adverse parties who retain the requisite 
stake in the outcome of the action? 
Electrical Fittings v. 'Phouws & Betts Co., supra, is the case 
primarily relied upon by the Court. It provides little or no 
support for today's ruling. In Electrical Fittings, a limited 
appeal vms allowed because the petitioner himself was prej-
udiced by the inclusion of an unnecessary and adverse finding 
in a generally favorable decree. See aute, at 10. Here, the 
existence of the District Court's order denying certification 
has 110 effrct \Yhatever on the respondents. Thus, the per-
sonal stake that justified the Electrical Fittings appeal is not 
present in this case. Absent such a stake, it is simply irrele-
vant that "policy considerations" sometimes may favor an 
appeal from "a procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of 
a litigation." Nor is it significant that the ruling "stands as 
an ad.iudication of onC' of the issues litigated." !d., at 9-10. 
( 'ollateml rulings-like other rulings-may be appealed only 
when the requirements of Art. III are satisfied. 
B 
After recognizing that thC' right to appeal is subject to the 
"j urisclictional limitations of Art. III." the Court agrees that 
only a "party I who] retains a stake in the appeal [can sat-
isfy] the requin•mcnts of Art. III." Ante, at 7; see id., at 
10. The Court also agrees that respondents have no remaining 
stake in "tlw lllC'rits of the substantive controversy." !d., at 
<·out rolling or l'Y<'H pl'r,;uat'ivc whrn 1 hey arr f:hown on further reflection 
fo ha\'e l><'PII imon"istPnt with ,;ettlrd la.w. A:-:, thr Court agrrps today, 
JH'ltlwr <·n~<· <·rc•afe,- nn l'X<'<'ption to thr fnndaml'nfnl rul<' that ''rfJederal 
npjl('llnfe juri::;dief IOn i:-; limited by Lhe appellant':; pcr::;oual sta,ke in the 
aprwal." Ante, aL 10. 
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9-10. Nevertheless. it holds that respondents retain a per-
sonal stake in this appeal because they "desire to shift to 
successful class litigants a portion of those fees and expenses 
that haw been incurred in this litigatiou and for which they 
assert a C'Otttinuing obligation." I d., at 7, n. 6; see id., at 10.0 
This conclusion is neither legally sou]l(l nor supported by the 
record. 
ThE' Court fails to identify a single item of expense, charge-
abl<' to the petitioner. that was incurred by respondents before 
the petitiotwr's tender. Similarly. respondents have been 
eottspiruously vague in identifying the "fees all(] expenses" 
r<'li<'d upo11 as supplyiug the adverse interest essential to a live 
eottLrov<•rsy.7 The only expense mentioned by respondents. 
apart from court costs included in the petitioner's tender. is 
noL a present obligatio11 at all. It is an offer to provide secu-
rity for costs in the evc11t a class ultintately is certified. Brief 
for Respondents :33; App. 78. ~or does the attorney's fee 
arrangentent in this case create any obligation, present or 
<> 'l'lw Court al~o nwntinn:-: that "rt]h<' ns(' of tlw claos aetwn procrdure 
for htig:tiion ul' in<ii1·idwd elaim" ma~· offl'r substantial a<ivanUtgr;;; for 
JlUilll'd plallllifk .. . " Allte, a( Jl, n. n. But any :;ueh advantages 
('annul a<·cnH' to tlw,.;l' n•spotHknt;:;, who wiJJ not lw litigating thPir own 
elunn~ on rmumd . lndPl•d, tlw Court rrfrn; to rp::;pondrnt.- in thi,; context 
onl~ to point out that thPir total damagt>:-1 \H'r<' ~o ;;mall that thry "would 
lw unltkd~· to ohtain legal n·dre"" at an acreptabll· ro::;t" if tlw~· c-ould not 
do ~o h~ · m<·:ut:-: of :1 eal~~ :tel ion. \V" m:t.1· a~:<unH' that rr::-:ponclent::; had 
~OIIl!' inl!-rp::;( in tlH· r·ln:':<-artion proePdurc· a~ a tnl'an:; of interP,.;Iing the1r 
Ll\lyt•r:-~ in tlw r·a,.:P or obtaining :1 sati~<faetory ;;~>tl lrmrnt. Thi,; may be 
an ini<'J'<'~<t. propPrl~· furl hnl'd IJy Hulr :2:~, but on<·<· rl'spondent~ obtained 
both a<"<'!''' I o <"ourt :md full indiviciual rl·lid t hHI inlt•re::;t di;:;:tppeared. 
7 Pt•rlw p~ t lw ,;t ronge:<t of re:-~pondl'nl :-:' :-;tat l·mc•nt~< j,: 
"Of <·om"', th<· int<•re~<t . of thr I l'l'spond<>nt:sJ i11 a',.;Ntion of th<' right to 
pror·Pl'd on behalf of thr ela,.;.~ include,; ;;urh mHitPr;; :t~< thr pro::;pect for 
'preading atlornl·~··,_ fN•,; and <·xprn~<·,.; among mort• daimant,; and thus 
rPdueing thr pPn·(•ntag<' that. would otlwrwi~l' lw payahiP b~· thrm." 
l'la i nt iff,;-Appellant"· Rril'f in Oppo~<itimt to :\lot ion to Di:-:mi~::< Appeal and 
HPply Briel" , filed in Roper v. Crm~urve (('A5, No . 76-3{\00), Jan. 10, 
HJ/7 . 
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future. that can be affected by the certification of a class. 
Respondents' complaint identifies the fee to be paid, subject 
to court approval. as "twenty-five percent (25/{ )" of the 
alllount of the final judgment. App. 14. 16.' No arrange-
ment othrr than this customary type contingent fee is identi-
fipd in the n'cord or the brids. Yet, no one has explained how 
respondents' obligation to pay 25~ of their recovery to coun-
sd could be reduced if a class is certified and its members 
becomf' similarly obligated to pay 25'/r of their recovery. 
Thus. tlw atise>rt<'d in trrest i11 "spreading [ ofl attorney's fees 
atHl expC'ns<'~; · :J r<'lat<'S to no pres<'nt obligation. lt is at 
1nost a11 <'X]Wctation-of thC' respo11dents' ancl particularly of 
tlwtr eounf:'Pl- that certain f<'es ami expenses 1nay become 
payahl<' in tilC' C'V<'nt. a class is certified. That expectation is 
ll'holly irr('l<'vant to the existence of a present controversy 
hPt\\'f'<'n pditiotter and rC'spondents. 
TIH' Court'ii reliat1ce on unidentified fees and expenses can-
not be rC'coneikd with the rep<'ated admonition that "un-
adomed SJH'culation will 110t suffice to invoke the federal 
judicial power.'' E. g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. lJ'elfare Rights 
Ory., 42() l ~ . ~. :2(), 44 (HJ76). Ruch speculation is particu-
larly i11appropriatc in this case, since neither the Court nor 
' Ht •,.,polHit·nt~ · "DPlllaJHl for .ludg:mr11t " a:-;b tlw ('OJJrt to nward the 
"I (·lo~t. of thi~ :IC'twn a~ wrll ns nttomp~· fpe,; in thr amount, of 25% ns 
h(•rpin:dloV(' :dh·g:Pd, or ~nl'h ot il!'r iilllOIIllt :1,.; Ill: I.'' I)(' drPmrd fit and 
propPr b.1· ill!' ('ourt." App. Hi. Tlw n·qtw,;t, for frc·,.; wa,.; rlarifird in 
Paragraph \'1 of til(' auwHdPd complaint, which rPad~ a:> follow~: 
'' Plaintiff :diPg:<·~ that. tlw CIPrk of thi~ Court lw cll'~ignatrd eu:-;todian 
of tlw fniHl,; and judgnwnt to he paid Plaintiff' and other pPr:-;on:; ;,;imilarly 
Hiluat<·d, b~ · Dd('lHiant" and tlw ClPrk depo"it ~aid fund" in a ,.;uitnblo 
depo~1t or,1· :11ul. upon prowr ordn of this Court. di,;bur:-;r ~aid funds 
:d't l'f <h·dul't 1011 of 11('('('"~'1 r~· <'XJH'll~<'~ and a ttornr~· frr" to Plaintiff's 
attonl!'~ ·. h<·n•Jn of (\\'('nt~ · -fi\'C' JH'r <·Put, (25%) of thP amount ::;o paid, 
thC' ~anw i>Ping n·H~onablc• b~· :dl ~tandnrds, ineluding: Owt allegrd and 
llliilzPd b~ · D<'i'PndHnt,.; in ~tnng ('('!'lain mPmbrr~ in of Lsic] thE' class in 
81:til• Court~ for llllp:ud :tC'C'Ounh." App. 13-H 
" B~'<' n. 7, upro. 
,. 
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rrspondents have suggested that the petitioner is or ever will 
he liable for the fees or <:'xpens<'s relied upon. Indeed, the 
American Rule "·ould bar an award of attomey's fees against 
this petitionrr. Thus. respondents' "injury"-if any exists-
is not one that "fairly can be traced" to the petitioner. I d., 
at 41- 42; scr GladstoNe, Realtors \'. l'iUage of Bellwood, 441 
U. S. !H, D9 (1979."' Whatever may be the basis for the 
rrspondc11ts' asserted desire to share fres and rxpenses with 
unnam.ecl mrmbers of a class. thr 1)('titioner is mrrely a by-
stalHler. "IF I ederal courts arr without power to decide ques-
tions that cannot affrct the rights of litigants in the case 
twforP tlwm.'' i\'ortll Ca,rolina "· Rice, 404 LT. S. 244. 246· 
( HJ71). This elementary principle should dispose of the case. 
c 
~ inec r0sponclents have no continuing personal stake in the 
outcome of this action, Art. 111 and the precedents of this 
Court rrquirr that tiH' case be dismissed as moot. E. g., 
A8hcroft v. J.lJattis, 431 U. R. 171,172- 173 (1977) (per curiam); 
lrm:11slei11 \'. Bradford, 42:3 U. S. 147 (Hl76) (per curiam); 
Preiser "· Xetokirk, 422 F. R. 395. 401-404 (1975); Indian-
apolis Sclwol Comm'rs "· Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975); De-
Funis \'. (}dfyrwrd, 416 U. R. 312. 316-320 (1974) (per 
curiam); .Yorth CaroliNa v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971) 
( ]Jfr curiam) ; SBC \' . 1\l edical Comut. for Human Rights, 
404 1 . S. 403, 407 (1972).11 
1" Far·r<':tl'hinl-( c·on~t·qnruc·f'~ <'onl<l flow from it rnlr thnt fers rcco\·rrable 
J'rolll putaliv<' !'l;t"'·" nwmlH•r,; tlla~· IJr '·trw·r•d'' to ill(' rla,.;s <lderHlant 
for JHll'JlO"'<'" of lhr <'<l"t' or rontro,·r·r~~· r<·qnirenwnt. At the lrab1·, this 
ntlr• would >'Upport a ('l<tim th<tl a pr•r,.,on who h<t"' a<'<'P]ll<•d full "'<>ttl<'ment 
of In,; iudn·tdual l'l<tilll j,., !'Ill itlrd to file "'uit 011 lwlwlf or <111 \lllfl'('Olllj)C'IL'<E'cl 
r·Lt,.. .~ .. \ppan·nrJ,·, iiH' putatin' plaintiff IH'l'd only ";t~,;Nit 1, '' ante, at 7, 
11. 1\, that I<•<•,; in<·tttT<'d in anli('ipation of thl' liiig<ttion ultimately might be 
sh; t r!'d with ;t pr<•,·;uling <'l<tl'...;. 
1 ' Tlw~<· <·a,:<·~ arl' di,:cu,.:,.:ecl more fully in Fniled States Parole Com-
?rl/.~81<111 v. 0<'mghty, pul!l, <LL --- (PoWELL, J ., dis"cnting). 
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Respondents do not suggest that their claims are "capable 
of repetition. yet evading rf'Vif'w." Cf. GeTstein v. Pugh, 420 
TJ. R. 103. 110-111, n. 11 (1975).12 Xot a single one of the 
allegre! !10.000 class members has sought to intervene in the 
uine years since this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines, 
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. R. 385 (1!J77). Nor has anyo1~e 
ehalkngrd the allegrclly usurious charges by informal com-
plaint or prot0st. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Eveu after certifica:-
tion was cknied. the action lay dormant during the seven 
months in which responde11ts sought to take an interlocutory 
appra1. without provoking a respouse from anyone who previ-
ously may hav<' thought that thf' class action would protect 
his rights. Apart frolll the p0rsistencc of the lawyers. this 
ha been a no11Cas0 · sinc0 the petitioner kndrr0d full satisfac-
tion of tlH' n'spondPnts' individual claims. To be sure, re-
.poncl0nts' couns0l may havC' the samr interest in an enlarged 
rc'C'OVC'ry that is inlH'rent .in any contingPnt fee arrangement. 
But [ kno\\' of no dPcision by any court that holds that a 
la wycr's in tc'rcst in a larg0r fpe. to be paid by third persons 
noL present in court. creates the personal stake in the outcome 
required by Art. lli. 
II 
Despitf' the absence of an Art. III controversy, the Court 
din'cts a remand in 'vhich this federal actiou will be litigated 
by lawyers whose only "clie11ts" arC' unidentified class mem-
bers who have shown no desire to be represented by a11yone.13 
1 ~ Il' a ('ln,.:,-aetion ddt>uclallt. were Rhown 1o ha\'P embarked on n rour:;e 
of conduct dcHigncd to insulate the class crrtifica tion isHue from appellate 
review in order to avoid classwide liability, a eourt in proper circumstances 
might. find the Ge7'stein test ,;a tisfied and the ca~e not moot. See Susman v. 
Lturoln Ame7'ican Co1'p., 587 F. 2d 866 (CA7 1978); 13 Wright, Miller & 
Cooper, Frdcrnl Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 171 (Supp. 1979); 
Comment , Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following 
Di~mi~sal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 57:3, 599-600. 
'" T do not ~ug;gc•,..t that eoun,..c·l artPd impropl'rl~- in pm~uing this case. 
i41nc·c· ttH'y haYe JH'f'\ 'ailed both in thi~ Court and 1n ti\C' Court of Appeals, 
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The Comt appears to endorse this form of litigation for rca-
sons of policy and prartice. It is said to be an effective 
"r<'sponse to the existence of injuries unremcdied hy t.he 
regulatory aetio11 of gov0rnnwnt." ,1 nl:e, at 12. I am not 
aware that sueh a ronsi<kration ever hcfore has inftut•uced this 
Court in tkter1ni ni ng whether the C onstitut·ion confers .i uris-
diction on thP fcd<•ral courts. ln any P\'t'nt. tlw consequences 
of a finding of mootncss an• not likt-ly to lw as rf'strictiw as 
thP ( 'ourt se<'lllS to fpar. And thf' ( 'ourt fails to recognize 
that allowi11g this action to proe0t>d without a11 int<>restcd 
plaintiff "'ill itself ge11Prate praetical diffieultiPs of some 
maonituclc. 
A 
.\ finding of mootness would have repercussions primarily 
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who 
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to 
a succPssful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent 
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification 
gcn<·rally \voul<l be barred by Art. lli. But the consequences 
of applying :-;('t tlC'<l rulC's of mootnt•ss in that situation v,:ould 
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were 
granted, the absent members of the putative class would have 
obtained hy force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of 
the benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand, 
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of 
the certification ruling would enable putative class members to 
take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability 
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable 
JUdgment. 1"hus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in 
this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" that 
tlw H)()() allH'JH!mrnts to Rule 2:3 wrrc illtt>Jidt>d to (•liminate.a 
tltP n·;-:pon.•ihilit~ · for allowin!!; elil'nt-1<•;-:, litigation~ fall on the federal 
tOll!'!.•. 
J 1 FI<'P C'omnH·nt, Jmmrdiate :\ppP;tlahility ol' Ordl·r~ D<'nylllg; C'hts" Cer-
tification , 40 Ohio St. L . J. 441, 470-471 (1979) , ln actions brought under 
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Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise 
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before 
judgment, as petitioner did in this case. A defendant cer-
tainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in 
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny 
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the 
enforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney[s] 
generaL" A'nte, at 11-12. The pra:ctical argument is not 
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns 
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the ade-
quacy of compensation and enforcement available for particu-
lar substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best 
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be 
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim. 
Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of 
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of 
usuary claims.1 " the Coures concern for compensation of puta-
tive class members in this case is at best misplaced and at 
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling 
Act.10 
Hulr 23 (b) (3), a class member must decide at the time of certification 
wlwther to "opt out" of the action under Rule 23 (c) (2). This provision 
waR designed to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class 
members wrrc permitted to intervene a.fter a decision on the merits 
in order to secure the benefits of that decision. Notes of the Advisory 
Committee on Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F. R. D. 69, 105-106 
(1966) . 
1 " Liddell v. Litton Systems. Inc .. :300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rrjrc!ing bor-
rowers' class aetion) ; Fry v. Layton. 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941). 
Petitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply with Mis-
~i~slppi '3 interest limits would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U. S. C. 
§ 85. But I do nut underHtand thnt the National Bank Act displaces state 
puhey disfavoring the aggregation of usury claim:;. A primary purpose of 
that Act is to protect national banks from di:seriminatory treatment or 
undur penaltir::; thnt may be imposed by ::;tate law. See 12 U. S. § 86. 
JH The Act pro,·iclrs that rulr,; of procrdnre promulgatrd by thif< Court 
"shaU not .. . enlarge or modify any substantive right."' 28 U. S. C. 
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The Court's concern for putative class members would be 
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced 
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litiga-
tion of successive suits by members of the putative class. I 
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial admin-
istration would be real. But these problems can and should be 
addressed by measures short of undercutting the law of moot-
ness, as the Court seems to have clone today. The first step 
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the 
denial of class certification in appropriate circumstances.17 
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292 
(b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain con-
trolling questions of law. In many cases, a class-action 
defendant undoubtedly would forgo the opportunity to settle 
with au individual plaintiff in order to obtain an immediate 
and final determination of the class certification question on 
appeal. 
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a class action by 
forced settlement, the District Court is not powerless. In at 
least some circumstances, it may require that putative class 
members receive some sort of notice and an opportunity to 
intervene within the appeal period. Rule 23 (d) (2). The 
availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent 
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District 
§ 2072. Sec American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538, 
557-558 (1974); Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1318, 1358-1359 (1976). See generally Landers, Of Legalized Black-
mail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-
Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974) . 
17 In ('oopns ,(: L!Jbrwul v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), this Court 
held that the denial of class certification is not a "final decision" appeal-
nNe as of right under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We relied in that case on the 
dangers of "indiseriminate" interlocutory review. /d., at 474. Although 
Coopers & Lyb1)and now prevents review in cases in which it would be 
desirable, Congress may remedy the problem by appropriate legislation. 
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Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the 
case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended 
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent inter-
locutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are 
lacking, it is for Congress-not this Court-to correct the 
deficiency.18 
B 
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it, 
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems often 
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their 
own. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respond-
ents will serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for the 
purpose of obtaining class certification. Since they can gain 
nothing more from the action, their participation in the case 
can be intended only to benefit counsel and the members of a 
putative class who have indicated no interest in the claims 
ass<'rted in this case. Respondents serve on their own mo-
tion-if indeed they serve at al1.10 Since no court has cer-
tified the class, there has been no considered determination 
that respondents will fairly and adequately represent its 
members. Nothing in Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure, 
and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it. 
Is CongrP~~ rurrPntly has before it a bill that attempts lo rrmedy the 
difficulties infecting this troubled area. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1979). The bill, supported by the Department of Justice, proposes to 
bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, see n. 17, supra, and to eliminate 
some of the problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by 
creating a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provides for 
the enforcement of this right in some instances through actions brought in 
the name of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory 
appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class cer-
tification under the proposed procedures. 
1.!J Ao; nolrd abon', p. 8. supra. rnspomknt,; took no appral in thrir 
own namr:<. One would think that this candid di:-;rlaimrr of prr:-;onal 
inlen·,;l. would di,;t.roy the foundation upon which the Court. predicates 
Art. III jmi:;di<"tion. A.nte, at 7; see p. 6, supra. 
k 
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Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent? 
See East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 
403-404 ( 1977). Are their currently nonexistent claims "typi-
cal of t.he claims ... of the class" within the meaning of Rule 
23 (a) (3)? 20 
The Court's holding well may prevent future "forced set-
tl<>ments" of class action litigation. Thus. the difficulties 
facf'<l by the District Court on remand in this case may not 
arisP again in precisely analogous circumstances. But today's 
result. also authorizes apprals by putative class representatives 
\Yho have litigated and prevailed on the merits of their in-
dividual claims. If tlw order denying class certification is 
n'versed i11 that situation, the named plaintiffs on remand 
·will ha vp no more continuing relationship to the putative 
class than rrspomkn ts have here. A remaud for certification 
eould also }pad to "one-way in tervcntion '' in direct violation 
of RulP 2:~. ~<'e p. 10. and 11. 14, supra. These tensions, 
arising from tlw express tf'rms of the Rule, undermine the 
Court's conclusion that the policies underlying Rule 23 dic-
tate the result rpached today. 
III 
' ~ I 
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem~f 
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from 
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence.21 It unuece 
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joins, dissenting, 
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that 
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the 
National Bank Act and Mississippi law/ They filed this 
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty 
equal to the same amount, for individm~l totals of $683.30 apd 
$322.70. App. 59. Respondent~ also sought relief on behalf 
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggre-
gating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District 
Court depied respondents' motion for class ce,rtification. 
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the 
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and 
court costs. · Over respondents' objection, the District Court 
entered :final judgment in their favor. Petitioner then depos-
ited the full amount due with the clerk of the court. 
No one disputes that the petitioner has tendered every-
thing that respondents could have recovered from it in this 
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed 
the denial of class certification. This Court affirms the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals, after finding that respondents ·· 
retain a personal stake in sharing the expense of litigation 
1 Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. §§,$5, 
86, which adopts th~ ?l~~r~t l!mh\l S\Jt by (lt~~:te ~ll:W1 and 28 U. S .. C.-
~ 1355. ' . 
.. 
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with members of the putative class. Ante, at 7, n. 6. This 
speculative interest simply will not sustain the jlJ.risdiction 
of an Art. III court under established and controlling prece. 
dents. Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
Although there are differences, this case is similar to United 
States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at -, in one 
important respect: both require us to decide whether puta. 
tive class representatives may appeal the denial of class cer· 
tHication when they can derive no benefit whatever from 
the relief sought in the action. Here, as in Geraghty, the 
District Court refused to certify a class. In this case, how. 
ever, the Court recognizes established Art. III doctrine. It 
states that the "right to employ Rule 23" is a "procedural 
right only, ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." 
Ante, at 6. It also agrees that a federal court "retains no 
jurisdiction over the controversy" when the parties' "sub-
stantive claims become moot in the Art. III sense." Ibid. 
Moreover, the Court acknowledges the familiar principle that 
a party who has no personal stake in the outcome of an action 
presents no case or controversy cognizable in a federal court of 
appeals. ld., at 7, 10. These are indeed the dispositive 
principles. My disagreement is with the way in which the 
Court applies them in this case. In my view, these principles 
unambiguously require a finding of mootness. 
A 
Since no class has been certified and no one has sought to 
intervene, respondents are the only plaintiffs arguably present 
in court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in the 
injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only dam· 
ages; those damages have been tendered in fulP Respond-
11 Although respondents also a.sked for attorney's fees, their complai,nt· 
il1ows tliat. fees· were· to h<e> granted only from the damage::; ultimately·-
, 
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ents make no claim that success on the certification motion 
would entitle them to additional relief of any kind from the 
petitioner.3 Their personal claims to relief have been aban-
doned so completely that no appeal was taken in their own 
names. The notice of appeal filed with the District Court 
recites that respondents appeal only "on behalf of all others 
similarly situated. . . ." App. 63. 
This in itself is compelling evidence that respondents have 
no interest in the "individual and private case or controversy" 
relied on by the Court today. Ante, at 5. But even without 
such evidence, this and other courts routinely have held that 
a tender of full relief remedies a plaintiff's injuries and elimi-
nates his stake in the outcome. California v. San Pablo & 
Tulare R . Co., 149 U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill & 
Thomas Co. v. United States, 392 F. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per 
curiam); Lamb v. Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968) 
(per curiam); A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F. 
2d 89 (CA5 1965) (per curiam). It is the tender itself that 
moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. Ibid, 
Thus, the law is clear that a federal court is powerless to re-
view the abstract questions remaining in a case when the 
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that fully 
satisfies his claims. 
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result 
should differ because the District Court has entered a judg .. 
ment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their law-
suit as moot.4 It is certainly true, as the Court observes, 
awarded to them or the class. App. 13-14. There is no possibility of 
prospective relief because tl1e Mississippi usury statute was amrnded in 
1974 to authorize, inter alia, the charges at issue in this ca.-;e. 1974 Mis$. 
Gen. Laws, ch. 564, § 7; see Miss. Code Ann.§ 75-17-1 (6). 
8 Neither the Court nor the respondents have asserted that the peti-
tioner's tender fails to include all costs and fees for which it could be held 
liable. See Part II-B, infra. 
4 The "statutory right" to appeal, ante, at 7, itself cannot supply a, 
personal stake in thfl outcome, for Congress cannot abrogate Art. III 
•' 
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that the entry of judgtnent in favor of a party does not in 
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any 
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of ~ generally 
favora:ble judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wright, 
Miller and Cooper, Federal Practi·ce and Procedure § 3902 
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Pra.ctice ~ 203.06 (1975). But 
the requirement of adverse effect is more than a rule "of 
federal appellate practice." Ante, at 7. As we have held 
repeatedly, an·d as the Court concedes, a:nte, at 10, Art. III 
itself requires a live controversy in which a personal stake is 
at issue "throughout the entirety of the · litigation." Sosna 
v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). See, e. g., Preiser v. 
Newkirk, 422 U."S.-395, 401-401 (1975). 
It is th~s constitutional limitation, and not any rule of prac-
tice, that has impelled federal courts uniformly to require a 
showing of continuing adverse effect in order to COf!fer "stand-
ing to appeal." 15 Wright, Miller and Cooper, supra,-§ 3902. 
llarry v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections, - U. S. 
4PP· D. C. -, 580 F. -2d 695 (1978); see Altvater v. Free" 
I 
man, 319 U. S. 359 (1943); Electrical Fittings v.· Thomas & 
Betts Co., 307 U. S. 241 (1939); Kapp v. National Football 
League, 586 F. 2d 644, 650 · (CA9 1978); Cover v. Schwartz, 
133 F. 2d 541 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U. S. ·748 (1943),a 
limitations on the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Gladstone, Realtortt 
v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979). 
~United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432' U.S. 385 (1977), and Caopenr 
& Lybrand v~ Livesay 437 U. S. 463 (1978), are not to the contrary. 
'Incidental dictum in both cases stated that the denial of class cert.ification 
is subject to appellate review after final judgment at the behest of the 
named· plaintiffs. Neither case di:scussed mootness, and neither analyzed 
the proposition in any way. Indeed, the only authority cited in Coopers 
& Lybrand was United Airlines, see 1137 U. 8., at 469, and the only 
authority cited hi United Ai1·lines was a concession made by the defendant 
and a list of case; from the Courts of Appeals, not one of which dealt 
with a suggestion of mootness in all analogous situat·ion, see <!32 U. S., at 
393, and n. 14. Such statements, ' casually enunciated withont a word of 
' e~p[anation in opinions dealing with unrehtted legal questions, are ·not 
.,. 
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,As these cases show, the requirements of Art. III are not 
affected by the "factual context" in which a suggestion of 
mootness arises. See ante, at 6. Whatever the context, 
Art. III as);cs but a singl~ qqestion: Is there a continuing 
controversy between adverse parties who retain the reqtJ.isite 
stake in the outcome of the action? 
Electrical Fitt-ings v. Thomas & Betts Co., supra, is the case 
primarily relied upon by the Court. It provides little or no 
support for today's ruling. In ElectricaJ Fittings, a limited 
appeal was allowed becau&e the petitioner himself was prej-
udiced by the inclusion of an unnecessary and adverse finding 
in a generally favorable decree, See ante, at 10. Here, the 
existence of the District Court's order denying certification 
l1as no effect whatever on the responqent~. Thl\s, the per-
sonal stake that justified th~ Electrical fittings appeal is not 
present in this case. Absent such a stake, it is simply irrele-
vant that "policy consideJTations" sometimes may favor an 
appeal from "a procedpral ruling, collateral to the meri_ts of 
a )itigation." Nor is it significant that the ruling "stands as 
an adjuclication of one of the issues litigated." ld., at 9-10. 
Collateral rulings-like other rulings-may be aPJ;ealed only 
when the requirements of Art. III are &:~-tisfied. 
B 
After recognizing that the right to l\.ppeal is subject to the 
"jurisdictional limitations of Art. III," th~ Court ~tgrees that 
only a "party 1[ who] retains a stake in the appeal [can sat-
isfy] the requirements of Art. III." Ante, at 7; see id., at 
10. The Court also agrees tpat respondents have no remaining 
stake in "the merits of the substantive controversy." Id., at 
controlling or even persua.-;ive w~en they are shown on further reflection 
·to have been inconsistent wit.h settled law. A~-; the Court agrees today, 
neither case creates an E-xception to the fundamental rule that '· [ f]E>deri:il 
appellate jurisdiction is limited uy the appellant'~-; personal st.ake in the 
a:ppeal." Ante, at 10, 
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"-10. Nevertheless, it holds that respondents retain a per. 
sonal stake in this appeal because they "desire to shift to 
successful class litigants a portion of those fees and expenses 
that have been incurred in this litigation ~nd for which they 
assert a continuing obligation." I d., at 7, n. 6; see id., at 10.6 
This conclusion is neither leg~lly sound nor supported by the 
record. 
The Court fails to identify a single item of expense, charge. 
able to the petitioner, that was incurred by respondents before· 
the petitioner's tender. Similarly, respondents have been 
conspicuously vague in identifying the "fees and expenses" 
relied upon as supp1ying the adverse interest essential to a live 
eontroversy.7 The only expense mentioned by respondents, 
apart from court costs included in the petitioner's tender, is 
not a present obligation at all. It is an offer to provide secu-
rity for costs in the event a class ultimf.l,tely is certified. Brief 
for Respondents 33; App. 78. Nor does the attorney's fee 
arrangement in this case create any obligfttion, present or 
• The Court also mentions that "[t]he use of the class aotion procedure 
for litigation of individual claims may offer sl)bstantial advantages for 
named plaintiffs .... " Ante, at 11, n. 9. But. any such advantages 
eannot accnte to these respondents, who will not be litigating their own 
elaims on remand. Indeed, the Court refers to respondents in this context 
only to point out that their total damages were so small that they "would 
be unlikely to obtain legal redress at an acceptable co:st" if they could not 
do so by means of a calss action. We may as:;-ume that respondents had 
some interest in the class-action procedure as a means of interesting the1r 
lawyers in the case or obtajning a satisfactory settlement. This may be 
an intere;,t properly furthered by Rule 23, but once respondents obtajned 
both access to court and full individual relief that intert>st disappeared. 
' Perhaps the strongest of respondents' statements is: 
"Of cour:se, the interebt of the [respondents] in assPrtion of the right to 
proceed on behalf of the class includes such matters as the prospect for 
Jpreading attorney's fees and expenses among more claimants and thus 
reducing the percentage that wq\lld otherwise be payable by them ... 
Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Appeal and 
Reply Brief, filed in Roper v. Can.surve (CA5, No. 76-3600) , Jan. 10, 
I9n: 
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future, that can be affected by the certification of a class. 
Respondents' complaint identifies the fee to be paid, subject 
to court approval, as "twenty-five percent (25% )" of the 
amount of the final judgment. App. 14, 16!1 No arrange-
mept other than this customary type contingent fee is identi-
fied in the record or the briefs. Yet, no one has explained how 
respondents' obligation to pay 25% of their recovery to coun-
sel could be reduced if a class is certified and its members 
become similarly obligated to pay 25% of their recovery. 
Thus, the asserted interest in "spreading [of] attorney's fees 
and expenses" 1J relates to no present obligation. It is at 
most an expectation-of the respondents' and particularly of 
their counsel-that certain fees and expenses may become 
payable in the event a class is .certified. That expectation is 
wholly irrelevant to the existence of a present controversy 
between petitioner and responqents. 
'£he Court's reliance on unidentified fees and expenses can-
not be reconciled with the repeated admonition that "un-
adorned speculation will not suffice to invoke the federal 
judicial power." E. (J., Simon v, Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights 
Org., 426 U. S. 26, 44 (1976). Such speculation is particu-
larly inappropriate in this case, since neither the Court nor 
! Respondents' "Demand for Judgment" asks the court to award t.he 
"[c]ost of t.his action as well as attorney fees in the amount of 25% as 
hereinabove alleged, or such other amount as may be deemed fit and 
proper by the Court." App. 16. The request for fees was clarified in 
Paragraph VI of the amended complaint, which reads as follows: 
"Plaintiff alleges that the Clerk of this Court. be designate4 custodian 
of the funds and judgment t{) be paid Plaintiff and other persons similarly 
situated, by Defendants and the Clerk deposit said funds in a t.uitable 
depository and, upon proper order of this Court, disburse said funds 
after deduction of necessary expenses and atton1ey fees to Plaintiff's 
attorneys herein of twenty-five per cent (25%) of the amount so paid, 
the same being reasonable by all standards, including th~tt alleged and 
utilizf!d by Defendants in suing certain members in of [sic] the class in 
State Courts for unpa.id account!§." App. 13-14. 
8 See n. 7, supra. 
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respondents have suggested that the petitioner is or ever ·Will 
be liable for the fees or expenses relied upon. Indeed, the 
American Rule would bar an award of fl,ttorney's fees against 
•, . 
this petitioner. Thus, respondents' "irijury"-if any exists-
is Iiot one that "fairly can be traced" to the petitioner. Id., 
at 41-42; see Gladstone, Realtors v. Vtllage of Bellwood, 441 
U. S. 91, 99 (1979.w Whatever may be the basis for the 
respot1dents' asserted desire to share fees and expenses with 
unnamed members of a class, the petitioner is merely a by-
stander. "[F]ederal courts are without power to decide ques-
tions that ·cannot affect the rights of litigants iu the case 
before them." North Carolin{l v. lUce, 404 (T. Pi. 244. 240. 
(1971). This elementary principle should dispose of the case, 
Since respondents have no continuing iJersonal stake in the 
outcome of this action, Art. III and the precedents of this 
Court require that the case be dismissed as moot. E. g., 
Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 172-173 (1977) (per curiam); 
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1976) (per curiam); 
Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401--404 (1975); Indian-
apolis School C!omm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 1T. S. 128 (1975); De-
Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, 316-320 (1974) (per 
curiam); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971) 
(per curiam); SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human R 'ights, 
404 u.s. 403, 407 (1972).11 
:t~ Far-reaching consequences could flow from :L rule that fees recoverable 
from puta1.jve cla;;s member::; may Le "tra,ced" to the cla&> defenda,nt 
for purposes of tlJe ca~e or cont.rover;sy l'equiremf'l'lt.. At th:• least., this 
rule would support a claim t11at a per::;on who h<~~ accPpted full ::;el.tlemeuL 
of hls individual claim is entitled to file suit on behalf of trn ·nnrecompen.::>ed 
clru.':l. Apparently, tbe putative plarntili' need only "a.sser[t]," ante, at 7, 
n . 6, that fep:s incurred in anticipation of t.he litigntion ultunntdy m.ighL ba 
shared with a prevailing class. 
11 These case.~ are discu.s.-;ed more fully in United States Parole Cmnr 
mil!sion v. Geraghty, post, at--- (Powm.L, .T., dis:;cmt,ing). 
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Respondents do not suggest that their claims are "capable 
of repetition, yet evading review." Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 
U. S. 103, 110-111, n. 11 (1975).12 Not a single one of the 
alleged 90,000 class members has sought to intervene in the 
nine years since this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines, 
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone 
chal1enged the allegedly usuri01.1s charges by informal com-
plaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certifica-
tion was denied, the action lay dormant during the seven 
months in which respondents sought to take an interlocutory 
appeal, without provoking a response from anyone who previ-
ously may have thought that the claes action would protect 
his rights. Apart from the persistence of the lawyers, this 
has been a noncase since the petitioner tendered full satisfac-
tion of the respondents' individual claims. To be sure, re-. 
spondents' counsel may have the same interest in an enlarged 
recovery that is inherent in any contingent fee arra11gement. 
But I know of no decieion by ltny court that holds that a 
lawyer's interest in a larger fee, to be paid by third persone 
not present in court, creates the personal stake in the outcome 
required by Art. III. 
II 
Despite the absence of an Art. III controversy, the Court 
directs a remand in which this federal action will be litigated 
by lawyers whose only "clients" are unidentified class mem-
bers who have shown no desire to be rep~esented by anyone.13 
12 If a class-action defendant were shown to have embarked on a course 
of conduct designed to insulate the class certification issue from appellate 
review in order to avoid classwide liability, a court in proper circumstances 
might find the Gerstein test satisfie<f and the case not moot. See Susman v, 
Lincoln American Corp., 587 ;F. 2d 866 (CA7 1978); 13 Wright, Miller & 
Cooper, J"ederal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 171 (Supp. 1979); 
Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following 
Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 591H)OO. 
lH I do not sugg~t that counsel acted improperly in pursuing thi l:l case. 
Since they ha.ve preva,iled both in th1s Court and in the Court of Appeals, 
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The Court appears to endorse this form of litigation for rea. 
10ns of policy and practice. It. is said to be an effective 
"response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the 
regulatory action of government." Ante, at 12. I am not 
aware that such a consfderation ever before has influenced this 
Court in determining whether the Constitution confers juris-
diction on the federal courts. In any event, the consequences 
of a finding of mootness are not likely to be as restrictive as 
the Court seems to fear. And the Court fails to recognize 
that allowing this action to proceed without an interested 
pl11intiff will itself generate practical difficulties of some 
magnitude. 
A 
A finding of mootness would have repercussions primarily 
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who 
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to 
a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent 
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification 
generally would be barred by Art. III. But the consequences 
of applying settled rules of mootness in that situation would 
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were 
granted, the absent members of the putative class would have 
obtained by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of 
the benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand, 
damages were awardeq and an appeal permitted, reversal of 
the certification ruling would enable putative class members to 
take advantage of' a favorable judgment on the issue of liability 
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable 
judgment. Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in 
this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" that 
the 1966· amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate.14 
the r&1Jopsibility for allowing client-less litigations fall on the feden~I 
oonrts. 
14 S('e Comment, Immediate Appealability of Orders Denying Class Cer-
tification, 40 Ohio St. L. J . 441, 470-471 (1979) . In actions brought under: 
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Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise 
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before 
judgment, as petitioner did in this caee. A defendant cer-
tainly will have a substaJltial incentive to use this tacti~ in 
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to de~y 
compensation to putative elass membe~ and jeoptlfdize the 
enforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney[s] 
general." Ante, at 11-12. The practical argument is not 
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns 
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the ade .. 
quacy of compensation and enforcement available for particu .. 
lar substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best 
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be 
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim. 
Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of 
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of 
usuary claims/.o the Court's concern for compensation of puta.. 
tive ·class members in this case is at best misplaced and at 
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling 
Act.1G 
Rule 23 (b)(3) , a class memb~r must deci4e at the time of ~:ertification 
whether to "opt out" of the action under Rule 23 ( c )(2) . This provision 
w~. qesigned ·to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class 
members were permitted to intervene after a decision on the ~erits 
in order to ~ure the benefits of that decision. Notes of the Advisory 
Committee o~ PropOiled Amend~~ts to Rule 23, 39 F . R. D. ~9, 105-106 
(1006) . 
16 LiddeU v. Litton Systems, Inc., 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting bor .. 
rowers' class action) ; Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d ~61 (1941) . 
Petitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply with Mil!-
llissippi'i! interest limits would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U. S. C. 
§ 85. But l do not understand that the National Bank Act displaces etate 
. policy disfavoring the aggregation of usury claim13. A primary purpose of 
that Act is to protect national banks from di13criminatory treatmeJ}t or 
tUtdue penalties that may be imposed by state Jaw. See 12 U. S. § 86. 
16 '.t'he Act provides t-hat rules of procedure promulgated by this Court 
''shti.U not . , • enlarge o,r modify any s.uba,tant~ve right." 28 U. S, C. 
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The Court's concern for putative class members would be 
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced 
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litiga-
tion of successive suits by members of the putative class. -- I 
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial admin-
istration would be real But the~e problems can and should be 
addressed by measures short of undercutting the law of moot-
ness, as the Court seems to, have done today. · ·The first step 
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the 
denial of class certification: in appropriate circumstances.17 
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C: § 1292 
(b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain con-
trolling questions of law.. In many cases, a · class-action 
defendant undoubtedly would forgo the opportunity to settle 
with an individual plaintiff in order to' obtain an immediate 
and final determination of the ' class certification question on 
appeal. 
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a· class action by 
forced settlement, the District Court is not powerless. · In at 
least some circumstances, it may require that putative class 
members receive some sort 'of notice and an opportunity to 
intervene within· 'the appeal period. · Rule· 23 (d){2) . · The 
availabpity or such· measures could be a significant deterrent 
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District 
§ 2072. See American Pipe & Construction Co . v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538, 
557-558 (1974); Developments in the Law...;_Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1318, 1358-1359 (1'976) . See generally Lllhders, Of Legalized l31aclc-
mail a.nd Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-
Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974) . 
11ln Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, -437 '1], S. 463 (1978), this Court 
held that the denial of class certification is not a "final decision" appeal-
able as of right under 28 U. S. C." § 1291. We relied in that case on the 
dangers of ''indiscrimiriate" interlocutory review: · fd., at -474. Although 
Coopers & Lybrhnd now prevents review in cases in ·which it would be 
' • desirable, Congress may remedy the problem by appropriate legislation. 
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Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the 
case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended 
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent inter-
locutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are 
lacking, it is for Congress-not this Court-to correct the 
deficiency.18 
B 
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it, 
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems often 
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their 
own. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respond-
ents will serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for the 
purpose of obtaining class certification. Since they can gain 
nothing more from the action, their participation in the case 
can be intended only to benefit counsel and the members of a 
putative class who have indicated no interest in the claims 
asserted in this case. Respondents serve on their own mo-
tion-if indeed they serve at all.10 Since no court has cer-
tified the class, there has been no considered determination 
that respondents will fairly and adequately represent its 
members. Nothing in Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure, 
and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it. 
18 Congress currently has before it a bill that attempts to remedy the 
difficulties infecting this troubled area. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sese. 
(19'1tl). The bill, supported by the Department of Justice, proposes to 
bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, supra, and to eliminate 
some of the problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by 
creating a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provides for 
the enforcement of this right in some Instances through actions brought in 
the name of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory 
appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class cer-
tification under the proposed procedures. 
111 As noted above, p. 3, supra, respondents took no appeal in theiJt: 
own names. One would think t.hat this candid disclaimer of personal 
interest would distroy the foundation upon which the Court prediC~tte&: 
Art. Ill jurisdiction. Ante, n.t 7; sec p. 6, supra. 
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Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent? 
See East Texas. Motor Freight v. Rodrigue~, ·431 U. S. 395, 
403-404 ( 1977). Are their currently none}!:istent claims "typi-
cal of the claims ... of the cla$s" within the meaning of Rule 
23 (a) (3)? 20 
The Court's holding well may pr~':ent future "forced set-
tlements" of class action litigation. Thus: the difficulties 
faced by the District Court on remand in this case may not 
arise again in preeisely analogous circumstances. But today's 
result also authorizes appeals by putative class representatives 
who have litigated and prevailed on the merits of their in-
dividual claims. If the order denying class certification is 
reversed in that situation, the named plaintiffs on remand 
will have no more continuing relationship to the putative 
class than respondents have here. A remand for certifi.clttion 
could also lead to "one-way intervention" in direct violation 
of Rule 23. See p. 10, and n. 14, supra. ' These tensions, 
arising from the express terms of the :ftule, undermine the 
Court's conclusion that the policies underlying Rule 23 dic-
tate the result reached today. 
III 
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of 
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from 
settled principles of Art. ·rn jurisprudence.21 It unneces-
20 The District Court properly may conclude on remand that respondents, 
for these or other reasons, cannot adequately represent the class. 
21 MR. JusTICE S·rEVENS states, in his concurring opinion, that all persons · 
allegro to be memlx>rs of a. putative class "should be considered parties 
to the case or controversy at least for the limited purpose" of Art. III, and 
that they "remain parties until a finaJ determination has been made tha.t the 
action may not be maintaint>d as a class act.ion." Ante, at -. This · 
novel view apparently dt>rives from early cases in which the Court referred 
to class members who would be bound by a judgment as "absent. partie::;," 
Han~betry v. Eee, 311 U. S. 32; 42 (1940), or "pa.rties in intere:st," 
Bmith v. Swormstedt, 16 How. 288, 303 (1853). Ante, a.t -, n. 3. But 
these cases were decided before certification was established a:s the method 
78-904-DISSENT 
DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK v. ROPER 15 
sarily creates significant problems in the administration of 
Rule 23. And it ma.y work a serious injustice in this ca.se.22 
by which a chiSi:l achieves judicial recognition . Under Rule 23, no mem~ 
her of a putative class will be bound by a judgment unless a proper cer~ 
tifiration order is E>ntered. Tha<t tl1ey may be "interested parties," ibid., 
before that time does not, make them parties to the litigation in any 
senSE>, as this Court has rE>cognized. In JndiarULpolis School Comm'rs v. 
Jawbs, 420 U. S. 128 ( 1975), thE' Court. hE>ld t.ha.t !Ul oral certification 
order was insufficient to identify t.he interests of absent rla;;s members for 
Art. III purposes. The result hardly could be different when the class 
has not been idE>ntified at all. Sre ah;o Memphis Light, Gas & Water 
Div. v. Craft. 436 U.S. 1, 8 (1978); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 423 U. S. aos, 
310, n. 1 (1976) ; Weinstein v. Bmdford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975); PasaderUL 
City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430 (1976) . 
Mu. JusTICE STEVENS indicatE's that, unnamed membE>rs of an uncerti~ 
fied clas.;; may be "present" HS parties for somE' purposes and not for 
others. No aut.hority i,; cited for such selective "presencE>." in an action. 
Nor is any explanation offered 11s to how a court is to determine when 
these unident.ifjE>d "parties" ltrfl prE>;;ent. If their presE>nce i:s to be 
limited to the satisfact,ion of the Art. III case or controver:sy requirement, 
then t.he rule of party statu.s would have no content apart from Art. III 
and could only be de;;cribed a!' a legal fiction. If, on the other ha.pd, the 
proposed rule is 'to appl~· outside the Art .. III context, it may have troubl~ 
some and fa.r~rE>aching implications t.hat. could prejudice the bringing of 
class actions . Presumably, u purposE" of t.he rule of party status would be 
to assure that satisfaction of the claims of named parties would not 
t.ermina.te the litigation. Nor could thE" rights of unnamed parties be 
extinguished by the failure of the named p&.rties to appeal. Thus, if the 
rule proposed by Mn. Jus•rwE STEVENs i:s to accompli:sh its purpose, 
I suppose that a fiduciary duty must be imposed upon flilmed part.ies to 
continue the litiga.tion where-alii here-the unnamed parties remain 
tmidentified and fail t.o intervPne. As fiduciaries, would the named 
part.ies not only be r«"quired to continue to litigate, but to assume per~ 
sonal responsibility for costs ru1d attorney's fees 'if the casE' ultimately is 
lost? Would responsible litigant$ be willing to file class actions if they 
thereby assumed such long~ term fiduciary obligations? These and like 
questions are substantial. They are not resolved by Rule 23. I believe 
they merit careful study by Congress before this Court-perhaps unwit~ 
tingly-creates a major category of clientless litigation unique in our 
sy&iem. 
22 The Court's re~urrection of this dead controversy may result in. 
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I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot. 
irreparable injury to im10cent parties, as well as to the petitioner bank. 
When • the District Court denied certification on September 29, 1975, •it 
assigned as one of its reasons the possible {'destruction of the [petitioner] 
bank" by damages then alleged to · total 12,000,000 and now potentially 
augmented by the accrual of intj:lrest. · App.' 47, see ante, at 2, n. 2. '.J;he 
possible destruction of the bank ·is ·irrelevant to 'the: jurisdictiona.l issue, 
but serious indeed to depositors, stockholders, and· the community served. 
It is said that 'this -is necessary to ·redress iilhtries possibly suffered by 
members of the putative class. Yet, no such ·person has come forward 
in the· nearly nine ·years that · have passed i>ince -' this action was filed. 
Indeed, the challenged conduct was atithorized by statute almost six years 
ago. As the ''District Comt·may be called :upon to "determine whether the 
equitable doctrine of "relation · back" permits it ·to toll the statute of 
limitations on remand, ante, at · q, n. 3, ·it will hardly be inappropriate for 
that court· to consider the equities on· both sides. · In the circumstances 
presented, the 'District Court may well · see no reason to exercise its equi-
table discretion in 'favor of putative class-members who have slept on their· 
rights these many years. 
• 
'l'o: The Chi P! ., ' 
Mr. Ju :t ,, d"' 'lf!dl 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART 
joins, dissenting. 
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that 
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the 
National Bank Act and Mississippi law.1 They filed this 
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty 
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and 
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf 
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggre-
gating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District 
Court depied respondents' motion for class certification. 
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the 
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and 
court costs. Over respondents' objection, the District Court 
entered final judgment in their favor. Petitioner then depos-
ited the full amount due with the clerk of the court. 
No one disputes that the petitioner has tendered every-
thing that respondents could have recovered from it in this 
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed 
the denial of class certification. This Court affirms the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals, after finding that respondents~ 
retain a personal stake in sharing the expense of litigation· 
1 Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. §§ ,85, 
86, which adopts the ~~~r~st litpits set br flt~tte l!!,w1 an<l 28 U. S. C.-
51355. . 
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with members of the putative class. Ante, at 7, n. 6. This 
speculative interest simply will not sustain the jtJrisdiction 
of an Art. III court under established and controlling prece. 
dents. Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
Although there are differences, this case is similar to United 
States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at -. in one 
important respect: both require us to decide whether puta-
tive class representatives may appeal the denial of class cer-
tification when they can derive no benefit whatever from 
the relief sought in the action. Here, as in Geraghty, the 
District Court refused to certify a class. In this case, how-
ever, the Court recognizes established Art. III doctrine. It 
states that the "right to employ Rule 23" is a "procedural 
right only, ancillary to the litigation of substa11tive claims." 
Ante, at 6. It also agrees that a federal court "retains no 
jurisdiction over the controversy" when the parties' "sub-
stantive claims become moot in the Art. III sense." Ibid. 
Moreover, the Court acknowledges the familiar principle that 
a party who has no personal stake in the outcome of an action 
presents no case or controversy cognizable in a federal court of 
appeals. !d., at 7, 10. These are indeed the dispositive 
principles. My disagreement is with the way in which the 
Court applies them in this case. In my view, these principles 
unambiguously require a finding of mootness. 
A 
Since no class has been certified and no one has sought to 
intervene, respondents are the only plaintiffs arguably present 
in court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in the 
injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only dam-
ages ; those damages have been tendered in fulP Respond-
11 Although respondent.,; also asked for attorney's fees, their complaint 
i!l1ows tT1at. fees were· to be· gr1mted only from the dama.ge;,: ult imately · 
• 
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ents make no claim that success on the certification motion 
would entitle them to additional relief of any kind from the 
petitioner.8 Their personal claims to relief have been aban-
doned so completely that no appeal was taken in their own 
names. The notice of appeal filed with the District Court 
recites that respondents appeal only 11on behalf of all others 
similarly situated ..•. " App. 63. 
This in itself is compelling evidence that respondents have 
no interest in the 11individual and private case or controversy" 
relied on by the Court today. Ante, at 5. But even without 
such evidence. this and other courts routinely have held that 
a tender of full relief remedies a plaintiff's injuries and elimi-
nates his stake in the outcome. Califomia v. San Pablo & 
Tulare R. Co., 149 U. S. 308, 313--314 (1893); Drs. Hill & 
Thomas Co. v. United States, 392 F. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (pet· 
curiam); Lamb v. Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968) 
(per curiam); A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F. 
2d 89 (CA5 1965) (per curiam). It is the tender itself that 
moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. Ibid. 
Thus, the law is clear that a federal court is powerless to re-
view the abstract questions remaining in a case when the 
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that fully 
satisfies his claims. 
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result 
should differ because the District Court has entered a judg~ 
ment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their law-
suit as moot.4 It is certainly true, as the Court observes, 
awarded to them or the clal:ir:l. App. 13-14. There is no pos.~ibility of 
prospective relief hecause the Mississippi u~ury statute was anwnded in 
1974 to anthorizP, i:nter alia, the clmrge::; at is.sue in this case. 1974 l\Iiso;. 
Gen. Laws, ch. 564, § 7; sec Mi~s. Code Ann.§ 75-17-1 (6) . 
3 Neither the Court nor the re:;pondents have asserted that the peti· 
tioner':; tender fails to include all cost::; and fees for which it could be hPld 
liable. See Part, II-B, infra. 
4 The ":statutory right" to appeal, ante, at 7, it::;elf cannot. supply a, 
personal stake in the outcome, for Congress cannot abrogate Art. III 
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that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in 
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any 
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally 
favorable judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wright, 
Miller and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3902 
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practice ~ 203.06 (1975). But 
the requirement of adverse effect is more ·than a rule "of 
federal appellate practice." Ante, at 7. As we have held 
repeatedly, and as the Court concedes, ante, at 10, Art. III 
itself requires a live controversy in whi·ch a personal stake is 
at issue "throughout the entirety of the ·litigation." Sosna 
v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). See, e. g., Preiser v. 
Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395,401-401 (1975). 
It is this constitutional limitation, and not any rule of prac-
tice, that has impelled federal courts uniformly to require a 
showing of continuing adverse effect in order to confer "stand-
ing to appeal." 15 Wright, Miller and Cooper, supra, § 3902. 
Marry v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections, - U. S. 
App. D. C. -, 580 F. -2d 695 (1978); see Altvater v. Free-
man, 319 U. S. 359 (1943); Electrical Fittings v. 'l'homas & 
Betts Co., 307 U. S. 241 (1939); Kapp v. National Football 
League, 586 F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9 1978); Cover v. Schwartz, 
133 F. 2d 541 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U. S. ' 748 (1943),n 
limitations on the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Gladstone, Realtont 
v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) . 
~United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977), and Coopertt 
& Lybrand v. Livesay 437 U. S. 463 (1978), arc not to the contrary. 
Incidental dictum in both cases stated that the denial of class certification 
is subject to appellate review after final judgment at·. the behest of the 
named plaintiffs. Neither case di::;cussed mootness, aJ1d neither analyzed 
the proposition in any way. Indeed, the only authority cited in Coopers 
& Lybrand was United Airlines. see '437 U. S., at 469, and the only 
authority cited in United Airlines was a concession made by the defendant 
and a list of cao;e:-; from the Courts of Appeals, not one of which dealt 
with a suggestion of mootness in an analogous situation, see 432 U. S., at 
393, and n. 14. Such ::;tatements, casually enunciated without a word of 
' e~planation in opinions dealing with unrelated legal questions, are not 
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,As these cases show, the requirements of Art. III are not 
affected by the "factual context" in which a suggestion of 
mootness arises. See ante, at 6. Whatever the context, 
Art. III as~s but a single question: Is there a continuing 
controversy between adverse parties who retain the requisite 
stake in the outcome of the action'! 
Electrical Fitt-ings v. Thomas.& Betts Co., supra, is the case 
primarily relied upon by the Court. It provides little or no 
support for today's ruling. In Electrical Fittings, a limited 
appeal was allowed because the petitioner himself was prej· 
udiced by the inclusion of an unnecessary and adverse finding 
in a generally favorable decree. See ante, at 10. Here, the 
existence of the District Court's order denying certification 
has no effect whatever on the respondents. Thus, the per. 
sonal stake that justified the Electrical Fittings appeal is not 
present in this case. Absent such a stake, it is simply irrele. 
vant that "policy considerations" sometimes may favor an 
appeal from "a procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of 
a litigation." Nor is it significant that the ruling "stands as 
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." /d., at 9-10. 
Collateral rulings-like other rulings-may be appealed only 
when the requirements of Art. III are satisfied. 
B 
After l'ecognizing that the right to appeal is subject to the 
"jurisdictional limitations of Art. III," the Court agrees that 
only a "party 1[ who] retains a stake in the appeal [can sat-
isfy] the requirements of Art. III." Ante, at 7; see id., at 
10. The Court also agrees that respondents have no remaining 
stake in "the merits of the substantive controversy." ld., at 
controlling or even persna<'ive when they are shown on further reflection 
to have been incon;;ii:itent with settled law. A~ the Court agrees today, 
neither rase rreat<>H a.n excrption to thr fundamrntal rulr that "[f]ederal 
appellate jurbdiction is limited by tho appellant's perwnal stake in the 
avpet~L" Ante, at 10, 
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~-10. Nevertheless, it holds that respondents retain a per. 
sonal stake in this appeal because they "desire to shift to 
successful class litigants a portion of those fees and expenses 
that have been incurred in this litigation and for which they 
assert a continuing obligation." !d., at 7, n. 6; see id., at 10.6 
This conclusion is neither legally sound nor supported by the 
record. 
The Court fails to identify a single item of expense, charge-
able to the petitioner, that was incurred by respondents before· 
the petitioner's tender. Similarly, respondents have been 
conspicuously vague in identifying the "fees and expenses" 
relied upon as supp1ying the adverse interest essential to a live 
eontroversy.7 The only expense mentioned by respondents, 
apart from court costs inc1uded in the petitioner's tender, is 
not a present obligation at all. It is an offer to provide secu-
rity for costs in the event a class ultimately is certified. Brief 
for Respondents 33; App. 78. Nor does the attorney's fee 
arrangement in this case create any obligation, present or 
• The Court also mentions that "[t]he use of the class a.ction procedure 
for litigation of individual claims may offer substantial advantages for 
named plaintiffs . .. . " Ante, at 11, n. 9. But. any such advantages 
eannot accrue to these respondents, who will not be litigating their own 
elaims on remand. Indeed, the Court refers to respondents in this context 
only to point out that their total damages were so l:lmall that they "would 
be unlikely to obtain legal redress at an acceptable cost" if they could not 
do so by means of a calss action. We may assume that respondents had 
some interest in the class-action procedure as a means of interesting their 
lawyers in the case or obtaining a satisfactory settlement. This may be 
an interest properly furthered by Rule 23, but once rei:ipondents obtained 
both acce~:~s to court and full individual relief that intere~t disappeared. 
'Perhaps the strongest of respondents' statements is : 
"Of course, the intere&"t of the [respondents] in assertion of the right to 
proceed on behalf of the class includes l:!Uch matters as the prOl:ipect for 
~preading attomey's fees and expenses among more chLimants and thus 
reducing the percentage that wql)ld otherwise be payable by them." 
Plaintifft~-Appellanti:i' Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismi:;s Appeal and 
Reply Brief, filed in Roper v. CaMurve (CA5, No. 76-3600) , Jan. 10, 
t9n: 
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future, that can be affected by the certification of a class. 
Respondents' complaint identifies the f~e to be paid, subject 
to court approval, as "twenty-five percent (25% )" of the 
amount of the final judgment. App. 14, 16.8 No arrange-
mep.t other than this customary type contingent fee is identi-
fied in the record or the briefs. Yet, no one has explained how 
respondents' obligation to pay 25o/o of their recovery to coun·· 
sel could be reduced if a class is certified and its members 
become similarly obligated to pay 25% of their recovery. 
Thus, the asserted interest in "spreading [of] attorney's fees 
and expenses" 9 relates to no present obligation. It is at 
most an expectation-of the respondents' and particularly of 
their counsel-that certain fees and expenses may become 
payable in the event a class is certified. That expectation is 
wholly irrelevant to the existence of a present controversy 
between petitioner and respondents. 
The Court's reliance on unidentified fees and expenses can-
not be reconciled with the repeated admonition that "un-
adorned speculation will not suffice to invoke the federal 
judicial power." E. g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights 
Dry., 426 U. S. 26, 44 (1976). Such speculation is particu-
larly inappropriate in this case, since neither the Court nor 
11 Respondents' "Dema.nd for .Judgment!' asks the court, to award the 
"[c]ost of this action as well m; at.t{)ruey fees in the amount of 25% as 
hereinabove alleged, or such other amount as may be deemed fit and 
proper by the Court." App, 16. The request for fees was clarified in 
Paragraph VI of the amended complaint, which reads as follows: 
"Plaintiff alleges that the Clerk of this Court be designated custodian 
of the funds and judgment to be paid Plaintiff and other persons similarly 
situated, by Defendants and the Clerk deposit said funds in a :;;uitable 
depository a.nd, upon proper order of this Court, disbur;:,lE) said funds 
after deduction of necPSSary expenses a.nd attorney fees to Plaintiff's 
attorneys herein of twenty-five per cent (25%) of the amount so paid, 
the same being reasonable by all st<tndards, including that alleged and 
utilized by Defendant;;~ in suing certain members in of [sic] the class in 
State Courts for unpa.id account8." App. 13-14. 
9 Seen. 7, 8Upra. 
·' 
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respondents have suggested that the petitioner is or ever will 
be liable for the fees or expenses relied upon. Indeed, the 
American Rule would bar an award of attorney's fees against 
this petitioner. Thus, respondents' "i1ijury"-if anr exists-
is not one that "fairly can be traced" to the petitioner. Id., 
at 41-42; see Gladstone, Realtors v. ViUage of Bellwood, 441 
U. S. 91, 99 (1979.10 Whatever may be the basis for the 
respondents' asserted desire to share fees and expenses with 
unnamed members of a class, tho petitioner is merely a by-
stander. "[F]ecleral courts are without power to decide ques-
tions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case 
before thrm." North Carolina v. Ri('c, 404 (T. S. 244. 24G 
(1971). This elementary principle should dispose of the c~. 
c 
Since respondents have no continuing persona] stake in the 
outcome of this action, Art. III and the precedents of this 
Court require that the case be dismissed as moot. E. g., 
Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171,172-173 (1977) (per curiam); 
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1976) (per curiam); 
Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401- 404 (1975); Indian-
apolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 ( 1975); De-
Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, 316-320 (1974) (per 
curiam); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971) 
(per curiam); SEC v. Medical Comm. jo1· Human Rights, 
404 u.s. 403, 407 (1972).11 
:to Far-reaching consequruce:; could How from a rule th~u fees recoverable 
from putative clal:iS member~ may l>e ·' tra.eed" tu the cla& Jcfendun t 
for purpo;:;es of tlu~ case or cont.rover;:;y reqnirPment . At t1w len st., t11is 
rule would ~upport. a chtim t1mt a per:>on who l1<~~ ael'<·ptccl full ~eWE'mcnL 
of his individual cbim is entitlrd to fiiP "uit on behalf of m1 unre<'()lnpensrd 
clab."!. Appart>J1t1y, tJ1e putative plaintiff need only ''a.,~rrrtl," ante, aL 7, 
n . 6, tlmt fee~ incurr<-'J in ailticipa.t.ion of the litignt.ion nltima.trly m1ght. be 
sha.red with tt prevailing class. 
11 The:se cai'Jt\~ :tn• di.-cul:i.~ed more fully in United States 'Pamte CD'In-
mission v. Geraghty, post, at --- (Pow:RJ,L, ,I., ctis~rllting). 
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Respondents do not suggest that their 'Claims are "capable 
of repetition. yet evading review." Cf. Gerstein v. Puf!h, 420 
U. S. 103, 110--111, n. 11 (1975).1:2 Not a single one of the 
alleged 90,000 class members has sought to intervene in the 
nine years since this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines, 
Inc. v. McDcmald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has apyone 
challenged the allegedly usurious charges by informal com-
plaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certifica-
tion was denied, the action lay dorrnant during the seven 
months in which respondents sought to take an interlocutory 
at)peal, without provoking a response from auyone who previ-
ously may have thought that the claes acticm would protect 
his rights. Apart from the persistence of the lawyers, this 
has been a noncase since the petitioner tendered full satisfac-
tion of the respondents' individual claims. To be sure, re-. 
spondents' counsel may have the same interest in an enlarged 
recovery that is inherent i11 any contingent fee arrangement. 
But I know of no clecieion by any court that holds that a 
lawyer's interest in a larger fee, to be paid by third persone 
not present in court, creates the personal stake in the outcome 
required by Art. III. 
II 
Despite the absence of an Art. III controversy, the Court 
directs a, remand in which this federal action will be litigated 
by lawyers whose only "clients" are unidentified class mem-
bers who have shown no desire to be represented by anyone.lll 
12 If a class-action defendant were shown to have embarked on a course 
of conduct designed to insulate the class certification issue from appellate 
review in order to avoid classwide liability, a court in proper circumstances 
might find the Gerstein test satisfied and the case not moot. See Susrru:tn v. 
Lincoln American Corp., 587 ;F. 2d 866 (CA7 1978); 13 Wright, Miller & 
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 171 (Supp. 1979); 
Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following 
Dismjssal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 599-600. 
l H I do not suggest, that counsel acted improperly in pursuing this case. 
Since they have prevailed both in this Court and in the Court of Appeals, 
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The Court appears to endorse this fonn of litigation for rea. 
aons of policy and practice. It is said to be an effective 
"response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the 
regulatory action of government." Ante, at 12. I am not 
aware that such a consideration ever before has influenced this 
Court in determining whether the Constitution confers juris-
diction on the federal courts. In any event, the consequences 
of a finding of mootness are not likely to be as restrictive as 
the Court seems to fear. And the Court fails to recognize 
that allowing this action to proceed without an interested 
plaintiff will itself generate practical difficulties of some 
magnitude. 
A 
A finding of mootness would have repercussions primarily 
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who 
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to 
a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent 
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification 
generally would be barred by Art. III. But the consequences 
of applying settled rules of mootness in that situation would 
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were 
granted, the absent members of the putative class would have 
obtained by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of 
the benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand, 
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of 
the certification ruling would enable putative class members to 
take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability 
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable 
judgment. Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in 
this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" that 
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate.14 
the responsibility for allowing client-less litigations fall on the federal 
conrt>;. 
11 S~ Comment, Inunedia.te Appealability of Orders Denying Class Cer· 
tification, 40 Ohio St. L. J . 441, 470-471 (1979) . In actions brought under' 
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Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise 
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before 
judgment, 88 petitioner did iJl this case. A defendant cer-
tainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in 
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny 
compensation to putative .class member!!! and jeopa.rdize the 
enforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney[s] 
general." Ante, at 11-12. The practical argument is not 
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns 
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the ade-
quacy of compensation and enforcement available for particu-
lar substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best 
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be 
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim. 
Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of 
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of 
usuary claims,lll the Court's concern for compensation of puta-
tive ·class members in this case is at best misplaced and at 
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling 
Act.16 
Rule 23 (b )(3), a class member must deci<le at the time of certification 
whether to "opt out" of the action under Rule 23 (c)(2). This provision 
was designed to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which claes 
members were permitted to intervene after a decision on the merits 
in order to ~ure the benefits of that decision. Notes of the Advisory 
Committee on Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F. R. D. 69, 105-106 
(1966) . 
16 LiddeU v. Litton System.s, Inc., 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting bor .. 
rowers' class action); Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17,2 So. 2d 561 (1941). 
Petitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply with Mis-
llissippi'i3 interest limits would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U. S. C. 
§ 85. But I do not understand that the National Bank Act displaces state 
. policy disfavoring the aggregation of usury claims. A primary purpose of 
that Act is to protect national banks from discriminatory treatment or 
undue penalties that may be imposed by :state law. See 12 U. S. § 86. 
10 The Act provides that rulrs of procedure promulgated by tllis Court 
t'sba.U not . , . enlarge or modify any aub$tantive right." 28 U. S, C. 
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The Court's concern for putative class members wotild -be 
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced 
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litiga-
tion of successive suits by members of the putative class. -- I 
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial admin-
istration would be real. But these problems can and should be 
addressed by measures short of u'lldercutting the law of moot-
ness, as the Court seems to. have done today: The first step 
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from- the 
denial of c1ass certification· in appropriate circumstances.17 
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292 
(b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain con-
trolling questions of law. In many cases, a -class-action 
defendant undoubtedly wo~ld forgo the opportunity to settle 
with an individual plaintiff in order to· obtain an immediate 
and final determination of the · class certification question on 
appeal. 
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a· class action by 
forced settlement, the District Court is not powerless. · In at 
least some circumstances, it may require that putative class 
members receive some sort 'of notice and an opportunity to 
intervene within 'the appea1 period. · Rule· 23 (d)-(2). -· The 
availabpity of such measures could be a significant deterrent 
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District 
§ 2072. See American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538, 
557-558 (1974) ; Developments in the Law-'-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1318, 1358-1359 (l976). See generally Landers, Of Legalized Black-
mail and Legalized Theft : Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-
Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974) . 
17 In Coopers & Lybrand v·. Livesay, -437 u. S. 463 (1978), this Court 
held that the denial of class certification is not a "final decision" appeal-
able as of right under 28 U. S. C: §1291. We relied in that ca.se on the 
dangers of "indiscriminate" ·interlocutory review: -!d., at -474. Although 
Coopers & Lybrand now prevents review in cases in ·which it would be 
• desirable, Congress may remedy the problem by appropriate legislation. 
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Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the 
case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended 
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent inter-
locutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are 
lacking, it is for Congress-not this Court-to correct the 
deficiency.18 
B 
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it, 
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems often 
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their 
own. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respond-
ents will serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for the 
purpose of obtaining class certification. Since they can gain 
nothing more from the action, their participation in the case 
can be intended only to benefit counsel and the members of a 
putative class who have indicated no interest in the claims 
asserted in this case. Respondents serve on their own mo-
tion-if indeed they serve at all. 10 Since no court has cer-
tified the class, there has been no considered determination 
that respondents will fairly and adequately represent its 
members. Nothing in Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure, 
and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it. 
18 Congress currE-ntly has before it a bill that attempts to remedy the 
difficulties infecting this troubled area. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(19'19). The bill, supported by the Department of Justice, proposes to 
bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, supra, and to eliminate 
some ot the problem11. of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by 
creating a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provides for 
the enforcement of this right in some instances through actions brought in 
the name of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory 
appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class cer-
tification under the propo~ed procedure~. 
10 As noted above, p. 3, supra, respondPnts took no appeal in theill· 
own names. One would think that this candid disclaimer of personal 
interest would distroy the foundation upon which the Court prediet~te&: 
Art. III jurisdict.ion. Ante, at 7; see p. 6, supra. 
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Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent? 
See East Texas. Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, ·431 U. S. 395, 
403-404 ( 1977). Are their currently nonexistent claims "typi-
cal of the claims ... of the class" within the meaning of Rule 
23 (a) (3)? 20 
The Court's holding well may prevent future "forced set-
tlements" of class action litigation~ .. Thus: the difficulties 
faced by the Distri·ct Court on remand in this case may not 
arise again in precisely analogous circumstances. But today's 
result also authorizes appeals by putative class representatives 
who have litigated and prevailed on the merits of their in-
dividual claims. If the order denying class certification is 
reversed in that situation, the named plaintiffs on remand 
will have no more continuing relationship to the putative 
class than respondents have here. A remand for certification 
could also lead to "one-way intervention" in direct violation 
of Rule 23. See p. 10, and n. 14, supra. · These tensions, 
arising from the express terms of the Rule, undermine the 
Court's conclusion that the policies underlying Rule 23 dic-
tate the result reached today. 
III 
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of 
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from 
settled principles of Art. "III jurisprudence.21 It unneces-
20 The District Court properly may conclude on remand that respondents, 
for these or other reasons, cannot adequately represent the class. 
21 MR. JusTICE S'l'EVENS states, in his concurring opinion, that all persons 
alleged to be members of a putative class "should be considered parties 
to the case or controversy at least. for the limited purpo::;e" of Art.. III, and 
that. they "remain parties until a final determination ha.s bC'en made that the 
action may not. be maintained a;; a class act.ion." Ante, at -. This · 
novel view apparently derives from early cases in which the Court referred 
t{) class member;; who would be bound by a judgment as ''absent parties," · 
Hansberry v. Lee, an U. S. 32; 42 (1940), or "parties in interest.," 
8mith v. 8wormstedt, 16 How. 288, 303 (1853). Ante, a,t -, n. 3. But 
these cases were decided before certification was e~tablished a.s the method 
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sarily creates significant problems in the administration of 
Rule 23. And it may work a serious injustice in this case.22 
by which a cla,;s achieves judicial recognition . Under Rule 23, no mem-
ber of a put~t.tive cla.s:s will be bound by a judgment, unless <L proper cer-
tification order i:; entered. Thil't the~· may be "intere:;ted parties," ibid., 
before that time doe:; not. make •them partie,.; to the litigation in any 
sense, as this Court ha." recognized. In Indianapolis Sc-hool Comm'rs v. 
Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975), the Court. held that an oral certification 
order was insuffici<>nt to identify the interest;; of n.b:sent cla:sl:l members for 
Art. III purpo~es. The re:sult hardly could be different when the cia$ 
has not been ident.ilied at nil. Sre also Memphis Light, Gas & Water 
Div. v. Craft. 4~6 U.S. 1, 8 (HJ78); Baxter v. Palmigiano, .na U. S. :ms, 
310, n. 1 (1976); Weinstein v. Bmdford, 423 U. S. 147 (1975) ; Pasadena 
City Board of Erlu,.ation v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 430 (1976) . 
MH. Jus1'ICE Sn~VENS indi~tte" that. unnamed members of an uncerti-
fied clas..,: may be '·present" as parties for ~orne purpo::;e:; :md not for 
other:;. No aut.hority is cited for i:>UCh selective "presrnee" in an achon. 
Nor is any explanation offered as to how a court is to determine when 
these unidentifird "parties" a.re prel:lent. If their pr<>sence i:s to be 
limited to the S<Lt.i:sfact.ion of the Art. III case or con1roverl:ly requirement, 
then tho rule of party st.at.u:s would have no content apart from Art. III 
and could only be de,.;cribed ill' a legal fiction. If, on the other hand, the 
proposed rule is to appl~· outside the Art.. III context, it may have trouble-
some and far-reaching implicationi'l that could prejudice the bringing of 
cln~ action::; . Pn~umably, a purpos<> of t.he rule of party l:ltatus would be 
to ns:<nre that satisfaction of the claims of named par•ties would not 
terminate the litigation. Nor could the right~ of unnamed parties be 
<>xtinguished by the failure of the named parties to appeal. Thus, if the 
rule proposed by Mn. Jus1'JCB STEVENS is to accomplie:h its purpoi;e, 
I suppose that a fiduciary duty must be imposed upon named parties to 
continue the litigation where-a;; here-the unnamed pa.rties remain 
unidentifi·ed and fail t.o intervene. As fiduciaries, would the named 
parties not only be required to continue to litign,t{', but to aSSIJme per-
sonal responsibility for costs a11d attorney's fees 'if the ca:sr u~timately is 
lost? Would responsible litigants be willing to file class actions if they 
thereby assumed such long-term fiduciary obligations? These and like 
questions are substantial. They are not resolved by Rule 23. I believe 
they merit careful study by Congress before this Court-perhaps unwit~ 
tingly-creates a major category of clientless litigation unique in our 
sybtem. 
22 The Court's resurrection of this dead conirover:;y may result in 
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I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot. 
irreparable injury to hmocent parties, as well as to the petitioner bank. 
When the District Court denied certification on September 29, 1975, ·it 
assigned as one of its reasons the possible !'destruction of the [petitioner] 
bank" by damages then alleged to total 12,000,000 and now potentially 
augmented by the accrual of interest. · App.' 47, see ante, at 2, n. 2. The 
possible destruction of the bank ·is ·irrelevant to 'the: jurisdictional issue, 
but serious indeed to depositors, stockholders, and· the community served. 
It is said that 'this -is necessary to ·redress ii:Jhtries possibly suffered by 
members of the putative class. Yet, no such person has come forward 
in the · nearly nine ·years that · have passed bince 'this action was filed. 
Indeed, the challenged conduct was atithorized by statute almost six years 
ago. As the ''District Court may be called ·upon to "determine whether the 
equitable doctrine of "relation · back" permit.~ it -to toll the statute of 
limitations on remand, ante, at' 3, n. 3, ·it will hardly be inappropriate for 
that court· to con:oider the equities on· both sides. · In the circumstances 
presented, the 'District Court may well · see no reason to exercise its equi-
table discretion in favor of putative class members who have slept on their· 
rights these many years. 
/~ 
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[February """/\' 1980] / f 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART 
joins, dissenting. 
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that 
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the 
National Bank Act and Mississippi law.1 They filed this 
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty 
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and 
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf 
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggre-
gating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District 
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification. 
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the 
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and 
court costs. Over respondents' objection, the District Court 
entered final judgment in their favor. Petitioner then depos-
ited the full amount due with the clerk of the court. 
No one disputes that the petitioner has tendered every-
thing that respondents could have recovered from it in this 
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed 
the denial of class certification. This Court affirms the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals, after finding that respondents . 
retain a personal stake in sharing the expense of litigation· / 
1 Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. §§ ,85, (of\ 
86, which adopts t~e ~~~r~t li!llits set hr ~ta,te l!lw1 an~28 U. S. C.-
51355. ' ../ 
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with members of the putative class. Ante, at 7~. 6} This 
speculative interest simply will not sustain the jtJriSdiction 
of an Art. III court under established and controlling prece~ 
dents. Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
Although there are differences, this case is similar to United 
~tates Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at -, in one 
important respect: both require us to decide whether pu~ 
tive class representatives may appeal the denial of class cer~ 
tHication when they can derive no benefit whatever from 
the relief sought in the action. Here, as in Geraghty, the 
District Court refused to certify a class. In this case, how~ 
ever, the Court recognizes established Art. III doctrine. It 
states that the "right to employ Rule 23'' is a "procedural 
right only, ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." 
Ante, at 6. It also agrees that a federal court "retains no 
jurisdiction over the controversy" when the parties' "sub-
stantive claims become moot in the Art. III sense." Ibid. 
Moreover, the C.tOurt acknowledges the familiar principle that 
a party who has no personal stake in the outcome of an action 
presents no case or controversy cognizable in a federal court of 
appeals. Id., at 7, 10. These are indeed the dispositive 
principles. My disagreement is with the way in which the 
Court applies them in this case. In my view, these principles 
unambiguously require a finding of mootness. 
A 
Since no class has been certified and no one has sought to 
intervene, respondents are the only plaintiffs arguably present 
in court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in the 
injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only dam~ ~ 
ages; those dainages have been tendered in fulP Respond-/ 
11 Although respondent~ also asked for attorney's fees, their complaint-
ii!lows tT1at, fees were· to be- granted only from the damages ultimately · 
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ents make no claim that success on the certification motion 
would entitle them to additional relief of any kind from the 
petitioner.3 Their personal claims to relief have been aban-
doned so completely that no appeal was taken in their own 
names. The notice of appeal filed with the District Court 
recites that respondents appeal only "on behalf of all others 
similarly situated ..•• " App. 63. 
This in itself is compelling evidence that respondents have 
no interest in the "individual and private case or controversy" 
relied on by the Court toclay. Ante, at 5. But even without 
such evidence, this and other courts routinely have held that 
a tender of full relief remedies a plaintiff's injuries and elimi-
nates his stake in the outcome. California v. San Pablo & 
Tulare R. Co., 149 U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill & 
Thomas Co. v. United States, 392 F. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per 
curiam); Larnb v. Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968) 
(per curiam) ; A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F. 
2d 89 (CA5 1965) (per curiam). It is the tender itself that 
moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. Ibid. 
Thus, the law is clear that a federal court is powerless to re-
view the abstract questions remaining in a case when the 
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that fully 
satisfies his claims. 
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result 
should differ because the District Court has entered a judg~ 
ment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their law-
suit as moot.4 It is certainly true, as the Court observes,~ 
awarded to them or the class. App. 13-14. There is no possibility of 
prospective relief because the Mississippi usury statute was amt'nded in 
1974 to authorizP, inter alia, the charges at issue in this case. 1974 Miss. 
Gen. Laws, ch. 564, § 7; sec Miss. Code A1111. § 75-17-1 (6) . 
3 Neither the Court nor the rr:spondeuts have asserted that the peti-
tioner's tender fails to include all costs and fee::; for which it could be held 
liable. See Part li-B, infra. 
4 The "statutory right" to appeal, ante, at 7, itself cannot supply ,<t 
per~onal stake in th(l outcome, for Congress cannot abrogate Art. III 
_/"' 
~-/. 
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-~~~~~~~o~f....;J~·u:.::d~g~n:;le::::n.:.:t~in favor of a party does not in 
itself moot his case. nte, at ~· There never has been any 
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally 
favora:ble judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wright, 
Miller and Cooper, Federal Practi·ce and Procedure § 3902 
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Pr~tctice ~ 203.06 (1975). But 
the requirement of adverse effect is more than a rule "of 
federal appellate practice." Ante, at 7. As we have held ~ 
repeatedly, and as the Court concedes, ante , at , r . / 
itself requires a live controversy in which a personal stake is 
at issue "throughout the entirety of the ·litigation." Sosn.a 
v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). See, e. g., Preiser v. 
Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395,401-401 (1975) . 
It is thjs constitutional limitation, and not any rule of prac-
tice, that has impelled federal courts uniformly to require a 
sJwwing of continuin ~se effect in order to co 1fer "stand- ~ 
ing to appeal." 15 Wright, Miller and Cooper, supra, § 390~ _; 
Marry v. Di~Bd. of Elections, - . . 
App. D. C.---,, 5 8800 F .. 2 dd 6 9955tl (1978); see Altvater v. Free-
mart, 319 U. S. 359 (1943); Electrical Fittings v. 'l'homas & 
Betts Co., 307 U. S. 241 (1939); Kapp v. National Football 
League, 586 F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9 1978); Cover v. Schwartz; ~ 
133 F. 2d 541 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U. S. '748 (1943),/ 
limitations on the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Gladstone, Realto1'1t 
v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979). 
~United Airlines, Inc . v. McDonald, 432' U.S. 385 (1977), and Coopertt 
& Lybrand v. Livesay 437 U. S. 463 (1978), are not to the contrary. 
Incidental dictum in both cases stated that the denial of class certification 
is subject to appellate review aft.er final judgment at. the behest of the 
named plaintiffs. Neither case di:scussed mootness, and neither analyzed 
the proposition in any way. Indeed, the only authority cited in Coopers 
& Lybrand was United Airlines, see 437 U. S., a.t 469, and the only 
authority cited in United Airlines was a concession made by the defendant 
and a list of case:; from the Courts of Appeals, not one of which dealt 
with a suggestion of mootness in an analogous situation, see 432 U. S., at 
393, and n. 14. Such statements, ca~-ually enunciated withotlt a word of 
' e~planation in opinions dealing with unrelated legal questions, are no~ 
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,A~:~ these cases show, the requirements of Art. III are not 
affected by the "factual context" in which a suggestion of 
mootness arises. See ante, at 6. Whatever the context, 
Art. III asl<s but a single question: Is there a continuing 
controversy between adverse parties who retain the requisite 
stake in the outcome of the A.ction? 
Electrical Fitt-ings v. 7'hornas & Betts Co., supra, is the case 
primarily relied upon by the Court. It provides little or no 
support for today's rtding. In Electrical Fittings, a limited 
appeal was allowed because the petitioner himself was prej-
udiced by the inclusion of an unnecessary and adverse finding 
in a generally favorable decree. See ante, at 10. Here, the 
existence of the District Court's order denying certification 
has no effect whatever on the respondents. Thus, the per-
sonal stake that justified the Electrical Fittings appeal is not 
present in this case. Absent sijch a stake, it is simply irrele-
vant that "policy oonsiderrations" sometimes may favor an 
appeal from "a procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of 
a litigation." Nor is it significant that the ruling "stands as 
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." /d. , at 9- 10. 
Collateral rulings-like other r1.1lings-may be appealed only 
when the requirements of Art. III are satisfied. 
B 
After recognizing that the right to &ppeal is subject to the 
"jurisdictional limitations of Art. III," the Court agrees that 
only a "party '[who] retains a stake in the appeal [can sat-
isfy] the requirements of Art. III." Ante, at 7; see id., at 
10. The Court also agrees that respondents have no remaining / 
stake in "the merits of the substantive controversy." ld., at ./ 
oot1trolling or even persua~ive when they are shown on further reflection 
to have been inconsistent. wit.h seWed law. A" the Court agrees today, 
neither case creates an exception to the fundament<~ I rule that ' ' l f]ederal 
appellate juriodict.ion is limited uy the appellan t'[<; perl)()nal sta ke in the / 
appettl." Ante, ut 10, / 
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~10. Nevertheless, it holds that respondents retain a per· 
sonal stake in this appeal because they "desire to shift to 
successful class litigants a portion of those fees and expenses 
that have been incurred in this litigation and for which they 
Msert a continuing obligation." Id., at 7, n. 6; see id., at 10.6 
This conclusion is neither legally sound nor supported by the 
record. 
:g. ,c.t l 
\\-\l)f\.1.) 
The Court fails to identify a single item of expense, charge-
able to the petitioner, that was incurred by respondents before· 
the petitioner's tender. Similarly, respondents have been 
conspicuously vague in identifying the "fees and expenses" 
relied upon as supplying the adverse interest essential to a live 
eontrovf'rsy.7 The only expense mentioned by respondents, 
apart from court costs included in the petitioner's tender, is 
not a present obligation at all. It is an offer to provide secu-
rity for costs in the event a class ultimately is certified. Brief ~ 
for Respondents 33; App. 78. Nor does the attomey's fee/ 
arrangement in this case create any obligatioil, present or 
• The Court also mentions that "[t]lw use of the cia~. action procedure 
for litigation of individual claims may offer substantial advantages for 
named plaintiffs .. . . " Ante, at lJa>....,.,.. But. any such advantages 
eannot accrue to these respondentl:i, who will not be litigating their own 
elaims on remand. Indeed, the Court referl:i to respondents in this context 
onl ' to point out that their total damages were so small that they "would 
e unlikely to obtain dress at an acceptable cost" if they could not 
o so b means of a calss action. We may assume that. respondents had 
some interest in the class-action procedure as a means of interesting the1r 
lawyers in the case or obtaining a sa.tisfactory settlement. This may be 
an interest properly furthered by Rule 23, but once respondents obtained 
both access to court and full individual relief that interest disappeared. 
' erhaps the strongest of r~pondents' statements is: 
"Of course, the intere;;.t of the [respondents] in assertion of the right to 
proceed on behalf of the class includes ~:~uch matters as the prospect for 
~preading attorney's fees and expense:; among more claimants and thus 
reducing the percentage that would otherwise be payable by them.'' 
Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismi:;s Appeul a11d 
Reply Brief, ffied in Rop~r v CaMurve (CA5, No. 76-3600), Jan. 10, 
197~: 
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future, that can be affected by the certification of a class. 
Respondents' complaint identifies the fee to be paid, subject 
to court approval, as "twenty-five percent (25% )" of the 
amount of the final judgment. App. 14, 16.8 No arrange-
mept other than this custom~try type contingent fee is identi-
fied in the record or the briefs. Yet, no one has explained how 
respondents' obligation to pay 25ro of their recovery to coun-
sel could be reduced if a class is certified and its members 
become similarly obligated to pay 25% of their recovery. 
Thus, the asserted interest in "spreading [of] attorney's fees 
and expenses" 11 relates to no present obligation. It is at 
most an expectation--of the respondents' and particularly of 
their counsel- that certain fees and expenses may become 
payable in the event a class is eertified. That expectation is 
wholly irrelevant to the existence of a present controversy 
between petitioner and respondents. 
rrhe C;0urt's reliance on unidentified fees and expenses can-
not be reconciled with the repeated admonition that "un-
adorned speculation will not suffice to invoke the federal 
judicial power." E. g., Simon v, Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights 
Org., 426 U. S. 26, 44 (1976). Such speculation is particu- (, 
larly inappropriate in this case, since neither the Court nor~ 
8 Respondents' "Demand for Judgment" asks the court. to award the 
"[c]ost of t.his action as well as attorney fees in the amount of 25% as 
hereinabove alleged, or such other amount as may be deemed fit and 
proper by the Court .. " App. 16. The request for fees was clarified in 
Paragra.ph VI of the amended complaint, Which reads as follows : 
":Plaintiff alleges that the Clerk of this Court be designated custodian 
of the funds and judgment to be paid Plaintiff and other persons similarly 
situated, by Defendants and the Clerk deposit said funds in a :mitable 
depository and, upon proper order of this Court, disburse said funds 
after deduction of necessary expenses and attorney fees to Plaintiff's 
attorneys herein of twenty-five per cent (25%) of the amount so paid, 
the same being reasonable by all standards, including that alleged and 
utilized by Defendants in suing certain members in of [sic] the classy·n 
State Courts for unpaid accounts." App. 13-14. 
0 See n. 7, supra. 
) 
78-904-DISSENT 
8 DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. 13ANK v. ROPER 
respondents have suggested that the petitioner is or ever ·Will 
be liable for the fees or expenses relied upon. Indeed, the 
American Rule would bar an award of ~:~-ttorney's fees against 
'.' 
this petitioner. Thus, respondents' "iiijury"-if an;y exists-
is not one that "fairly can be traced" to the petitioner. ld., 
at 41-42; see Gladstone, Realtors v. Yi-~lage of Bellwood, 441 
U. S. 91, 99 1 w Whatever may be the basis for the 
respondents' asserted desire to share fees and expeHses with 
unnamed members of a class, the petitioner is merely a by-
Btander. "[F]edcral courts are without power to decide ques-
tions that ·cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case 
before them." North Carolin(l v. l?.irc, 404 (T. R. 244. 24G 
(1971). This elementary principle should diBpose of the case, 
c 
Since respondents have no continuing personal stake in the 
outcome of this action, Art. III and the precedents of this 
Court require that the case be dismissed as moot. E. g., 
Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 172-173 (1977) (per curiam); 
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1976) (per curiam); 
Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-404 (1975); Indian-
apolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975); De-
Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, 316-320 (1974) (per 
curiam); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971) 
(per cu.riam); SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights, ~ 
404 u.s. 403, 407 (1972).11 / 
J.o Far-reaching consequences could How from :t rule thai fees recoverable 
from put~ttjve cl<llis membero; ma.y be "traced" t.o the class defendtmt 
for purposes of t1H:1 ca.-::e or controvero;y requiremf'Tit.. At tlH" lenst., this 
rule would support a claim t1mi a rerson who ha.~ acreptrcl li11l o;ettlemeni 
of his individual cla.im is entitled to fi[p suit ou behalf of ~m unrreompC'm.:ed 
clUb.~. Apparently, the putative plaintiff need only ''a&-;,-erft]," ante, at 7, 
n . 6, tlmt fee~ incurred in aJ1ticipa.t.ion of t.he litiga.tion ultimntrly nught be 
sharrd with tt prevailing class. 
11 These cast-\~ nre discussed more fully in Uniterl States Parule Cam,. 
'fftisNion v. Geraghty, post, at --- (PowHLL, .1., dis,;;cnting). 
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Respondents do not suggest that their claims are "capable 
of repetition. yet evading review." Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 Ard 
U. S. 103, 110-111, n. 11 (1975).u ~t a single one of the 
alleged 90,000 class members has s<>ught to intervene in the 
nine years since this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines, 
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone 
challenged the allegedly usurious charges by informal com-
plaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certifica-
tion was denied, the action lay dormant during the seven 
months in which respondents sought to take an interlocutory 
atJpcal, without provoking a response from anyone who previ-
ously may have thought that the cla~s action would protect 
his rights. Apart from the persistence of the lawyers, this 
has been a noncase since the petitioner tendered full satisfac-
tion of the respondents' individual cla.ims. To be sure, re-
spondents' counsel may have the same interest in an enlarged 
recovery that is inherent in any contingent fee arra1~gement. 
But I know of no deci~ion by any court that holds that a 
lawyer's interest in a larger fee, to be paid by third person~ 
not present in court, creates the personal stake in the outcome 
required by Art. III. 
II 
Despite the absence of an Art. III controversy, the Court 
directs a remand in which this federal action will be litigated 
by lawyers whose only "clients" are unidentified class mem~ 
hers who have shown no desire to be represented by anyone.13 
----
12 If a cla<>S-action defendant were shown to have embarked on a course 
of conduct designed to insulate the class certification issue from appellate 
review in order to avoid classwide liability, a court in proper circumstances 
might find the Gerstein test satisfied and the case not moot. See Susman v. 
Lincoln American Corp., 587 ;F. 2d 866 (CA7 1978); 13 Wright, Miller & 
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 171 (Supp. 1979); 
Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following 
Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 599-600. 
l H I do not suggest that counsel acted improperly in pursuing this case, 
Since they havo prev.Hed both in thi• Cooct and in tbe Court of Appeal/ 
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The Court appears to endorse this fonn of litigation for rea. 
aons of policy and practice. It is said to be an effective 
"response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the 
regulatory action of government." Ante, at 12. I am not 
aware that such a consideration ever before has influenced this 
Court in determining whether the Constitution confers juris-
diction on the federal courts. In any event, the consequences 
of a finding of mootness are not likely to be as restrictive as 
the Court seems to fear. And the Court fails to recognize 
that allowing this action to proceed without an interested 
plaintiff will itself generate practical difficulties of some 
magnitude, 
A 
A finding of mootness would have repercussions primarily 
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who 
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to 
a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent 
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification 
generally would be barred by Art. III. But the consequences 
of applying settled rules of mootness in that situation would 
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were 
granted, the absent members of the putative class would have 
obtained by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of 
the benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand, 
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of 
the certification ruling would enable putative class members to 
take advantage of' a favorable judgment on the issue of liability 
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable 
judgment. Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in 
this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" that ./" 
the 1966' amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate./ 
the respOllsibility for allowing client-less litigation~ fall)r-o-:n""'7Tth:-:-e- l,...'ed.,.,e-n--.ll--lf$ 
courts. · 
H See Comment, Immediate Appealability of Orders Denying Class Ce;; ~ 
tification, 40 Ohio St. L. J . 441, 470-471 (1979) . In actions brought und/ 
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Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise 
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before 
judgment, a.s petitioner did in this caee. A defendant cer-
tainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactie in 
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny 
compensation to putative .class membel'f$ and jeops.rdize the 
enforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney[s] 
~ general." Ante, at@12. The practical argument is not 
· out force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns 
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the ade-
quacy of compensation and enforcement available for particu-
lar substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best 
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be 
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim. 
Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of 
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of 
~ry claims/ 11 the Court's col1cern for compensation of puta-
tive ·class members in this case is at best misplaced and at, 
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling 
Act/ 6 
Rule 23 (b )(3) , a class member tl\Ust deci4e at the time of certification 
whether to "opt out" of the action under Rule 23 (c)(2). This provision 
was qesigned ·to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class 
members were permitted to intervene after a decillion on the merits 
in order ro 1$00Ure the benefits of that decision. Notes of the Advisory 
Committee o~ PropQfled Amendment!:! to Rule 23, 39 F . R . D. ~9, 105-106 
(1966) . 
1 6 LiddeU v. Litton Systems, Inc., 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting bor .. 
rowers' class action); Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941). 
Petitioner ill a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply with Mill-
llissippi'a interest limits would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U. S. C. 
§ 85. B1.1t I do not understand that the National Bank Act displacet; state 
. policy disfavoring the aggregation of usury claim13. A primary purpose of 
that Act is to protect national banks from discriminatory treatment or 
undue penalties that may be imposed by state law. See 12 U. S. § 86. 
16 'l'he Act provides t.hat rules of procedure promulgated by this Court 
''eb.aU no.t . , • enlarge ol' modify any aub$tantive right." 28 U. S, C. 
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The Court's concern for putative class members would be 
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced 
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litiga-
tion of successive suits by members of the putative· class. ···· I 
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial admin-
istration would be real. But these problems can and should be 
addressed by measures short of u~dercutting the law of moot-
ness, as the Court seems to, have done today. -·· The first step 
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the 
denial of class certification in appropriate circumstances.17 
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C: § 1292 
(b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain con-
trolling questions of law._ In many cases, a -class-action 
defendant undoubtedly would forgo the opportunity to settle 
with an individual plaintiff in order to' obtain an immediate 
and final determination of the' class certification . question on 
appeal. 
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a· class action by 
forced settlement, the District Court is not powerless. -. In at 
least some circumstances, it may require that putative ~class 
members receive some sort"of notice and an opportunity to 
intervene within. 'the appeal period . .. Rule· 23 (d)-(2). ·· The 
availabpity oT such· measures could be a significant deterrent ~ 
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District / 
§ 2072. See American Pipe & C~nstruction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538, 
557-558 (1974); Developments in the Law-'-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1318, 1358-1359 (1'976) . See generally Landers, Of Legalized l3lack-
mail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-
PrQCedure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974) . 
17 In Coopers & Lybrand v·. Livesay, -43TU. S. ·463 (1978), this Court 
held that the denial of class certification is not a "final decision" appeal-
able as of right under 28 U. S. C: § 1291. We relied in that case on the 
dangers of i'indiscrimhiate" interlocutory review: -!d., at -474. Although 
Coopers & Lybraiul now prevents review in cases in ·which it would b~ . /~ 
' desirable, Cong""' may remedy ·the problem by appropriate legislation/ 
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Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the 
case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended 
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent inter-
locutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are 
lacking, it is for Congress-not this Court-to correct the 
deficiency.18 
B 
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it, 
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems often 
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their 
own. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respond-
ents will serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for the 
purpose of obtaining class certification. Since they can gain 
nothing more from the action, their participation iA tlu ease 0 
can be intended only to benefit counsel and the members of a 
putative class who have indicated no interest in the claims 
asserted in this case. Respondents serve on their own mo-
tion-if indeed they serve at alP0 Since no court has cer-
tified the class, there has been no considered determination 
that respondents will fairly and adequa,tely represent its 
members. Nothing in Rule 2~ authorizes this novel procedure, ____-
and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to ity-
18 Congress currt>ntly has before it a bill that attt>mpts to remedy the 
difficulties infecting this troubled area. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1919). The bill, supported by the Department of Justice, proposes to 
bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, supra, and to eliminate 
some of the problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by 
creating a new federal right of actjon for damages. The bill provides for 
the enforcement of this right in some Instances through actions brought in 
the name of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory 
appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class cer-
tification under the propo;;ed procedurefi!. 
19 As not~d above, p. 3, supra, respondt>nts took no appeal in thei11: 
own names. One would think t.hat this candid disclaimer of personal 
'
o· ) distroy tho foundation upon which the Court predicateS.: 
Art. III jurisdiction. 1 e, at ; see p. 6, supra. 
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Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent? 
See East Tex,as. Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, ·431 U. S. 395, 
403-404 ( 1977). Are their currently none)!:istent claims "typi-
cal of the claims ... of the class" within the meaning of Rule 
23(a)(3)? 20 · 
The Court's holding well may pr~vent future "forced set-
tlements" of class action litigation: ~ Thus; the difficulties 
faced by the District Court on remand in this case may not 
arise again in precisely analogous circumstances. But today's 
result also authorizes appeals by putative class representatives 
who have litigated and prevailed on the merits of their in-
dividual claims. If the order denying class certification is 
reversed in that situation, the named plaintiffs on remand 
will have no more continuing relationship to the putative 
class than respondents have here. A remand for certification 
could also lead to "one-way intervention" in direct violation 
of Rule 23. See p. 10, and n. 14, supra. , These tensions, 
arising from the express terms of the ltule, undermine the 
Court's conclusion that the policies underlying Rule 23 dic-
tate the result reached today. 
III 
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of 
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from 
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence.21 It unneces-/ 
20 The District Court properly may conclude on remand that respondents, 
for these or other reasons, cannot adequately represent the class. 
21 MR. JusTICE S•rEVENS states, in his concurring opinion, that all persons · 
allegoo to be membt'rs of a putative class "should be considered parties 
to the case or controversy at least for the limited purpOISe" of Art. III, a.nd 
that. they "remain parties until a final determination has been made tha.t the 
action may not be maintajned as a class action." Ante, at -. This · 
novel view apparently derives from early cases in which the Court reft•rred 
to class members who would be bound by a judgment as "absent partirs," 
Han~berry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32; 42 (1940), or "parties in intere.st.," 
Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 How. 288, 303 (1853). Ante, aJ. -, n. 3. But 
these cases were decided before crrtification was e<1tabli~hed as the method 
~ 
_ s /V~r/r J-
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earily creates significant problems in the administration of 
Rule 23. And it mtl-Y work a serious injustice in this c,_as_e_._22 _ __,r_~ 
"'b which a chu,;s achieves judicial recognition. Under Rule 23, tt6'\ mem- t_-
ber of a pu a, v c ass wt be bound by a judgment unless <L proper cer-
tification order iH entered. Thaot t11er ma.y be "inter~ted parties," ibid., 
before that time does not. make •them parties to tl1e litigation in any 
~' as tthis Court hw;; recognized. In Jndiaoopolis School Comm'rs v. 
Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975), the Comt. hPld tha.t an oral certification 
order was insufficient to idPntify the interest.-; of absent rla.'Ss IPembers for 
Art. III purpo:;es. The result lmrdly could be differPnt when the class 
has not been identified at all. See al;;o Memphis Light, Gas & Water 
Div. v. Craft. 436 U.S. 1, 8 (HJ78); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 423 U.S. ao8, 
310, n. 1 (1976); Weinstt>in v. Bmdford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975); Pasadena 
City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 430 (1976). 
MH. Just•tcE STEVENS indicntes tha.t unnamed members of an uncerti-
fied clas.~ may be "present" as parties for some purposes and not for 
others. No ttu t.l10rit>' is cited for such selective "pret;ence" in an actjon. 
Nor is any explanation offered as to how a court is to determine when 
theJSe unidentifjed '·parties" arE~ preJSent. If their presence is to be 
limited to the satisfact.ion of the Art. III case or controversy requirement, 
then t.he rule of party status would have no content apart. from Art.. Ill 
and could only be drscribed a~< a legal fiction . If, on tho other hand, the 
proposed rule is 'to apply outsidr the Art .. III context, it may have trouble-
some ~mel fa.r-rraching implication~;~ that could prejudice the bringing of 
clal:lS actionti. Presumably, a purpos<> of the rule of party status would be 
to a :;nre that satisfaction of the claims of named par;t.ie:; would not 
terminate the litigation. Nor could the rights of unnamed parties be 
extinguished by the frulure of the named parties to appeal. Thus, if tthe 
rule proposed by Mu. JusncE STJWENS is to accomplish its purpose, 
I suppose that a fiduciary duty must be imposed upon named part.ies to 
continue the litiga.tion where-aH here-the unnamed })iLrties remain 
unidentified and fail to intervenP. As fiduciarie;;, would the named 
part.ie;; not only be rrquired to continue t.o litigate, but to assume per-
sonal responsibility for costs and attorney's fees 'if the case ultimately is 
lost? Would responsible litiganta be willing to file class actions if they 
thereby assumed such long-term fiduciary obligations? These and like 
questions are substantial. They are not resolved by Rule 23. I believe 
they merit careful study by Congress before this Court-perhaps u~1wit~ 
tingly-creates a major category of clientless litigation unique in our 
system. 
22 The Court's re~lUrrection of this dead controversy may result i/ 
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I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot. 
irreparable injury to ilmocent parties, as well as to the petitioner bank. 
When the District Court denied cert.ification on September 29, 1975, ·it 
assigned as one of its reasons the possible ,"destruction of the [petitioner] 
bank" by damages then alleged to total 12,000,000 1U1d now potentially 
augmented by the accrual of interest. 'App.' 47, see ante, at 2, n. 2. The 
possible destruction of the bank ·is ·irrelevant to 'the. jurisdictional issue, 
but serious indeed to depositors, stockholders, and· the community served. 
It is said that 'this -is necessary to ·redress injuries possibly suffered by 
members of the putative class. Yet, no such person has come forward 
in the nearly nine ·years that · have pa~ed since 'this action was filed. 
Indeed, the challenged conduct was atithorized by statute almost six years 
ago. As the ''District Court· may be called ·upon to ·determine whether the 
equitable doctrine of "relation · back" permits it to toll the statute of 
limitations on remand, ante, at· 3, n. 3, ·it will hardly be inappropriate for 
that court· to consider the equities on· both sides. · In the circumstances 
presented, the 'District Court may well see no reason to exercise its equi-
table discretion in favor of putative class members who have slept on their 
rights these many years. 
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SUPBEME COUBT OF THE UNITED STAn! 
No. 78-904 
Deposit Guaranty National Bank,IOn Writ of Certiorari to 
Jackson, Mississippi, Petitioner, the United States Court 
v. of Appe.als for the Fifth 
Robert L. Roper et al. Circuit. 
[March 19, 1980], 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART 
joins, dissenting. 
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that 
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the 
National Bank Act and Mississippi law.1 They filed this 
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty 
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and 
$322.70. App: 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf 
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggre-
gating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District 
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification. 
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the 
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and 
court costs. Over respondents' objection, the District Court 
entered final judgment in their favor. Petitioner then depos-
ited the full amount due with the clerk of the court. 
No one disputes that the petitioner has tendered every-
thing that respondents could have recovered from it in this 
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed 
the denial of class certification. This Court affirms the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals, after finding that respondents 
retain a personal stake in sharing the expense of litigation 
1 Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U.S. C. §§ 85, 
86, which adopts the interest limits set by state law, and on 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1355. 
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with members of the putative class. Ante, at 7, n. 6. 10. Thig 
speculative interest simply will not sustain the jurisdiction 
of an Art. III court under established and controlling prece-
dents. Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
Although there are differences, this case is similar to United 
States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at -, in one 
important respect: both require us to decide whether puta-
tive class representatives may appeal the denial of class cer-
tification when they can derive no benefit whatever from 
the relief sought in the action. Here, as in Geraghty, the 
District Court refused to certify a class. In this case, how-
ever, the Court recognizes established Art. III doctrine. It 
states that the "right to employ Rule 23" is a "procedural 
right only, ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." 
Ante, at 6. It also agrees that a federal court "retains no 
jurisdiction over the controversy" when the parties' "sub-
stantive claims become moot in the Art. III sense." Ibid. 
Moreover, the Court acknowledges the familiar principle that 
a party who has no personal stake in the outcome of an action 
presents no case or controversy cognizable in a federal court of 
appeals. !d., at 7, 10. These are indeed the dispositive 
principles. My disagreement is with the way in which the 
Court applies them in this case. In my view, these principles 
unambiguously require a finding of mootness. 
A 
Since no class has been certified and no one has sought to 
intervene, respondents are the only plaintiffs arguably present 
in court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in the 
injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only dam-
ages; those damages have been tendered in fulJ.2 Respond-
2 Although respondents also asked for attorney's fees, their complaint 
shows that fees were to be granted only from the damages ultimately 
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ents make no claim that success on the certification motion 
would entitle them to additional relief of any kind from the 
petitioner.8 Their personal claims to relief have been aban-
doned so completely that no appeal was taken in their own 
names. The notice of appeal filed with the District Court 
recites that respondents appeal only "on behalf of all others 
similarly situated .... " App. 63. 
This in itself is compelling evidence that respondents have 
no interest in the "individual and private case or controversy" 
relied on by the Court today. Ante, at 5. But even without 
such evidence, this and other courts routinely have held that 
a tender of full relief remedies a plaintiff's injuries and elimi-
nates his stake in the outcome. California v. San Pablo & 
Tulare R. Co., 149 U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill & 
Thomas Co. v. United States, 392 F. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per 
curiam); Lamb v. Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968) 
(per curiam); A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F. 
2d 89 (CAS 1965) (per curiam). It is the tender itself that 
moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. Ibid. 
Thus, the law is clear that a federal court is powerless to re-
view the abstract questions remaining in a case when the 
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that fully 
satisfies his claims. 
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result 
should differ because the District Court has entered a judg-
ment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their law-
suit as moot.4 It is certainly true, as the Court observes, 
awarded to them or the class. App. 13-14. There is no possibility of 
prospective relief because the Mississippi usury statute was amended in 
1974 to authorize, inter alia, the charges at issue in this case. 1974 Miss. 
Gen. Laws, ch. 564, § 7; see Miss. Code Ann.§ 75-17-1 (6). 
8 Neither the Court nor the respondents have asserted that the peti-
tioner's tender fails to include all costs and fees for which it could be held 
liable. See Part 11-B, infra. 
4 The "statutory right" to appeal, ante, at 7, itself cannot supply a 
personal stake in the outcome, for Congress cannot abrogate Art. III 
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that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in 
itself moot his case. Ante, at 6- 7. There never has been any 
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally 
favorable judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wright, 
Miller and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3902 
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practice 1f 203.06 (1975). But 
the requirement of adverse effect is more than a rule "of 
federal appellate practice." Ante, at 7. As we have held 
repeatedly, and as the Court concedes, ante, at 7, 10, Art. III 
itself requires a live controversy in which a personal stake is 
at issue "throughout the entirety of the litigation." Sosna 
v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). See, e. g., Preiser v. 
Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401-401 (1975). 
It is this constitutional limitation, and not any rule of prac-
tice, that has impelled federal courts uniformly to require a 
showing of continuing adverse effect in order to confer "stand-
ing to appeal." Barry v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elec-
tiorns, - U. S. App. D. C. -, 580 F. 2d 695, 696 (1978); 
15 Wright, Miller and Cooper, supra, § 3902; see Altvater v. 
Freeman, 319 U. S. 359 (1943); Electrical Fittings v. Thomas & 
Betts Co., 307 U. S. 241 (1939); Kapp v. National Football 
League, 586 F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9 1978); Cover v. Schwartz, 
133 F. 2d 541 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U. S. 748 (1943).5 
limi~ations on the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Gladstone, Realtors 
v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91 , 100 (1979). 
5 United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977), and Coopers 
& Lybrand v. Livesay 437 U. S. 463 (1978), are not to the contrary. 
Incidental dictum in both cases stated that the denial of class certilication 
is subject to appellate review after final judgment at the behest of the 
named plaintiffs. Neither case discussed mootness, and neither analyzed 
the proposition in any way. Indeed, the only authority cited in Coopers 
& Lybrand was United Airlines, see 437 U. 8 ., at 469, and the only 
authority cited in United Airlines was a concession made by the defendant 
and a list of cases from the Courts of Appeals, not one of which dealt 
with a suggestion of mootness in an analogous situation, see 432 U. S., at 
393, and n. 14. Such statements, casually enunciated without a word of 
explanation in opinions dealing with unrelated legal questions, are not 
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As these cases show, the requirements of Art. III are not 
affected by the "factual context" in which a suggestion of 
mootness arises. See ante, at 6. Whatever the context, 
Art. III asks but a single question: Is there a continuing 
controversy between adverse parties who retain the requisite 
stake in the outcome of the action? 
Electrical Fittings v. Thomas & Betts Co., supra, is the case 
primarily relied upon by the Court. It provides little or no 
support for today's ruling. In Electrical Fittings, a limited 
appeal was allowed because the petitioner himself was prej-
udiced by the inclusion of an unnecessary and adverse finding 
in a generally favorable decree. See ante, at 10. Here, the 
existence of the District Court's order denying certification 
has no effect whatever on the respondents. Thus, the per-
sonal stake that justified the Electrical Fittings appeal is not 
present in this case. Absent such a stake, it is simply irrele-
vant that "policy considerations" sometimes may favor an 
appeal from "a procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of 
a litigation." Nor is it significant that the ruling "stands as 
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." Id., at 9-10. 
Collateral rulings-like other rulings-may be appealed only 
when the requirements of Art. III are satisfied. 
B 
After recognizing that the right to appeal is subject to the 
"jurisdictional limitations of Art. III," the Court agrees that 
only a "party [who] retains a stake in the appeal [can sat-
isfy] the requirements of Art. III." Ante, at 7; see id., at 
10. The Court also agrees that respondents have no remaining 
stake in "the merits of the substantive controversy." Id., at 
controlling or even persuasive when they are shown on further reflection 
to have been inconsistent with settled law. As the Court agrees today, 
neither case creates an exception to the fundamental rule that "[f]ederal 
appellate jurisdiction is limited by the appellant's personal stake in the 
appeal." Ante, at 10. 
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10. Nevertheless, it holds that respondents retain a per-
sonal stake in this appeal because they "desire to shift to 
successful class litigants a portion of those fees and expenses 
that have been incurred in this litigation and for which they 
assert a continuing obligation." Id., at 7, n. 6; see id., at 10.6 
This conclusion is neither legally sound nor supported by the 
record. 
The Court fails to identify a single item of expense, charge-
able to the petitioner, that was incurred by respondents before 
the petitioner's tender. Similarly, respondents have been 
conspicuously vague in identifying the "fees and expenses" 
relied upon as supplying the adverse interest essential to a live 
controversy.7 The only expense mentioned by respondents, 
apart from court costs included in the petitioner's tender, is 
not a present obligation at all. It is an offer to provide secu-
rity for costs in the event a class ultimately is certified. Brief 
for Respondents 33; App. 78. Nor does the attorney's fee 
6 The Court also mentions that "[t]he use of the class action procedure 
for litigation of individual claims may offer substantial advantages for 
named plaintiffs .... " Ante, at 11. But any such advantages cannot 
ac<ftj to these respondents, who will not be litigating their own claims 
on remand. Indeed, the Court refers to respondents in this context only 
to point out tha:t their total damages were so small that they "would 
be unlikely to obtain legal redress at an acceptable cost" if they could not 
do so by means of a class action. ld, at 11-12, n. 9. We may assume 
that respondents had some interest in t,he class-action procedure as a 
means of interesting their lawyers in the case or obtaining a satisfactory 
se1Jtlement. This ma,y be an interest properly furthered by Rule 23, but 
once respondents obtained both access to court and full individual relief 
that interest disappeared. 
7 Perhaps the strongest of respondents' statements is: 
"Of course, the interest of the [respondents] in assertion of the right to 
proceed on behalf of the class includes such matters as the prospect for 
spreading attorney's fees and expenses among more claimants and thus 
reducing the percentage that would otherwise be payable by them." 
Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Appeal and 
Reply Brief, filed in Roper v. Cansurve (CA5, No. 76-3600), Jan. 10, 
1977. 
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arrangement in this case create any obligation, present or 
future, that can be affected by the certification of a class. 
Respondents' complaint identifies the fee to be paid, subject 
to court approval, as "twenty-five percent (25% )" of the 
amount of the final judgment. App. 14, 16.8 No arrange-
ment other than this customary type contingent fee is identi-
fied in the record or the briefs. Yet, no one has explained how 
respondents' obligation to pay 25o/o of their recovery to coun-
sel could be reduced if a class is certified and its members 
become similarly obligated to pay 25% of their recovery. 
Thus, the asserted interest in "spreading [of] attorney's fees 
and expenses" 9 relates to no present obligation. It is at 
most an expectation-of the respondents' and particularly of 
their counsel-that certain fees and expenses may become 
payable in the event a class is certified. That expectation is 
wholly irrelevant to the existence of a present controversy 
between petitioner and respondents. 
The Court's reliance on unidentified fees and expenses can-
not be reconciled with the repeated admonition that "un-
adorned speculation will not suffice to invoke the federal 
judicial power." E. g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights 
Org., 426 U. S. 26, 44 (1976). Such speculation is particu-
larly inappropriate in this case, since neither the Court nor the 
8 Respondents' "Demand for Judgment" asks the court to award the 
"[c]ost of this action as well as attorney fees in the amount of 25% as 
hereinabove alleged, or such other amount as may be deemed fit and 
proper by the Court." App. 16. The request for fees was clarified in 
Paragraph VI of the amended complaint, which reads as follows: 
"Plaintiff alleges that the Clerk of this Court be designated custodian 
of the funds and judgment to be paid Plaintiff and other persons similarly 
situated, by Defendants and the Clerk deposit said funds in a suitable 
depository and, upon proper order of this Court, disburse said funds 
after deduction of necessary expenses and attorney fees to Plaintiff's 
attorneys herein of twenty-five per cent (25%) of the amount so paid, 
the same being reasonable by all standards, including that alleged and 
utilized by Defendants in suing certain members in of [sic] the class in 
State Courts for unpaid accounts." App. 13-14. 
9 See n. 7, supra. 
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respondents have suggested that the petitioner is or ever will 
be liable for the fees or expenses relied -qpon. Indeed, the 
American Rule would bar an award of attorney's fees against 
this petitioner. Thus, respondents' 11injury"-if any exists-
is not one that 11fairly can be traced" to the petitioner. ld., 
at 41-42; see Gladstone, Realtors. v. Village of Bellwood, 441 
U. S. 91, 99 (1979).10 Whatever may be the basis for the 
respondents' asserted desire to share fees and expenses with 
unnamed members of a class, the petitioner is merely a by-
stander. "[F]ederal courts are without power to decide ques-
tions that 'Cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case 
before them." North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246, 
(1971). This elementary principle should disp()se of the case. 
c 
Since respondents have no continuing personal stake in the 
outcome of this action, Art. III and the precedents of this 
Court require that the case be dismissed as moot. E. g., 
Ashcroftv.Mattis,431 U.S.171, 172-173 (1977) (percuriam); 
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1976) (per curiam); 
Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-404 (1975); Indian-
apolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975); De-
Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, 316-320 (1974) (per 
curiam); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971) 
(per curiam); SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights, 
404 u.s. 403, 407 (1972).11 
1° Far-reaching consequences could flow from a rule that fees recoverable 
from putative class members may be "traced" to the class defendant 
for purposes of the case or controversy requirement. At the least, this 
rule would support a claim that a person who has accepted full settlement 
of his individual claim is entitled to file suit on behalf of an unrecompensed 
class. Apparently, the putative plaintiff need only "asser[t]," ante, at 7, 
n. 6, that fees incurred in anticipation of the litigation ultimately might be 
shared with a prevailing class. 
11 These cases are discussed more fully in United States Parole Com-
mission v. Geraghty, post, at--- (PowELL, J., dissenting). 
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Respondents do not suggest that their claims are 11capable 
of repetition, yet evading review." Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 
U.S. 103, 110- 111, n. 11 (1975).12 And not a single one of the 
alleged 90,000 class members has sought to intervene in the 
nine years since this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines, 
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone 
challenged the allegedly usurious charges by informal com-
plaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certifica-
tion was denied, the action lay dormant during the seven 
months in which respondents sought to take an interlocutory 
appeal, without provoking a response from anyone who previ-
ously may have thought that the class action would protect 
his rights. Apart from the persistence of the lawyers, this 
has been a noncase since the petitioner tendered full satisfac-
tion of the respondents' individual claims. To be sure, re-
spondents' counsel may have the same interest in an enlarged 
recovery that is inherent in any contingent fee arrangement. 
But I know of no decision by any court that holds that a 
lawyer's interest in a larger fee, to be paid by third persons 
not present in court, creates the personal stake in the outcome 
required by Art. III. 
II 
Despite the absence of an Art. III controversy, the Court 
directs a remand in which this federal action will be litigated 
by lawyers whose only 11clients" are unidentified class mem-
bers who have shown no desire to be represented by anyone.18 
12 If a class-action defendant were shown to have embarked on a course 
of conduct designed to insulate the class certification issue from appellate 
review in order to avoid classwide liability, a court in proper circumstances 
might find the Gerstein test satisfied and the case not moot. See Susman v. 
Lincoln American Corp., 587 F. 2d 866 (CA7 1978); 13 Wright, Miller & 
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 171 (Supp. 1979); 
Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following 
Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 599-600. 
18 I do not suggest that counsel acted improperly in pursuing this case. 
Since they have prevailed both in this Court and in the Court of Appeals, 
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The Court appears to endorse this form of litigation for rea-
sons of policy and practice. It is said to be an effective 
"'response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the 
regulatory action of government." Ante, at 12. I am not 
aware that such a consideration ever before has influenced this 
Court in determining whether the Constitution confers juris-
diction on the federal courts. In any event, the consequences 
of a finding of mootness are not likely to be as restrictive as 
the Court seems to fear. And the Court fails to recognize 
that allowing this action to proceed without an interested 
plaintiff will itself generate practical difficulties of some 
magnitude. 
A 
A finding of mootness would have repercussions primarily 
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who 
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to 
a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent 
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification 
generally would be barred by Art. III. But the consequences 
of applying settled rules of mootness in that situation would 
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were 
granted, the absent members of the putative class would have 
obtained by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of 
the benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand, 
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of 
the certification ruling would enable putative class members to 
take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability 
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable 
judgment. Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in 
this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" that 
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate.14 
the responsibility for allowing client-less litigation falls on the federal 
courts. 
14 See Comment, Immediate Appealability of Orders Denying Class Cer-
tification, 40 Ohio St. L. J. 441, 470-471 (1979). In actions brought under 
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Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise 
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before 
judgment, as petitioner did in this case. A defendant cer-
tainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in 
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny 
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the 
enforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney[s] 
general." Ante, at 12. The practical argument is not with-
out force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns 
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the ade-
quacy of compensation and enforcement available for particu-
lar substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best 
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be 
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim. 
Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of 
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of 
usury claims,1 5 the Court's concern for compensation of puta-
tive class members in this case is at best misplaced and at 
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling 
Act.18 
Rule 23 (b )(3), a. class member must decide at the time of certification 
whether to "opt out" of the action under Rule 23 (c) (2). This provision 
was designed to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class 
members were permitted to intervene after a decision on the merits 
in order to secure the benefits of that decision. Notes of the Advisory 
Committee on Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F . R. D. 69, 105-106 
(1966). 
1 5 LiddeU v. Litton Systems, Inc. , 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting bor-
rowers' class action); Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941). 
Petitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply with Mis-
sissippi'3 interest limits would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U.S. C. 
§ 85. But I do not understand that the National Bank Act displaces state 
policy disfavoring the aggregation of usury claims. A primary purpose of 
that Act is to protect national banks from discriminatory treatment or 
undue penalties that may be imposed by state law. See 12 U. S. § 86. 
16 The Act provides that rules of procedure promulgated by this Court 
"shall not . , . enlarge or modify any substantive right." 28 U. S. C. 
78-904-DISSENT 
J2 DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK v. ROPER 
The Court's coneern for pytative class members would ba 
more telling in a more appropriate cttse. A pattern of forced 
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the Iitiga .. 
tion of successive suits by members of the putative class. I 
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial admin-
istration would be real. But these problems can and should be 
addressed by measures short of undercutting the law of moot-
ness, as the Court seems to have done today. The first step 
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the 
denial of class certification in appropriate circumstances.17 
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292 
(b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain con-
trolling questions of law. In many cases, a class-action 
defendant undoubtedly would forgo the opportunity to settle 
with an individual plaintiff in order to obtain an immediate 
and final determination of the class certification question o~ 
appeal. 
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a class action by 
forced settlement, the District Court is not powerless. In at 
least some circumstances, it may require that putative class 
members receive some sort of notice and an opportunity to 
intervene within the appeal period. Rule 23 (d)(2). The 
availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent 
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District 
§ 2072. See American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538, 
557-558 (1974); Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1318, 1358-1359 (1976). See generally Landers, Of Legalized Black-
mail and Legalized Theft : Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-
Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974). 
17 In Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463 (1978), this Court 
held that the denial of class certification is not a "final decision" appeal-
able as of right under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We relied in that case on the 
dangers of "indiscriminate" interlocutory review. ld., at 474. Although 
Coopers & Lybrand now prevents review in cases in which it would be 
~irable, Congress may remedy the problem by approprjate legifl.lation. 
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Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the 
case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended 
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent inter-
locutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are 
lacking, it is for Congress-not this Court-to correct the 
rdefidency,18 
B 
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it, 
'judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems often 
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their 
own. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respond-
ents will serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for the 
purpose of obtaining class certification. Since they can gain 
nothing more from the action, their participation can be 
intended only to benefit counsel and the members of a 
putative class who have indicated no interest in the claims 
asserted in this case. Respondents serve on their own mo-
tion-if indeed they serve at all.19 Since no court has cer-
tified the class, there has been no considered determination 
that respondents will fairly and adequately represent its 
members. Nothing in Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure, 
·and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it. 
18 Congress currently has before it a bill that attempts to remedy the 
'difficulties infecting this troubled area. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1979). The bill, supported by the Department of Justice, proposes to 
bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, 8Upra, and to eliminate 
some of the problems of claims too small to justify individua:I lawsuits, by 
creating a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provides for 
· the enforcement of this right in some instances through actions brought in 
' the nmne of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory 
·appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class cer-
tffication under the proposed procedures. 
'19 As noted above, p. 3, supra, respondents took no appeal in their 
own names. One would think that this candid disclaimer of personal 
interest would distroy the foundation upon which the Court predicates 
Art. III jurisdiction. Ante, at 10; seep. 6, supra. 
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sarily creates significant problems in the administration of 
Rule 23. And it may work a serious injustice in this case.22 
by which a claBs achieves judicial recognition. Under Rule 23, the mem-
bers of a putative class will not be bound by a judgment unless a, proper 
certification order is entered. That they may be "interest,ed parties," 
ibid., before that time does not make them parties to the lit,iga.tion in any 
sense, a.'3 this Court has recognized. In Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. 
Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975), the Court held that an oral certification 
order was insufficient t.o identify the interests of absent class members for 
Art. III purposes. The result hardly could be different when t.he class 
has not been identified at all. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water 
Div. v. Craft, 4313 U. S. 1, 8 (1978); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 423 U. S. 308, 
310, n. 1 (19713); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975); Pasadena 
City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 430 (19713). 
Mn. JusTICE STEVENs indicates that unnamed members of an uncerti-
fied class may be "present" a.'3 parties for some purposes and not for 
others. No authority is cited for such selective "presence" in an action. 
Nor is any explanation offered a.'3 to how a court is to determine when 
these unidentified "parties" are present. If their presence is to be 
limited to the satisfaction of the Art. III case or controversy requirement, 
then the mle of party status would have no content apart from Art. III 
and could only be described as a legal fiction. If, on the other hand, the 
proposed rule is to apply outside the Art. III context, it may have trouble-
some and far-reaching implications that could prejudice the bringing of 
elMs actions. Presumably, a purpose of the rule of party status would be 
to aBsure that satisfaction of the claims of named pa.rties would not 
terminate the litigation. Nor could the rights of unnamed parties be 
extinguished by the failure of the named parties to appeal. Thus, if the 
rule proposed by Mn. JusTICE S'l'EVENS is t.o accomplish its purpose, 
I suppose that a fiduciary duty must be imposed upon named parties to 
continue the litiga.tion where-as here-the unnamed parties remain 
unidentified and fail to intervene. As fiduciaries, would the named 
parties not only be required to continue to litigate, but to assume per-
sonal responsibility for costs and attorney's fees if the case ultimately is 
lost? Would responsible litigants be willing to file class actions if they 
thereby assumed such long-term fiduciary obligations? These and like 
questions are substantial. They are not resolved by Rule 23. I believe 
they merit careful study by Congress before this Court-perhaps unwit-
tingly-creates a major category of clientless litigation unique in our 
system. 
22 The Court's resurrection of this dead controversy may result in 
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I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot. 
irreparable injury to innocent parties, as well as to the petitioner bank. 
When the District Court denied certification on September 29, 1975, it 
assigned as one of its reasons the possible "destruction of the [petitioner] 
bank" by damages then alleged to total 12,000,000 and now potentially 
augmented by the accrual of interest. App. 47, see ante, at 2, n. 2. The 
possible destruction of the bank is irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue, 
but serious indeed to depositors, stockholders, and the community served. 
It is said that this is necessary to redress injuries possibly suffered by 
members of the putative class. Yet, no such person has come forward 
in the nearly nine years that have passed since this action was filed. 
Indeed, the challenged conduct was authorized by statute almost six years 
ago. As the District Court may be called upon to determine whether the 
equitable doctrine of "relation back" permits it to toll the statute of 
limitations on remand, ante, at 3, n. 3, it will hardly be inappropriate for 
that court to consider the equities on both sides. In the circumstances 
presented, the District Court may well see no reason to exercise its equi-
table discretion in favor of putative class members who have slept on their 
rights these many years. 
